The Evolution of Programs and Policies

May 1980

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

AMERICAN CIVIL DEFENSE 1945-1975

The Evolution Of Programs And Policies

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FOREWORD

This is a study of the evolution of civil defense policies and programs in the United States for the period 1945-1974. Written as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Virginia over a 3-year period (1978-1980), this study draws heavily on a large selection of executive and legislative branch hearings, reports, studies and government-sponsored research. It is reproduced in the belief that the information it contains will be of use to those conducting research in civil defense-related fields and to those responsible for the administration of civil defense programs.

The author is Dr. B. Wayne Blanchard, and the dissertation was prepared for the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia. It was approved by the Department on December 11, 1979.

PREFACE

This is a study of the evolution of the civil defense policy and programs of the United States from 1945 to 1974, with special emphasis on the determinants of change. This study was born after a conversation with Dr. Frans Bax in the Spring of 1977, at which time my interest in the subject of civil defense was aroused by his comments on the controversial nature of civil defense in recent years. Upon initial investigation of the various controversies surrounding contemporary civil defense I decided that before one could do justice to an analysis of civil defense today, one would have to understand civil defense yesterday. From this the present study has emerged and thus a special debt of gratitude is owed to Dr. Bax for not only providing the initial impetus but for nurturing and guiding the efforts that followed.

Another debt of gratitude is owed to the Graduate Department of Government and Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia and to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for the fellowship assistance which allowed this study to proceed much more swiftly and smoothly than would have otherwise been the case.

There are many individuals who assisted me in the collection of data or formulation of ideas, but several provided particularly important assistance. I would like therefore to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Alfred Lieberman of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Jerry Strickler on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Dr. Roger J. Sullivan of the System Planning Corporation, former

Assistant Secretary of Defense Steuart Pittman, Mrs. Margaret Garner of the research library of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, and especially Dr. William K. Chipman of the DCPA (reorganized into the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 1979).

Among those who have reviewed drafts of this study, in whole or in part, the author wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the comments of Dr. Chipman of the DCPA, Dr. Lieberman and Alfred Wilcox of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Drs. Robert Wood and Frans Bax of the Faculty of the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. While all of these, and many others, deserve much of the credit for whatever may be of value in this study, I alone take responsibility for any errors of omission and commission.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, without whose continued support this would have been a much more difficult task. By taking on all the responsibilities of the home as well as her own work I was able to devote my time to this study.

B.W.B.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
BAS	Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist
BOB	Bureau of the Budget
CQS	Congressional Quarterly Service
DCPA	Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
FCDA	Federal Civil Defense Administration
FDAA	Federal Disaster Administration Agency
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FPA	Federal Preparedness Agency
FY	Fiscal Year
HASC	House Armed Services Committee
HCA	House Appropriations Committee
HGOC	House Government Operations Committee
JCAE	Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
JCDP	Joint Committee on Defense Production
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KT	Kiloton
NRDL	Navy Radiological Defense Laboratory
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSRB	National Security Resources Board
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum

OCD	Office of Civil Defense
OCDM	Office of Civil Defense Mobilization
OEP	Office of Emergency Planning
OMB	Office of Management and the Budget
PF	Protection Factor
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SCA	Senate Appropriations Committee
SGOC	Senate Government Operations Committee

INTRODUCTION

In September of 1977, Bernard T. Feld, in an editorial in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, noted that with the exception of the fallout-shelter boom of the 1960s the subject of civil defense during the atomic age had "been confined to the fringes of the discussions on defense policy, arms control and national security in the United States." He went on to note that "recently, however, there has been a revival of discussion of the issue, based mainly on the assertion of the existence of a very vigorous civil defense program in the Soviet Union, involving massive underground relocation of industry, widespread shelter construction, underground food storage, and planning for almost instantaneous evacuation of major urban centers."[1]

Another observer of this development has written that "the evidence is unmistakable and ominous. The Soviets have added a major civil defense component to their military posture--an addition which, in a superpower showdown, could prove decisive."[2] If true, this increasing emphasis by the Soviet Union on civil defense could imply an approach towards a war-winning capability and aggressive intent. Regardless of intent, however, if during a time when the strategic environment is characterized by detente and SALT negotiations which are attempting to set limits to the growth of offensive systems, one superpower engages in a rapid, expensive, or significant buildup in defensive systems, strategic stability may be jeopardized. In a controlled strategic environment, expanding defensive systems offset offensive systems and thereby

diminish their effectiveness. The strategic balance becomes weighted in favor of the side expanding its defensive system.

Inevitably, the subject of Soviet civil defense is a controversial one. In dispute are the issues of the size, scope, intent, and effectiveness of the Soviet system. Also in dispute is the issue of the proper United States response. Should the United States step up its own civil defense efforts to counter those supposedly being made by the Soviets? What type of civil defense efforts should be highlighted--sheltering or evacuation (also called crisis relocation)?

Beyond dispute is the fact that many conservatives (including many in Congress) are using the Soviet civil defense issue to discredit the detente and arms control policies of the last three administrations. One observer of this debate has written that:

> Administration officials for years have said that an unwritten assumption behind the 1969 Soviet-U.S. treaty limiting deployment of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and behind the SALT treaty was, that if nuclear war threatened, each country could hold the other's population hostage. If, since that time the Soviets have been mounting a massive civil defense effort with the aim of fighting, surviving, and winning such a war, these American assumptions, and the disarmament decisions of U.S. leaders which were based on them, could look foolish indeed.[3]

Background: 1974-1979

Limited Nuclear War

Adding to the controversies noted above there is today another development which also makes important a study of civil defense. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are developing limited nuclear war capabilities and strategies. Civil defense, as a damage limitation program, fits into limited nuclear war doctrine. This point was made in September of 1974, only a few weeks after Gerald Ford assumed the Presidency. The then Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, had told a

Senate Subcommittee the previous May that a limited nuclear war scenario was conceivable in which as a result of a Soviet attack against United States counterforce targets, the U.S. might sustain fatalities in the hundreds of thousands rather than in the tens or hundreds of millions. Civil defense, he noted, was a contributing factor in accounting for this relatively low estimation of the destructiveness of a hypothetical nuclear war. /See Chapter Six/

A few weeks following this observation a somewhat skeptical Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee invited Secretary Schlesinger to return in September to give what became a controversial "Briefing on Counterforce Attacks." During this hearing Schlesinger made more precise his earlier estimate of the possibility of "relatively few civilian casualties" as the result of a hypothetical Soviet attack against U.S. military installations.[4] The Department of Defense estimated that if the Soviets deliberately sought to minimize the collateral destructiveness of an attack by controlling the attack scenario and targeting doctrine, something on the order of 800,000 U.S. fatalities might result from an attack on all six U.S. ICBM fields. Schlesinger also presented other scenarios with fatalities ranging up to five to six million and compared these to an all-out Soviet attack which could claim 95 to 100 million fatalities as the direct consequence of the attack.[5]

Schlesinger's conclusion was that if deterrence should fail there was a distinct possibility that the nuclear war which would follow could be limited. Given this possibility he favored improvements and modifications in weapons systems, command and control, targeting doctrine, and civil defense in order to facilitate limited nuclear war planning. Secretary Schlesinger's observations, however, attracted criticism both

from within the Committee and from elsewhere. Senator Symington was surprised that the Secretary and the Department of Defense were seriously considering war fighting scenarios. To him this indicated a cavalier attitude:

> I personally cannot conceive of any country using nuclear weapons at any level today, because if I may say so, with great respect, you talk as if the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Soviet Union and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States were together in this thing and started to play a game of chess.[6]

Senator Case voiced the view that "there is not any real possibility of a low level nuclear exchange."[7] A few months later, Harold Brown, who would become President Carter's Secretary of Defense, stated that if there was a nuclear war, "I am convinced that by far the least probable outcome is a nuclear exchange confined in any effective way to military targets." Even if an exchange could be limited (at least initially) he contended that "tens of millions" would be killed on each side anyway.[8]

Underlying the views expressed by Symington, Case, Brown and others on the subject of limited nuclear war is the perception that deterrence is weakened rather than enhanced through limited nuclear war preparations and doctrine. More precisely, it is feared that limited nuclear war capabilities and planning lower the nuclear threshold by making nuclear exchanges more "thinkable." To the extent that civil defense reduces the destructiveness in lives of even a limited nuclear attack it has sometimes been perceived as going hand-in-hand with limited nuclear war planning in the lowering of the nuclear threshold. For some "arms controllers," therefore, the attainment of the first fundamental objective of arms control is thereby obstructed.

