DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

CIVIL DEFENSE AND SOCIETY

BY
JIRI NEHNEVAJSA
IN COLLABORATION WITH
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DONNA J. KROCHMAL
RICHARD H. POMEROY

FOR
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
OCD-OS-62-267
JULY, 1964
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ABSTRACT

Propositions, indicative of opposition to civil defense, were collected from the professional and lay literature for a period of several years. These were the bases of essential arguments which have led to the development of a frame of reference upon which this report is based. This frame of reference entails the identification of a number of barriers which are, in turn, deduced stages in non-acceptance. These barriers are categorized sequentially in that they reflect basic phases in the design of systems of programs of any kind. Thus, they are "scalar" in character in that it is logically reasonable to say that if someone adopts the reasoning underlying a given barrier, he need not consider issues associated with subsequent barriers. Of course, in reality, patterns of opposition or non-acceptance are not readily scalable, even if it is convenient to so order the information. It is suspected that ideological complexes tend to be involved in which all, or most, of the arguments are incorporated at one and the same time and in one and the same person.

The ten barriers of non-acceptance are:

Barrier I: unacceptability of the terminal goals

Barrier II: unacceptability due to relative unimportance of the objectives

Barrier III: unacceptability of operational goals

Barrier IV: unacceptability due to relative unimportance of operational goals

Barrier V: unacceptability in terms of evaluation of effectiveness

Barrier VI and VII: unacceptability concerning costs

Barrier VIII: unacceptability due to detrimental effects on personality structure

Barrier IX: unacceptability due to detrimental societal effects

Barrier X: unacceptability due to detrimental international impact

Throughout this phase of the research, pertinent arguments about civil defense programs and data regarding attitudes of Americans bearing on these arguments have been juxtaposed—sometimes rather tangentially.

The research supports the fact that Americans do not think that civil defense systems will make war more probable. Nor do they believe that
war will become less likely. They would like to see a world with arms control measures, or even a disarmed one. They do not expect this to happen. But while they yearn for a world in which modern weaponry is put under various forms of international control, they maintain their favorableness to measures of civil defense as a kind of insurance. The "insurance" argument seems to have been widely accepted and it appears in various guises in the data available.

Hence, no substantial support for the viewpoints which go into the various barriers, or non-acceptance patterns have been found. But it is crucial to emphasize that beliefs of the population are not necessarily valid.

However, the problems of civil defense systems are at once technical and political. At the technical level some of these issues cannot be resolved. The resolution of many of the problems is political in character, in that the nation's decision makers must come to grips with the various positions and assess the alternative risks.

Precisely because some of these decisions entail important human values and cannot be made on technical grounds alone, the views of Americans must count heavily in determining the kinds of choices that must be made and the types of risks which are acceptable and which are not.

This report provides some of the raw materials in terms of which sound debates about the nation's civil defense policies may continue.
The design and implementation of a complex system is always a difficult task. This is especially true when the proposed system has an extensive and visible impact on the society proper. A civil defense program, of necessity, has definite and pervasive consequences for the larger society, as, indeed, does any major effort on behalf of the public welfare. It is the specification of these consequences that is the concern of this report.

Firstly, the designer of a complex, large-scale system would like to have fully specified all possible and probable effects of the implementation of a proposed system. This the present report does not attempt. All that can be done with existing methodology is to examine summarily some of the more obvious possibilities. The second element of concern, and the one chiefly dealt with in this report, is the very fact that the resulting ambiguity stemming from our inability to specify consequences has produced a great deal of conjecture, both pro and con, about civil defense programs. Statements are made, opinions expressed, and opposition voiced concerning programs and aspects of programs both real and nonexistent.

This report attempts to specify and codify propositions comprising opposition to civil defense programs, generally, or to programs or aspects of programs, specifically. Opposition patterns to the introduction of any system have been schematized into a non-acceptance paradigm in Part One of this report. Part Two specifies this methodology in its application to examination of opposition to civil defense. Part Three consists of a detailed examination of each pattern of opposition to civil defense and provides an analysis of the available empirical material relevant to each element of the arguments involved.

An extensive search of the pertinent literature over a five year period was made to collate the arguments expressing opposition to civil defense. Books, periodicals, reports, congressional hearings, and news statements were all examined and statements concerning civil defense were extracted. These statements were systematized as to the type of argument they comprised. Arguments expressing opposition to civil defense can be categorized as follows:

1. No defense at all is possible.
2. Whatever defense may be possible would be so limited as to not be worth the effort.
3. Alternative programs should take precedence.
4. Civil defense conflicts with other, more important, objectives.
5. Civil defense conflicts with peace objectives.
6. Civil defense has given relationships with deterrence strategy.
7. Civil defense increases the probability of war.
8. Civil defense has deleterious consequences for America's image.
9. Civil defense has detrimental effects on personality.
10. Civil defense has disfunctional consequences for society.

Insofar as was possible, these various arguments were specified as to their component elements and related to whatever empirical data could be found that was relevant to their actual propositions, implicit as well as explicit. A thorough examination was made of the available empirical data in the data bank of the Research Office of Sociology. Relevant information was extracted, reproduced and codified. Each table extracted was identified as to the arguments and propositions it dealt with. Thus, for most, but not all, of the various propositions comprising opposition to civil defense, the pertinent data on public opinion and attitudes have been specified.

In Part Three of the report the ten barriers of the non-acceptance paradigm are examined in detail. At the conclusion of the discussion of each barrier in Part Three is an appendix containing all empirical data cited in the discussion plus, on occasion, some supporting material not directly referenced. These tables are grouped by topic and in themselves comprise a brief synopsis about what is known concerning these matters.

Each barrier discussion consists of a separate chapter of Part Three. These are numbered in Roman numerals from I to VII (some barriers were discussed together). At the end of each of these chapters, the pertinent tables are collected and are referenced in the body of the text by the chapter number followed by a table number. Thus, a discussion followed by the reference III-27 indicates that the supporting data is from table 27 in the appendix following chapter III. In addition to the bibliographic reference at the foot of each table, a fully annotated list of citations is included, alphabetized by title of source. Directly underneath the bibliographic material of each of these annotated citations, is a short statement of sample size and design and the actual date of data collection, rather than of publication, which is provided in the bibliographic portion of the citation.

In addition to the empirical data-tables, each chapter's appendix (except that of Chapter IV, for which there were no relevant propositions in the literature), also includes a selection of the relevant arguments culled from the literature. These arguments are also grouped by topic and their source is identified by a number in the left hand margin which is referent to the complete bibliography of discussions of civil defense in the available literature which is also included in this report. The list of annotated citations and the bibliography of the literature are at the rear of the document.
Following Part Three is Part Four, the conclusions derived from the application of the basic methodology to the problems of opposition to civil defense. Part Five of the document is a separate supplement chronologically listing all presidential statements concerning civil defense from President Truman in 1945 through President Johnson in the first half of 1964.

Many of the arguments comprising opposition to civil defense and their derivable propositions are essentially technical in nature. Some are not. The emphasis of this report on public opinion and attitudes is relevant to both considerations. Regardless of the actual objective facts of any situation, what people think and feel is still of great importance for any technical or policy decision in civil defense. In order to clear up popular misconceptions to obtain co-operation, various types of education programs may be necessary. Once the facts are known to the public, and the responsible officials are apprised of the actual state of public opinion, the whole picture of popular support for civil defense might change. Aside from resolvable technical considerations, a great many of the critical issues surrounding civil defense are either essentially unresolvable at the technical level or are basically political in nature. That is to say, that either because of lack of information, or because of the very nature of the question, a great many decisions are political in character rather than technical. The whole complex of alternative "risks" and personal and societal human values comes to bear. Certainly "public opinion" should not be construed as determinate, but it must rank high as a consideration in choices and decisions essentially rooted in national values and the commitment of the individual American.

This report raises more questions than it answers. Some broad conclusions have been tentatively made, but the impact of civil defense on society has yet to be adequately examined. The data available at present has only been summarily analysed, and then only with reference to the rather ill-defined propositions implicit in arguments in opposition to civil defense. Analysis relating a number of associated variables should be made. Any subtle interactions must be found. Much of the data presented in this report is in raw form at our Research Office and more can be obtained. The results of pending and future inquiries should be incorporated and related to the actual progress of civil defense programs throughout the nation. Much would be gained by a discrete chronological specification of key opinions and attitudes among various groupings of the population. The mass of data, both already tabulated and as yet unexamined, is reaching the point where automated data retrieval systems are necessary.

Further examination of the impact of American civil defense measures abroad is required for any comprehension of foreign response. On some issues no real data was available. Was this because the topics
dear to editors and commentators are irrelevant to the population at large or because they have been neglected in research? Much needs yet to be done, both in determining the content of popular response to civil defense and Cold War issues and in assessing their saliency.

The very nature of a report such as this required extensive effort and dedication on the part of many of our associates and co-workers at the University of Pittsburgh. Especial thanks are due Dorothy Brodie and Donna Krochmal for their contribution to the editing and the formatting of the report and its assembly. Theirs was a truly essential contribution. Similarly, expression of thanks must go to the assistance a number of doctoral candidates at the University of Pittsburgh have rendered the projects in support of this report. Richard Pomeroy, Aldo Scafati, and Martha Willis are only a few among the persons deserving of mention in this regard. The actual production of the report required considerable commitment on the part of the entire support staff. The efforts of Doris Heater, Toni DiGiorno and Regina Paris coupled with those of Della Drucker, Linda Meyers, and Sally Silverman made it possible to produce this report.

In particular, we must express our admiration for, and appreciation to, Ralph Garrett of the Office of Civil Defense for his guidance, criticism and financial support of this research endeavor.

One final point remains. The use and analysis of data provided by a great many other people is OUR responsibility. Any interpretations have been made by US and any corresponding misuse of data should be attributed to our hands only and not to the authors of the reports that have provided us the essential material for this document.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE

A. Introduction.........................................................1
B. The Future..........................................................3
C. Problem Dimensions of System Design............................8
   1. Objectives..................................................8
   2. Effectiveness...............................................9
   3. Cost........................................................10
   4. Impact.....................................................11
D. Decision Points...................................................12
E. Phases of System Design.........................................20
F. System Environments..............................................21

PART TWO

A. Introduction.........................................................23
B. Scope of Impact Research.........................................24
C. Scope of this Report..............................................26

PART THREE

I. Terminal Goals.......................................................27
   A. Introduction................................................27
   B. Acceptability of Terminal Goals..........................28
   C. Priority of Terminal Goals................................29
   Tables................................................................38
   Arguments............................................................105

II. Operational Goals...................................................108
    A. Introduction.................................................108
    B. Kinds of Attack.............................................110
    C. Kinds of Weapons..........................................113
    D. Kinds of Weapons Effects.................................115
    E. Kinds of Protection.........................................119
    F. Summary.....................................................123
    Tables................................................................126
    Arguments............................................................185

III. Effectiveness of Civil Defense Systems........................190
    A. Introduction.................................................190
    B. No Defense..................................................191
    C. Limited Defense............................................194

-1-
IV. Cost of Civil Defense Systems ............................................. 292
A. Introduction ........................................................................... 292
B. Total Cost ............................................................................... 293
C. Time-Based Cost ................................................................. 295
D. Indirect Cost ......................................................................... 296
E. Summary ................................................................................ 297
Tables ...................................................................................... 299

V. Personality and Civil Defense .................................................. 320
A. Introduction ........................................................................... 320
B. Personality Selection .............................................................. 321
C. Anxiety Level ......................................................................... 325
D. Aggressiveness ...................................................................... 327
E. Selfishness ............................................................................ 328
F. Sense of Security ................................................................. 331
G. Pessimism ............................................................................. 334
H. Black-and-White Perspectives .............................................. 337
I. Summary ............................................................................... 338
Tables ...................................................................................... 342
Arguments .............................................................................. 415

VI. Society and Civil Defense ....................................................... 421
A. Introduction ........................................................................... 421
B. Centralization ...................................................................... 423
C. Militarization ....................................................................... 426
D. Regimenation ........................................................................ 427
E. Divisiveness ......................................................................... 429
F. Summary .............................................................................. 433
Tables ...................................................................................... 434
Arguments .............................................................................. 473

VII. International Effects of Civil Defense ................................. 480
A. Introduction ........................................................................... 480
B. Effects on Other Nations ..................................................... 482
C. Probability of War .............................................................. 482
D. Peace Objectives ............................................................... 485
E. Summary .............................................................................. 488
Tables ...................................................................................... 490
Arguments .............................................................................. 512
PART FOUR
Conclusions..........................................................527

PART FIVE
Presidential Statements.......................................532
REFERENCES......................................................578
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR TABLES..................582
BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE ARGUMENTS........595
PART ONE

A. Introduction

The Office of Civil Defense has been charged with the responsibility to generate a system to protect life and property in the United States in the event of an enemy attack. The system includes, specifically, all functions which seek to minimize the effects upon civilians which such an attack might cause.

