1. The War Department Civil Defense Board was established pursuant to WD Memo 400-5-5, dated 25 November 1946, as amended by Changes No. 1, WD Memo 400-5-5, dated 30 December 1946.

2. Mission of the Board: To determine the War Department's views and policies on:

   a. Allocation of responsibilities for civil defense to existing or new agencies of the Government.

   b. The responsibilities which should be handled by the War Department and the allocation thereof to existing or new staff agencies.

   c. The structural organization, from the national level down to the operating groups, and the authority which must be vested therein for the adequate discharge of its responsibilities.

   d. The action in matters of civil defense which should be undertaken currently by the War Department pending the foregoing determinations.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. Conduct of the Board:

   a. The members and advisory members (a representative from each General Staff Directorate) attended meetings, examined witnesses, and studied documentary evidence.

   b. A wide range of witnesses, both civil and military, were called before the Board. These witnesses were grouped as follows:

      (1) Commanders of defense commands and service commands who had World War II experience in dealing with regional, state and municipal officials at the operating levels.
(2) Directors and operating officials of the national and regional levels of the Office of Civilian Defense, (OCD).

(3) State directors of civil defense.

(4) Leaders of municipal civil defense organizations.

(5) Qualified engineers, scientists and technical specialists, interested or experienced in civil defense problems.

(6) Representative of the Navy Department.

(7) Representative of American Red Cross.

(8) Representatives of certain Chiefs of Services of the Army.

(9) Directors of General Staff Divisions.


a. The Office of Civilian Defense was dissolved by Executive Order 9562, effective 30 June 1945. This order did not transfer any of the funds or functions of OCD to the War Department.

b. No federal organization is at present charged with civil defense.

c. State and municipal civil defense organizations in general, have been disbanded.

d. During August 1945, the Acting Secretary of War informed the Director of the Bureau of the Budget that the War Department considers the subject of civil defense to be a matter of equal and direct interest to the civilian as well as to the military agencies of the government and since major matters of national policy are involved, the subject should be considered in conjunction with the overall study that the Bureau is making for the President with regard to the Reorganization Act of 1945.

The Director of the Budget replied as follows:

"There can be no argument with your basic point that considerable work must be done in civilian defense planning during peacetime if we are to be prepared for a future emergency. It is apparent also that we should move promptly to fix primary responsibility in an appropriate agency.

"My main question is whether this phase of national preparedness planning should be considered by itself
or whether the organization of all phases of the broader problem have to be considered together. We are now giving some attention to the whole question of how a National Security Resources Board, as recently endorsed by the President, should be organized. We have tentatively been looking on civilian defense planning as one aspect of the general problem with which that Board should be set up to deal.

"In any event, you may be sure that we will consider your suggestions carefully in conjunction with our work for the President in carrying out the provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1945."

a. Legal responsibilities of the War Department.

(1) National Defense.

(a) The Secretary of War is a member of the Council of National Defense established by Act of Congress. The Council is responsible "for the coordination of industries and resources for the National security and welfare." (U.S.C. Title 50, Ch.1).

(b) The War Department General Staff is charged, by Act of Congress with the responsibility of preparing "plans for national defense and the use of the military forces for that purpose, both separately and in conjunction with the Naval Forces, and for the mobilization of the manhood of the nation and its material resources in an emergency." (U.S.C. Title 10, Sec 34).

(2) Civil Defense.

None specifically prescribed, except as pertains to District of Columbia and the metropolitan area. (Public Laws 373 and 699 - 77th Congress).

III. ASSUMPTIONS

5. It may be expected that international agreements and organizations for the maintenance of peace will grow in effectiveness with time. The United States must, however, for the foreseeable future, provide for constant readiness to act to maintain its security.
6. In the event of war, it is assumed that:
   a. Some period of strained relations, with or without declaration of emergency, will precede the outbreak of hostilities.
   
   b. The enemy may use weapons of mass destruction if he considers it to his advantage.
   
   c. There can be no guarantee of a specific warning of an attack.
   
   d. Strategic areas in the United States and its possessions, territories and trust territories may be subjected to initial surprise attacks by air to cripple our industrial effort and destroy the will and ability of the people to resist.
   
   e. A major war involving the United States will require rapid total national mobilization.
   
   f. It may logically be anticipated that "Fifth Column" activities will have to be faced in the United States in case of an emergency.
   
7. It is assumed that the armed forces will be united under a single department of national defense. (Department of the Armed Forces).

IV. DISCUSSION

8. Definition:
   
   a. Civil Defense is the organization of the people to minimize the effects of enemy action.
   
   b. Specifically, Civil Defense is the mobilization, organization, and direction of the civil populace and necessary supporting agencies to minimize the effects of enemy action directed against communities, including industrial plants, facilities and other installations, and to maintain or restore those facilities essential to civil life, and to preserve the maximum civilian support of the war effort.
   
   c. The Board considered civil defense in its broadest concept and eliminated the following:
      
      1) Active defense measures, such as aircraft warning systems and static anti-aircraft participation which may utilize civilian volunteers, are a responsibility of the Armed Forces.
(2) Internal security, which is closely related to, but not an integral part of civil defense. If the agency or agencies responsible for internal security should determine that certain assistance can be given by the civil defense organization specific assignments can then be made.

(3) Such activities as salvage, victory gardens, recreation, bond drives, etc., which should be supervised by agencies other than civil defense.

9. Review of civil defense organization that existed in Great Britain, Germany, and Japan, during World War II:

Civil defense came into consideration as part of national defense about a decade before the outbreak of World War II. Throughout the period of hostilities it developed largely by trial and error, never keeping pace with methods of warfare waged against civilian populations and installations. Great Britain, Germany, and Japan, developed their civil defense in patterns that varied with their political organization and with their national characteristics. From each, practical lessons can be learned.

a. Great Britain.