Soviet Civil Defense

Throughout 1975 the issues of limited nuclear war and the role of civil defense in nuclear war planning continued as subjects of controversy, though restricted primarily to a small group of national security specialists. In 1976, however, the subject of civil defense went public. The immediate focus of attention was Soviet civil defense. The immediate causes for this attention were threefold: (1) the publication in the January 1976 edition of Foreign Affairs of an article by Paul Nitze on "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente";[9] (2) the April publication of War Survival in Soviet Strategy--USSR Civil Defense by Leon Goure;[10] and (3) the testimony of T.K. Jones before Congressional Committees in March and November.[11]

In his Foreign Affairs article, Mr. Nitze, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Secretary of the Navy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and SALT negotiating team member, drew attention to such Soviet civil defense programs as evacuation and industrial protection, and to Soviet civil defense manuals and statistics which indicated that the Soviets foresaw the possibility of as few as five to eight percent fatalities in a nuclear war with the United States.[12] He concluded that:

> 1) As the Soviet civil defense program becomes more effective it tends to destabilize the deterrent relationship....
>
> 2) The ability of U.S. nuclear power to destroy without question the bulk of Soviet industry and a large proportion of the Soviet population is by no means as clear as it once was, even if one assumes most of U.S. striking power to be available and directed to this end.
>
> 3) The absence of a U.S. capability to protect its own population gives the Soviet Union an asymmetrical possibility of holding the U.S. population as hostage to deter retaliation following a Soviet attack on U.S. forces.[13]

Along with the recommendations Nitze made to correct this situation, he noted that "the most economical and rapidly implementable approach to removing this one-sided instability would be for the United States to pursue a more active civil defense program of its own."[14]

Shortly following Nitze's warning, Professor Goure's book on Soviet civil defense was published. Goure, a former RAND research analyst, had, over the course of fifteen years, made numerous studies on the subject of Soviet civil defense. War Survival summarized and expanded upon much of that work and in unmistakable terms expanded upon Nitze's warning. Goure argues that the Soviets do not accept the U.S. definition of detente, but instead prefer to use the term "peaceful coexistence" in their own publications. According to Goure, peaceful coexistence is but a "strategy and an instrument of struggle...to 'facilitate' and widen the upsurge of the revolutionary and national liberation movements throughout the non-communist world." Moreover, peaceful coexistence helps limit the "export of /Western/ counterrevolution."[15]

Goure argues that the Soviets do not intend to start a nuclear war but do intend to expand their influence, power, and ideology as widely as possible. Detente facilitates this process. In line with this (and in order to insure no more Koreas, Vietnams, Cubas, etc.,) the Soviet Union has undertaken to build up every facet of its conventional and nuclear forces. If their goal is not superiority it is surely to attain such a level of strength that the United States will be restrained from intervening or hampering Soviet efforts. Civil defense contributes to this deterrence posture the Soviets are building up. When combined with their war fighting conventional and nuclear forces they can demonstrate that not only could they fight a war if absolutely necessary, but could

win and survive. This is not a claim the United States can make and thus the Soviets gain deterrence and bargaining power:

> They contend...that no country can rationally and credibly threaten nuclear war if it accepts that such a war would be suicidal. Thus, the credibility of deterrence in the nuclear age depends not only on a country's strategic offensive capability but also on its ability to convince itself, and especially its enemy, that it can survive a nuclear war and, therefore, that it can rationally threaten to resort to war if this proves necessary.[16]

Thus, in the Foreword to Goure's book former Ambassador to the USSR Foy Kohler warned:

> Soviet civil defense measures, indeed civil defense measures on either side, have consistently been treated in U.S. estimates as an essentially insignificant consideration. Now we are finding that they may well be decisive, and that the whole foundation of the U.S. deterrent posture is crumbling.[17]

The Congressional Hearings

The controversies over limited nuclear war and civil defense, Soviet civil defense, funding for U.S. civil defense and the policies to stress in U.S. civil defense were such that two committees of Congress opened hearings on civil defense in 1976--the first time for such investigative hearings in over a decade. In the House the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Armed Services Committee formed a Panel on Civil Defense under the Chairmanship of Robert L. Leggett of California. (Donald J. Mitchell of N.Y. and Bob Carr of Michigan comprised the remainder of the Panel, although Mr. Carr did not attend any of the sessions.) This Panel held hearings on civil defense during February and March and received testimony from Nitze, Goure, and Federal, State, and local government witnesses, among others.

Among these other witnesses was Mr. T.K. Jones, the Program and Product Evaluation Manager for Boeing Aerospace Company. From June 1971

thru August 1974 Mr. Jones had been employed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and served as the Deputy Director of the OSD SALT support group and as Senior Adviser to the OSD representative (Paul Nitze). Mr. Jones testified on Soviet civil defense measures (especially industrial dispersal and hardening and population evacuation). After noting the lack of U.S. preparations in these areas he posited that a stark asymmetry existed between U.S. and Soviet civil defense efforts and capabilities. Furthermore:

> After a Soviet attack on U.S. forces, the U.S. would have large numbers of strategic nuclear weapons surviving...If all of these weapons were delivered against Soviet territory they would destroy all people in an aggregate area equal to 2.7 percent of the Soviet land area. This assumes that people are not protected by any buildings or terrain and takes into account all blast, thermal, and radiation effects of weapons detonated above ground. All people in the remaining 97% of the Soviet land area would survive. If the people were protected by simple, foxhole-type shelters, it would reduce the area which could be covered by U.S. weapons to about 1/3 of one percent of the Soviet land area.[18]

Translated into fatalities, Jones posited that eight percent of the Soviet population (about 20 million) would die in an attack if there were no fallout protection and two percent (five to six million) would be killed with fallout protection. Moreover, he added:

> It should be noted that these estimates assume a retaliatory attack designed for maximum population fatalities at a considerable sacrifice in damage inflicted on Soviet industry. The retaliation targeted the evacuation areas and used ground-level detonations to produce the maximum amount of fallout. For conservatism, the radiation protection of the Soviet shelters has been degraded to one-fifth of the measured capability.[19]

Testifying before Senator Proxmire's Joint Committee on Defense Production in November, Mr. Jones noted the "growing emphasis on industrial survival in the Soviet Union" and the present lack of such preparedness in the United States. This, he warned, "could have far-reaching consequences with respect to the future security of the United

States."[20] Elaborating, Mr. Jones told the Committee that:

> During the past decade, the Soviet Union has located more than three-forths of its new industry outside of its large cities. Furthermore, confirmed observations show that adjacent factories are separated to insure that a single U.S. warhead cannot destroy more than one, and even the buildings in a single complex have been rather widely separated. We have estimated that destruction of an entire Soviet complex would require eight times the megatonnage needed to destroy a typical U.S. complex with the same building area.[21]

From a Boeing study on the cost and feasibility of industrial hardening and emergency protection programs Mr. Jones concluded "that the Soviet civil defense program can effectively protect the industrial base of the Soviet Union and could facilitate a relatively swift recovery from a nuclear war."[22] When combined with other Soviet civil defense measures and with the ever growing strategic and conventional Soviet arsenals, Jones concluded that in a few years "the Soviet Union will have gained a 'war-winning' capability comparable to that which the United States held in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis...The Soviets believe we have a rational leadership and that the U.S. leadership, when placed at a major disadvantage, as the Soviets themselves were in 1962, can be forced to acquiesce to Soviet demands in future confrontations." His recommendation was to significantly upgrade U.S. civil defense efforts and capabilities.[23]

Reaction in the U.S.