Civil defense systems are therefore to be designed, and implemented, so as to attain this general objective. This assumes that the legislative mandate must be translated into more operational terms.

A clue is given in the provision of this mandate which deals with "minimization" of attack effects. Hence, it becomes necessary to postulate alternative enemy attacks, and the most effective system is one which makes damage to life and property the least for each particular attack and over the range of reasonable attack models. The single optimal solution then has to do with a system which has, in these terms, maximum effectiveness against the worst realistic attack which could occur at any time during the system's presumed life cycle.

The system design then includes the choice of system components and the functions which link the components in temporal and spatial arrangements such that the objective is attained to the maximum over the range of circumstances relative to which the system is to be developed.

For given degrees of effectiveness of a particular design, wherein effectiveness pertains to the correspondence between actual and desired results, one can derive systems requirements including cost. For given cost, one can design systems of some identifiable effectiveness. The two approaches normally will not lead to the same system design. The most effective systems are rarely those which one can, or wants to, pay for. In turn, the systems which one might be willing to acquire are seldom the most effective ones which could be designed and implemented.

This usually holds when one considers total cost of a system. It need not hold if cost is considered per unit time, such as on an annual basis. For then it might become possible to spread the total, and perhaps prohibitive, cost over a longer period of time so that the expenditure per unit time may be the same (or even lower, even for the most effective system), regardless of the underlying design philosophy.
PART FOUR
CONCLUSIONS

To prepare this report, we have reviewed both professional and lay literature for a period of several years to identify the kinds of statements which are made about civil defense programs.

In particular, we were interested in propositions indicative of opposition to such programs and the rationale underlying such arguments. These are propositions which postulate that various consequences might ensue if the nation were to seriously consider, or implement, civil defense programs in general or particular programs specifically.

The essential arguments have led to the development of a frame of reference which entails the identification of a number of barriers. These barriers, in turn, are deduced stages in non-acceptance. That is to say, they establish various basic positions each of which in itself would suffice to lead to the rejection of civil defense measures by the proponent of the argument, and if the view were to be adopted by the nation, by the population as a whole.

These barriers are categorized sequentially in that they reflect basic phases in the design of systems or programs of any kind. Thus, they are "scalar" in character in that it is logically reasonable to say that if someone adopts the reasoning underlying a given barrier, he need not consider issues associated with subsequent barriers.

This means that if people were in opposition to the terminal objectives of civil defense, it would be irrelevant whether effective systems can be designed to meet these objectives, or whether such systems would be inexpensive or costly, or whether they would have beneficial or detrimental personal, social and international implications.

Similarly, even though particular systems may be effective and not altogether costly, it should be sufficient for opposing them if someone were to accept the view that their impact upon American national character were detrimental.

Of course, in reality the issues are not as simple as that. Patterns of opposition or non-acceptance are probably not readily scalable even if it is convenient to so order the information. Indeed, we suspect that ideological complexes tend to be involved in which all, or most, of the arguments are incorporated at one and the same time and in one and the same person. In this sense, an opponent of
particular measures can simply "fall back" upon subsequent arguments if his previous doubts are convincingly dispelled. In other words, even though someone may argue that civil defense systems are ineffective, it is unlikely that technical information of their relative degree of effectiveness would be enough to convince him: such an individual is likely to "fall back" on the systems' cost; or on their personality impact; or on their social or international effects.

Barrier I pertains to unacceptability of the terminal goals. In civil defense systems, this revolves around the rejection of the idea that it is desirable to protect lives and property in general, and more specifically, against the effects of a nuclear attack upon our society. There are probably no Americans who subscribe to this notion. But this Barrier links actually with Barrier X, the last one in the series. For one aspect of the international implications of civil defense entails the notion that they enhance the chances of war, or lead to changes in Soviet strategy, so that actually more lives are likely to be lost with such systems than in their absence. In this manner, the frame of reference is interlaced and the linearity of presentation throughout our report disappears in the light of this consideration.

Barrier II postulates relative unimportance of the objectives. Civil defense measures of any kind might lack saliency as they do to most Americans. In the extreme, this is due to the fact that no system is needed at all simply because war will not come, or because of a religious conviction which makes life and death issues a matter of divine, rather than human, concern. There are quite a few people, indeed most, who do not assess civil defense systems with a keen sense of urgency and thus do not demand that they be implemented.

But there are few Americans, although some have so reacted throughout the years, who feel that no measures to protect civilians are needed; or who are convinced that war will definitely not come; or who feel that all we need to do is rely on divine intervention without any action on our part.

Barrier III has to do with the translation of the terminal objectives into operational ones. It may entail non-acceptance of particular systems because they do not solve the dilemma of given attacks; or because they are limited to only certain classes of weapons; or because they cope only with certain weapons effects. Barrier IV merely poses the question of relative importance of the specific system objectives—that is, civil defense systems designed to cope with particular attacks, given weapons systems, certain weapons effects, and so on.

In the non-acceptance pattern, the argument takes the form that even if a certain system might protect to some extent against one weapon, it is unlikely to protect against other kinds of weapons. Even though it may be reasonably satisfactory if the enemy were to select one strategy of attack, it will not work against other strategies.
Barrier V has to do with effectiveness. This, of course, is entirely central to the acceptance of any system apart from its costs, monetary and social. The system may not do the job for which it was designed, or may not do the job adequately enough. Thus, there may be assumed no way of being defended against the kinds of attacks and weapons that are most likely; or if some defense is possible, people may not be able to avail themselves of it. The warning system may be inadequate so that even if the nation had otherwise effective shelter or dispersion plans, it could not utilize them appropriately. Or, there may not be enough warning time even if the warning system is otherwise technically effective in that most people can actually get warning when needed. Alternatively, there may be lack of information on appropriate actions so that even effective and available warning will not lead to those responses which increase prospects for survival. And again: even if people were to get to shelters, they may not survive for the duration of their necessary stay either because of equipment malfunctions, lack of supplies, or social and human conditions of habitancy. And finally, even though they might survive these circumstances, the post-war environment will be non-survivable so that all the effort would be wasted anyway.

All these are difficult arguments to evaluate. No matter what point is made, enough of an area of confusion remains to assure an individual, predisposed to opposition, to maintain his view, and enough of an area of confidence remains to assure, similarly, an individual predisposed to favor civil defense measures.

There is no doubt that most Americans are convinced that civil defense measures would have a reasonable degree of effectiveness. Study by study and year by year, the respondents indicate their conviction that survivability would be enhanced if some civil defense systems were actually developed and implemented. They are more convinced of effectiveness of shelters than they are of dispersion measures, perhaps because of the flow of information to the public.

At the same time, many Americans would not recognize a warning, at least not promptly, and many would not know what needs to be done even if they were alerted. They are also rather uncertain about the post-war environment and many subscribe to the belief that a thermonuclear war would just about mean the end of the world, end of civilization, or end of the nation as a viable social system. But despite these uncertainties, they favor all measures which would have some potential protective value.

Barriers VI and VII concern costs. Private shelter programs have been clearly too expensive even if actual family shelters may not have been too costly. They have been viewed as such, and the problem has been confounded by the inequities which such systems lead to. But the national program as a whole, if anything, has been seen as costing more than it actually has and most people think that the nation should be spending substantially more than it has been. The empirical evidence does not suggest fears of excessive national costs, and further burdening of the budgets beyond the point of endurance.
Barrier VIII refers to detrimental effects of civil defense programs on personality structure, or possibly, on the attractiveness of the programs to people with less than desirable characteristics. Prominent among the issues have been those which postulate increased anxiety, selfishness, aggressiveness, (false) sense of security, pessimism, and authoritarianism. There is little to support this viewpoint. If anything, the various components of the argument contradict each other to begin with. It does not seem that civil defense measures have had any of these effects; perhaps some are obscured by more drastic developments on the world scene, i.e., the Korean war, Berlin blockade, Berlin wall, and subsequent and repeated crises, i.e., the Cuban crisis, Viet-Nam, Laos, and so on. It would seem somewhat self-evident that such crises might induce some changes in personal beliefs and attitudes, or reenforce some existing anxieties, pessimisms or hostilities. In contrast with these developments, civil defense programs appear to be rather insignificant.

Barrier IX includes arguments about societal effects of civil defense. In particular, these have to do with the emergence of a garrison type society so that efforts at solving the crises of international totalitarianism lead to a kind of domestic totalitarianism. The components of the problem have to do with increased governmental centralization, militarization, and with regimentation of life throughout the nation. There are, of course, imaginable systems which could have such impacts. But none of the realistically considered civil defense systems seem to have these properties, and there are no data to suggest that many Americans are fearful of such developments.

Finally, Barrier X leads to non-acceptance of civil defense measures due to their international impact. On one hand, these are effects on allies and neutrals whose image of America might be unfavorably affected or who might consider civil defense programs selfish or wasteful in a world needing help on all fronts of human endeavor. On the other hand, Barrier X postulates more direct effects on probabilities of war or at least, on prospects for viable international settlements of the existing conflicts.

Throughout this phase of our research, we have juxtaposed some of the pertinent arguments about civil defense programs and data regarding attitudes of Americans bearing on these arguments—sometimes rather tangentially.

Americans do not think that civil defense systems will make war more probable. Nor do they believe that war will become less likely. They would like to see a world with arms control measures, or even a disarmed one. They do not expect this to happen. But while they yearn for a world in which modern weaponry is put under various forms of international control, they maintain their favorableness to measures of civil defense as a kind of insurance. The "insurance" argument seems to have been widely accepted and it appears in various guises in the data available to us.
We have not found substantial support for the viewpoints which go into the various barriers, or non-acceptance patterns. But it is entirely crucial to emphasize that beliefs of the population do not necessarily resolve these difficult issues. The fact that Americans may be convinced, as they are, that civil defense systems are irrelevant from the vantage point of war probabilities does not make this a valid belief. The fact that Americans think that shelter systems might help them in the event of an attack does not make shelters actually effective, and so on.

The problems of civil defense systems are, thus, at once, technical and political. At the technical level, some of these issues cannot be resolved. For instance, it is impossible to prove that certain civil defense measures would not be provocative to the Soviet Union; it is impossible to prove that certain systems might not have some detrimental effects on Americans as individuals, or upon our social system as a whole. It is similarly impossible to prove the opposite viewpoint. In this sense then, the resolution of many of these problems is political in character, in that the nation's decision-makers must come to grips with the various positions and assess the alternative risks.

Precisely because some of these decisions entail important human values and cannot be made on technical grounds alone, the views of Americans as people must count heavily in these considerations. Hence, the validity of the opinions of our population is not in itself at stake. But these opinions are highly relevant in determining the kinds of choices that must be made, and the types of risks which are acceptable and which are not.

This report provides some of the raw materials in terms of which sound debates about the nation's civil defense policies may continue. It does not solve the difficulties, and does not make policy choices particularly easier. But it establishes a context in which more evidence, and less passion, may be brought to bear upon problems, the viable resolution of which is in the interest of us all.
PART FIVE

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS

The statements contained in this appendix are direct quotes of statements by the Presidents of the United States from Harry S. Truman to Lyndon B. Johnson (1945-1964) on the subject of Civil Defense. These quotes were extracted from public speeches, statements to Congress, news conferences and all other Presidential messages released by the White House.

The sources for this information were: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (published yearly), The New York Times and the Congressional Record.
May 2, 1945

Statement by the President Concerning the Termination of the Office of Civilian Defense (1)

This change does not in any respect lessen the need for volunteer efforts in our states and communities. State and local governments are fully aware of their continuing responsibilities and I am sure that we can depend upon their knowledge and the patriotism of the millions of volunteers to continue the war jobs in which the whole nation has had to be trained.

NOTE: This statement was made public as part of a White House release stating that the President had that day written to the Congress announcing the forthcoming termination of the Office of Civilian Defense and withdrawing its proposed budget for the next fiscal year. The release further stated that developments in the European war and the efficient operation of community volunteer forces made possible the decision that Federal supervision of civilian defense was no longer needed.

June 1, 1945

The President's News Conference (2)

QUESTION: Mr. President, when Mayor Kelly of Chicago and Mayor LaGuardia of New York left Monday, they told us you talked about the civilian defense material that is around this country.

THE PRESIDENT: They talked to me about it. I have been giving it some consideration. We are trying to work out a policy and a plan for its disposal.

