

An Introduction to Survivable Crisis Management



Federal Emergency Management Agency





Introduction

During the last decade, our Presidents declared over 250 disasters across the United States and its territories. These events cost almost \$7 billion in Federal disaster assistance and affected millions of people. Such numbers indicate that a costly disaster can strike any community at any time. As our world grows more crowded and complex, the potential consequences of any disaster are increasing dramatically.

If you are the Governor, the Mayor, the chairman of a county board of supervisors, or the leader of any emergency response organization, you have a legal responsibility to manage the consequences of any emergency that affects your jurisdiction regardless of its cause.

To assure that you can respond effectively to protect and assist people, your emergency response capabilities must survive the emergency itself. No matter what causes the emergency, you must be able to direct and control emergency operations within your State or local jurisdiction and coordinate with other jurisdictions and the Federal Government. The ability to survive and continue to direct and control emergency operations and continue to govern is called Survivable Crisis Management (SCM).

The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) goal is a nationwide network of statewide SCM capabilities, all compatible with each other and with those of the Federal Government. To this end, FEMA is pursuing the SCM Initiative with interested States and Territories to encourage and assist them in developing comprehensive SCM plans in which they:


- Assess the risks and threats to their State or Territory
- Define the required SCM capabilities
- Assess existing capabilities in light of requirements
- Identify deficiencies
- Develop a plan to correct deficiencies and achieve the required capabilities
- Develop contingency plans to deal with deficiencies until they are corrected
- Work with FEMA to obtain technical support and Federal civil defense funding assistance.


The SCM Initiative makes achievement of statewide SCM capabilities in each of the 50 States and six Territories a top FEMA priority. Its immediate aim is to focus and integrate Federal funding and other resources to help States and Territories meet their SCM requirements. Each State and Territory must manage the consequences of emergencies regardless of their cause. Therefore, each must identify and develop a basic SCM infrastructure that will meet the needs and threats of that State or Territory. This document explains:

- What SCM is
- Why SCM is Important
- How to Achieve SCM Capabilities

A companion document, The Survivable Crisis Management Development Guide, will provide step-by-step guidance on how to develop an SCM plan and an SCM capability.

The SCM Initiative provides a simple, flexible way for States and Territories to assess their needs and capabilities and to obtain Federal assistance in developing SCM capabilities.





What is Survivable Crisis Management ?

The Survivable Crisis Management Initiative grew out of a set of simple emergency preparedness truths:

- A basic emergency response capability is needed to deal with any disaster
- Key preparedness elements are common to all emergencies
- Every State and Territory can experience a wide range of emergencies from natural disasters to terrorism and war
- Any jurisdiction can experience more than one severe emergency at a time
- Any emergency may affect several jurisdictions at the same time
- Federal, State, and local coordination is essential to comprehensive national emergency preparedness
- To respond effectively, governments must be able to survive and continue to direct and control emergency operations.

SCM Elements:


Survivable Crisis Management requires a range of capabilities that are common to effective responses in all emergencies. A State SCM capability consists of several basic survivable elements:

- Dedicated, Technically Qualified, and Trained People
- Exercised and Tested Plans and Procedures
- Operationally Ready Emergency Facilities
- Operationally Ready Support Equipment
- Operationally Ready Communications
- Safeguarded Vital Records and Databases
- Established Lines of Succession and Delegations of Authority.

Dedicated, Technically Qualified, and Trained Personnel:

The people assigned to manage emergencies are the most valuable components of any SCM capability. State and local emergency management organizations require people with a broad range of qualifications and skills to perform a wide variety of functions. These include hazard and threat analysis, emergency planning and exercising, emergency operating center and telecommunications systems analysis and operations, emergency resource management, radiological defense and health physics, facility engineering and human resource and program management.

In personnel terms, the keys to an effective emergency response capability are: (1) well qualified emergency response personnel with clearly assigned roles and responsibilities, and (2) thorough training, followed by frequent, periodic exercising and retraining of personnel in their specific roles. To borrow a term from the military, good training is a “force multiplier.” It allows government to get the most from its people, equipment, facilities, and procedures.