Great Britain had a strong central government, which, with its existing civilian controls, dealt directly with "Local Authorities," (County and Town Councils, headed by County or Town Clerk).

As early as 1935, the Government, through the Home Security Office, took the people into its confidence and publicly announced a necessity to create an organization to minimize the consequences of attack. This was a difficult task - the organized "selling" to a peace minded people, of preparedness against war, rather than for war. "Air Raid Precautions" with technical information for private shelters, gas defense, etc., was issued to the public and its provisions were urged upon them through "Local Authority" supervision.

In 1939, the Home Security Office was elevated to the status of a Ministry, headed by the Home Secretary. The Civil Defense Act was passed and published, making the "Air Raid Precautions" mandatory and enforceable through the local authorities. Control was decentralized to regions within the British Isles for flexibility of operations.
The program was subsidized to provide compensation for expenditures, or damage, in connection with construction, equipment or premises used for the common good.

Later, the fire services, because of necessity for quick standardization, were nationalized. This mid-war change created controversies and organization difficulties, but was successful in affecting the means for well controlled mutual aid.

It should be mentioned here that the British Home Guard, an auxiliary armed force under the War Office, designed to assist in repelling invasion was an organization separate and distinct from the "Air Raid Precautions" of the Nation.

Mutual aid was developed to a high degree between neighborhoods within a community and between communities. Organized central mobile reserves, however, such as were developed in Germany, did not exist.

Five outstanding features of British civil defense should be carefully noted:

1. Authoritative control through regions thence to local communities.

2. The organization had a strong structural nucleus of full time paid leaders.

3. At the lowest organizational operating level, thoroughly trained "Incident Control Officers," members of the civil defense organization, were given complete unchallenged command over all civil forces and services at the scene of each incident whether major or small. This control existed from the moment of his arrival until the last individual was accounted for, the last flame was extinguished, and the area was again functioning, or officially abandoned.

4. Great Britain's civil defense organizations and activities confined themselves to the purely protective services, to vigorous action to physically minimize the effects of enemy attack, and to quick restoration of communities to a post-raid operating normal.
(5) The five year pre-war "selling" of air raid precautions to the British people on the part of the government prepared them for ready acceptance of an authoritative program. This foresightedness and the advance planning effort of the Home Office can well be credited with averting complete disaster when the enemy struck.

b. Germany.

Despite a totalitarian form of government, the exercise of controls was a matter for which Hitler's top aides competed with deep intensity. Civil defense, with its close contact with the people, became a political football at the highest level, but the implementation at the operating level of a disciplined people was as simple as the issuance of a degree. Although compliance locally was easy to obtain, the effectiveness of the measures themselves was impaired by the scramble at the top. Goering dominated the policy, the techniques, the development of self-help, the warning system, and the organized mobile reserves. Himmler seized and maintained operating control through the nationalized police. Speer (of Munitions) aided by the Transportation and Communications Ministry, maintained supervision and principal control over industrial air raid protection. Hitler himself, aided by Goebels, and the straight party organization, clung to the welfare measures that would add to their personal popularity.

Under Goering and the Nazi party leadership, the National Air Raid Protection League, in seven active years of pre-war effort, preached vulnerability and promoted a "volunteer-under-pressure" organization. This organization developed plans and techniques for defense, emphasizing the principle of self-help. This principle later became an irrevocable requirement by law with penalties for any breach in preparation or performance. This was so severe as to almost eliminate mutual aid at the lowest levels of operations; i.e., between individuals.

The protective services were organized, officially, at the level of the municipalities under the police system which was expanded greatly by drafting full time paid personnel. The local fire services were static, dominated by the Nationalized Police and operated only when self-protection was overwhelmed.
Mutual aid was accomplished by orders issued through party lines; e.g., a Police President of a city ordered a factory to loan a part of its private force to aid the city; a Gau (Political subdivision of Greater Germany) Leader ordered one city to dispatch part of its force to a neighboring city.

By early 1944, top-side jealousies were subordinated to an all-out effort to strengthen civil defense. A great emergency construction program, in addition to starting industries to underground protection and forest concealment, had built hundreds of huge concrete "bunkers" for the protection of the people, all at terrific expense. There was a shuttling of large mutual aid forces between cities and still the forces of civil defense were being overwhelmed by saturation attacks.

Mobile reserves, previously anticipated by the Germans as a necessity, were hastily developed to the utmost, consistent with manpower and materiel limitations. These mobile reserves were regular military forces, principally Luftwaffe units equipped with the best available fire-fighting, demolition and heavy rescue equipment. They were manned with able-bodied men of combat standards. Fifty-three of these battalions were organized and used, employing almost 25,000 men. In addition, thousands of Wehrmacht troops were employed in debris clearance to open the way for protective services, in augmenting emergency feeding, etc.

The outstanding fact in the analysis of Germany civil defense was that each progressive step in the development of its amazingly large operations, was always behind the development of weapons and the volume of attack. The means to accomplish more were present but the defensive planning was tardy throughout.

c. Japan.

With the earliest start in planning and with the most receptive populace of the three heavily bombed nations, Japan was the most dilatory in its final organized planning. Seven years before either Britain or Germany were promoting civil defense education, the Neighborhood Groups throughout urban Japan were holding public air raid drills, flailing out simulated fires, dumping sand on dummy incendiary bombs and prompting well disciplined, but purile and inadequate civil defense. All of this was encouraged by the farsighted Minister of Home Affairs, whose good efforts then and throughout the war were hampered and almost nullified by the military clique who refused throughout to tolerate the thought that anyone could ever get past their defenses.
The Minister of Home Affairs persisted in efforts to organize civil defense from the top. In spite of complete non-concurrence and non-cooperation by the Minister of War, the Emperor issued decrees establishing organized air raid protection. The self-protection promoted by the Neighborhood Groups was established by law, and protective services were developed by expanded national police and fire departments aided by auxiliary fire and police organizations.