QUESTION: That hasn't come to its conclusion?

THE PRESIDENT: That hasn't been worked out as yet. I think it will be worked out very shortly.
1946 - Harry S. Truman

NOTHING ON RECORD

1947 - Harry S. Truman

NOTHING ON RECORD

1948 - Harry S. Truman

NOTHING ON RECORD
March 4, 1949

President Rejects Civil Defense Unit (3)

...Under present conditions the essential need of the Federal Government in the area of civil defense is peacetime planning and preparation for civil defense in the event of war, rather than operation of a full-scale civil defense program. Therefore, I see no need to establish at this time a permanent organization, such as a proposed office of civil defense. Rather, I see a definite necessity to continue planning for civil defense...

Since peacetime civil defense planning is related to and a part of over-all mobilization planning of the nation in peacetime, I have concluded that the National Security Resources Board which is charged with advising me concerning the coordination of such over-all mobilization planning, is the appropriate agency which should also exercise leadership in civil defense planning.

I would like, therefore, for the board to assume such leadership in civil defense planning and to develop a program which will be adequate for the nation's needs....
September 18, 1950

President Truman's Message Transmitting Civil Defense Plans of the National Security Resources Board to Congress (4)

This report provides a set of suggested guideposts for states and local communities, who have the principal responsibility for organizing and training the many types of specialized groups needed.

This report also sets forth a basic plan for the Federal Government's part in the national civil defense effort, and recommends Federal civil defense legislation and the establishment of a Civil Defense Administration.

I intend to establish a Temporary Civil Defense Administration which will carry forward the civil defense work until permanent legislation is enacted by the Congress, and will provide a central point of leadership for state and local efforts.
January 12, 1951

Message Transmitting Bill for Civil Defense

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, which I have signed today, is designed to protect life and property in the United States in case of enemy assault. It affords the basic framework for preparations to minimize the effects of an attack on our civilian population, and to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which such an attack would create.

I shall soon transmit to the Congress a request for an initial appropriation of funds to carry on the Federal responsibilities under the new act.

The act will permit the Federal Government to provide matching grants of funds to the states for constructing air raid shelters. The act also allows certain measures to be taken by the Federal Government directly, such as the procurement and stockpiling of necessary medical and other materials and supplies and the provision of suitable warning systems....

The Federal Government can and will provide the necessary coordination and guidance for the civil defense program. I have named Millard E. Caldwell, former Governor of Florida, to head the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

It is the expressed policy and intent of Congress, however, that the responsibility for civil defense should be vested primarily in the states and their political subdivisions. I, therefore, call upon all citizens to lend their support to civil defense in their own communities....

January 15, 1951

Budget for the United States for the Fiscal Year 1952

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1951 - continued

CIVIL DEFENSE. -- With modern methods of warfare our Nation could be subjected to a sudden, devastating enemy attack. The military services have responsibility for warding off attack, but effective civil defense can sharply reduce the injuries, loss of life, and destruction of homes and factories that otherwise might occur.

Under legislation just enacted, the Federal Civil Defense Administration will provide equal matching grants to states for the construction of shelters and other protective facilities in critical target areas. These grants account for the larger part of the expenditures projected for this program in the fiscal year 1952. The Administration will also begin building a national reserve of supplies and equipment. In addition, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation will make loans to public authorities for public works which can serve both as shelters and for other community purposes, when the Administrator certifies that there is a civil defense necessity for such projects....

May 7, 1951

Why We Need Allies: Address before a dinner of the Civil Defense Conference, Washington, D. C. (7)

CIVIL DEFENSE AGAINST ATOMIC BOMBS. -- Our civil defense problem starts with a few basic facts. Because there was an atomic explosion in the Soviet Union in 1949, we must act on the assumption that they do have atomic bombs. They have planes that could drop atomic bombs upon our cities. No matter how good our air defense may be, or how big an air force we build, a determined air attack by the Soviet Union could drop bombs upon this country....There is no complete protection against an atomic-bomb attack. But there is a lot we can do to reduce the number of deaths and injuries and to check panic.

We must organize ourselves—in every city, factory, office, and home. Civil defense is a responsibility which begins with the individual, and is shared with the city, the State, and the Nation.

We have two immediate jobs. One is to teach all our people how to protect themselves in the event of enemy attack. The other is to organize and train millions of volunteers as active members of the United States Civil Defense Corps.
1951 - continued

...So long as we face the threat of an atomic attack on the United States, we have got to build a strong civil-defense organization. But even with such an organization, our losses in an atomic war, if we should have one, would be terrible. Even with such losses, frightful as they would be, I think this country would survive and would win an atomic war. But even if we win, an atomic war would be a disaster......

June 21, 1951

$806,454,000 Asked for Defense Units (8)

(President Truman asked for $535,000,000 for the Federal Civil Defense Administration and $270,000 separately for civil defense activities in Washington).

There is no complete protection against an atomic air attack, but there is a great deal that can be done to reduce the number of deaths and injuries that may result. The lives of many millions of people may depend on the development of a strong civil defense program to meet such an attack......

Every city, factory, office and home must be organized for civil defense......We cannot be caught unprepared......

November 3, 1951

Truman Deplores Defense Fund Cut (9)

The amount appropriated for civil defense is tragically insufficient. Out of a total of $535,000,000 originally requested, the Congress has seen fit to grant only $74,945,000. The program for protective shelters was completely eliminated and serious reductions were made in funds for the stockpiling of emergency supplies and equipment.

......Civil defense is a vital part of our mobilization effort. It is reckless to evade, under the pretense of economy, the national responsibility for initiating a balanced Federal-State civil defense program......

There are no bargain basements where we can pick up America's security at cut-rate prices.
January 9, 1952

Annual Message on State of the Union (10)

.....During 1951, we did not make adequate progress in building up civil defense against atomic attack. This is a major weakness in our plans for peace, since inadequate civilian defense is open invitation to a surprise attack. Failure to provide adequate civilian defense has the same effect as adding to the enemy's supply of atomic bombs.....

January 12, 1952

Statement Observing First Anniversary of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (11)

Because of what civil defense has been able to accomplish against considerable odds, I am convinced that this country is today more alert and better prepared against enemy attack than it has ever been in our peacetime history—but we are far from being fully prepared.....I can report that our states and our cities are moving forward on all fronts in civil defense, but unfortunately with varying degrees of effectiveness.....

Until civil defense is manned by many more millions of trained volunteers and until the desperately needed supplies and equipment for civil defense are in place and ready for use, America will not be prepared to resist aggression...

If war comes to America, we may well win or lose as a result of how ready we are when the first attack comes.....

January 21, 1952

President's Message to Congress outlining the National Budget: Fiscal Year 1953 (12)

(In millions)

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CIVIL DEFENSE. -- A strong civil defense program is an indispensable part of our security effort. Neither our geographic position nor our military defenses can assure absolute protection against attack... This threat to our civilian population and to our productive facilities can be reduced, however, by strengthening the civil defense program now under way. Failure to do so could leave a fatal gap in our security structure.

I am therefore recommending a substantially increased appropriation. These funds will finance minimum Federal stockpiles of essential supplies and will match state and local expenditures to prepare protective shelters in densely populated areas and to assemble necessary local equipment.

Although civil defense is primarily a state and local responsibility, the Federal Civil Defense Administration plays a key role in providing information, leadership, coordination, and financial assistance to state and local governments. Federal expenditures for civil defense in the fiscal year 1953 are estimated at $39 million dollars compared to $44 million dollars in 1952 and less than half a million dollars in 1951.

This sharp increase is necessary to overcome dangerous gaps which now exist in the program caused by the inadequate financial support given it by the Congress last year.....

April 18, 1952

Truman Orders Agencies to Draw Plans to Carry on if Attack Comes

....Section 1. In furtherance of national planning for the utilization of the personnel, materials, facilities, and services of the Federal departments and agencies which will be required in the event of a civil defense emergency, each Federal department and agency shall, in consultation with the Federal Civil Defense Administration, prepare plans for providing its personnel, materials, facilities, and services pursuant to the provisions of Section 302 or the said Federal Civil Defense Act during the existence of a civil defense emergency.....

Section 2. In addition to the plans required by Section 1 hereof, each Federal department and agency shall prepare plans for maintaining the continuity of its essential functions at the seat of the Government and elsewhere during the existence of a civil defense emergency.....
1952 - continued

July 15, 1952

Truman Statement on Fund Bill (14)

I have today signed H.R. 8370, the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1953.....

In a number of ways, this act falls so short of what is required in the national interest that I feel I cannot let it go without comment.....

In particular, I am deeply concerned by the slashes in funds for civil defense.....

In the case of civil defense, the Congress reduced the funds requested by more than 90 percent. This repeats the gross error of the last two years by postponing once again the construction of key shelters in our most vulnerable cities and the stockpiling of adequate medical and other supplies to save and sustain life in case of attack.....
February 2, 1953

Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (15)

......While retaliatory power is one strong deterrent to a would-be aggressor, another powerful deterrent is defensive power. No enemy is likely to attempt an attack foredoomed to failure.

......Because the building of a completely impenetrable defense against attack is not possible, total defensive strength must include civil defense preparedness. Because we have incontrovertible evidence that Soviet Russia possesses atomic weapons, this kind of protection becomes sheer necessity.

Civil defense responsibilities primarily belong to the State and local governments—recruiting, training, and organizing volunteers to meet any emergency. The immediate job of the Federal Government is to provide the leadership, to supply technical guidance, and to continue to strengthen its civil defense stockpile of medical, engineering and related supplies and equipment. This must go forward without lag.

March 4, 1953

Statement by the President on the Occasion of the Swearing in of Val Peterson as Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration (16)

The task of civil defense is vital to our national life. It demands a preparedness that can do more than limit the damage of a wartime disaster. It means developing a preparedness, a vigilance, so impressive as to deter aggression itself.

......The recruiting, training and organizing of volunteers competent to meet any emergency are tasks largely of our state and local governments.

The responsibility of the Federal Government is to provide leadership.

March 19, 1953

The President's News Conference of March 19, 1953 (17)

QUESTION: Robert J. Donovan, New York Herald Tribune: Mr. President, coming back to that question about the MIT studies, so far as you can see, do you anticipate in the near future a radical increase in the amount of money we will have to spend for air defense? It was a gigantic increase.
THE PRESIDENT: The one they were talking about was not merely air defense, it was also civil defense. Now as I have tried to point out several times, it is my conviction that civil defense by its very nature must necessarily be primarily a local matter.....

.....But this is what I would say: if you would carry forward the static defense of any country to what it could be you have a most expensive thing--terribly expensive thing; but that expense would not certainly be all Federal. I would say a greater portion would be local in the aggregate than it would be Federal.....

May 19, 1953

Radio Address to the American People on the National Security and its Costs

(18)

.....Clearly every technological advance profoundly affects this problem of air power—including the development of missiles now in production. Similar advances in Civil Defense will help shape the nature and size of our Air Forces....

August 4, 1953

Remarks at the Governors' Conference, Seattle, Washington

(19)

.....Civil defense is absolutely impossible without the complete and enthusiastic cooperation, not merely of Governors, not merely of mayors, but of every man, woman, and child in the United States. Here is one thing that can't be handled except by people themselves. It is perfectly clear that the first thing that is needed, if you are going to have an effective civil defense against a possible attack in this country, is an ordered or disciplined movement and action on the part of the people in the face of emergency.....

.....The indispensable ingredient of any civil defense is some self-control and that is all that discipline is. On top of it, then, is an ordered plan that takes people to a position and place of safety. On top of that, you can build a number of artificial and organized defenses, even to include your warning services and things that the Federal Government takes over in the field of actual active defense. But without this orderly action on the part of the civilian population, all civil defense measures will fall flat to the ground.

.....The Federal Government has a very wide, definite, fixed responsibility in this whole program. But they can never do it unless localities down to the last individual will cooperate.....
1953 - continued

September 25, 1953

Memorandum Directing Federal Agencies to Participate in a Civil Defense Exercise (20)

To the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies:

The need for effective civil defense planning is still vital to our national welfare. But national plans and preparations are of little value without active participation at local community levels. The Director of the Office of Civil Defense for the District of Columbia, through the Deputy Director of Federal Buildings Services, has again scheduled a Civil Defense Exercise to be held on November 5, 1953. I recognize that such tests are essential to the proper training of Federal employees in their local civil defense duties and I continue to urge all Departments and Agencies to prepare for these exercises to the fullest extent possible.

Accordingly, it is directed that each Department and Agency of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government in the Metropolitan Area of Washington participate in the Civil Defense Exercise which will be held on November 5, 1953.