The debate over civil defense which went public in 1976 due in large measure to the statements of Nitze, Gouré, and Jones, was quickly joined. In the April issue of Foreign Affairs Jan M. Lodal disputed Nitze's findings and conclusions on Soviet civil defense and argued that Nitze's recommendation for augmenting the U.S. civil defense effort was "ill-advised."[24] Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, the Director of the Stanford

Linear Accelerator Center, disputed the arguments that civil defense would be able to reduce significantly the lives lost as a result of either a limited or all-out nuclear war.[25] Dr. Richard Garwin told a Congressional Committee that the Soviets had trouble feeding and housing their people even in peacetime. He doubted that Soviet civil defense efforts could mitigate the hardships that would result after a nuclear war.[26]

While these debates continued (the above being only the tip of the iceberg) some action was initiated within the Government. After a five-year lapse, the U.S. intelligence community began once again in 1976 to examine Soviet defense against nuclear attack.[27] According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown, the Department of Defense, in recognition of the "civil defense imbalance," changed its nuclear targeting doctrine to focus on "targeting a war recovery capability" rather than targeting population per se.[28] And, the National Security Council ordered a review of civil defense which resulted in "NSSM /National Security Study Memorandum/ 244--United States Civil Defense Policy."[29] While the contents of this study are classified, it has become known that the inter-agency study group which drew up this report found the issues of U.S. and Soviet civil defense quite controversial within the group, with sharp differences of opinion on several points and "discussions" which at times became almost acrimonious.[30]

As 1977 began it quickly became apparent that the controversial nature of the civil defense subject had not abated within the Government. On January 2nd, the Washington Post published a story on the "Team A, Team B" controversy over intelligence estimates on Soviet might and intentions. A central aspect of this dispute was on whether or not

Soviet strategy was based on preparing for (and winning) a limited nuclear war. In connection with this the article quoted recently retired Lt. General Daniel O. Graham (Director of DOD's Defense Intelligence Agency) to the effect that one of two "catalytic factors" in the current official assessment of Soviet intentions was "the discovery of a very important Soviet civil defense effort--very strong and unmistakable evidence that a big effort is on to protect people, industry and to store food." Graham's own conclusion was that "the evidence indicates that they are seeking a war-fighting capability."[31]

The very next day another article appeared (this time in the New York Times) which would cause as much controversy as the Team A-Team B Intelligence dispute. This article dealt with a number of observations made by retiring General George J. Keegan, Jr. (Chief, Air Force Intelligence) which raised serious questions about the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Among other things, Keegan claimed:

1) That the USSR already has achieved military superiority over the United States.

2) That the United States is incapable of carrying out its assigned retaliatory tasks of crippling the Soviet industrial economy, the essential civilian-military leadership, nuclear stockpiles and the basic fighting capacity of the USSR....

3) That the USSR has hardened on the order of 35,000 installations including 75 underground command posts for the civil military leadership within the Moscow Beltway alone....

4) That there are bunkers for civilians in all major cities including several at Moscow University the size of several football fields....

5) That grain storage bunkers the size of several football fields have been identified on the perimeters of all major cities and are guarded by the military--the most elaborate of their kind in the world....

6) That the United States had lost the strategic balance in part due to the Soviet buildup in civil defense....

7) That past American intelligence estimates had shown that in a nuclear war 10 Americans would die for every Russian and that these estimates had been suppressed. That the gap had widened--that perhaps 35-40 Americans would be killed for every Russian.[32]

Concerned with these allegations, Senator Proxmire requested a response from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a letter dated 28 January 1977, the Chairman of the JCS, General George Brown, stated that in the opinion of the JCS some of General Keegan's assertions were relatively accurate whereas some were not. General Brown then responded point by point to Keegan's assertions. Among the points made by General Brown:

1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned...that the recent U.S. and Soviet trends in military programs and civil defense could permit the USSR to attain superiority....

2) An increasingly effective Soviet civil defense program in conjunction with other Soviet strategic military programs could reduce the U.S. capability to achieve /assured destruction/ criteria....

3) The Soviet /civil defense/ program is more extensive and better developed than it appeared to be several years ago. Under optimum conditions, which include a period of warning prior to an unrestrained U.S. attack and successful evacuation and other preparations, Soviet civil defense measures could probably: (1) assure survival of a large percentage of the leadership necessary to maintain control, (2) reduce prompt casualties among the urban population to a small percentage, and (3) give the Soviets a good chance of being able to distribute at least a subsistence level of supplies to the surviving population, although the economy as a whole would experience serious difficulties....

4) That some current studies indicate that a fatality ratio of 10 to 1 (US/USSR) might occur....[33]

The following month, John B. Walsh, Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering for Strategic and Space Systems (DOD), told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Soviet civil defense effort was degrading the U.S. deterrent. Walsh noted that:

> It is our belief that a successful civil defense effort, if mounted, and successfully so viewed by the Soviets, would then lead them to believe that even an attack on their economic

> system would not kill a lot of their citizens who would be able to rebuild the society.[34]

During the same hearing, General David Jones, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, indicated in response to a question by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia that the DOD estimate of Soviet fatalities resulting after a Soviet counterforce attack and an all-out U.S. counter-attack amounted to "roughly 16 million," or less than the fatalities suffered by the Soviets during World War II.[35]

Throughout 1977 and 1978 and into 1979 the controversies over Soviet (and U.S.) civil defense have continued and remain basically unresolved despite attempts made by both the Legislative and Executive branches of the Government to shed light on the subject. Decisions have been made, however, on the basis of recent studies even though unanimity within the Government has not been achieved. Two decisions in particular are noteworthy: (1) the decision made by President Carter in September 1978--Presidential Decision (PD) 41--to implement a new civil defense policy, and (2) the decision made by President Carter to reorganize the civil defense and emergency preparedness apparatus of the Federal Government.[36]

In PD 41 President Carter directed that a new civil defense policy should be implemented based upon the following guidelines:

> 1) That the United States civil defense program should enhance the survivability of the American people and its leadership in the event of nuclear war, thereby improving the basis for eventual recovery, as well as reducing vulnerability to a major Soviet attack;
>
> 2) That the United States civil defense program should enhance deterrence and stability, and contribute to perceptions of the overall U.S./Soviet strategic balance and to crisis stability, and also reduce the possibility that the Soviets could coerce us in times of increased tension;

3) That the policy not suggest any change in the U.S. policy of relying on strategic nuclear forces as the preponderant factor in maintaining deterrence; and,

4) That the program include planning for population relocation during times of international crisis as well as be adaptable to help deal with natural disasters and other peacetime emergencies.[37]

Obviously a response to the Soviet civil defense program and to the controversy that had continued to build in the public domain since 1976, PD 41 was significant in two respects. First, it represented a departure from the "prudent insurance" justification for civil defense enunciated by President Kennedy during the early 1960s. Second, it highlighted the need for "crisis relocation," or evacuation, which, as a concept had been put out to pasture towards the end of the Eisenhower Administration. Decisions had been made at that time to focus on the development of a fallout shelter capability for the U.S. population. President Kennedy implemented this policy. In recent years, however, crisis relocation had gained in acceptability because of the Soviet efforts in this area as well as the awareness that a nuclear attack would most probably follow a severe crisis (thus granting warning time) rather than come "from out of the blue," as a surprise attack.

The second notable Carter decision in relation to civil defense involved the reorganization of civil defense and emergency preparedness responsibilities within the Federal Government. Implemented during 1979, the reorganization program consolidated five existing agencies into a combined unit (the Federal Emergency Management Agency):

1) The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (Department of Defense), which until then had administered the national civil defense program and provided planning guidance and financial assistance to State and local governments for attack and natural disaster preparedness.

2) The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (Department of Housing and Urban Development) which had coordinated and funded federal natural disaster relief operations.

3) The Federal Preparedness Agency (General Services Administration) which coordinated civil planning for national emergencies (continuity of government, mobilization resources, stockpiles, and post-attack recovery).

4) The Federal Insurance Administration (HUD).

5) The National Fire Prevention and Control Administration (Department of Commerce).

Arguing that the current fragmentation of civil defense and emergency preparedness responsibilities among these agencies caused "redundancy and inefficiency in the federal effort and confusion on the part of States and localities," the White House stated that the reorganization was designed to ameliorate this situation and achieve the following objectives:

1) Make a single agency, and a single official, accountable to the President and Congress for all emergency preparedness, mitigation and response activities;

2) Create a single point of contact for State and local governments, who have strongly urged consolidation of Federal emergency programs;

3) Enhance the dual use of emergency preparedness and response resources at all levels of government by taking advantage of the similarities in planning and response activities for peacetime and attack emergencies; and

4) Provide an improved basis for determining the relative benefits--and cost-effectiveness--of spending for hazard mitigation, preparedness planning, relief operations and recovery assistance.[38]

While it is much too early to form an opinion of the effectiveness of the FEMA reorganization at this time, as the agency stabilizes and proceeds to implement the President's policies one concern will stand out above all others as the basis to form such an opinion. This concern involves the relationship expressed in point 3 dealing with civil defense against nuclear attack preparedness on the one hand, and local disaster emergency management preparedness on the other (the combination

comprising dual-use). Under the Nixon Administration a similar focus on dual-use policy led, in reality, to a primary focus on peacetime local disaster preparedness with attack related civil defense preparedness relegated to a back seat and a dwindling share of DCPA budget appropriations (see Chapter Six).