Japan is subdivided into prefectures. Most governmental functions are decentralized to prefectural governors, including the operation of the national police and fire services. Civil defense was operated through this channel of command and each governor was required by imperial decree, personally, to be the air raid protection chief in his prefecture. At all levels, the chief executives of government, utilities and industry were required personally to command the organized air raid protective services. With such organizations, Japan had the machinery for effective civil defense operation.

After the Doolittle raid, their operation was elaborate. Their techniques, however, lagged so far behind the tempo of modern attack that protective efforts were overwhelmed. The flair for quasi-military organization and discipline at all levels, accomplished four principal results:

1. Confinement of conflagration to the areas bombed;
2. Vigorous, mass post-raid activities affected restoration of the essential utilities to an extent limited only by lack of reserve material;
3. Although shelters were extremely crude, a major prevention of casualties was accomplished;
4. Most effective evacuation plans for children;

10. Review of Civil Defense Organization in the United States during World War II

Great Britain furnished the model for civil defense in the United States. With no other experience available to guide us, numerous missions were dispatched to London by the various cities, states and the federal government. They returned to their various headquarters and applied the British
system; usually without regard to the geographical and political differences of the two countries. Locally, the pattern would fit, and American organization began at the level, varied by our characteristic penchant for personal and local individuality.

Although certain states and municipalities took early and independent action to coordinate community civil defense effort, it was not until six months before Pearl Harbor that national organization was initiated. By executive order the President established the Office of Civilian Defense within the Office of Emergency Management with an appointed, non-salaried director. This office was assigned functions typified by the following phrases: "Serve as center for coordination" - Keep informed of problems" - "Assist State and local government in establishing of defense councils" - "Study and plan measures" - "Sponsor and carry out civil defense programs" - "Distribute to appropriate officials, information concerning civil defense measures." This organization was given no power to direct.

The Office of Civilian Defense had two divisions: one followed the general pattern of the British civil defense system by promoting the organization of "protective services," the other departed there from by entering into a field which prompted "volunteer participation" activities designed "to assist national morale and to provide opportunities for constructive service participation in the defense effort."

The sum of one hundred million dollars was appropriated by Congress for the program - 85% was to be expended on material and equipment; 15% for personnel pay.

OCD regions were organized coterminous with Army Corps Area (later Service Commands). Policies and plans, coordinated at the national level, were transmitted to the regional director for use at the local operating levels.

Assistance was requested and obtained from the War Department and some eighty officers of field grade were assigned to duty with the OCD. These officers served as directors, deputies, and chiefs of divisions, branches and sections of the Protective Service Division. This augmentation of professional executive assistance, together with Army Service Command liaison and cooperation gave the operating groups at the state and local levels an impression of military supervision. The Facilities Security Program operated by Civilian Defense subject to the approval
of the Secretary of War, and the establishment of certain
types of civil defense schools at Army installations, fur-
thered this impression. This impression of military
supervision was, in the main, welcome to them in lieu of
any other authoritative chain of command, but caused
confusion and misunderstanding.

Pearl Harbor spurred the public to action and
most States and many cities, with OCD guidance, hastily passed
war legislation granting war powers to implement civil defense
operations.

Guided and assisted by regional officers, a
local pattern of organized protective services began to
emerge; auxiliary fire-fighting equipment was distributed,
and auxiliary emergency service units recruited and trained.
In some cases they were absorbed in the regular city estab-
lishment and in other cases were independent agencies with
legal authority to act in emergency. Practice drills, sim-
ulating air raid conditions, were held regularly throughout
the nation. By this means, a fair local proficiency was
attained.

The "incidents" however, did not visualize
raids of great proportion and it is apparent, in retrospect,
that the civil defense organization, in spite of the note-
worthy patriotic response of the civilian volunteers, was
inadequate to cope with a heavy attack.

The so-called "volunteer participation"
program comprised the greater part of the civil defense
organization. Of the 1,400 OCD employees, about 60% were
engaged in the promotion of such activities as: victory
gardens, war bond drives, child welfare, consumer interest,
nutrition study, salvage, education, rationing, and the like.
The almost unanimous opinion of witnesses before the Board,
was that a civil defense organization should confine itself
to emergency protective services and that extraneous activi-
ties should be supervised by other agencies.

Analysis points out the following in connec-
tion with activities of civil defense in this country:

a. OCD accomplished a volunteer mobilization
of great magnitude, but its capabilities were untried by even
a minor enemy attack.

b. Operation at local levels by augmenting
existing means, was sound.
c. Regional control, sound in principle, was weak in operation due to lack of authority.

d. No clear delineation of civil defense responsibilities existed.

e. Activities in conflict with the operation of the protective services diverted effort from the primary mission of civil defense.

f. There was no advanced planning. Hasty organization became necessary.

g. There was little experienced leadership.

h. Adherence to the principle of States' rights and traditional municipal individuality blocked standardization of plans in certain instances.

i. Due to the lack of authority in the Office of Civilian Defense, state and local leaders frequently looked to the Army for command decisions.

j. Mutual aid as planned and arranged by agreements, had no backing by Federal legislation and seldom by state legislation. It is doubtful that mutual aid would have functioned under heavy and repeated air attack.

II. Basic Concepts of Civil Defense.

a. Self-help.