October 1, 1953

Remarks to State Directors of Civil Defense (21)

...but I can assure you of something about the attitude of the Federal Government toward you. We are quite well aware of its importance, and we are certainly determined to support you.

...As far as I can see, it is only through persistence, through continuing to achieve those things in which we believe, that we can finally continue to, one, give ourselves that confidence that comes from the maximum preparation on our part; and, second, have a finer influence, if we are confident, for bringing about a basis for the solution of the world's problems, because we can talk calmly from a position of strength, a feeling of safety and not of hysteria.

December 14, 1953

Remarks Opening the White House Conference of Mayors (22)

But the real occasion for this particular type of conference is that for the first time in history, cities have become principal targets for any enemy seeking to conquer our Nation....
.....And, so that creates problems. They can be solved only if we consult together and act intelligently. I do not mean to say, of course, that the Federal Government is disabused of responsibility—has lost its responsibility merely because the target is a city. Far from it. But now we have got to a place where the matter can no longer be handled by professional or organized military forces, and where we must all act together in the operation of any plan necessary for our safety.

.....We can't be an armed camp. We are not going to transfer ourselves into militarists.....We are simply going to do our job but do it intelligently.

.....It is getting over reasonable preparation without being hysterical. That is our job.....
January 7, 1954

Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (23)

......An indispensable part of our continental security is our civil defense effort. This will succeed only as we have the complete cooperation of the State Governors, Mayors, and voluntary citizen groups. With their help we can advance a cooperative program which, if an attack should come, would save many lives and lessen destruction.

January 21, 1954

Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1955 (24)

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......The defense team, both military and civilian, is working hard toward improvement of the organization, procedures, and methods of the entire Defense Establishment.....

......Consistent with these plans for a sustained military capability at the lowest possible cost is an integrated plan of continental and civil defense. Such planning is necessary in order to hold our civilian losses from possible enemy attack to a minimum.

......This budget reflects a new concept of civil defense which takes account of the destructive threat of modern weapons and which emphasizes improved warning of impending attack and planning for the dispersal of populations of potential target cities in advance of enemy attack.

Much planning, organization, and training remains to be done, however, to make this strategy of civil defense fully effective at all levels of government. It will be the Federal responsibility, as reflected in this budget, to provide warning of impending attacks, and to stockpile medical supplies. The Federal Government will not assume the responsibilities which belong to local governments and volunteer forces, but will supplement State and local resources, provide necessary information on weapons effects, and advise and assist States and localities.....

......Expenditures for civil defense are included in housing and community development because of their community aspects.....Federal expenditures for civil defense are estimated at 68 million dollars in the fiscal year 1955.

April 5, 1954

Radio and Television address to the American People on the State of the Nation April 5, 1954 (25)

......In addition to all this, we devote ourselves to civil and continental defense, in order to make certain that we have the best possible chance to live through such a catastrophe, as well as to inflict upon the enemy such losses that he would quit fighting.....
1954 - continued

......And so we have plans, and this administration has presented to the Congress a plan—a legislative program. In that program there is ample measure for defense, civil, and continental defense and for the deterrent effects of our atomic development.

April 30, 1954

Memorandum directing the Departments and Agencies to Take Part in a Civil Defense Test Exercise. (26)

On June 14 and 15, 1954 a nation-wide Civil Defense test exercise will be held in cooperation with the Dominion of Canada. United States Territories and Possessions will also participate.

The task of civil defense is vital to our national life. It demands preparedness that can do more than limit the damage of a war-time disaster. It means developing a preparedness, a vigilance, so impressive as to deter aggression itself. This awareness must touch every community, every citizen of our land.....

August 30, 1954

Address at the American Legion Convention, August 30, 1954 (27)

......Perhaps you would permit me to interject here that the civil defense program must be remembered as another arm of our true national defense. What this American Legion can do to inspire people to participate actively as responsible citizens in the civil defense program adds that much to our national and our individual security.....

October 26, 1954

Remarks at the Conference of the National Women's Advisory Committee on Civil Defense, October 26, 1954 (28)

......Now one of the things, then, we have to do is to prepare ourselves, in our minds and in our hearts and in our spirits, for any catastrophe that might come to us. We have got to recognize that war is no longer something that is neatly packaged, divided into parts, and there are soldiers off some place, and we are doing our best through the Red Cross, the USO, and knitting the things to send to them. It is not that remote any longer from us—it is right on our doorstep, right squarely there.....

......Because I will tell you: I think, first, as this is understood in the world, what we are doing, you have lessened the chances of war, exactly as we believe that a bombing squadron or a good regiment, we believe with that much, it lessens the chances of war.
January 6, 1955

Annual message to the Congress on the State of the Union January 6, 1955 (29)

The forthcoming military budget...assures the maintenance of effective, retaliatory force as the principal deterrent to overt aggression. It accelerates the continental defense program and the build-up of ready military reserve forces.

...Our civil defense program is also a key element in the protection of our country. We are developing cooperative methods with State Governors, Mayors, and voluntary citizen groups, as well as among Federal agencies, in building the civil defense organization. Its significance in time of war is obvious; its swift assistance in disaster areas last year proved its importance in time of peace.

January 17, 1955

Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1956 (30)

Civil defense is also an integral part of the overall program for defense of the continental United States against enemy attack.

The concept of civil defense adopted last year takes account of the destructive threat of modern weapons and places emphasis on improved warning of impending attack, to allow time for evacuation of potential target cities. Since this policy was announced, the Federal Civil Defense Administration has developed its plans more fully and individual cities have tested mass evacuation. I cannot stress too much that civil defense will succeed or fail in proportion to the willingness of American communities to meet the peril. The Federal Government is developing cooperative methods with State governors, mayors, and voluntary citizen groups, as well as among Federal agencies, in building the civil defense organization. In accordance with the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, the primary responsibility for civil defense rests with the States and their political subdivisions.

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March 16, 1955

The President's News Conference of March 16, 1955. (31)

Q. Matthew Warren, DuMont Television: Mr. President, in view of the devastating effects of our modern thermonuclear weapons and the secrecy surrounding their development, how do you think we can maintain an adequate civilian defense?

THE PRESIDENT: Of course, you are touching one of the most serious problems facing us today, and it is all the more serious because it is one of those facts that human beings just rather recoil from looking squarely in the face, do not like to do it.

Not long ago, the Atomic Energy Commission published a rather long paper giving a considerable amount of information on the effects of thermonuclear weapons and, particularly, the fallout.

The purpose of it was to show that while it is known that downwind from these things you can get a long area in which there could be very serious consequences, it is also possible for the individual to take care of himself. It was intended, given the proper amount of work the man will do, to be reassuring and not to be terrifying.

The great chore you have here is to give people the facts, show them what they can do, get the Federal leadership, get the participation of the States and the municipalities, without terrifying people.

I have one great belief: Nobody in war or anywhere else ever made a good decision if he was frightened to death. You have to look facts in the face, but you have to have the stamina to do it without just going hysterical. That is what you are really trying to do in this business.

May 18, 1955

Memorandum to Federal Agencies directing participation in a national Civil Defense Exercise. (32)

On June 15 and 16, 1955, a national Civil Defense test exercise will be held. The forty-eight States, the District of Columbia, and the United States Territories and Possessions will participate.

Vigilance and preparedness under all circumstances all of the time is essential to the civil defense of our country. Every community and every citizen must be ready to act swiftly and with confident knowledge of what they are about. Not only will such vigilance and preparedness minimize the effects of any disaster, it can powerfully deter aggression itself.....
July 6, 1955

The President's News Conference (33)

Q. Joseph A. Dear, Capital Times: Mr. President, what is your opinion of the civil defense recommendations contained in the Report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't recall what the item was.

Q. Mr. Dear: I mention specifically the recommendation that civil defense should be the primary responsibility of the National Government rather than the States.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will tell you this: the problem, of course divides itself into many phases, those of (a) detecting the intentions of some foreign government; (b) detecting as quickly as possible any evidence of an impending attack against you.

Now, those two things are obviously more the business of the Federal Government than anybody else or, let's say, the exclusive business.

But, let's go to the other end now for a moment. How are you going to evacuate a city? It has got to be not only municipal responsibility, it has got to be personal responsibility. You can't in this country, by edict from the Federal Government, evacuate any city, because we don't move in that way.

This has got to be an informed and relatively trained citizenry doing this for themselves. So it has got to be a local responsibility and a very active participation by every individual and by every responsible official in the locality before there can be any usefulness.

Now, this is true, whether it is a mere matter of evacuation or taking shelter or rescuing the wounded or protecting yourself against fallout or anything else that could happen, and it must be a very positive local participation and responsibility.

July 6, 1955

The President's News Conference (34)

Q. Anthony H. Leviero, New York Times: Mr. President, in "Operation Alert" you issued a test proclamation of martial law on a national scale. I wonder if you would discuss the application of it and where the Governors and other civil authorities would fit into the picture.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Leviero, remember, this was an answer to a specific instance. The problem I was confronted with when I left my office and which I hadn't known before—I refused to let them tell me the conditions under which this problem was to be operated, because I conceive the played (hypothetical) decisions should be made in the proper atmosphere of emergency—I was suddenly told that 53 of the major cities of the United States had either been destroyed or so badly damaged that the populations were fleeing; there were uncounted dead; there was great fallout over the country. Here there was, as I saw it, no recourse except to take charge instantly; because even Congress dispersed from Washington because of a bomb, would take some hours to meet, to get together, to organize themselves.....
Now, because of this unexpected development they handed me, I have asked the Attorney General to look through our entire record of precedents from the beginning of our Government to see what would be the thing that would do the least violence to our form of Government, which would protect the population, protect the national decision. Let's say that particular incident did at least have this benefit; to cause us to study more deeply and in a more analytical fashion our whole history to see what would be the best thing to do under such circumstances.

Note: A four page statement was released by the White House on July 7 concerning a report made to the President on that date by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization on the Federal agency relocation activities, which were part of a nation-wide civil defense test held June 15, 16 and 17.

The release included a statement concerning Director Flemming's report on the draft proclamation providing for limited martial law, which was prepared during the exercises for future study.
January 5, 1956

Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (35)

...Closely related to the mission of the Defense Department is the task of the Federal Civil Defense Administration. A particular point of relationship arises from the fact that the key to civil defense is the expanded continental defense program including the distant early warning system. Our Federal civil defense authorities have made progress in their program, and now comprehensive studies are being conducted jointly by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the States, and critical target cities to determine the best procedures that can be adopted in case of an atomic attack. We must strengthen Federal assistance to the States and cities in devising the most effective common defense.

January 16, 1956

Annual Budget Message to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1957. (36)

...CIVIL DEFENSE - The key to our civil defense is the expanded continental defense program, including the distant early warning system. Additional progress has been made in the civil defense program under the Federal Civil Defense Administration....Comprehensive studies are being conducted jointly by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the States, and critical target cities to determine the best procedures that can be adopted in case of an atomic attack. Such planning has vital national importance and parallels the necessity for maintaining a strong military establishment.

This budget provides for a strengthened effort on the part of the Federal Government to assist the States and cities in devising the most effective common defense. It includes funds to extend civil defense preparations in more metropolitan target zones in accordance with recent recommendations of a special committee on civil defense. Funds also are included to accelerate procurement of field-type hospitals and increase stockpiles of medical and radiological supplies.

January 26, 1956

Special Message to the Congress on the Nation's Health Program. (37)

...Public Health Aspects of Civil Defense. -- The skills and resources of the Public Health Service and the Food and Drug Administration will be of great value to the Nation in dealing with any civil defense emergency that may arise. The Federal Civil Defense Administration has delegated vital responsibilities to these agencies, and I have included funds in the budget to strengthen research on the public health aspects of civil defense.
1956 - continued

The advances made in your three years as Federal Civil Defense Administrator delineate some of the major routes we have been following in civil defense. Planning for urban evacuation is in progress. The growing stockpile of medical supplies is being relocated as required by new weapons. Survival studies of specific target areas will provide an accurate measure of the advance warning time required in each area to permit the saving of lives by evacuation. Systematized attack warning channels and procedures are better adjusting the civilian response to military alert warnings. Continental defense is being daily strengthened as the Distant Early Warning System comes rapidly into operation.

.....It is equally clear that no matter how crushing a blow we can strike in retaliation for an attack upon us, to permit our great centers of population and industry to lay exposed to the weapons of modern war is to invite both an attack and national catastrophe.

Therefore, our whole civil defense effort needs both strengthening and modernizing. This need arises not from any increase in international tensions but, rather, from the recent spectacular developments in weapons and methods of delivery.