Such an evolution is again a possibility, notwithstanding the PD 41 policy decision, particularly since not every agency in the Government was happy with PD 41. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in particular, denies that civil defense should or could contribute to deterrence.[39] Within the interagency task-force which drew up the policy paper for President Carter prior to his PD 41 decision there was disagreement.[40] This task-force was to analyze the current civil defense program, determine the changes to be made, and offer a range of alternative policy options for the future. Specifically, the task-force examined the following questions:

1) What is the role of civil defense and strategic policy?

2) Can civil defense make a significant difference in the outcome of a nuclear exchange?

3) What civil defense measures would be most useful?

4) If a role is identified what should it be?[41]

Disagreement within the task-force on these issues existed at the time and continues today within the agencies which comprised the task-force. Thus, the last has not been heard on these issues.

Evidence in support of this position can be gathered from a look at the controversy which surrounded the funding of the fiscal year 1980 budget for civil defense. Since the Kennedy Administration, appropprations for civil defense have rather steadily decreased, both in terms of appropriation levels and in terms of non-inflated dollars. Beginning

several months prior to the disclosure of PD 41 and continuing afterwards, there was a good deal of speculation in the press concerning the FY 1980 civil defense funding level. Judging from the figures posited in several of these articles, it was apparent that leaks both pro and con were issuing from the Executive branch. On 7 April 1978, the New York Times wrote of an approximately $150 million appropriation (as compared to an FY 1979 appropriation of less than $100 million).[42] A 20 October 1978 article spoke of "nearly $2 billion over the next seven years."[43] Later reports in December stated that President Carter had decided to go with a $115 million appropriation for civil defense despite the "at least $145 million" requested by Secretary of Defense Brown for the implementation of a crisis relocation program in support of the President's policy decision.[44] By January it was being argued in the press that the President had been dissuaded from implementing his policy decision:

> The '$2 billion civil defense program' discussed in the press, followed by editorial attacks on Carter's new doctrine making civil defense part of the strategic balance, frightened the President. Internal opponents, at ACDA and at State, quickly moved in to ridicule the whole idea of civil defense....The new budget...falls far short of the $140 million...originally expected to be approved by Carter. Instead, it is around $110 million....[45]

At the time of this writing the indications from Washington are that the FY 1980 appropriation will be about $100 million, as compared with the $108 million requested in the President's budget for FY 1980. This would amount to one of the all-time lowest, if not the lowest, civil defense appropriations (in terms of non-inflated dollars). PD 41 could not be implemented effectively at such a level of funding. In fact, such an appropriation would most likely lead to further retrogression in the civil defense program.

Why the Present Study?

The foregoing has been an attempt to demonstrate the enormous complexity and range of problems involved in the civil defense issue today. Not all of the significant developments in civil defense in the 1975-1979 period have been touched here, much less dealt with adequately. To do so would require a book length study in itself. The present study is but a first step toward an understanding of the issues, questions and uncertainties which are so controversial today. Of these there are surely many. For example,

- How will the new reorganization affect civil defense?
- How will the new FEMA Administrator balance civil defense and peacetime disaster priorities?
- Will the Congress fund an augmented civil defense program?
- What will be the effect of the new (PD 41) policy on civil defense?
- How effective is civil defense (U.S. or Soviet)?
- Will Soviet civil defense undermine the U.S. deterrent?

There is another question more pertinent to the study at hand. This question was raised by the nuclear physicists Edward Teller and Eugene Wigner in an article in a prominent newspaper during the height of the controversy and speculation over the funding of PD 41. Put simply it is:

- Why do we have no evacuation plan and no shelter system?[46]

This last question raises a number of corollary questions:

- What type of civil defense system does the United States have?
- Why this system?
- What alternatives have been proposed and why have they not been accepted?
- What have been the major determinants of U.S. civil defense?

There are thus three reasons for the present study of the evolution of civil defense policy and programs in the post World War II nuclear age: First, it is the intention of the author to provide the information (through description and analysis) with which these last four questions can be answered. Secondly, given the nature and scope of these unanswered questions, the continuing nature of the unresolved controversies, and the uncertainties over the future, it is felt that some light can be shed on these questions, controversies, and uncertainties through an understanding of the history of civil defense in the United States. Given such a background, it is the contention of the author that these enormous complexities can be better dealt with. Lastly, it is felt that the current study of the evolution of civil defense from 1945 to 1974 fills a gap in the literature devoted to civil defense.

Sources and Organization

The primary sources for this study have been published Congressional and Governmental hearings and reports. Beginning with the Bull Board and Hopley reports and continuing through all the various Holifield subcommittee hearings and reports down to the more recent House and Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, all relevant public documents, including all appropriations hearings concerning civil defense from FY 1950 through FY 1979, have been covered. The Congressional Record has also been surveyed for relevant material for the period 1945 to 1979. Various governmental agencies (particularly the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) have been very helpful in providing unpublished materials for scrutiny.

The RAND Corporation, the Hudson Institute and other research organizations have at various times published heavily in the civil defense

field and their publications have been utilized. Other sources have been derived through a Department of Defense (Defense Documentation Center) Library Search of relevant government and government sponsored research, and through a New York Times "Information Bank" search. The 1960s fallout shelter debate resulted in scores of published articles, books, and reports related to civil defense and an attempt has been made to be as comprehensive as possible in covering this material. Much useful information has also been gained through interviews with persons currently, or at one time, active or interested in the civil defense field. In all, over six hundred sources have been utilized.

The study itself is organized into six substantive chapters focusing on specific Administrations and civil defense. Chapter One starts with the Truman Administration, since civil defense as we know it began then due to the impetus of the outbreak of the Korean War. The focus of this chapter will be on the factors that shaped the new civil defense organization--the Federal Civil Defense Administration--and its policies. Special emphasis is given to an analysis of the dispersal-shelter-evacuation controversy which soon followed, and to problems with Congressional support.

The second and third chapters deal with the first and second terms of the Eisenhower Administration respectively. Attention is paid to the discovery of the serious fallout threat and to the official reactions to this threat. Special emphasis in these chapters will be given to the various Holifield House Government Operations Subcommittee hearings and Atomic Radiation Subcommittee hearings held throughout Eisenhower's two terms and to the clash between Holifield's Government Operations Subcommittee, in partucular, and FCDA Administrator Val Peterson over the

evacuation versus shelter issue. The Gaither Report conclusions on civil defense and Eisenhower's reaction are also of interest.

The fourth chapter deals with the Kennedy Administration. This chapter focuses on the quick rise in prestige, influence, and funding of civil defense following President Kennedy's July 1961 address to the Nation and transfer of civil defense to the Department of Defense (followed shortly by the Berlin Crisis). Some attention is paid to the "great debate' on civil defense and the alleged "shelter mania" that erupted after Kennedy's speech. Close attention is also paid to the lengthy and exhaustive examination given civil defense by Representative Hébert's House Armed Services Subcommittee.

Chapter Five deals with civil defense during President Johnson's years in the White House. A major watershed for civil defense develops when Senator Jackson's Armed Services Subcommittee tables action on H.R. 8200, which would have authorized a shelter incentive subsidy program to complete the nationwide shelter system begun under Kennedy. Executive and Legislative activity in this development is analyzed. Also of interest are the implications for civil defense which derived from strategic policies, the ABM issue, and the war in Vietnam.

Chapter Six deals with the Nixon Administration. Under President Nixon civil defense undergoes organizational change. The old Office of Civil Defense becomes the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. Underlying this change is a reorientation of civil defense policy and programs from an emphasis on sheltering to a dual-use concept involving preparedness to cope with peacetime disasters. Emphasis is given to the Executive and Legislative studies which preceeded the name change and to the reasons for both the name and policy change.