The fundamental principle of civil defense is self-help. In the event of another war widespread destruction may be anticipated in industrial areas and centers of population. Such destruction may be expected simultaneously in many localities; therefore it is incumbent upon each individual to protect himself, his home and family to the maximum before calling for aid. To implement the self-help principle, the populace should be organized into small groups under leaders trained in fire-fighting, rescue, and first aid. The same principle of self-help applies to the groups. Calls for aid should not be made until the situation is beyond the control of the group. Similarly, passive defense measures in plants, industries, public utilities, transportation systems and other enterprises, are a primary responsibility of such installations.

b. Responsibilities of Government.
(1) General:

It must be the responsibility of each echelon of government to organize, train and equip for civil defense within its boundaries. This includes furnishing support through directed mutual aid and the employment of mobile reserves to cope with situations beyond the capabilities of lower echelons.

(2) Municipalities:

Municipalities must provide the organization to furnish and operate the protective services to deal with situations beyond the efforts of its self-help groups. The municipality normally is the lowest operating agency which has available all the protective services and which directs mutual aid.

(3) States.

States must provide for rendering quick support for lower echelons when the latter's capacity for self protection has been exceeded, for directing mutual aid between communities, and for requesting federal assistance when necessity demands.


The Federal Government must provide guidance and coordination in planning, organizing, and training for civil defense. It should direct only as necessary to insure uniform plans and action. It should employ mobile reserves, effect mutual aid activities between states and, when required, assume control.

c. Mobile Reserves.

Since the protective services in any community will be limited, the establishment of mobile fire-fighting, rescue, medical and other protective service units as state and federal reserves is essential.
d. Civilian Morale.

Full and authoritative information, recognition of the necessity for required action, confidence in the efficiency of operation and in ability to cope with the situation, are essential factors in the development of high public morale, and consequent public interest and participation.

e. The Armed Forces.

The armed forces' primary mission requires devotion of their effort to active measures, both offensive and defensive. They must avoid diversion of effort and means to civil defense, except to meet federal requirements and dire emergencies, beyond the capabilities of the states when the national interest is involved.


Civil defense planning will embrace many fields; government (federal, state, and municipal), industry, and the people themselves. Some of the more important problems requiring consideration are:

a. Government.

(1) Civil defense organization - from the national level down to and including the municipal level.

(2) The degree of uniformity required within the state and municipal organizations.

(3) The degree of which federal, state and municipal organizations are to be completed during peacetime.

(4) The number and types of fire, police rescue, medical and other emergency units.

(5) Standardization of equipment for fire-fighting and other protective services

(6) Mobile reserve requirements and movement plans.
(7) Establishment of reserve supplies for critical areas.

(8) Repair and restoration of essential community services.

(9) Relief and rehabilitation of persons.

(10) Plans for the emergency evacuation of large numbers of civilians.

(11) Adequate civil defense warning system.

(12) Passive defense measures, against existing and new weapons.

(13) Plans for inter and intra-state mutual aid and federal assistance to states.

(14) Manpower requirements for civil defense.

(15) Integration of civil defense plans, with other national security plans, including internal security.

(16) Preparation of necessary legislation to provide for various civil defense measures.

b. Industry.

Protection of industrial facilities:

(1) Dispersion

(2) Use of underground sites.

(3) Protective construction.

(4) Internal and external plant protection.

(5) Protection of essential communications and transportation facilities.

c. The People.
(1) Information to be provided to the public regarding the nature of future warfare and its possible effects on civilian communities.

(2) Education of the public regarding the necessity for establishing a civil defense organization, the tasks to be accomplished in order of priority and the responsibility therefor.

(3) Mobilization and training.

13. The Necessity for Planning and Organizing for Civil Defense.

In July 1935, when the world was in a relative state of peace, the British Home Secretary in discussing the need for civil defense, informed the British people: "The need for these measures in no way implies a risk of war in the near future * * * the measures * * * are wholly precautionary * * * the Government would be neglecting their duty to the civil population if they failed to take these precautions * * * it is impossible to guarantee immunity from attack * * * so long as the possibility of attack exists, it is necessary to create organizations to minimize the consequences of attack and, as it would not be possible to improvise effective measures on the spur of the moment in time of emergency, preparation must be made in time of peace. It is of the essence of any such preparation that the civil population should be informed of the present and future possibilities of air attack and instructed in the precautions designed to meet it." Accordingly, the British Home Office then commenced planning in this new and uncharted phase of warfare.

We find ourselves in very much the same position as the British in 1935, except that we have the benefit of World War II experience and face the possibility of far greater devastation.

The advent of new weapons and the consequent possibility that the United States may be attacked without warning demand, as a matter of national interest, that an effective civil defense organization be established and that necessary plans now be prepared.

At present no single agency of the Government is responsible for the over-all coordination of civil defense, although many agencies have a direct interest. Such planning as is carried on, is wholly uncoordinated and treated on a part time basis as a matter of secondary importance.
The preparation of adequate and timely plans necessitates that some single federal agency be made responsible for civil defense, and, that its responsibilities be fully defined.


a. General.

In considering the problems of organization at the various levels of government, the Board found little difficulty in determining what it considers sound patterns for organization within the states. It also recognized the necessity for an agency to determine policy at the highest level. How best to organize the federal operating agency essential to fill the gap between a national policy board and the states was more difficult to determine. An understanding of civil defense problems in the state, and municipalities, and organization therefor, is essential prior to passing judgment on the federal organization.

b. Municipal Level

Study of required civil defense activities indicates that the great burden of operation falls on the civilian communities. Due to the magnitude and nature of the tasks the work must be done by the citizens of these communities, and can most efficiently be performed by using the existing governmental framework and existing civil organizations and facilities. Organization, training and operation for civil defense will affect the normal peacetime life of large numbers. Only a flexible, trained, and self-sufficient organization within the communities, utilizing to the full their existing capabilities, can meet the demands which may be placed upon them. These considerations indicate the need for recognizing the responsibility of local civil defense as primarily that of the local civil government.

While details of local organization should be prescribed by the local authorities they should satisfy a national pattern to meet the requirements of state and federal civil defense agencies for necessary over-all uniformity. The local organization must have a Civil Defense Director heading a local Civil Defense Council, with emergency powers for effective action.