The threat we face affords us only three basic alternatives. One extreme would be to hold our people subject to a rigid discipline, on the premise that a regimented citizenry would be better able to survive a nuclear attack. But this approach, continued, would destroy the America we are determined to preserve. The opposite extreme would be to accept the ultimate annihilation of all persons in urban target areas as unavoidable or too costly to prevent, and by this unwarranted decision remove the burdens and cares of a peacetime civil defense program. Of course, we reject both extremes. There is another way we must follow.

We must continue to avoid Federal preemption of all civil defense programs which are so dependent upon widespread citizen participation. But it is now evident that the exigencies of the present threat require vesting in the Federal Government a larger responsibility in our national plan of civil defense.

.....In the same vein, the heads of the various Federal departments and agencies were long ago instructed to give maximum support to the civil defense effort. Among the results of that directive is the incorporation by the Secretary of Defense of civil defense considerations in National Guard and other military reserve instruction. He has also ordered disaster plans to be formulated in direct concert with State and local officials, as well as the Federal Civil Defense Administration.....

.....But these efforts will still not meet our needs. The Federal civil defense law was written before the advent of the hydrogen bomb and the recent striking advances in methods of delivering modern weapons. This law must be realistically revised. Plans to meet post-attack situations are, of course, essential, but the Federal Civil Defense Administration needs authority to carry out necessary pre-attack preparations as well. It must be enabled to assure adequate participation in the civil defense program. It must be empowered to work out logical plans for possible target areas which overlap state and municipal boundaries. It must have an organization capable of discharging these increased responsibilities.
March 11, 1956

The President's News Conference (38)

Q. Charles S. von Fremd, CBS News: Mr. President, some members of a House subcommittee which is pursuing or examining the problems of civil defense believe, on the basis of testimony they have heard, that we do not have an adequate civil defense program today. Some Civil Defense officials have told them they can't get sufficient funds from Congress and, apparently, there is also a lack of volunteers in some parts of the country. Is there anything you think could or should be done to improve or strengthen civil defense?

THE PRESIDENT: I think if you would go back over the last 3 of these 43 years you are talking about, you would find that I have made several very eloquent speeches on this subject here in this room.

Civil defense by its very nature is a critical local problem....The people on the spot have got to take an interest or it cannot be done.

You could appropriate billions, you could put every kind of device and arrangement throughout this country, but unless people themselves will take the interest, and this means learning what they must do in the event of a catastrophe, civil defense will never reach the state of efficiency that it should.

....This thing is more serious, and here is the great reason that it is more serious: the more effective our civil defense, the greater is the deterrent power of this country against the outbreak of any war. The more that other people know that we take this thing seriously and are prepared to do what need be to defend ourselves, not only in the military sense but in our homes, in our cities, then once we get that started we will have no problem of getting the money for the mechanical defense of cities.....

July 17, 1956

Letter to Val Peterson, Administrator of Civil Defense, on the Occasion of Operation Alert 1956, (39)

Our unchanging national goal is a peaceful world community in which the vast human and material resources now being invested in offensive and defensive preparations can be turned to the good of mankind. But the lessons so harshly learned during the past few decades make it clear that, until a stable peace prevails in the world, we must stay strong and vigilant. Thus peace and preparedness are joined. Our civil defense program and its activities such as Operation Alert 1956 are essential to both. An effective civil defense is an important deterrent against attack on our country and thus helps preserve peace. In the event of an attack upon us, civil defense at once becomes one of our immediate reactions imperatively required for our nation's survival.
Moreover, the prestige and effectiveness of the Federal Civil Defense Administration must be equal to the heavy responsibility it holds. As a step in this direction, I have, for planning purposes, charged your organization, the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization with various basic functions which it is imperative be maintained in the event of attack.

Already you have been invited to attend and participate fully in those National Security Council meetings in which matters relevant to civil defense are discussed.

From now on I request that you also participate in Cabinet meetings to help ensure that the civil defense program is fully integrated into our national planning.

...One final thought I would like to express. Should an emergency occur, our nation's survival may be dependent upon the way each of us responds to his duty. In an area attacked, survival will initially rest mainly with the individual and the community. Therefore, to ensure civil defense readiness, the Federal Government, despite its increased civil defense role, must remain in partnership with States, cities and towns. Only in this way can we obtain more citizen participation, more vigorous efforts by States, local governments and metropolitan areas, and more readiness by the Congress to support necessary civil defense measures. Civil defense can never become an effective instrument for human survival if it becomes entirely dependent upon Federal action....

September 9, 1956

Statement by the President Marking the Opening of National Civil Defense Week. (140)

...Our purpose now is to be strong enough to preserve peace, for weakness and unreadiness invite attack. That is why last year I recommended, and the Congress approved, an appropriation of funds to enable the Federal Civil Defense Administration in cooperation with the several States, to work out detailed, flexible plans for the defense of our communities.

...You will also find that a strong local Civil Defense is a good investment in community readiness to meet any natural disaster....

...Through working together in Civil Defense...we make it plain, as only a united people can, that aggression will not pay; and by discouraging aggression we will strengthen the hands of men of good will in all nations....
September 15, 1957

Remarks Marking the Opening of National Civil Defense Week. (II)

The atom can be made to work usefully for mankind, for the good of all, instead of growing as a menace to our very existence. But until it is made so to work, and until the possibility of nuclear destruction is removed, it is of the utmost importance to all of us that we create and maintain a total national defense readiness.

We cannot permit weakness in either military or civil defense to tempt a reckless aggressor. Total readiness is the greatest deterrent to any aggression in the uncertain time that must endure until we can turn our atomic effort exclusively to the welfare of mankind. We must reach that state of readiness.

.....The Federal Civil Defense Administration shows us many ways we can help. Two are of the greatest importance.

One is to build into every agency of government the capacity to function effectively in any kind of disaster. As you know, the departments of the Federal government have been for some years developing programs to this end. It is my hope that our state and city authorities will take similar common sense precautions.

The second way in which we can ready ourselves for unforseen emergencies begins right in our own homes. Through family and community civil defense preparedness, in such things as first aid, home firefighting, and mass feeding, we will be better able to cope with every kind of emergency, including the natural disasters that each year take their tolls of life and property. In the home, at work, in schools, in all community affairs, we can make great contributions to the preparedness we should have.....
January 13, 1958

Annual Budget Message to the Congress - Fiscal Year 1959 (h2)

(In Millions)

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Civil Defense.—Our civilian defenses must be further strengthened through joint Federal-State action. To carry out this purpose, recommendations were transmitted to the last session of the Congress to provide for greater Federal sharing with the States of costs of civil defense personnel and administration and for placing added responsibility on the Federal Government for civil defense. New obligatory authority of $26 million is provided in the budget for the first-year cost of this legislation, which has been approved by the House of Representatives and is pending in the Senate.

Expenditures for activities designed to promote the defense of the civilian population against nuclear attack are estimated to be about the same in the fiscal year 1959 as in the current year. The question of a shelter program is under consideration and tests of various types of shelters are continuing. The budget provides for extending and improving the attack warning system, and for expanding research and training in civil defense problems. These increases will be offset by a temporary suspension of procurement of medical supplies.

The structure of Federal organization for the planning, coordination, and conduct of our nonmilitary defense programs has been reviewed, and I have concluded that the existing statutes assigning responsibilities for the central coordination and direction of these programs are out of date. The rapid technical advances of military science have led to a serious overlap among agencies carrying on these leadership and planning functions. Because the situation will continue to change and because these functions transcend the responsibility of any single department or agency, I have concluded that they should be vested in no one short of the President. I will make recommendations to the Congress on this subject.

April 21, 1958

Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan I of 1958 (h3)

I transmit herewith Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, prepared in accordance with the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended. The reorganization plan provides new arrangements for the conduct of Federal defense mobilization and civil defense functions.
1958 - continued

...The principal effects of the reorganization plan are:

First, it transfers to the President the functions vested by law in the
Federal Civil Defense Administration and those so vested in the Office of
Defense Mobilization. The result is to establish a single pattern with re-
spect to the vesting of defense mobilization and civil defense functions.

...Under the plan, the broad program responsibilities for coordinating and
conducting the inter-related defense mobilization and civil-defense functions
will be vested in the President for appropriate delegation as the rapidly
changing character of the nonmilitary preparedness program warrants.

Second, the reorganization plan consolidates the Office of Defense Mobili-
zation and the Federal Civil Defense Administration to form a new Office of
Defense and Civilian Mobilization in the Executive Office of the President.
I have concluded that, in many instances, the interests and activities of
the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administra-
tion overlap to such a degree that it is not possible to work out a satisfac-
tory division of those activities and interests between the two agencies.

...Third, the reorganization plan transfers the membership of the Director
of the Office of Defense Mobilization on the National Security Council to the
Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization and also transfers
the Civil Defense Advisory Council to the Office of Defense and Civilian
Mobilization.

Initially, the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization will perform the
civil defense and defense mobilization functions now performed by the Office of
Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration. One of its
first tasks will be to advise me with respect to the actions to be taken to
clarify and expand the roles of the Federal departments and agencies in carrying
out nonmilitary defense preparedness functions. After such actions are taken,
the direction and coordination of the civil defense and defense mobilization
activities assigned to the departments and agencies will comprise a principal
remaining responsibility of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization....

Note: Reorganization Plan I of 1958 became effective on July 1, 1958.

June 24, 1958

Letter to Leo A Hoepfl, Administrator of Federal Civil Defense, on His
Becoming Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization. (hh)

...This closer association of civil defense with our other mobilization
programs should assure more rapid progress in fulfilling our national mobili-
zation objectives than has been possible heretofore....

Note: On August 26 this office was redesignated Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization (Public Law 85-763, 72 Stat. 861.)
January 19, 1959

Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1960. (15)

(In Millions)

<table>
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CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 merged the former Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration into the new Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. This merger is now substantially completed and permits improved coordination of our non-military defense. New obligatory authority of $87 million is recommended for 1960.

Methods for formalizing the means by which the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization utilizes appropriate resources of other departments and agencies are now being studied. The OCDM budget includes $12 million for financing the assigned responsibilities of such agencies in civil defense and mobilization programs.

It also includes $21 million to carry out legislation enacted last year for sharing with the states the cost of civil defense personnel and administration, and for providing radiological monitoring devices to states and cities for training and operational use.

During the past year the administration accelerated a program of public education on the effects of fallout with the aim of stimulating preparations for fallout protection. The new obligatory authority for OCDM includes $11 million for the continuing support of this program and for research and demonstration on shelters.

May 13, 1959

Remarks at the Semi-annual Conference of State Civil Defense Directors. (16)

......I am particularly pleased with the legislation that makes us partners, the Federal Government with the States and localities, well recognizing that the main responsibility for implementation of responsibility rests with the locality which is to be protected.

......This is the job that means the greater assurance for America of its security -- our national security. It is a very essential part of our security arrangements and activities.....
January 18, 1960.

Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1961. (47)

(In Millions)

<table>
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CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION. - Preparations for nonmilitary defense have been seriously hindered by the unwillingness of Congress to provide appropriations to carry out programs authorized by the 1958 amendments to the Federal Civil Defense Act. Funds are again being requested for 1961, as well as in a supplemental appropriation for 1960, to help States and localities strengthen their full-time civil defense organizations. Increased funds are also required to finance greater purchases of radiological instruments for donation to the States; for expansion of the emergency preparedness activities of other Federal agencies; and to carry on the national fallout shelter policy.

In accordance with the national fallout shelter policy, the Federal departments and agencies have been directed to include fallout shelters when appropriate in the design of new buildings for civilian use, and funds for such shelters are included in the budget requests of the various agencies. In addition, the budget of the General Services Administration includes $6 million for a new fallout shelter program at certain Federal relocation sites and in some existing Federal buildings.

May 12, 1960

Statement by the President Upon Signing the Independent Offices Appropriation Act. (48)

I have today approved H.R. 11776, the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1961.

In enacting this law the Congress refused to provide recommended funds which would have enabled the General Services Administration, at small cost, to include fallout shelters in certain appropriate new and existing Federal buildings. In fact, by a general provision, the law actually precludes the construction of fallout shelters in Government-owned or leased buildings unless specifically authorized.

It is an aspect of the Federal Government's policy in this area to provide leadership by example. The incorporation of fallout shelters in appropriate new and existing Federal buildings is intended to stimulate State and local governments and the public to undertake shelter projects on their own initiative.
1960 - 1961 continued

State Governors attending a recent White House meeting on civil defense unanimously agreed that providing protection from fallout was an essential requirement of national policy. Last year, in Puerto Rico, and again this year in Montana, the Governors' Conference reached the same conclusion.