Without training, even perfect plans and ideal equipment are likely to fail. Realistic training and exercises using typical, as well as worst case scenarios, allow crisis management leadership and personnel to “live through” a wide variety of disaster situations, working with and thinking about their roles. It lets them make the mistakes they might make in a real situation and learn from those mistakes, without jeopardizing life or property.

Exercised and Tested Plans and Procedures:

Intuitive and creative choices often occur to people in the heat of the moment, but in the midst of a crisis is not the best time to be improvising. Spur of the moment solutions in emergencies often fail miserably, at great potential cost to life and property. Plans and procedures must be developed, exercised, tested, and put in place in advance to allow crisis managers and responders to react quickly and effectively.

These plans and procedures should be exercised regularly with the personnel who will implement them to assure that response teams identify and focus on the important aspects of the situations at hand.

Operationally Ready Emergency Facilities:

An SCM capability requires survivable primary and alternate Emergency Operating Centers (EOC's) and their support equipment. By ensuring that there are sufficient survivable sites at which the government may function in the event of a disaster, a State or Territory can avoid a potentially crippling loss of leadership or disruption of management linkages.

Operationally Ready Emergency Support Equipment:


Emergency power; protective equipment such as radiological instruments, electromagnetic surge protection, and protective suits; emergency water and sanitation systems; medical support; feeding and housing equipment; and operational equipment such as maps, displays, copiers, and similar equipment are all essential to an effective emergency response capability. Responsible personnel must know how to operate and maintain this equipment, train regularly in its applications, and be thoroughly familiar with any health or safety hazards associated with its use.

Operationally Ready Emergency Telecommunications:

Modern society runs on nearly instant communication. When disaster strikes and normal communications fail, the government cannot respond to the emergency unless a survivable emergency communication network is in place and ready to function. At a minimum, reliable links among Federal, State, and local governments and key private responders are required along with the ability to quickly access, process, and use emergency information.

Safeguarded Vital Records and Databases:

Vital records and databases are frequently the last things to be thought about in an emergency. Their survival and availability, however, can be critical to effective emergency response and to recovery after a disaster. Whether in hard copy, microfilm, or electronic forms, governments need to ensure that vital records and databases are survivable and up-to-date, that personnel are familiar with their use, and that they are available to emergency responders when and where needed.




Established Lines of Succession:

To prevent the exercise of governmental authority from being disrupted in an emergency, lines of legal succession and delegations of authority must be established to assure orderly, prompt, and legitimate transfers of power and authority when necessary. Lines of legal succession and delegations of authority must be

published. It is important to exercise succession and delegation processes to assure that all concerned know what is expected and how to proceed.

These SCM elements represent the foundation of a State's or a Territory's all-hazard preparedness and SCM efforts. The SCM Initiative can help the State or Territory assess its capabilities in each of these elements. If one or more of the key

elements is absent from a State's SCM capability, it is highly likely that the responsible officials will be unable to fulfill their obligations in the event of an emergency. Detailed guidance concerning the full range of specific capabilities, such as emergency operating centers, warning and communications systems, and emergency planning, can be found in the CPG's listed in Appendix B to this document.



Why Survivable Crisis Management is Important

When an emergency occurs, the first things people look for are information, aid, assistance, and direction from their elected and appointed officials. This expectation is more evident in every new emergency as Americans increasingly look to their government to be their “guardian” in times of disaster. The consequences of a government not being prepared for an emergency can be disastrous, involving potential loss of life, human suffering, damage to homes, businesses, and other property, and the loss of public confidence in government and its leadership.

Most States, Territories, and localities recognize these facts, and they have adopted plans to deal with the most common emergencies they face in their communities. Most jurisdictions have adopted contingency plans, acquired communications and other special equipment, and established emergency operating procedures. Many have recruited either paid or volunteer personnel and organizations to respond in the event of an emergency. In short, the nation as a whole is moving in the right direction.

Recent disaster experience indicates, however, that if they are not properly designed, located, equipped, and supported, specific capabilities, such as communications and power

supplies, or even entire emergency response organizations, can become the victims of a disaster. These experiences have underscored a need for the critical appraisal of capabilities and their survivability that is encouraged by the SCM Initiative.

What are the Benefits of Survivable Crisis Management?