The final section will summarize and bring together the various strands of the study. It evaluates the factors which encourage or discourage a national commitment of resources to civil defense. Among these are Presidential interest, Congressional support, international crises, civil defense organizational leadership, and strategic policy. The reasons why certain influences have been more or less important are analyzed and the implications of this for the current debate over civil defense are suggested. Whatever other personal conclusions and recommendations that may have been prompted by this study will then be offered.

NOTES

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7 Ibid., p. 34.

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12 Nitze, p. 212.

13 Ibid., pp. 223 and 227.

14 Ibid., p. 227.

15 Goure, p. 27.

16 Ibid., p. 6.

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18 HASC, Hearings, Civil Defense Review, p. 244.

19 Ibid., p. 246.

20 JCDP, Hearings, Defense Industrial Base..., p. 26.

21 Ibid., p. 27.

22 Ibid., p. 29.

23 Ibid., p. 200.

24 Jan M. Lodal, "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative View," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, April 1976, especially pp. 463, 477-78.

25 JCDP, Hearings, Civil Preparedness and Limited Nuclear War, especially, pp. 32-34, 39, 41.

26 Ibid., p. 61.

27 Noted in U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, Report--Civil Preparedness Review, Part II: Industrial Defense and Nuclear Attack, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., April 1977, p. 1. This led to the publication in July 1978 of the unclassified report on Soviet Civil Defense by the Central Intelligence Agency, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1978).

28 See testimony of Brown in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee of the Budget, Hearings, First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget--Fiscal Year 1977 (Vol. III), 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1976 (March 26), p. 141.

29 Noted by Donald S. Marshall in Civil Defense: A Strategic Assessment, an unpublished Department of Defense study paper, June 1977, p. 2.

30 From author interview with high-level Executive branch official.

31 Murray Marder, "Carter To Inherit Intense Debate on Soviet Intentions," Washington Post, 2 Jan. 1976, pp. A2 and A4.

32 New York Times, 3 Jan. 1977 (David Binder article).

33 Both Proxmire's letter of 4 Jan. 1977 and Brown's letter of 28 Jan. 1977 are included in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture, Part 6: Civil Defense--Title VII, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., February 1977, pp. 229-243.

34 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization For Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths (Part 2), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1977, p. 852.

35 Ibid., p. 872.

36 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 was sent to Congress dated 19 June 1978.

37 From reproduced copy of the prepared statement of Bardyl R. Tirana (Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency) presented before the House Armed Services Committee holding authorization hearings on the DCPA budget request for FY 1980, on 26 Feb. 1979. (Printed copies of the hearings have not been made available at the time of this writing.)

38 See Fact Sheet, Office of the White House Press Secretary, 19 June 1978, pp. 1-2.

39 A point made more than once during interviews with ACDA and DCPA officials.

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41 Tirana statement, pp. 2-3.

42 New York Times, 7 April 1978, p.3.

43 Evans and Novak, "A $2 Billion Boost for Civil Defense," Washington Post, 20 Oct. 1978.

44 New York Times, 28 Dec. 1978, p. 1.

45 Evans and Novak article, Washington Post, 5 Jan. 1979, p. A19.

46 Edward Teller and Eugene P. Wigner, "America Needs a Better Civil Defense Program," Washington Post, 22 July 1979, p. D3.

CHAPTER I

THE TRUMAN YEARS

At 8:17 A.M. on 6 August 1945 the first atomic bomb to be exploded in anger was detonated roughly 2000 feet above the city of Hiroshima, Japan. At first there was a blinding light followed quickly by a hurricane-like blast wave that hit the city like a wall of water. Within minutes the hundreds of smaller fires that were generated by the heat and blast effects of the explosion began to join until conflagrations blanketed the area of blast destruction.[1] At the peak of the fires, two to three hours after the blast, air from around the blazes was being sucked into the center at 30 to 40 miles per hour. Though the fires were to burn out eight to nine hours later, smoldering persisted for four days. Almost five square miles were destroyed as the result of this approximately 20 kiloton atomic explosion and 70,000 people were dead or would die.[2] Three days later at 11:02 A.M. August 9th another atomic device of similar yield was detonated over Nagasaki. Fires continued to burn two days later throughout the one square mile area of serious destruction. Tens of thousands more were killed.[3]

The atomic age had arrived and with it a new dimension was given to the term "civil defense."[4] At the time, however, little thought was given to civil defense against atomic weapons. World War II was drawing to a close and it was not anticipated that any other country would be able to develop atomic weapons for many years to come. Moreover, the Office of Civilian Defense which had organized the nationwide network of

civil defense volunteers during the war had been abolished just five weeks before the Hiroshima bomb.[5] Responsibility for civil defense was then transferred to the War Department where the principal activities relating to civil defense were the investigations made by the Strategic Bombing Survey of the civil defense organizations of Germany, Japan, and Great Britain.[6]

For those who did consider what it might be like if an atomic bomb were exploded over an American city the reaction was more often than not "there is no defense against atomic bombs."[7]

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey

Such was not the conclusion of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, however. Twelve months after the Japanese bombings their report "The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki" was published. Mindful of the destructiveness of these weapons the report's writers asked themselves: "What if the target of the bomb had been an American city?"[8] They concluded that the result would have been basically the same. Both Japanese cities and American cities were typically crowded. Whereas the Japanese cities bombed had been crowded horizontally, U.S. cities were usually just as crowded, only more often than not, in a vertical fashion. And, in their opinion, the overwhelming majority of buildings in American cities could not stand up against an atomic explosion in an area of a mile to a mile-and-a-half from ground-zero.

The Survey investigators next looked at the possibility of protection from the effects of atomic explosions and concluded that protective measures were feasible. They noted that in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki several hundred people had survived the blast in tunnel shelters--some near ground-zero.

> Without question, shelters can protect those who get to them against anything but a direct hit. Adequate warning will assure that a maximum number get to shelters.[9]

Since protection was feasible the first order of priority was considered to be the creation of a national civil defense organization. It should be the duty of this organization to plan for crisis implementation of civil defense measures centered around (1) evacuation of non-essential personnel from potential target areas, and (2) emergency construction of shelters for essential personnel.

On the economic level the report called for industrial decentralization, balanced regional economies, reserves of critical materials, and other long term measures which would facilitate recovery after an atomic attack.

> In our planning for the future, if we are realistic, we will prepare to minimize the destructiveness of such attacks, and so organize the economic and administrative life of the Nation that no single or small group of successful attacks can paralyze the national organism.[10]

Most importantly, the report noted the importance of avoiding delay in implementing these measures, as the benefits of the longer term preparations would not begin to accrue for many years.[11]

The recommendations of the report met with varied reactions, but in the private sector skepticism prevailed. One commentator wrote, "This prospect of running for cover and burrowing like moles is so fantastic as to seem almost unbelievable."[12] He was referring to the evacuation and sheltering proposals. Moreover, not only would such activities be unbelievable, they would also be un-American: "Particularly must we appreciate what such mass movements of population would mean to the free American way of life. They could not be accomplished without regimentation and discipline such as Americans have never yet tolerated."[13]

In a manner similar to many of his contemporary commentators on the evils of atomic weaponry during the early postwar years, this commentator concluded: "Unless we establish world control, government officials must plan defense and decentralization measures beyond description."[14]

In the government sector little action was taken on the Survey Report. There was little interest in the War Department at that time in civil defense or civil defense planning. One reason for this was that with a limited military budget, civil defense was an unwelcome potential competitor for funds. Thus, it was felt that civil defense should be a civilian responsibility. This point was made, for example, in a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of War to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in August 1946. The Director was at that time in the process of determining the future responsibilities of the planned National Security Resources Board, to be set up pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1945. It was implied in the memorandum that civil defense would be a more appropriate responsibility of this new agency than the War Department.[15]

The Bull Board

This same feeling was stated more explicitly in the Bull Board Report, released on 15 February 1948. Formally set up as the Civil Defense Board by the War Department (25 November 1946), the Bull Board, as it came to be called, was to determine the War Department's views and policies on the structure of civil defense. Made up of twelve general officers and chaired by Major General Harold R. Bull, the Board proceeded to interview a wide range of civil and military witnesses on the

subject of civil defense placement, organization, and responsibility.[16]

The Bull Board Report concluded that civil defense was ultimately a State and local responsibility and recommended that a civil defense organization be set up to guide and advise on local activities. For a variety of reasons it was not felt that the military was the best choice for the placement of civil defense responsibility:

> 1) The armed forces' primary mission requires devotion of their effort to active measures, both offensive and defensive. They must avoid diversion of effort and means to civil defense, except to meet Federal requirements and dire emergencies, beyond the capabilities of the states when the national interest is involved.
>
> 2) Study of required civil defense activities indicates that the great burden of operation falls on the civilian communities. Due to the magnitude and nature of the tasks the work must be done by the citizens of those communities, and can most efficiently be performed by using the existing governmental framework and existing civil organizations and facilities. Organization, training, and operation for civil defense will affect the normal peacetime life of large numbers. Only a flexible, trained and self-sufficient organization within the communities, utilizing to the full their existing capabilities, can meet the demands which may be placed upon them. These considerations indicate the need for recognizing the responsibility of local civil defense as primarily that of the local civil government.
>
> 3) It is recognized also that national budgetary problems may lead to public misconception that funds made available for civil defense are for the support of the armed forces and that placing civil defense under the Department of the Armed Forces may be viewed with concern by the public as too great a concentration of power in one department.[17]

The Report further recommended that until action was taken on the recommendations of the Board and a separate civil defense organization was created, civil defense responsibilities should stay within the Department.