The Congress accordingly should appropriate the omitted funds when it convenes again in August. Such positive action would be in the best interest of our national security.

December 30, 1960

Letter Accepting Resignation of Leo A. Hoehn as Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. (19)

......I was particularly pleased to note in your report that the National Shelter Policy, issued in May 1958, has already resulted in the construction of over one million family fallout shelters, that, under the National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, all states and 2500 county and city governments have completed Survival Plans, and that 38 states now have adopted continuity of government measures. Today, OCDM officers could, in the event of dire emergency, warn all states and hundreds of local areas within 15 seconds after an attack is detected. More than half the Nation's high schools have received radiological instruments for instruction; more than 25,000 leaders have received training at the OCDM Staff College; 20 million Americans have received written instruction on fallout shelters. These are some of the outstanding achievements for which you deserve the grateful thanks of the Nation.....

January 12, 1961

Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union. (50)

......United States civil defense and nonmilitary defense capacity has been greatly strengthened and these activities have been consolidated in one Federal agency.....

January 16, 1961

Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1962. (51)

CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION. - Prudent concern for the protection of the civilian population from hazards in a nuclear world makes it necessary to recommend increases for 1962 in appropriations for civil defense. The largest increases for nonmilitary defense will provide funds for increasing medical stockpiles and for the first full-year cost of a program begun in 1961 to match State and local costs for civil defense personnel and administration. Additional funds are also requested for procurement of radiological equipment and for strengthening Federal activities in emergency health and manpower programs.
The Congress and the executive branch have recognized that civil defense is the joint responsibility of Federal, State, and local governments. As exercise of its partnership, the Federal Government has, by leadership and example, implemented a national shelter policy, which recognizes the fallout shelter as the best single nonmilitary defense measure for the protection of the greatest number of people. Under this policy the Federal Government has instructed people in protective measures, conducted a sample survey of existing shelter capabilities, accelerated shelter research, and constructed prototype shelters for example and guidance. Moreover, the Congress has been urged to provide funds for inclusion of fallout shelters in appropriate new and existing Federal buildings. Funds and appropriate legislation are being requested to accelerate these activities in 1962.

In order to strengthen the program, legislation is being proposed to require appropriate fallout shelters in certain new private construction where the Federal Government provides some form of financial assistance. This legislation will also provide for a 1-year program of grants to States to assist in the construction of fallout protection shelters in selected State buildings. Upon the enactment of this legislation supplemental appropriations will be required.

(In millions)

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Recommended new obligation authority for 1962
January 23, 1961

Statement by the President Concerning the Appointment of Frank B. Ellis
As Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. (52)

OCDM as presently constituted is charged with the staff function of
mobilization planning and, at the same time, with the operating functions
of civilian defense. Both of these tasks are of vital importance to our
national security. I consider it imperative that they be organized and
performed with maximum effectiveness. Accordingly, I am asking Mr. Ellis,
as his first order of business, to join with the Director of the Budget in
a thorough going review of our nonmilitary defense and mobilization programs.

April 28, 1961

Remarks Recorded for Broadcast During the Annual Civil Defense Exercises. (53)

The annual civil defense exercise of which this broadcast is a part is
a test of our program of peaceful preparedness. We do not expect war. How-
ever, common prudence demands that we take all necessary measures to protect
our homes, our institutions, and our way of life, so that they can survive
should an enemy thrust war upon us.

Should the United States ever be subjected to direct enemy attack
Conelrad and the National Emergency Broadcasting System will be vital to our
defense.... The voluntary participation of the radio and television broad-
casters of the nation at their own expense is a commendable example of in-
dividual responsibility which is so essential to the survival of this Nation.

In the whole area of civil defense there is the same requirement. It is
true that your government, too, must fulfill its responsibility in civil de-
fense with vigorous leadership. To this end, I have directed an intensive study
of the whole subject of emergency planning. It is also true, however, that
individual preparedness, which is beyond the province of government, is
essential to an effective civil defense. For unless individual Americans plan
to protect their own families -- the most ambitious and carefully organized
activities of government will prove inadequate....

....Therefore, I ask you to support civil emergency planning in your
local communities.

May 25, 1961

Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs. (54)

One major element of the national security program which this nation has
never squarely faced up to is civil defense. This problem arises not from
present trends but from national inaction in which most of us have partici-
pated. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety of
programs, but we have never adopted a consistent policy....
This Administration has been looking hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack.

We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is so strong and so invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response. If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute.

But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men.... It is on this basis that civil defense can be readily justifiable - as insurance for the civilian population in case of an enemy miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed - but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.

Once the validity of this concept is recognized there is no point in delaying the initiation of a nation-wide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures. Such a program would protect millions of people against the hazards of radioactive fallout in the event of large-scale nuclear attack. Effective performance of the entire program not only requires new legislative authority and more funds, but also sound organizational arrangements.

Therefore, under the authority vested in me by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, I am assigning responsibility for this program to the top civilian authority already responsible for continental defense, the Secretary of Defense. It is important that this function remain civilian, in nature and leadership; and this feature will not be changed.

The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization will be reconstituted as a small staff agency to assist in the coordination of these functions. To more accurately describe its role, its title should be changed to the Office of Emergency Planning.

As soon as those newly charged with these responsibilities have prepared new authorization and appropriation requests, such requests will be transmitted to the Congress for a much strengthened Federal-State civil defense program. Such a program will provide Federal funds for identifying fallout shelter capacity in existing structures, and it will include, where appropriate, incorporation of shelter in Federal buildings, new requirements for shelter in buildings constructed with Federal assistance, and matching grants and other incentives for constructing shelter in State and local and private buildings.

Federal appropriations for civil defense in fiscal 1962 under this program will be in all likelihood more than triple the pending budget requests; and they will increase sharply in subsequent years. Financial participation will also be required from State and local governments and from private citizens....
July 20, 1961

Statement by the President Upon Issuing Order Assigning Major Responsibility for Civil Defense to the Secretary of Defense. (55)

More than ever, a strong civil defense program is vital to the Nation’s security....

.....In calling upon the resources of the Department of Defense to stimulate and invigorate our civil defense preparations, I am acting under the basic Federal premise that responsibility for the accomplishment of civil defense preparations at the Federal level is vested in me. In the States and localities, similar responsibilities are vested in the governors and local executives....

.....Civil defense.....reaches into virtually every phase of our government and of our national life. I shall accordingly be actively concerned with the problem of coordinating our civil defense preparations with other non-military defense preparations required to achieve a strong position for our Nation.....

July 25, 1961

Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis. (56)

We have another sober responsibility. To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do and where they should go if bombs begin to fall would be a failure of responsibility. In May, I pledged a new start on Civil Defense. Last week, I assigned, on the recommendation of the Civil Defense Director, basic responsibility for this program to the Secretary of Defense, to make certain it is administered and coordinated with our continental defense efforts at the highest civilian level. Tomorrow, I am requesting of the Congress new funds for the following immediate objectives: to identify and mark space in existing structures--public and private--that could be used for fall-out shelters in case of attack; to stock those shelters with food, water, first-aid kits and other minimum essentials for survival; to increase their capacity; to improve our air raid warning and fall-out detection systems, including a new household warning system which is now under development; and to take other measures that will be effective at an early date to save millions of lives if needed.

In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved -- if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available. We owe that kind of insurance to our families -- and to our country.....

.....The addition of $207 million in Civil Defense appropriations brings our total new defense budget requests to $3,454 billion, and a total of $47.5 billion for the year.....
September 22, 1961

Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Relating to the Office of Emergency Planning. (57)

I have today approved H.R. 8406, a bill "To Change the Name of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to Office of Emergency Planning."

Effective August 1, I assigned to the Secretary of Defense major Federal responsibilities for civil defense.....

October 6, 1961

Letter to the Members of the Committee on Civil Defense of the Governors' Conference (50)

.....There is need for a nationwide understanding of what each level of government, each private organization and each citizen can do to bring about and maintain the best attainable protection for the civilian population against the major effects of a thermonuclear attack. Information is in preparation which I will use to inform the American people on what individuals should know and can do for their own protection. In the meantime, your committee may wish to inform the Governors of the goal towards which the Federal Government, the state governments, industry and other institutions in the United States should work.

In simple terms, this goal is to reach for fallout protection for every American as rapidly as possible. Radioactive fallout.....could account for the major part of the casualties which might result from a thermonuclear attack on an unprotected population.....

The Federal Government is moving forward to bring into operation fallout shelter space for large groups of people under very austere conditions. Many homeowners, communities and business firms can and will provide more adequate and better located shelter space for their own needs. The Federal Government is backing this effort with a massive dissemination of technical information. In addition, we will inform those who cannot afford costly structures on low-cost methods of improvising shielding against fallout radiation.....

.....The state governments have a vital role to play in accelerating attainment of the goal of full fallout protection. Shelter can be provided in new construction of state and local public buildings. State and municipal laws and ordinances can be adapted to encourage private initiative in this effort. State and local leadership in organizing people to prepare, and communities to cooperate, during and immediately after an attack is a cornerstone of any successful civil defense effort.....
October 11, 1961

The President's News Conference. (59)

Q. Mr. President, I believe recently you spoke to a group of New Jersey publishers about your forthcoming plan involving fallout shelters that might be quite economical. In this general range of interest, sir, do you have personally fallout shelters in any of the residences that you frequently use.....

THE PRESIDENT:.....But I would say that there are naturally provisions for the protection of those in the Presidency and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others who would have to maintain responsibility in case of a military action.....

.....Obviously you cannot build a shelter in the accepted sense of the word for the kind of money which we have talked about. But we can provide directions whereby a family can take steps to protect themselves on a minimum basis.....

.....My own feeling is that these shelters are most useful and most important, and we're going to live through a long period of constant tension with these dangerous weapons which will be proliferating, and, therefore, anything that we can do to increase the chances of protection for our families ought to be done.

November 8, 1961

The President's News Conference. (60)

Q. Mr. President, there is a great deal of confusion among the public in regard to fallout shelters. Many people--people apparently aren't sold on building home shelters. Do you have any comment that might be helpful today on any aspect of this matter?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, of course, as you know, none of us were really interested -- I think that includes us all -- in civil defense really until this summer and until we began to recognize the change in weapon technology which gave the Soviet Union the power to reach the United States with missiles as well as bombers, the destructive nature of the weapons, and also the fact that our two systems were in conflict in various areas.

We asked for additional appropriations, therefore, this summer for civil defense. We are -- we asked for five times and received five times as much as we had the previous year.....I stated that in July -- that we were going to send a book giving the latest information that we had to every household, and I'm hopeful that that book will be completed before the end of this month.
.....But it was not really, in my opinion, until August that this became a matter of great public urgency. The responsibility for shelters was then transferred to the Department of Defense and I believe that the booklet will be helpful, but it will be a -- must be recognized that each family, each community, each State, and the Federal Government are all going to have a role, and we desire to interpret that role with precision so that we are moving ahead on it.

November 29, 1961

The President’s News Conference.  (61)

Q. Mr. President, in attempts to clarify your civil defense policy, it's been reported that you favor community shelter, fallout shelters, over the private shelters. If this was so, could you give us some of your reasoning behind that move?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, we have never thought that the Government could engage in the task of building shelters in each home because it would be a diversion of our resources and would vitally affect our deterrent strength which remains our best hope of avoiding a nuclear exchange. So that we have stated from the beginning and the decisions made last spring and summer in regard to the markings of available shelters emphasize the community structure.

We made some decisions in regard to Federal policy in relation to community shelters last Friday. We are now going to talk to some of the Governors who are directly concerned and involved in this matter because it requires cooperation between the Federal Government, the State, and the communities so that we will have a program and a budget to send to the Congress in January.

The emphasis will be on community shelters, and information will be made available to the individual as to what he could do within his own home. But the central responsibility, it seems to me, is for us to provide community shelters.....

November 29, 1961

The President’s News Conference.  (62)

Q. Mr. President, earlier you said that information would be made available to private citizens as to what they can do individually to protect against fallout. Do you have an opinion as to whether individuals should build private shelters or not?

THE PRESIDENT. I stated that we are going to send out a booklet when it is ready. I hoped it would be ready by the end of November. The booklet will reflect the decisions we made in November, and I think it will tell them what the Federal policy will be; what we hope to do, and what each individual can do in his own home, which will provide greater assurances if an attack should come.
I want to emphasize that the best defense still remains the American deterrent.

But I do think that within each individual home that some steps can be taken which are not expensive, but which would, if a disaster should strike us, provide a greater security, though of course, there is no security against blast.....