Undertaking and achieving SCM capabilities will provide the State or Territory several real benefits. The benefits range from an assured ability to deal with extreme emergencies to the more effective use of existing capabilities and resources. The following points illustrate SCM’s key benefits:

- **Survival of the ability to govern and to direct emergency response functions.**


This is both an essential need and a crucial benefit of any emergency preparedness capability. During Hurricane Hugo in 1989, some emergency management structures, as well as governing authorities, were so heavily damaged that massive external resources were required to reconstitute

and reconstruct basic crisis management and life-sustaining capabilities. In short, the government itself became the victim.

The SCM Initiative is designed to assure the development of a minimum infrastructure of SCM capabilities by each State and Territory that should prevent such a situation from occurring again.

- **Comprehensive evaluation and upgrade of emergency management capabilities.**

Both the design and the execution of an SCM plan provide vital knowledge to State and local emergency planners about their existing capabilities. The process promotes review and evaluation of all State and local systems and practices and their interfaces with other State and Federal systems. At a minimum, this process promotes a current understanding of the whole emergency management framework for the State, identifies gaps and weaknesses in plans, and provides a starting point for developing the needed statewide capabilities. It also provides a basis and impetus for development of short-term contingency plans for dealing with the lack of capability where deficiencies exist.



■ **More effective application of Federal, State, and local resources.**

SCM plan development helps State and local emergency planners define requirements, assess capabilities, and identify and prioritize needs. States can then make better use of existing resources to support improvements in their emergency response capabilities and more easily identify and justify additional resources at all levels of government, including Federal resources.

■ **Creation of statewide, nationally compatible emergency management systems.**

Major emergencies have no respect for State or other jurisdictional boundaries. In many situations, the governments of adjoining States, the FEMA Regions, private agencies, and volunteers will be attempting to help their populations and areas recover from the same disaster.

Hurricane Hugo, which struck the Carolinas in October 1989, represented a classic example. To be able to support each other effectively, the affected States and jurisdictions, FEMA, the Red Cross, and many other assistance donors needed to coordinate responses, including the identification of needs and the allocation of outside resources. In attempting to do so, they encountered major interagency, interdepartmental, and interstate coordination problems.

Coordinated emergency response requires survivable and compatible communications and information collection, processing and reporting capabilities, and comprehensive plans that are exercised and tested with all levels of government. A good SCM plan will address all these elements comprehensively and will include Federal review and coordination.

■ **What are the Risks and Threats?**

The United States and its Territories are subject to a wide variety of hazards, including emergencies posed by the forces of nature, technological hazards, such as chemical spills and

nuclear accidents, and national security emergencies, which include terrorism and war. An illustration of the full “spectrum” of potential emergencies is shown in Figure 1. Some of these possible emergencies are, of course, more likely than others.

In the 5-year period between 1987 and 1991, FEMA provided \$3,526,000,000 in disaster assistance to victims (individuals and State and local governments) of 144 disasters. Disasters do not come on any schedule, but rather seem to come in clusters as indicated by the annual costs for the same 5-year period. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate these points.





Figure 1.
The Spectrum of Emergencies



**Federal Disaster Assistance
Fiscal Years 1987 - 1991**

Disaster Assistance by Types of Events

<u>Number of Events</u>	<u>Type of Disaster</u>	<u>Amount of Assistance</u>
69	Floods	\$ 422,000,000
19	Tornadoes/floods	254,000,000
14	Tornadoes	51,000,000
11	Hurricanes	1,727,000,000
2	Earthquakes	760,000,000
10	Severe winter storms	163,000,000
4	Fires	7,000,000
14	Typhoons	133,000,000
<u>1</u>	Volcanoes	<u>9,000,000</u>
144		\$3,526,000,000

Disaster Assistance by Year

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount of Assistance</u>
FY 1987	\$ 155,000,000
FY 1988	150,000,000
FY 1989	1,724,000,000
FY 1990	1,045,000,000
FY 1991	<u>452,000,000</u>
	\$3,526,000,000

Figure 2.

Federal Disaster Assistance
Fiscal Years 1987 - 1991


The risk of large-scale conventional or global war has diminished greatly with the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and the Soviet Union itself. However, as a result of destabilization within the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe and the proliferation of sophisticated conventional and unconventional weapons, including nuclear weapons, the risk of small-scale or single weapon attacks involving conventional or unconventional weapons may be increasing.