To permit the local Civil Defense Director to exercise control he should provide under his Civil Defense Council an organization to supervise, coordinate, augment and direct the following activities: Fire, police, rescue, emergency medical, emergency relief, and other protective services, found to be necessary.
c. State Level.

(1) General.

The state government must accept the responsibility of civil defense for its people and communities. Again the problems requiring the exercise of normal functions and responsibilities of state government and utilizing largely the existing organization for their solution. Federal civil defense agencies advise, assist and secure necessary uniformity, and must have the power to direct state action when the emergency is interstate or vitally affects federal interests.

Normal state governmental machinery must be augmented by a State Civil Defense Council and a Director of Civil Defense with emergency powers to coordinate and direct police, fire, and other protective services, and to supervise and prescribe as necessary the civil defense organization in the subdivisions such as countries, regions or municipalities. The organization also should follow a national pattern in essential details.

(2) Special Problems

Some of the states will no doubt organize State or Home Guards to strengthen their law and order forces when their National Guard units are inducted into the federal service. Such units as troop reserves in close support for local emergencies will further strengthen the civil defense agencies.

State and municipal civil defense organizations constitute an excellent means for meeting emergency relief situations. Such organizations with their established control centers already exist in some states where valuable work has been done in connection with fire, floods, riots, earthquake, etc. By using
a civil defense framework for this emergency work in peacetime can be maintained economically an operating organization capable of rapid conversion to civil defense in the event of a war emergency.

(3) Personnel Problems.

The personnel problems for civil defense activities will require careful consideration by manpower authorities. State civil defense organizations should be built around a nucleus of paid personnel. A small number of these would devote all their time to civil defense, while others, such as directors, state police officers, fire marshals, etc., could assume part-time civil defense responsibilities. Selected personnel of state, county, and municipal governments should form the nucleus for local civil defense organizations. The most competent personnel of the community should furnish the leadership.

To a limited degree in peacetime, and to a large degree in time of emergency the bulk of the civil defense personnel must be volunteers. It is not probable that large volunteer participation can be obtained in peacetime prior to a recognized threat of war.

Requirements of civil defense will make a heavy demand on manpower in time of war. The personnel of state and city police and fire departments are vital in modern war. Their strength must be greatly augmented to meet a war emergency. A civil defense organization cannot be successful unless mobilization plans recognize its sound requirements, permit deferments for certain essential key personnel and actually allot adequate numbers. Personnel, both men and women, not suitable for the armed forces, can and must be used for civil defense to the maximum degree, and usually in an additional assignment. In peacetime, all civil defense organizations, including mobile
reserve units, will probably, through necessity, be on a skeleton basis requiring trained fillers as the emergency becomes apparent.

d. Regional Civil Defense Organization (Federal)

A system of federal regional headquarters is believed to be necessary for coordination between the states and with the military commanders within the regional areas. In general, the civil defense regions should correspond to the military areas in order to facilitate coordination with the armed forces.

The headquarters will require a director and a small staff. It should be organized to supervise, coordinate, and furnish technical advice and assistance to the operating echelons, to provide liaison, and to direct action in emergency situations as required.

In certain of the large metropolitan areas which overlap military and political boundaries, it may be necessary to establish sub-areas, in order that the civil defense organizations in a highly populated area may be under the direction of a single head. The establishment of sub-areas is not desirable, but may be necessary in order that consideration be given to the common interests of the people, industry, government and defense agencies in those areas. Examples of such areas might be; Chicago-Gary; New York-Newark-Jersey City; and Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington.

e. Federal Level.

(1) National Policy Board.

Coordinated and coordinated civil defense planning at all levels of government, local, state and federal awaits national direction. Until certain policy determinations have been made and authoritative national decisions made known, perfection of our civil defense planning and organization cannot be expected. Formulation of these policies should be charged to a national policy board (possibly the presently discussed National Security Resources Board) which will reflect cabinet level decisions transcending the responsibility of any one department.
Two major problems which require policy determinations before civil defense planning can be fully and effectively carried out are manpower allocations and the assignment of responsibilities to and coordination of national security. Other decisions of national economic, social and political importance and of major interest to civil defense relate to dispersion of industry, use of underground sites, protective building construction, city planning for local dispersion and large scale evacuation planning.

Although practical limitations are evident in any effort to improve the national situation, particularly in densely populated and critical industrial areas, the Board feels that a reasonable pattern, when determined, should be indicated to guide both industry and civilian communities toward progressive improvement.

(2) Federal Operating Civil Defense Agency.

A federal operating civil defense agency will be required to carry out broad policy decisions and to plan, operate and supervise civil defense in all its phases. In arriving at a recommendation as to the position and composition of the civil defense agency, the following were considered:

Existing or new agency.
Cabinet or lower level.
Military or civilian departments.
Military or civilian personnel.
Civilian agency in a military department.

With these considerations in mind, the Board examined the following solutions:

a. Existing Civil Departments and Agencies.

Without attempting exhaustive study of the functions and organization of existing non-military federal departments and agencies the Board carefully considered placing Civil Defense Agency therein.
The essentially civilian nature of the problem, the deep interest of the states and communities, and the desirability of freeing the military departments from the added burden indicated such action. Review of published documents setting forth the functions of such departments and agencies and limited testimony from witnesses did not reveal any single civilian department or agency especially appropriate to discharge the over-all planning and direction required in peace and war, although some departments and agencies have limited interest in fields of civil defense. None would afford the intimate coordination with the military deemed so essential.

(b) New Civil Department or Agency.

The Board considered the merits of creating a new federal department or independent civil agency. The importance and broad scope of the federal organization indicates that civil defense should be represented at cabinet level. To create a new department or a wholly independent agency for civil defense would introduce difficulty in closely coordinating with agencies responsible for other fields of national defense and would further complicate both planning and operation at the federal level.