December 11, 1961

Letter to Governor Rockefeller on Civil Defense  (63)

.....I have assigned responsibility for the shelter program to the Department of Defense to underline the fact that a civil defense effort must be kept in proper perspective in relation to our other defense efforts, as well as because of the organizational and technical capabilities which that Department possesses.....
January 11, 1962

Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (64)

...The Nation's first serious civil defense shelter program is under way, identifying, marking, and stocking 50 million spaces; and I urge your approval of Federal incentives for the construction of public fallout shelters in schools and hospitals and similar centers.

January 13, 1962

Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1963 (65)

NATIONAL DEFENSE...The key elements in our defense program include:...

The budget for the current year provides for identifying and marking available civilian shelter space for approximately 50 million people. This phase of the civil defense program is proceeding ahead of schedule. For 1963, I am requesting nearly $700 million for civil defense activities of the Department of Defense, including $460 million for a new cost-sharing program with State and local governments and private organizations to provide shelters in selected community buildings, such as schools and hospitals....

July 5, 1962

The President's News Conference (66)

Q. Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee has not scheduled any hearings on your request for $460 million for a big fallout shelter program, and apparently it has had no prodding from you. My question is, do you expect to renew your appeal for this program?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I have talked to the responsible officials involved. I hope the hearings are held. I hope they can be held this month. I hope we'll secure the money we requested. As you know, within the last ten days I've sent up a supplemental appropriation request for around $35 million for the distribution of food throughout the country, which would be available in case of an attack....

...I think we ought to take the action recommended by the administration. It may be that there does not seem to appear to be a need as of today, but that does not mean that there may not be need for it at a later date. Then everyone will wonder why wasn't more done. I think the time to do it is now.

Under the program which we started some months ago, nearly 60 million shelters have been identified. We want to have food in them and other necessities, and I'm hopeful that the Congress will implement the program we have sent up.
1962 - continued

August 3, 1962

Letter to the Chairman of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees on Civil Defense (67)

Legislation and appropriations are pending before the Congress on Civil Defense programs which would greatly increase the capacity of this country to survive and recover after a nuclear blow. I wish again to state my view that, in these times, the Federal Government has an inescapable responsibility to take practical and sensible measures to minimize loss of life in the event of nuclear attack, to continue the essential functions of the Government, and to provide a base for our survival and recovery as a nation. These matters are an integral part of a balanced defense program for the security of our nation.

...It is important that we overcome our natural tendency to put off making preparations for a contingency which is both awful and unlikely.

Last year I sent to the Congress a program embodying my views of what is a sensible and practical program, which focused on protecting as many of our people as possible against lethal fallout radiation. The Secretary of Defense and my other senior advisors on this subject had intensively reviewed what is known and what is not known about the possible effects of nuclear warfare. The conclusion was clear that, for the foreseeable future, under a wide range of attack assumptions, large numbers of lives could be saved by adequate fallout shelter space. Postponement of practical measures to shield our people from fallout radiation cannot be justified by the inevitable imponderables and the continuing need for a greater research effort....Nothing in the studies that have been made since last year's decisions justifies change of the program which we have proposed.

The Defense Department survey, which was the first step in our new program, reveals that we already have enough shelter space for 60 million people which needs only to be marked and provisioned. Funds made available for fiscal year 1962 have financed completion of the survey and procurement of over half of the necessary provisions. Thus we are beyond debating whether to create public shelter systems; we have now done it as a result of the action taken by Congress at my request last summer. When we complete this task, the chances of survival of tens of millions of Americans will be improved at a cost of $3 to $4 for each person....

Communities planning to create an effective shelter program founded on space identified in the national survey must be able to act in reliance on the Federal Government to carry out announced plans to deliver shelter supplies, improve the warning system, a radiological monitoring net, protect emergency broadcasting stations, and provide training materials and instructor training to meet the need for specialized skills in each shelter. The Defense Department is dependent upon the pending $235 million appropriation request to carry out the Federal Government's share in this undertaking.
1962 - continued

Municipal governments and building owners around the country are now faced with the difficult task of working out the details of making effective use of the surveyed shelter space. This will be our country's first experience with the practical problems of sheltering large numbers of people.

I particularly wish to call attention to the importance of continuing last year's program for adding low-cost fallout shelter space to suitable buildings owned or leased by the Federal Government. Failure of federal, state and local governments to provide shelter space in public buildings makes it difficult to communicate to our citizens the priority which this type of protection must command.

The second phase of the new civil defense program will provide financial help to schools, hospitals and similar non-profit institutions electing to include fallout shelter space needed in their buildings. It requires legislation which is pending before the two Armed Services Committees and, therefore, is not effectively before the Appropriation Subcommittees.

A decision to put public money into shelters in privately owned buildings is a difficult one which deserves deliberate and careful scrutiny by the appropriate committees of Congress. I had hoped that hearings for this purpose would have taken place earlier in this session when there was time and an opportunity to give the matter the necessary attention. I am requesting that these hearings be held early enough to enable a supplement request for enough FY 1963 funds to keep pace with those communities and eligible institutions with plans for creating new fallout shelter spaces.
January 17, 1963

Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1964 (68)

NATIONAL DEFENSE....The 1964 budget proposals for national defense continue the emphasis which in recent years we have placed on:

....A Civil defense fallout shelter program to improve the chances that a large portion of our population would survive a possible nuclear attack....

February 26, 1963

Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights (69)

VI. Other Uses of Federal Funds

The basic standard of non-discrimination—which I earlier stated has now been applied by the Executive Branch to every area of its activity—affects other programs not listed above:

...Although President Truman ordered the armed services of this country desegregated in 1948, it was necessary in 1962 to bar segregation formally and specifically in the Army and Air Force Reserves and in the training of all civil defense workers...

May 8, 1963

Message to the Conference of State Civil Defense Directors (70)

....Federal, State, and local governments each have immense and inescapable responsibilities to prepare for survival and recovery from the kinds of attack which must be faced as real possibilities, however unlikely, over the years ahead. Major responsibility for the survival part of this difficult task was assigned in August 1961 to the newly created Office of Civil Defense in the Department of Defense; major responsibility for recovery planning was assigned at the same time to the newly created Office of Emergency Planning in the Executive Office of the President. Many of you are Emergency Planning Directors, as well, and have first hand experience with both aspects of these problems.

Since that time, a sensible and practical civil defense program has been developed which has the potential of saving tens of millions of lives which would be exposed to lethal fallout radiation in the event of a major nuclear attack on the United States. This program does not purport to offer security under these dreadful conditions, but it does significantly improve the chances of survival of our people as individuals and as communities, and thus of national survival and recovery.
The new Federal civil defense program has been in operation for only a little over a year. The first stage of the program has concentrated on finding and making effective use of the already existing shelter space for over 100 million people.

One of the most heartening developments this year has been the widespread willingness of building owners to permit their buildings to be marked and used as public shelters and to donate valuable space to the storage of shelter supplies, without any compensation except the satisfaction of knowing that they are contributing to the safety of their communities and defense of their country.

Progress in the new civil defense program has precipitated crucial decisions for civil defense which confront State and local governments and the Congress this year.

Congress faces the requirement for additional funds to complete the financing of the last third of the shelter supplies needed to provision surveyed shelter space over the year ahead for an estimated 70 million people. County and municipal budgets must carry the costs of installing these supplies. There is every reason to believe that this essential operation will be successfully concluded.

The next stage of this nationwide effort will require additional Federal financial assistance to communities and institutions planning to meet the local deficiency in shelter space which has been defined for the first time by the recently completed survey.

I am confident that there will soon be a careful congressional review of the civil defense problem, and I hope it will lead the Congress to the same general conclusions which have appeared inescapable to the Secretary of Defense and to me. These conclusions form the basis for the program which is already well started.

The significance of these pending decisions should be clearly understood. We are forced to spend over $50 billion this year for defense and to press forward with every opportunity to maintain the peace and protect our people and institutions. A fallout shelter oriented civil defense program is a necessary element in this balanced effort to maintain an effective national security posture.

Because it involves the direct participation of the American people in preparation for the possibility of a war we seek to avoid, civil defense quite naturally evokes conflicting emotions and attitudes. Federal leadership in civil defense, therefore, must be shared by the Congress. I believe our people have a right to expect to be led and not followed by their Government in matters of national defense.
There is every reason to believe that the balanced search for peace through diplomacy, military strength and economic progress will prevent nuclear war and perhaps in the years ahead reduce the risk under which we live today. We know from recent experience how real these risks are and in the years ahead we must face the fact that they may well increase if the control of nuclear weapons spreads to more nations and possibly less responsible hands.

For this reason, it makes sense to work today toward more effective civil defense tomorrow. The present national civil defense program is a soundly conceived and practical minimum effort in this direction. I consider this program a sensible and necessary undertaking in which the Federal Government has clear responsibility to provide consistent and continuing leadership, including the necessary financial support without which the States, counties, and local communities cannot meet their responsibilities...
January 21, 1964

Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1965

...To reinforce the total defense effort, the Congress should authorize funds for fallout shelters in public buildings, schools, hospitals, and other nonprofit institutions...

...Our inventories of strategic and critical materials are being reviewed to assure that they are necessary for current civil and military defense requirements. I recommend that the Congress enact legislation to improve the management of these materials and simplify the disposal of those no longer needed...

CIVIL DEFENSE--An effective civil defense program is an important element of our total defense effort. It aims at the achievement of a nationwide fallout shelter system. The 1965 program is based on enactment of legislation similar to that proposed last year to provide Federal assistance for fallout shelters in public buildings, schools, hospitals, and other non-profit institutions. Total obligational availability of $0.4 billion is proposed for the civil defense program for 1965, compared with $0.1 billion in 1964.

The 1965 program also provides for continued work on systems to warn the population of an attack, equipment for monitoring the level of radioactivity, construction of protected regional centers for emergency governmental operation, training and education for emergency preparedness, research and development, financial assistance to the States, and procurement of provisions for fallout shelter spaces. The nationwide shelter survey, under which 104 million spaces have already been identified, will continue...
References


(2). Ibid., p. 81.


(7). Ibid., p. 5148.


(16). Ibid., pp. 75-76.

(17). Ibid., pp. 113-114.

(18). Ibid., p. 312.


(20). Ibid., p. 613.


(22). Ibid., pp. 827-829.


(26). Ibid., p. 447.

(27). Ibid., p. 784.


(30). Ibid., p. 119.


(32). Ibid., p. 519.

(33). Ibid., pp. 671-672.

(34). Ibid., pp. 674-675.


(37). Ibid., p. 203.


(40). Ibid., pp. 718-719.


(44). Ibid., p. 498.


(49). Ibid., p. 384.

(50). Ibid., p. 918.

(51). Ibid., p. 971, pp. 981-985.


(55). Ibid., p. 525.

(56). Ibid., pp. 536-537.

(57). Ibid., p. 618.


(60). Ibid., pp. 705-706.

(61). Ibid., pp. 761-762.


(63). Ibid., p. 798.


(65). Ibid., p. 28.

(66). Ibid., p. 543.


(69). Ibid., p. 229.

(70). Ibid., pp. 369-370.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR TABLES
AIPO, Unpublished data.

The American Institute of Public Opinion has provided data from a number of their national samples. Each table included from the various AIPO studies is identified by the pertinent study number and the date of data collection. The processing of the raw data into tabular form was done at the Research Office of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh.


National probability sample of 1474 respondents.
Data collected September-October 1961.

Interviewing was conducted from late September to late October on public acceptance of shelters, anxiety over the Cold War and various possible solutions to the problems associated with it. This is a preliminary report.


A total of 1828 personal interviews were conducted in nine northeastern communities, 110 of these interviews were with community leaders, the rest (1718) of the interviews were with the general public. The sample was heavily weighted with shelter owners and their neighbors.

The nine communities under study were Harlem, N.Y.; Chicopee, Massachusetts; West Orange, New Jersey; Union City, New Jersey; Greenwich, Connecticut; Stamford, Connecticut; Lancaster, Pennsylvania; York, Pennsylvania; Port Jervis, New York.

Interviews were conducted in January, February and March 1963.

Study analyzes the beliefs, opinions, and behavior of the general public and of community leaders regarding international affairs and the Cold War, with a particular focus upon their views on the fallout-shelter
issue, i.e., are reactions of communities that are potential targets in a nuclear war different from those in less vulnerable towns, who favor and who oppose fallout shelters, etc.


Nine community sample of 1382 respondents.

These tables are from a "cross-section" of an elaborate community sample design in nine communities within a 150 mile radius of New York City. The communities varied in socio-economic characteristics and objective "target" vulnerability. This codebook consists primarily of marginal response tables rather than analysis.


Purposive sample of 372 households.
Data collected April, 1961.