There continues to be a risk that political disputes may be pursued with such weapons and that these weapons may be used to attack the United States or to influence our policies and actions.

Survivable Crisis Management capabilities are essential to the ability to deal with the extreme of any of the disasters listed in Figure 1. An effective SCM capability will assure State or Territorial leaders and emergency managers that they are capable of handling the consequences of emergencies of all kinds, regardless of cause.

Trends Affecting Emergency Management:

In addition to the threats posed by specific hazards, various trends also affect the consequences of emergencies and their impact on emergency management organizations. Our global environment is changing rapidly, and many of



Major Disasters: Fiscal Years '87 - '91
All Causes





Figure 3.

Major Disasters: Fiscal Years '87 - '91



those changes increase our exposure and render us more vulnerable to risks and hazards. These trends also place greater demands on Federal, State, and local authorities to be prepared and capable of managing emergencies resulting from hazards of all kinds.

■ **Our population is growing.**

The amount of available living space for each of us is shrinking. This means that any future crisis is likely to affect more people.

■ **We depend more every day on complex and interdependent systems.**

Thus, any major system failure has more widespread and potentially more severe human and material consequences.

■ **The pace of events around us is accelerating.**

In a world where things happen quickly, crises erupt suddenly. Long warning times in which to increase preparedness capabilities and

enhance operational readiness cannot be assumed. Governments must be prepared at all times.

■ **There is a growing public reliance on government for crisis support.**

Individuals and groups will help themselves in any crisis situation, but only governments and large organizations can marshal the resources to deal with large crises. Especially in severe, widely dispersed situations, the public must look to government for help.


■ **There is a growing need to effectively and efficiently use public resources.**

Now and in the foreseeable future, no government organization is likely to have freely disposable resources. Like everything else, emergency preparedness must compete with other priority needs for available resources. Thus, hard resource use choices must be made to ensure that preparedness needs are met. Emergency management priorities must be defined and limited resources focused on the priorities.

■ **Global political conditions remain unstable.**

While the risks of global war have diminished, the number of regional and local political disputes has grown. Proliferation of conventional, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons technologies and sophisticated delivery systems increase the potential for attack from a variety of sources. These risks make it prudent for us to maintain our preparedness to meet attack emergencies of all kinds.

These factors help make up the complex environment of any emergency that a jurisdiction may experience. They put a high premium on all-hazard preparedness and the ability to deal with the consequences of emergencies regardless of their cause. They also raise the prospect of severe consequences for failure to be ready when the next emergency occurs. They place new emphasis on the ability of government response capabilities to survive and perform in any emergency. They are key reasons for the high priority FEMA places on achieving nationwide Survivable Crisis Management.



How to Achieve SCM Capabilities

Development and adoption of an SCM plan is a joint venture among FEMA, the State, and its localities. The key steps in the process are discussed more fully below.

Assess the risks and threats to the State or Territory.

Each State or Territory has a somewhat different set of potential hazards, depending on factors such as location, geology, climate, population, and principal activities. Facility design, equipment, staffing, training, and procedures are each affected in some measure by such factors. The first task is to assess the risks and threats in each specific setting as a means to judge whether existing statewide emergency response capabilities are adequate.

Define the required SCM capabilities.

Analyze the essential emergency functions, both those related to the ability to direct, control, coordinate, and manage emergency operations and those involved in providing direct emergency services such as evacuation, shelter, feeding, debris

removal, rescue, fire fighting, and law enforcement. SCM is focused on the former functions and the capabilities required to perform them. The emergency service functions and the capabilities required to provide them are directed and controlled through the SCM structure but are not a part of the SCM capability itself.

States and Territories should have capabilities to perform both types of functions. The Federal Government assists in developing the SCM capabilities to assure that States and Territories can survive and continue to govern. When an emergency exceeds the ability of State and local government to provide emergency response and recovery, the Federal Government can provide Federal resources and assistance to the State. But for the Federal response and recovery assistance to be effective, the State must survive and be able to continue to direct and control emergency operations within the State. It must have an SCM capability.

FEMA can help States to define SCM and other emergency management requirements as part of the SCM Initiative. Technical requirements for emergency operating centers, warning and communications, planning, and other elements


of SCM have been defined in a variety of guidance documents shown in Appendix B. The FEMA Regional Offices are prepared to assist States in defining SCM requirements.