(c) The Department of the Armed Forces.

While the precise nature of organization and allocation of responsibility within the Department of the Armed Forces are unknown, the Board considered the desirability of placing the responsibility for civil defense on the Secretary of the Armed Forces.

Consideration was first given to placing civil defense responsibility on one of the Departments of Army, Navy and Air. This was rejected because it would result in removing civil defense control to a position too remote from
the cabinet head and would fix responsi-
sibility on one of three co-equal mil-
itary departments thus complicating
coordination both within the proposed
Department of the Armed Forces and with
other departments and agencies. Exclusive
control of civil defense at the federal
level by military personnel is undesirable
as the problem is essentially civilian
in nature.

A single agency within the depart-
ment, separate from the three military
departments, seems desirable. This agency
would have no direct responsibility to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff who are interested
primarily in national strategy and joint
operations. Direct control by the Secretary,
however, would insure necessary coordination.

The creation of such an agency, directly
under the Secretary, directed and operated by
civilians, would have major advantages. The
responsible head being at cabinet level would
assure action and coordination on a broad
national basis. The necessary integration
of personnel and the continuous close contact
between the civil and military in planning and
operation could be positively assured in peace
and war. The agency composed of civilians
would assure control by officials familiar
with civilian problems, organization and
procedures. This concept places the maximum
responsibility on civilian organizations from
the federal to local levels consistent with
necessary coordination with the armed forces.
At the same time, it permits the armed forces
to remain free for their primary mission of
operations against the enemy.

The disadvantage of placing the responsi-
bility for civil defense on the Secretary of
the Armed Forces, whose duties and responsi-
bilities will be heavy, is recognized. It is
recognized also that national budgetary problems
may lead to public misconception that funds
made available for civil defense are for the
support of the armed forces and that placing
civil defense under the Department of the
Armed Forces may be viewed with concern by
the public as too great a concentration of
power in one department.
Comparative consideration of the above factors appeared to favor the allocation of civil defense responsibility to the Secretary of the Armed Forces.

(d) Alternate Solution.

In the event a national defense department such as the proposed Department of the Armed Forces is not created an alternate solution is discussed in paragraph 16.

(e) Mobile Reserve.

Organization for civil defense requires adequate mobile reserves including: fire-fighting, rescue, police, medical and emergency feeding.

Normally, municipalities have protective services available only in sufficient quantities for normal peacetime operations. Provisions should be made in advance to augment these services in time of war.

The need for intra-state reserves must be determined and plans developed for their utilization. Necessary legislation should be prepared in advance to give state civil defense officials the authority to move a percentage of municipal units for mutual assistance. Provisions should, also, be made for state reserve units to meet additional requirements. These would normally be the first reserves employed.

Provisions for directed movement of inter-state reserves from one state to another either in furtherance of mutual aid agreement or by federal order, should be planned for and necessary legislative authority granted. Federal mobile reserves either in military or civilian status are essential to support the states in extreme emergency, and to provide maximum flexibility in prompt use of all reserves.
(f) Role of National Organizations in Civil Defense.

The American Red Cross in order to avoid conflicts of authority while operating with civil defense in war at the state and local level, should tender its service on a co-operative basis. Red Cross participation should be included in civil defense planning. Its national charter should be changed to modify its responsibility for disaster relief in war.

Many national organizations such as the veterans groups have the capabilities and the patriotic desire to assist in promoting public interest and in organizing and serving at the operating levels. It would be inappropriate to assign official responsibilities to such organizations because of conflicts with state and municipal authority. The extension of their potential assistance, however, should be thoroughly explored with a view to maximum practicable utilization.

(g) Territories and Possessions Outside of the Continental United States.

The Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Territories of Hawaii and Alaska and overseas possessions should establish civil defense organizations which follow the general pattern adopted by the states, subject to alterations which must be made to fit local conditions. Civil defense matters in these areas will require coordination with the appropriate departmental head.

(h) Overseas Theaters.

Civil defense will be the responsibility of each Theater Commander for those portions of the theater under his military control.

15. Organization for Civil Defense in the Department of the Armed Forces.

If the Department of the Armed Forces is charged with civil defense responsibility, an appropriate allocation of responsibility within the Department would be as follows:
a. Office of the Secretary of the Department of the Armed Forces responsible for over-all coordination of civil defense matters.

b. Director of Civil Defense - responsible for planning, organizing, operating, coordinating and directing civil defense activities through a regional organization.

c. Army, Navy and Air Departments would have civil defense responsibilities within their own installations and responsibility for furnishing required federal military aid to the states. Other responsibilities of each department would include emergency use of their forces as mobile reserves, furnishing airlift when available for diversion from assigned tasks and furnishing professional advice, guidance and assistance.

d. Within the Army Department, civil defense can adequately be supervised by an assistant to the Secretary with a small group specializing on civil defense problems, and over-all Army coordination therewith.

(1) The Plans and Operations Division should be charged with primary responsibility for staff coordination of over-all Army planning and operations.

(2) General and Special Staff Divisions and Chiefs of Technical and Administrative services should be charged with those civil defense responsibilities appropriate to each.

(3) Commanding General Army Ground Forces (if continued) should be responsible for appropriate civil defense matters related to his command responsibility on the basis of maximum decentralization to Army Commanders.

(4) Commanding General Army Areas.

Army Commanders should provide required liaison with states and should cooperate with the regional civil defense heads in planning and operations. Army Commanders will be responsible under department policies for civil defense matters involving their own personnel and facilities. Army Commanders should cooperate with regional civil defense
heads in perfection of plans with state authorities involving use of federal troops in grave civil defense emergencies.

e. Organization within the Navy and the Air Departments should be comparable to that indicated for the Army Department to insure similar cooperative action with the civil defense agency at all levels.