The Hopley Report

In line with the above-mentioned recommendation of the Bull Board on the interim placement of civil defense, on 27 March 1948 an Office of

Civil Defense Planning was created within the newly organized Department of Defense under the direction of Russell J. Hopley.[18] The OCDP was charged with the preparation of a program for the civil defense of the United States, "including a plan for a permanent Federal Civil Defense Administration which, in conjunction with the several States and their subdivisions, could undertake those peacetime preparations which are necessary to assure an adequate civil defense system in the event of war."[19]

Under the leadership of Hopley the OCDP undertook a thorough examination of civil defense for the United States. In October of 1948, after eight months of study, the examination was completed and written up in a report entitled Civil Defense For National Security and forwarded up the chain of command. Known as the Hopley Report, the study set off a major controversy within the Executive by stating that there was a "missing link" in American defense policy and the missing link was civil defense. To meet this need it recommended the creation of a nationwide civil defense organization which would work alongside existing State governmental units "trained, prepared, and equipped in advance to meet the problem of enemy attack and to be ready against any weapon that an enemy may use."[20]

In keeping with the preceeding studies done by the Strategic Bombing Survey and the Bull Board, the Hopley Report viewed civil defense as a local responsibility operationally, with leadership, guidance, and training of cadres the responsibility of "a national Office of Civil Defense, with a small but capable staff." The local organizations would be manned by "loyal volunteers."[21] The Hopley Report disagreed with the Bull Board Report in the placement of civil defense within the Executive.

The Hopley Report proposed a civilian director of an agency that would be set up either to report directly to the President or to be set up under the Secretary of Defense. The latter was the preferred choice "since a very large part of the civil defense program will require continuous coordination with all Agencies responsible to the Secretary of Defense."[22]

As with the Bull Board Report, the Hopley Report did have its critics. However, most of the criticism of the Hopley Report came not from "Ban the Bomb" types but from people working in, or interested in civil defense, primarily at the local level. For example, Horatio Bond (at the time the chief engineer of the National Fire Protection Association) criticized the Report for its deficient factual data on atomic bomb effects--information that was vitally needed if realistic planning was to be done. Writing in the November, 1949 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (a publication which was very interested in civil defense in its early days), Bond argued that "the Military Establishment has not done the one part of the job of civil defense which is theirs and theirs only."[23] In order for the civilians to do their job, the military would have to be more forthcoming with atomic data.

The SSRC Report

Even with the deficiency noted by Bond, for those who worked on the Hopley Report the prospect that their recommendations would be acted on favorably by those higher up must have seemed good. The direction of their findings was in line not only with that of the Strategic Bombing Survey and the Bull Board Report but with those of the Social Science Research Council, as well. Its committee on Social and Economic Aspects of Atomic Energy had been studying the problems of civil defense since

early 1946 when it had been formed "to plan and encourage research on problems of human relations associated with the utilization of atomic energy in peace or war."[24]

In 1947 the Committee published their conclusions in The Problem of Reducing Vulnerability to Atomic Bombs, in which it was asked: "Are there practicable methods by which mankind can substantially reduce its vulnerability to atomic warfare?" Relying heavily on the Strategic Bombing Survey's report on the Japanese bombings for scientific data, the authors concluded that protective measures should be implemented. The measures specifically advocated were: (1) physical dispersal of industrial concentrations, (2) planning dispersed growth, and (3) stockpiling and physical protection as in hardened construction methods and shelter construction.[25]

While the question posed was not answered with any real degree of certainty, the study, nevertheless, was able to make a contribution to the evolving field of civil defense by indicating the avenues along which more intensified research efforts should follow. The study was also notable in that it forsaw many of the problems civil defense would encounter in the years to come. In the Foreword to the study the Committee chairman speculated that many people would find the subject of the analysis "abhorrent." Others would consider it "defeatism" in that it undertook to deal with hazards that could only be brought about should the methods being used to guarantee the peace fail, as if one were not really sure of his government's ability. Another possible objection was that the adoption of measures to reduce vulnerability might tend to make people feel "safe" and thus willing to forego sacrifices that a cautious and prudent national program might require. The

Committee also entertained doubts that people would be willing to undertake the cost of a realistic program of dispersal and reduction of vulnerability if the United States were "to remove any possibility that a small number of bombs, delivered by surprise, would give a decisive advantage to any aggressor."[26] Despite these possible objections, the Committee felt that "so long as great power relations show symptoms of chronic instability, vulnerability reduction compels our attention, however reluctant."[27]

While the SSRC study did not deal specifically with the placement or organization of civil defense, it seems clear that implementing its recommendations would have required the creation of a full-time civil defense organization along the lines of the Hopley Report. An already established agency would have been hard pressed to incorporate such time and money consuming tasks into a structure devoted to another mission. Data collection on a nationwide basis, research into little known or unknown areas, organization, training, planning, shelter construction and related tasks would have overwhelmed an existing agency.

Truman's Response and the NSRB

Despite the confluence of opinion which culminated in the Hopley Report, President Truman rejected the Report's recommendations. Instead, he chose to place responsibility for civil defense in the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). In a "Memorandum on Civil Defense Planning," dated 4 March 1949, Truman stated,

> I have recently given considerable attention to the question of the appropriate organization of the executive branch for civil defense.
>
> Under present conditions the essential need of the Federal Government in the area of civil defense is peacetime planning and preparation for civil defense in the event of war, rather than

> operation of a full-scale civil defense program. Therefore, I see no need to establish at this time a permanent organization such as a proposed Office of Civil Defense. Rather, I see a definite necessity to continue planning for civil defense and an immediate need to fix in a responsible agency definite leadership for such planning.
>
> Since peacetime civil defense planning is related to, and a part of, overall mobilization planning of the Nation in peacetime, I have concluded that the National Security Resources Board, which is charged with advising me concerning the coordination of such overall mobilization planning, is the appropriate agency which should also exercise leadership in civil defense planning.[28]

John R. Steelman, the Chairman of the NSRB, named William A. Gill "Coordinator of Civil Defense" but did not set up an internal organization within the NSRB responsible to Gill. Thus beginning in June, Gill was forced to farm out civil defense planning tasks and studies to other agencies such as the Defense Department and the General Services Administration and to various offices within the NSRB.[29]

For some aspects of civil defense (such as recovery operations), the placing of responsibility for civil defense within the NSRB was appropriate. Some work had already been started along these lines pursuant to legislation within the National Security Act of 1947 which, noting "the vulnerability of the Nation's concentrated industrial and population patterns" instructed the NSRB to study "the strategic relocation of industries, services, Government and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security."[30] Thus the NSRB had by this time undertaken numerous mobilization projects which would have been valuable to civil defense in time of attack or recovery. Included were manpower studies compiling rosters of doctors, nurses, dentists, sanitary engineers, etc.; studies of strategic and industrial relocation; resource studies; and supply inventories.[31] Moreover, after assuming civil defense responsibilities, the NSRB broadened

its planning program to include a study of where the U.S. was in terms of civil defense and what would need to be done in the future.[32] Nevertheless, some basic civil defense responsibilities, such as the planning for or physical provision of protection for people, remained outside the ability or purview of the NSRB.