Assess existing capabilities in light of requirements.

Identifying technical deficiencies or shortcomings between what already exists and what is needed to meet SCM requirements is the next step. Involvement by key emergency planners and response personnel from all over the State or Territory will ensure that their capabilities, practices, and concerns are reflected in final judgments on requirements.

Identify deficiencies.

Next, the major corrective actions needed to meet SCM requirements can be identified together with an estimate of the required levels of effort and funding. Specific questions should be addressed to emergency planners concerning the ability of existing capabilities to meet worst-case scenarios.



Develop a plan to correct deficiencies and achieve the required capabilities.

This step requires a high degree of interaction with FEMA and between State or Territorial authorities. While FEMA will provide advice on generic approaches to each type of problem, the acid test is applicability of the solutions chosen to your emergency management situation. Here each jurisdiction should examine critically which deficiencies require changes in procedure, new or different hardware, new or modified facilities, organizational or staffing changes, or lastly, training or readiness improvements.

The result of this step is a comprehensive plan for achieving the required statewide SCM capability. This plan should establish priorities, should be multi-year, and should identify specific capabilities which need to be developed over

time. It can be used to justify funding requests at the State and local levels and by the State to the Federal level. It is a framework for the development of the required emergency management infrastructure capability statewide.

Develop contingency plans to deal with deficiencies until they are corrected.

This phase should include the development of any short-term contingency plans needed to temporarily overcome any deficiencies when the capabilities cannot be quickly obtained.


Work with FEMA to obtain technical support and Federal civil defense funding assistance.

Based on the comprehensive SCM plan, States should develop specific project proposals to develop needed capabilities. This phase should

include identification of specific means of achieving the required capability and potential funding sources at the Federal, State, and local levels including volunteer and private sector sources as appropriate.

The project proposals can be used to justify funding, to claim unused funds, and as a basis for joint projects or coalitions with other organizations which may have funds or resources available. The proposals should be developed and made ready whether or not resources are readily available in order to quickly take advantage of resources that may become available unexpectedly.

Estimating how long it will take and what will be involved in completing an SCM development program must be determined on a State-by-State basis. FEMA can help by providing information on the costs of various types of upgrades and on what portion of those costs FEMA can fund.



Conclusion

The key point for all State, Territorial, and local emergency planners is that Survivable Crisis Management has become a vital nationwide necessity. Every day the potential costs and consequences of the inability to assure SCM are mounting. Achievement of an SCM capability for every State and Territory is a top FEMA priority.

States and Territories are not expected to incur the whole cost of upgrading their capabilities to provide Survivable Crisis Management. Federal matching funds are available for such things as emergency operating center development, warning and communications systems, personnel, planning, training, radiological instrumentation, Emergency Broadcast System broadcast station protection, electro-magnetic protection of key facilities, and facility and equipment maintenance. Additional funding may be appropriate in some cases.

The regulations covering the allocation of Federal funds to State SCM projects are fairly well-defined. But, because each State situation is somewhat different, there is built-in flexibility. FEMA is prepared to consider each SCM request on its own merits. The SCM Initiative is designed to be flexible and to focus and integrate civil

defense resources to support comprehensive SCM plans and projects and to achieve SCM capabilities in the 56 States and Territories.


The benefits of an SCM capability are substantial. The political, economic, and human benefits of the ability of government to survive a disaster and to continue to deal with its consequences are enormous. Being able to coordinate effectively with other response organizations and to apply resources effectively to a disaster situation are likely to mitigate consequences and speed recovery. Having a better understanding of how your SCM capabilities work and what is needed to be effective can help government make optimum use of existing emergency preparedness resources.

The important thing is to get started on an SCM plan. Today, the assured ability to deal with emergency situations, whenever they arise, whatever their cause, has become a hallmark of effective leadership. The lessons of recent incidents are hard: The worst damages to human life, property, and reputation usually are set in motion within the first few hours. If the leaders responsible for managing emergencies and the capabilities needed for them to do so are not

ready and survivable when the situations occur, the consequences can be catastrophic. That is why Survivable Crisis Management should be a high priority for the Federal Government and for every State and Territory in the United States.