16. Organization for Civil Defense in the War Department in the event of no Unification.

Consideration was given to placing responsibility for civil defense in the War or the Navy Department in the event the Department of the Armed Forces is not created. In view of the more intimate relationship with civil defense problems and the more adequate territorial organization, the War Department was deemed the more desirable of the two. An alternate solution is to organize a separate civilian agency with a civilian director responsible directly to the Secretary of War. Under this plan, the Secretary of War would be the cabinet member charged with civil defense. The allocation of responsibilities to existing agencies of the War Department would be the same as that indicated for the Department of the Army in paragraph 153 above, with minor modification. This solution would accomplish the same objective as set forth for the single department but would lack its capabilities of complete coordination.

Coordination of the ground and air forces with civil defense and integration of professionally trained personnel in the civil defense agency would be arranged through the coordinating authority of the Secretary of War. Navy participation would be accomplished through inter-departmental coordination. Coordination of planning and operation involving naval aid to state authorities would require inter-departmental planning.

17. Civil Defense matters which are at present responsibilities of the War Department.

While the War Department has no legal responsibility for civil defense outside its own domain and the District of Columbia, it has a moral one because of its national defense mission.

a. Responsibilities which are of primary concern to the War Department are:

(1) Determination and execution of adequate civil defense measures within Army installations.

(2) Passive air defense training of military personnel.
(3) Military assistance to civilian communities in the event of a disaster beyond their capabilities.

(4) Emergency control of lighting, radio, transportation, etc., when it affects the military situation.

(5) Civil defense measures in military controlled areas.

(6) Continued studies involving possible dispersion, underground sites and other measures providing for the safety of military resources.

(7) Study of existing military areas with a view to modification of boundaries to perfect Army, Navy, Air and civil defense coordination.

b. Other responsibilities which require the furnishing of information, guidance and technical data to civil defense agencies:

(1) Intelligence on the nature, scope and demands of modern warfare.

(2) Protective measures against enemy weapons of mass destruction.

(3) Designation and priority of protection of strategic and/or critical areas, including communications, industrial plants, utilities, etc.

(4) Passive means of defense - shelters, camouflage, lighting, etc.

(5) Training methods, training manuals and training facilities.


Planning for civil defense is a problem of fundamental importance not only to the armed forces but to the public at large. It is imperative that every reasonable precaution be taken to insure that our will to fight for our national security be maintained. It is incumbent upon the federal government to assume leadership in civil defense planning.
Sound planning for civil defense will be a slow and tedious task. The national pattern must be set. Prior to establishing such a pattern, it will be essential to confer with designated state authorities, representatives of large metropolitan areas, and small communities, as well as many industrial and technical military and civilian experts. Reconciliation of conflicting views is essential prior to proceeding with public education required to secure the necessary enthusiastic support for such a vast volunteer effort. Once the national pattern is determined, legislative authorization will be required. Certain matters will undoubtedly involve states' rights and other local and political considerations. Other problems will involve federal and/or state subsidies, as well as state legislation to carry out the requirements of civil defense. Completion of plans and procedures down to include the state level and arrangements for proper financial support and personnel may, under normal planning procedures, require a period of years before a fully acceptable civil defense organization can be perfected. Such delay is an unnecessary risk.

Many of the major civil defense problems are not appropriate for Department responsibilities. Such problems, civilian in nature, should be solved by civilians familiar with problems of civil government. Considerable delay is to be expected in the determination of the federal government agency responsible for civil defense. In view of the long period of time required for sound planning and the urgency of providing an adequate civil defense, it is imperative that some organization be directed to initiate action for basic planning without delay. It is believed that of the existing federal agencies, the War Department is best suited immediately to undertake these responsibilities. If the War Department should be so designated, its responsibility and authority should be clearly defined by executive directive or other legal means.

19. Missions that should be undertaken by the War Department pending determination of the federal agency responsible for civil defense.

   a. War Department General and Special Staffs should immediately initiate planning on problems outlined in paragraph 17, a and b.

   b. Initiate over-all interim civil defense planning as directed.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Civil defense is an essential part of national defense.

b. No effective civil defense organization now exists in the nation and no coordinated planning is being conducted.

c. The nation should be organized for civil defense.


Civil defense in the United States as organized and directed in "World War II would be inadequate for the future.


a. A national group at the cabinet level should be charged with the formulation of over-all policy.

b. The major civil defense problems are not appropriately military responsibilities. Such problems are civilian in nature and should be solved by civilian organization.

c. A single, permanent, federal Civil Defense Agency should be responsible for planning, organizing, operating, coordinating, and directing civil defense matters at all levels of government. This agency should operate in accordance with general national policy guidance. It should be established as a separate civilian agency, within the Department of the Armed Forces, with a Director reporting directly to the Secretary of the Armed Forces.

d. The armed forces, by virtue of their mission in national defense, are responsible for technical advice and guidance in fields in which they have special capabilities and knowledge, for establishing and operating such civil defense measures as pertain to their own establishments, and for military aid to civil authorities as prescribed by law.

e. Regional organizations should be provided for federal-state and inter-state coordination and cooperation within territorial areas, corresponding generally to organized military areas. Special problems of highly industrial or densely populated areas overlapping state or military area boundaries must be recognized and provisions made for coordination of action within those areas.

f. States should be charged with responsibility for organizing state civil defense organizations, generally of uniform pattern modified as may be advisable to meet local conditions.
g. State subdivisions, county and municipal civil defense organizations should be provided under state direction, with generally uniform pattern as found essential to control.

h. As an alternate plan if the armed forces are not united under a single department, the Civil Defense Agency should be established as a separate agency within the War Department, with the Director of Civil Defense reporting directly to the Secretary of War.