The Soviet Bomb

In early 1949 this official lack of emphasis on civil defense caused little anxiety throughout the country for a variety of reasons--not the least of which was the fact that no other country possessed an atomic bomb and it was not expected that the Soviet Union would be able to duplicate this accomplishment for years to come. In point of fact, the Finletter Commission Report to the President in January 1948, predicted that the Soviets would not be able to produce an atomic bomb any earlier than 1953.[33] It came as quite a shock to most Americans, then, when Truman announced on 23 September 1949 that the Soviets had exploded their first atomic bomb on August 29th, almost a month earlier. Suddenly, civil defense took on new importance both in and out of government.[34] In October, Senator Brien McMahon, the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), announced that his committee would begin a series of hearings on civil defense.[35] In November the National Convention of the American Legion, meeting in Indianapolis, came out strongly for an active nationwide civil defense program:

> Whereas failure of the executive branch of the Federal Government to produce a civil-defense blueprint and training program has aroused the country and
>
> Whereas the American Legion believes that this is inexcusable ....therefore be it
>
> Resolved, That in order to put an end to these ominous delays and omissions, and in order to get the action demanded by the people...it is

> Resolved, That the American Legion now demands in terms so unmistakeable that there can be no misunderstanding that the Congress of the United States take this matter into its own hands and proceed to enact a law which will provide a sound and acceptable plan of Nationwide civil-defense training designed to give to all of the States a common basis of civil defense; and be it further
>
> Resolved, That the Congress provide that civil-defense planning and training be made the responsibility of a single Federal office or department...[36]

In other developments, in December the NSRB began sending out the first of a series of "Civil Defense Planning Bulletins" to State Governors;[37] on January 31st, Truman announced that he had directed the Atomic Energy Commission "to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super bomb,"[38] (thereby reversing a decision made earlier to defer its development); and, on March 1st the NSRB finally set up an "Office of Civil Defense" and named Paul J. Larsen its director.[39]

Congressional Hearings

On 17 March 1950, Congress for the first time showed an active interest in atomic-age civil defense when its Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, chaired by Senator Brien McMahon (Dem.,Con.), opened the "first in a series of hearings regarding the state of our civilian defenses as it pertains to atomic attack."[40] (These were the hearings publicized by McMahon the previous October.) In opening the hearings Senator McMahon stated: "I personally have great faith and hope that any set-up that we have will never be made use of. We must realize, however, that we are spending some $15,000,000,000 a year on our Military Establishment, and we are spending it for the purpose of protecting this country. It therefore would seem only right and sensible that we examine into the state of the plans for the protection of our civilians...in the atomic field."[41]

During five public hearings held in March and April of 1950, the Committee listened to a wide range of interested parties from State, local, and Federal Government and from private life. The common denominator, it soon became apparent, was a criticism of the present inadequacy of the civil defense program and lack of strong official support. For example, Clyde Dougherty, the Coordinator of Civil Defense for Detroit, Michigan, testified:

> One finds little serious thought on the subject of civil defense planning, with resultant apathy on the part of the public generally on this topic and worse than apathy, an attitude of sometimes almost derision toward those suggesting that there is any need presently for such a program. I personally, in attempting to advise our local program before groups of what would ordinarily be regarded as well-informed and responsible citizens, have met with an attitude, I might say of amused tolerance, which in effect says, "If Washington is not excited about the urgency of such a program, why should we be too disturbed?" Such an attitude points out the need for information and policies emanating from high level if local efforts are to progress and local programs are to be taken seriously...42

The Mayor of San Francisco, Elmer E. Robinson, argued that "we are not prepared because, as of this date, the civil defense of our people from atomic attack seems to be nothing more than a buck-passing operation of the first magnitude between top Federal agencies." He went on to note that it had been five years since Hiroshima, during which time about all that the Federal Government had been doing was "fumbling the ball of civilian defense." His most troubling complaint, however, involved the lack of information provided by the Government, instructing local areas in measures to prepare for an attack or telling them what to do during or after one. Referring to the NSRB Bulletins, pamphlets, etc., he stated:

> Now, this literature is all very nice, which is made up here in Washington....But it doesn't tell the mayor of large cities, having the direct responsibility to the people, what to do and how to proceed. And I challenge any man to take the literature

> that has come out there and show us where there is any direct instruction for planning for civilian defense; except to lick your wounds, nurse your injuries, and die...[43]

Recommendations were made to the committee to set up an independent agency of civil defense or to create such an agency in the Executive Office of the President or the Department of Defense. There were calls for the Selective Service Act to be extended to civil defense, making it "our fourth arm, with training schools, lectures, drills, and so forth."[44] Some thought uniforms would help to create better public acceptance for civil defense workers.

The Director of the NSRB Office of Civilian Mobilization, Paul Larsen, was generally unreceptive to suggestions made during the hearings, especially in relation to the creation of a separate civil defense agency. Civil defense, he indicated, was the responsibility of local administrations in peacetime as well as in time of war:

> It is our belief that the responsibility of the Federal Government in civil defense activities even after implementation /In other words, even after attack/ will not require the establishment of a large Federal organization in order to insure adequate civil defense to overcome disaster which may occur by enemy action...[45]

As he saw it the role of the Federal Government in civil defense should be in the following areas:

> 1) formalizing a Federal plan which will be accepted by States and local communities
>
> 2) assisting States and local communities in training of volunteer workers
>
> 3) establishing national schools for training of key State and community civil defense personnel
>
> 4) evaluating requirements of equipment and resources for civil defense and determining which of these should be obligations of the Federal Government and/or State and local communities
>
> 5) evaluating weapons effects in order to determine sound

> dispersion and evacuation policies of Government activities and/or other vital installations
>
> 6) maintaining such reserve stores of critical materials as will be required in event of disaster plus control and distribution of these to communities requiring them in the event of disaster, and
>
> 7) maintaining close liaison with the public and public groups through the medium of information, public relations and education on civil defense planning and the dangers which the public should prepare for without introducing hysteria or fear [see n. 467] which would affect morale and effective civilian participation in the civil defense program and the public's main functions of maintaining activity at top level for the war effort...[47]

Such, Larsen argued, could be accomplished for the time being without changing the structure of the present civil defense arrangement and without special legislation.[48] Larson told both this committee and Senator Kefauver's Armed Services Subcommittee on Civil Defense (holding parallel hearings) that it would be approximately the first of September before he could go over all the civil defense material submitted to his Office, consolidate plans, and have these plans approved. At that time he would be prepared to recommend legislation,if it was deemed necessary or desirable.[49] Both committees decided, therefore, not to recommend that civil defense legislation be passed at that time. In fact, the SASC Subcommittee on Civil Defense noted in its preliminary report, that while on the one hand,

> The subcommittee has been deeply impressed with the seriousness of the problem and are most anxious that the planning be completed as expeditiously as possible. On the other hand, it strongly urges the members of the Committee and Congress to proceed cautiously in urging speed lest the time saved should be offset by a failure to consider the problem in its fullest aspects.[50]

The Korean War Impetus

The above noted situation was to change suddenly, however. On 24 June 1950 North Korea invaded the South using Soviet tanks and

equipment. The next twelve months would witness several changes and developments in American military and civil defense policies. Contrary to previously stated intent, the United States immediately sent armed units to Korea. Five days later the AEC stated (warned?) that "great steps" had been achieved in developing the hydrogen bomb.[51] Small civil defense staffs were soon established in the Department of Defense, the General Services Administration, and the Public Health Service. More significantly, the Korean invasion gave Truman the wherewithal to implement NSC 68, a National Security Council policy paper he had approved in April that would serve as the blueprint for waging the Cold War.

NSC 68 argued that the Soviets were aggressive and expansionistic, especially on the EurAsian land mass, and that the post-war world was a bipolar one with the United States pitted against the Soviet Union. The United States should (1) cease trying to negotiate with the Soviets (it was fruitless and they were deceitful), (2) massively buildup U.S. armed might (20 percent of our GNP, or $50 billion was cited as affordable), (3) make Americans aware of the danger and mobilize them, (4) mobilize the world through alliance systems against the USSR, and (5) attempt to convert the Russian people and sow discord there. In line with these recommendations work was speeded up on the hydrogen bomb and Truman requested and received an additional $4 billion for defense in July.