Developing a comprehensive SCM plan is a fairly straightforward task. FEMA, at both Federal and Regional levels, is ready to assist in SCM plan development and execution. With experiences gained in other pilot SCM projects, FEMA is able to share the "lessons learned" in SCM planning and in developing the required SCM capabilities.

Several States already have completed SCM plans and projects. With the approval of the originating State, those plans can be made available as models. FEMA also has generic design criteria, as well as a number of relevant documents, which State planners are invited to study. FEMA will supply these upon request. Requests for or discussions of such materials would be welcomed by the Regional Directors of FEMA. For further information, please contact your FEMA Regional Director. A list of addresses for each of these offices is provided in Appendix A.



FEMA Regional Offices – Appendix A

FEMA Region I
JW McCormack Post Office
and Courthouse Building
Room 442
Boston, MA 02109-4595

CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT,

FEMA Region VI
Federal Regional Center
800 N. Loop 288, Room 206
Denton, TX 76201-3698

AR, LA, NM, OK, TX

FEMA Region II
26 Federal Plaza, Room 1338
New York, NY 10278-0002

NJ, NY, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands

FEMA Region VII
911 Walnut St., Room 300
Kansas City, MO 64106-2085

IO, KN, MO, NB

FEMA Region III
Liberty Square Building, 2nd Floor
105 South Seventh St.
Philadelphia, PA 19106-3316

DC, DE, MD, PA, WV

FEMA Region VIII
Denver Federal Center
Building 710, Box 25267
Denver, CO 80255-0267

CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY

FEMA Region IV
1371 Peachtree St., NE Suite 700
Atlanta, GA 30309-3108

AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN

FEMA Region IX
Building 105, Presidio
of San Francisco
San Francisco, CA 94129-1250

AZ, CA, HI, NV, Pacific
Commonwealths and Territories

FEMA Region V
175 W. Jackson, 4th Floor
Chicago, IL 60606-2698

IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI

FEMA Region X
Federal Regional Center
130 228th St., SW
Bothell, WA 98021-9796

AK, ID, OR, WA



References – Appendix B

Title	Number	Date
Guide CCA General Program Guidelines	CPG 1-3	Jun 1987
Objectives for Local Emergency Management	CPG 1-5	Jul 1984
Guide for the Development of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans	CPG 1-8	Jun 1990
Guide for the Review of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans	CPG 1-8a	Sep 1988
Guide for the Development of a State and Local Continuity of Government Capability	CPG 1-10	Jul 1987
Principles of Warning and Criteria Governing Eligibility for National Warning Systems (NAWAS) Service	CPG 1-14	Nov 1990
National Warning System (NAWAS) Operations Manual	CPG 1-16	Nov 1980
Outdoor Warning Systems Guide	CPG 1-17	Mar 1980
Emergency Operating Centers Handbook (with Change 1)	CPG 1-20	May 1984
Guide for the Design and Development of a Local Radiological Defense Support System	CPG 1-30	Jun 1981
Broadcast Station Protection Program	CPG 1-33	May 1984
Hazard Identification, Capability Assessment, and Multi-Year Development Plan	CPG 1-34	Jan 1985

Title	Number	Date
Hazard Identification, Capability Assessment, and Multi-Year Development Plan	CPG 1-35	Oct 1987
Capability Assessment and Multi-Year Development Plan for State Governments	CPG 1-36	Jan 1986
State and Local Communications and Warning Systems Engineering Guidance	CPG 1-37	Sep 1984
A Guide to the Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement	CPG 1-38	Jun 1986
Radiological Defense Preparedness	CPG 2-1	Sep 1989
Radiation Safety in Shelters	CPG 2-6.4	Sep 1983
Transportation Planning Guidelines for the Evacuation of Large Populations	CPG 2-15	Sep 1984
A Guide to Hurricane Preparedness Planning for State and Local Officials	CPG 2-16	Dec 1984
Electromagnetic Pulse Protection Guidance	CPG 2-17	Jan 1986
State and Local Earthquake Hazards Reduction: Implementation of FEMA Funding and Support	CPG 2-18	Aug 1985
Life Support Operations in Shelters	CPG 2-20	Jan 1988
Electromagnetic Pulse Protection Inspection and Maintenance Procedures	CPG 2-23	Nov 1990