23. Legislation.

In order to vest the appropriate authority in the civil defense agencies for adequate discharge of their responsibilities:

a. Federal legislation is required to establish a civil defense organization, define federal responsibilities, and delineate federal authority both in peace and war.

b. State legislation is required to establish civil defense organization, define responsibilities and delineate authority within states both in peace and war.

24. Planning.

a. Planning should be initiated now.

b. Planning at both national and state levels should be the first step in creating a civil defense organization followed by progressive organization in skeleton form at the various levels.

c. Plans should include a public relations program designed to provide full and timely information to the public.

d. Plans should not provide for general public participation until the nature of the threat can be authoritatively determined and announced, the organization and responsibilities of the various agencies can be determined and tasks can be assigned with indicated priorities. Thereafter the organization should be perfected as conditions warrant and permit.

25. Miscellaneous.

a. Internal security problems are closely related to those of civil defense. Before civil defense related functions can be determined, the responsibilities of the many agencies involved in internal security must be delineated.
b. Self-help and mutual aid are vital principles of civil defense.

c. Civil defense protective services should include services such as fire, rescue, emergency medical, police, etc., designed to minimize the effect of enemy action. Services extraneous to civil protection should be otherwise assigned.

d. Federal and state mobile reserves are essential to adequate civil defense.

e. Dispersal of industry, use of underground sites, mass evacuation, and protective building construction would all reduce the nation's vulnerability to hostile action. These are problems the solution to which is largely influenced by economic factors, national in scope. They require consideration by many governmental agencies and by industry itself. To improve our position a reasonable pattern should be set by the Federal government to give long range guidance to industry and city planning.

f. National standardization of fire equipment to permit interchangeability throughout the United States is essential.

26. Interim Planning.

Some agency should be designated to initiate coordinate planning pending final decision on civil defense responsibilities. Of the existing federal agencies, the War Department is best suited immediately to undertake this responsibility.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

27. It is recommended that the organization for civil defense and the allocation of responsibilities be as follows:

a. Within the federal government.

   (1) A national policy group (such as the proposed National Resources Board) to be responsible for formulating over-all national policy.

   (2) The Secretary of the Department of the Armed Forces be responsible for over-all coordination of civil defense.
(3) A single permanent civilian agency (Civil Defense Agency) separate from the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air, be established under a civilian director reporting directly to the Secretary and be charged with the responsibility of planning, organizing, operating, coordinating and directing civil defense activities.

(4) Regional civil defense organizations be established and be responsible to the Director, Civil Defense Agency, for federal-state and inter-state coordination.

(5) The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air, each be responsible for:

(a) Civil defense matters pertaining to their own establishments.

(b) Providing information and technical advice in fields in which they have special capabilities.

(c) Providing personnel, equipment and installations as necessary to assist the Civil Defense Agency.

(d) Military support of the states in emergencies as required by law.

(6) Department of the Army allocate responsibilities to its staff agencies as follows:

(a) Office of the Secretary of the Army, responsible for coordinating these civil defense matters which are within the purview of the Department of the Army.

(b) Army Department General Staff, Special Staff and Technical and Administrative Services:

1. Plans and Operations Division primarily responsible for the exercise General Staff coordination of military problems involved in civil defense matters.
2. Each General Staff Division, Special Staff Division, Technical and Administrative Service, responsible for military problems involved in civil defense matters, appropriate to its assigned functions.

(7) The Navy and Air Departments to allocate their civil defense responsibilities in a manner comparable to the Army Department as determined by the respective Secretaries.

b. Within the States.

(1) The states be charged with responsibility for establishing and operating their necessary civil defense organizations according to the general pattern established by the federal government.

(2) The appropriate state subdivisions, counties and municipalities be charged with the responsibility for establishing and operating their necessary civil defense organizations according to the general pattern established by federal and state governments.

28. In the event the armed forces are not united under a single department, it is recommended that the responsibility for civil defense within the federal government be allocated as follows:

a. A national policy group be responsible for formulating overall national policy.

b. The Secretary of War be responsible for overall coordination of civil defense.

c. A single permanent civilian agency (Civil Defense Agency) separate from the military forces, be established under a civilian director, reporting directly to the Secretary and be responsible for planning, organizing, operating, coordinating and directing civil defense activities.

d. Regional civil defense organizations be established and be responsible to the Director, Civil Defense Agency for federal-state and inter-state coordination.

e. The major commands under the Chief of Staff be responsible for:

(1) Civil defense matters pertaining to the military establishments.
(2) Providing technical advice and guidance in fields in which they have special capabilities and knowledge.

(3) Providing personnel, equipment and installations as necessary to assist the Civil Defense Agency.

(4) Military support of the states in emergency as required by law.

f. The War Department allocate responsibility to its existing staff agencies as follows:

(1) War Department General Staff, Special Staff and Technical and Administrative Services:

(a) Plans and Operations Division:

Primarily responsible for and exercise General Staff coordination of military problems involved in civil defense matters.

(b) Each General Staff Division, Special Staff Division, Technical and Administrative Service, be responsible for military problems involved in civil defense matters appropriate to its assigned functions.

29. Pending a final decision on the foregoing determinations, it is recommended that:

a. The War Department initiate action to accomplish fulfillment of its responsibilities as listed in paragraph 17.

b. The Secretary of War recommended to the President that:

(1) An early decision be made to establish the Civil Defense Agency.

(2) As an interim measure, the War Department be charged by Presidential directive with developing civil defense plans, to include:
(a) Tentative plans for civil defense organization at federal, regional, state and local levels.

(b) Requirements for the federal and state mobile reserves and procedures for their employment.

The War Department organize for civil defense planning by:

(1) Establishing a civil defense planning section in the Plans and Operations Division, General Staff, charged with the formulation and coordination of all War Department civil defense plans.

(2) Authorizing utilization of civilian experts for consultation as required.

END