Joint effort of the staff and students at The George Washington University from a complete listing of the occupied homes in the school district (1120) arranged in geographical order, every third one was selected for an interview.

Attitudes and Knowledge Concerning Fallout Shelters in Austin, Texas, by Harry Estill Moore, January, 1962.

Purposive community panel of 500 respondents.
Data collected late 1961.

Panels of 200 persons in leadership roles in recognized institutions and of 300 persons chosen by random sampling methods as representative of the total population of the city were interviewed in Autumn, 1961.

Community mail survey of 437 respondents.
Data collected in March, 1962.

Students in a seminar on social research at Smith College mailed questionnaires about civil defense, the building of shelters, and the arms race to 1194 randomly selected adult residents of Northampton on March 22, 1962. 437 completed questionnaires were returned.

Civil Defense and Cold War Attitudes: Data Book for the 1963 National Probability Sample, Department of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, June, 1964.

National probability block sample of 1434 respondents.
Data collected in summer, 1963.

This data book contains the study design and marginal tabulations from the mid-1963 Foreign Affairs and Civil Defense national survey for the Office of Civil Defense. The outcomes methodology was applied to desirabilities and expectations of alternative civil defense postures as well as to Cold War outcomes. A variety of scales and items from other civil defense inquiries were replicated.


Two-community probability sample.
Data collected late 1962.

Case study of two communities, Livermore, California and Norwalk, Connecticut which had been involved in substantial public discussion of community shelter programs and appeared to be on the verge of constructing shelters on a community-wide basis. The primary purpose of the study was to investigate the adoption-diffusion, social action and decision-making processes about community shelter programs.

Probability samples of 441 and 250 were obtained from Livermore and Norwalk respectively in late 1962.
During the interviewing at Livermore, the Cuban crisis broke. In response to this event, 199 people who had already been interviewed were reinterviewed.


Purposive sample of 214 students.
Data collected October, 1962.

The study was launched October 22 on President Kennedy's announcement of the Cuban crisis. The standard cold war outcomes schedule was administered to a sample of high school seniors, college students and foreign students. To this standard questionnaire were added twelve alternative futures of the Cuban quarantine and eighteen alternative Civil Defense postures.


These tables are derived from the data obtained from a followup of *The Cuban Crisis: Meaning and Impact* by J. Nehnevajsa and M. Berkowitz at the University of Pittsburgh. Some of the original respondents were re-interviewed and the results from incorporation of related items into ongoing research are also included.


Probability block sample of 614 people in eleven metropolitan areas.
Data collected August-September, 1951.

A cross-section of the adult population of the 11 largest metropolitan areas of the United States: New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Detroit, Boston, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, St. Louis, Cleveland, and San Francisco and their suburbs.

In 1950 a prior study was done using a cross-section of the adult population of the above cities without the suburbs. Both studies are based on open-ended interviews administered to a probability block sample in each metropolitan area.
Differential Reactions to the Fallout-Shelter Issue: Gene Levine, BASR, Columbia University; a paper delivered at AAPOR, May 9, 1964.

1382 respondents comprising a "cross-section" of a nine-community study and questions on a national sample of 1482. Data collected early 1963.

Households where building permits for shelters had been issued were oversampled in the nine communities as were related neighborhood clusters. The towns varied in possible risk of damage from an attack. Four questions were replicated in a simultaneous national sample to obtain comparable national norms. This is essentially the same study as The American Public and the Fallout-Shelter Issue by G. Levine with J. Modell.

"Facts, Beliefs and Baloney About the Cold War Public," by Andrea Modigliani, Council for Correspondence Newsletter, No. 24, March, 1963.


A survey conducted in Watertown, Massachusetts during December and January 1961-1962. The sample, gathered by door-to-door interviewing consisted of 121 respondents. The sampling method consisted in choosing an area of eight square blocks and then proceeding to sample from various blocks within it.


Telephone interviews in eight cities, 3514 respondents. Data collected December 1961.

Eight cities within the United States selected on the criteria of size and geographical location: Minneapolis; Boston; Oklahoma City; Santa Monica, California; Lansing; Manhattan, Kansas; Chapel Hill, North Carolina; and Seattle.
For each city, pages of the telephone directory were selected randomly and every nth name from the top of each was selected as a respondent. A total of 3514 people were contacted.

Respondents were contacted by telephone interviewers. Telephone interviews required approximately twenty minutes.

Interviews were conducted in the third week of December, 1961, approximately two weeks before the public issuance of the **Fallout Protection Booklet**.


Telephone interviews in eight cities, 3514 respondents. Data collected December, 1961.

Sample the same as in Report # 1--3,514 adults who were interviewed by telephone in December of 1961 in eight American cities: Minneapolis; Boston; Oklahoma City; Santa Monica, California; Lansing; Manhattan, Kansas; Chapel Hill, North Carolina; and Seattle.

The analysis is based on the samples' responses to questions on plans for shelter building.


A sample of 249 communities from a sampling frame of civil divisions within 150 mile radius of mid-Manhattan--excluding New York City and Philadelphia. In addition to census and target rating data for each community, replies from questionnaires mailed in the summer of 1962 were obtained for 183 building inspectors, 222 postmasters, and 157 local civil defense directors from the communities.

Two mail surveys; one of 727 respondents in early 1962 and one of 210 in July 1962.

In early 1962, a civil defense official Sgt. Michels in Haworth, New Jersey mailed a questionnaire to each of the some 900 families resident in the town. He received 727 replies.

The BASR tabulated the data and sent a further questionnaire to the original respondents who had written their names and addresses. With one mailing in July, 1962, 210 persons responded.


A total of 1828 personal interviews were conducted in nine northeastern communities, 110 of these interviews were with community leaders, the rest (1718) of the interviews were with the general public. The sample was heavily weighted with shelter owners and their neighbors.

The nine communities under study were Harlem, New York; Chicopee, Massachusetts; West Orange, New Jersey; Union City, New Jersey; Greenwich, Connecticut; Stamford, Connecticut; Lancaster Pennsylvania; York, Pennsylvania; Port Jervis, New York.

Interviews were conducted in January, February and March 1963.

Study analyzes the beliefs, opinions, and behavior of the general public and of community leaders regarding international affairs and the Cold War, with a particular focus upon their views on the fallout-shelter issue, i.e., are reactions of communities that are potential targets in a nuclear war different from those in less vulnerable towns, who favor and who oppose fallout shelters, etc.
Interim Report of the ABO Project, Lutz, F. W., and Lutz, S. B.,

Purposive sample of 590 pupils and 60 teachers in four elementary schools.

Four elementary schools in the Artesia, New Mexico School District were examined. One, the Abo Elementary School and Fallout Shelter is completely underground. Another, Yucca, is windowless, and the remaining two, Central and Hermosa are conventional structures. A total sample of 590 pupils were tested on a number of performance, personality, and achievement scales. All sixty teachers involved were also tested for anxiety and attitudes.

Minnesota Poll, Unpublished data.

Each week a probability sample is made of the population of the state of Minnesota on the current issues of importance. The raw data from a number of these has been processed by the Research Office of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh. Each table from the Minnesota poll is identified by its date and sample size.

The NEAR System: A Study in Public Acceptance, Jiri Nehnevajsa,
Department of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,

National probability block sample of 1402 respondents.
Data collected December, 1963.

This research sought to determine the acceptability of a NEAR receiver to the American public. Acceptability was assessed under varying modes and costs of distribution and were contingent upon evaluations by the sample of the overall Cold War environment and civil defense considerations in general. Outcomes methodology was utilized to evaluate relative desirabilities and expectations.


This is the code-data book for the Research Office of Sociology study of public attitudes towards the cold war and civil defense, in general, and the NEAR attack warning system for households, in particular. The outcomes methodology of specifying desirability and probability expectations was used.


Opinion surveys taken by 41 Congressmen.

Polls were mailed to constituents by the Congressmen ostensibly to solicit opinion on the key issues before the national legislature.

Little, if any, scientific sampling procedure was used.

A total of 100 poll tabulations were obtained from the Congressmen and the data in the report is drawn from 41 of these; the 41 polls were those received which contained items on the Federal fallout shelter program.

The 41 districts are in 19 states, distributed as follows: California--5; Illinois--2; Indiana--1; Kansas--1; Maryland--2; Michigan--1; Minnesota--2; Missouri--1; Montana--1; Nebraska--1; New Hampshire--1; New Jersey--3; New York--5; Ohio--4; Oregon--1; Pennsylvania--4; South Dakota--1; Washington--3; Wisconsin--2;

The South is not represented because none of the seven southern Congressmen included an item on the Federal shelter program.

Probability block sample of 813 households.
Data collected in August, 1951.

813 persons interviewed are a representative cross-section of the adult population living in private households in the following eleven metropolitan areas: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and St. Louis.

The research is focused on the factors in public thinking which affect the development of civil defense organizations in American cities and states. It is also concerned with the psychological factors considered important for constructive or adaptive social handling of crises or disasters.

Public Thinking about Atomic Warfare and Civil Defense: A Study Based upon an Intensive Interview Sample Survey of People in Eleven Major Cities, September-October 1950, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, January 1951.

Probability sample of 614 people in eleven cities.
Data collected September-October 1950.

614 people interviewed were selected to be a representative cross-section of the adult population of the eleven largest cities in the United States. Suburbs were not included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Number of Interviews</th>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
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<td>Boston</td>
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<td>Los Angeles</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Francisco--Oakland</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Open-ended interviews of one-half to an hour or more in length were administered, using pre-tested questions asked by trained interviewers.


A mail questionnaire sent to a sample of 1,000 persons listed in Who's Who in America. Data collected late 1958.

The study analyzes the opinions of Who's Who listees from two standpoints: their occupations and other major social characteristics reported in the Who's Who biographies; and such attitudinal characteristics as their beliefs about the chances of war, the extent of cooperation possible between the Western and Communist countries, and related matters.


This is a report of a national study conducted in March, 1954. It also includes material from a number of other studies (3 in number) also conducted by the Survey Research Center on the problems of civil defense.

The first study, done in 1950, covered the population in the metropolitan areas of the eleven largest cities in the United States. Sample size was approximately 600 persons.

The second study, done in 1951, extended the above sample to include the suburban area surrounding these eleven largest cities. Sample size=800 persons.

The third study, done in 1952, extended the sample to the nation as a whole but did not sample the rural areas at the same rate as the urban areas due to available financing. Sample size=1600 persons.

The fourth study, done in 1954, for the first time in this series took a straight unweighted sample of the national adult population but included persons aged 16 to 20 years old in addition to the adults usually interviewed. Sample size=1600 persons.
Each of the studies made use of personal interviewing as a means of obtaining the necessary data.

The fourth study, that done in March, 1954, receives most of the emphasis in this report.

"A Survey of Suburban Residents on What To Do About the Danger of War", by Allen Barton, Council for Correspondence Newsletter, No. 24, March 1963.

Block sample of 343 households in four towns. Data collected in May, 1962.

The independent Research Council of Bergen County conducted a public opinion survey in May of 1962.

One house was selected at random on every third block in four Bergen County towns, Englewood, Fort Lee, Leonia, and Teaneck. A total of 343 usable interviews was obtained from a brief questionnaire consisting of background information and open-ended questions.

University of Michigan, Study 418, Unpublished data.


The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan has provided data from their national survey of 1956. Each table included from their study number 418 has been derived from processing at the Research Office of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh.


Based on interviews conducted during a period of international crisis this study examines public attitudes and conceptions of the U.S.--U.S.S.R. power struggle.
The Use of Volunteers and Voluntary Organizations in Civilian Defense and Preparedness, Lois Dean and Associates, Department of Sociology, Cornell University, March, 1964.

Mail surveys, January and June 1963, of 634 CD directors and 75 community leaders.

Interviews conducted December 1962 to June 1963 of 131 community leaders.

In five communities in two midwestern states, a total of 131 community leaders were asked a series of open-ended questions on world problems, the Cold War, prospects of nuclear war, and a number of domestic issues including civil defense. Of these community leaders 18 were Civil Defense officials. The sample was obtained by obtaining lists of managers, financial and labor leaders, lawyers, etc. in the communities and submitting these lists to the examination of a local Chamber of Commerce official who reduced each community list to 20 to 35 highly influential people in his view. The communities were "representative" American ones, from ten to a hundred thousand population, and located in the vicinity of a major target area.

In January 1963, questionnaires were sent to all 634 local civil defense directors in Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin. Of these some 50%, 316 actually replied. The survey dealt with personal characteristics, participation in the community and the nature and background of their CD activities. A similar questionnaire was mailed to the community leaders in the five communities in June. Of these 75 responded. The researchers note the inadequacy of their samples.