An increased interest in defense also meant a speedup in activities with civil defense ramifications. In August the AEC issued a long-awaited Weapons Effects Handbook, dealing with atomic explosives and, as one historian has written, "for the first time, civil defense planners had comprehensive and authoritative guidance on the blast, thermal, and initial nuclear radiation hazards of kiloton weapons."[53]

It was greeted warmly throughout the country by civil defense planners who now thought they could begin to deal with the problem of civil defense. As we will see later, however, this enthusiasm would be dulled in just a few years when nuclear effects not dealt with by the handbook were discovered and disclosed; effects which would greatly complicate the problem of planning for civil defense.

Fast on the heels of the release of the AEC's Handbook, the NSRB released its long-awaited report on United States Civil Defense.[54] Presented as "the culmination of extensive thinking and planning for civil defense that has been going on in the world for the past 10 years," the report recommended to the President that legislation be passed authorizing the establishment of a Federal civil defense administration and program. Such an undertaking was considered "vital to the future security of the United States because it might provide the means whereby this country, if suddenly attacked heavily and without warning, could get up off the floor and fight back."[55]

As in preceeding studies, United States Civil Defense considered civil defense a local responsibility. The Federal organization would assist in planning, training, information, guidance, etc.:

> The basic operating responsibility for civil defense is in the individual and his local government. The individual, given all training possible, does what he can for himself in an emergency. The family unit, similarly trained, attacks its own problems while also contributing to the organized community effort. The community's civil-defense organization works to meet its own crisis, receiving outside help if its facilities are inadequate, or contributing support to neighborhood communities under organized State direction. In order to help communities carry out their responsibility, the State and Federal Governments contribute assistance in organizational advice, over-all planning, and resources...
>
> The responsibility of the Federal Government is to establish a national civil-defense plan with accompanying policy, and to insure informational and educational material about both. The

> Federal Government will provide courses and facilities for schooling and training, provide coordination of interstate operations, furnish some of the essential equipment, and advise the States concerning the establishment of stockpiles needed at the time of disaster....[56]

The report was notably deficient in specifics, such as what type of equipment the Federal Government would supply and on what basis, and was in essence a restatement of past announcements promising a plan. Mayor Frank Zeidler of Milwaukee, after attending a civil defense exercise in Chicago as well as a civil defense meeting of mayors at the U.S. Conference of Mayors in Washington (both held after the publication of United States Civil Defense), wrote that "the first impression gained by most civil defense directors with whom I have spoken is the United States Civil Defense is principally a restatement of the Hopley Report."[57] Similarly, a Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists editorial called it a "scissors-and-paste job" on the Hopley Report, and stated that civil defense knowledge was "little advanced beyond that existing before the NSRB began its consideration of the problem."[58] James M. Landis, Director of the Federal Office of Civil Defense during World War II, stated that "the new federal plan for civil defense seems...to be more like a plan for World War II than for World War III..."[59]

The USCD Report was not a wasted effort, though. It did give local officials a somewhat better understanding of what they might expect from the Federal Government in the way of civil defense assistance. But what makes this report significant is the fact that it included a draft of a legislative proposal to create an independent Federal civil defense organization along the lines of its recommendations. The climate at the moment was ripe for such a recommendation, and this time Truman approved, as did Congress when the President's proposal was submitted.

The Korean War and a growing anxiety in Washington concerning the possibility of communist attack in Europe made the difference in civil defense acceptance. Many were coming to feel that the Korean invasion might actually be just a diversion, an attempt to tie the United States down as a prelude to a European attack. Others felt that the Korean War might escalate, pulling in the Communist giants, and that attacks in Europe might result from that development. The lead article in the August 1950 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by the Bulletin's editor, Eugene Rabinowitch, for example, noted that the war could spread to Europe where the United States was not prepared to withstand Soviet attack. Thus, there was the danger of a U.S. nuclear response on the Soviet homeland and the prospect that "the Soviet leaders will not be able to refrain from an attempt to give the Americans a taste of their own medicine and will stage at least a few hit-and-run attacks on American cities.[60] This possibility, he argued, called for "atom-proofing" civil defense measures.

In another article in the same issue, Stuart Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and the current Chairman of the NSRB, reflected similar concerns while noting the conventional disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union:

> 1) Russia now has a ground army greater in numbers than the combined armies of the United States and its allies,
>
> 2) Russia now has an air force whose strength in nearly all categories is the largest in the world and growing relatively larger month by month,
>
> 3) Russia now has the world's largest submarine fleet and an intensive submarine development and construction program,
>
> 4) Russia has the bomb.[61]

The possibility of conventional engagements, Symington wrote, and the

resulting probability of nuclear escalation due to conventional disparities made civil defense a very timely subject.

Writing in the New York Times, Hanson Baldwin agreed and warned that "The threat from atomic attack is...a real one..." In fact, the threat was felt to be so real that in New York City, authorities there instituted a policy of examining incoming ships for hidden atomic bombs.[62] And, polls taken at the time (September 1950) indicated that a majority of Americans felt that within two years the United States would be in another world war.[63]

As a reflection of such concerns in Washington, Truman asked Congress for $140 million in August to begin a program of dispersing government agencies out of Washington into the surrounding countryside.[64] In September he ordered four divisions sent to Europe as a precaution. Also in September the Administration placed before the Congress a bill calling for the creation of a Federal Civil Defense Administration. For civil defense the cogwheels of change and progress were beginning to move in Washington. The period of August through December 1950 witnessed a series of civil defense related events. Various bills (in addition to the Administration bill) were placed before the House and Senate seeking to create an operational Federal civil defense organization, hearings were held, pamphlets were published, and civil defense became a subject of some discussion.[65]

Back in Korea, events there would accelerate this process during the latter months of 1950 for in October U.S. forces in Korea first began engaging Chinese "volunteer" units. These units had been able to infiltrate into Korea completely undetected and their discovery came as a surprise. Surprise soon turned to shock, however, when on November 26

Chinese forces in Korea attacked in mass, pushing the United Nations forces back all along the front.[66]

In Washington new urgency was given to the debates on civil defense. Apparently, however, President Truman felt there was too much discussion and not enough action, for on December 1st, 1950, just a few days after the Chinese assault, and while the Congress continued to debate the merits of the various civil defense bills before it, he issued an Executive Order removing civil defense from the jurisdiction of the NSRB and established a separate Civil Defense Administration in the Executive Office of the President.[67] Truman then asked Congress to expedite its deliberations on civil defense and give the new agency statutory authority.

Congress responded and quickly convened civil defense subcommittees under the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. The sense of urgency with which Truman acted made itself felt in the committee rooms of Congress as civil defense legislation developed. Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee's Special Subcommittee on Civil Defense on December 7th, for example, Murray S. Levine, Chairman of the New York Committee on Atomic Information, stated:

> Today, in the darkest hour America has known since Pearl Harbor, I am sure I do not need to emphasize the urgency of the matter /the passage of a CD bill/....if attack came at noon, as it might, our Pearl Harbors will be a national scandal far worse than the first one and the scandal will be only a small part of the catastrophe...The anniversary of Pearl Harbor reminds me that we have had a bad national habit of mobilizing after we are in danger. To mobilize this time means amongst other things, raising a civilian army of almost 15,000,000 men and women. That Army must be ready, alert and equipped before a Pearl Harbor on our shores. We cannot afford to further delay. And this time we may not survive complacency. Today we are reliving Bataan and still there are officials in power with a pre-Pearl Harbor mentality. We must change that.[69]

While today such language may seem overly dramatic, there is no doubt that in late 1950 a crisis atmosphere pervaded Washington. Not only did many government officials share such perceptions, but it has been reported that in early December, as these hearings were being held, the Joint Chiefs of Staff became convinced that the Soviet Union was planning to initiate a general war in a matter of two or three weeks.[70] It was at this point that President Truman is said to have told his advisers, "It looks like World War III is near."[71] As the Mayor of Boston, John B. Hynes, appearing before the Senate subcommittee considering civil defense legislation, put it: "Despite the earnest efforts and the fervent prayers of good people all over the world, it becomes more apparent each day that Russia, spearheaded by her willing satellites, is determined to dominate the world."[72]

In this crisis atmosphere, or "state of national emergency" as Truman declared to the nation,[73] there was little dispute in Congress over the need for an operational Federal civil defense program. Thus, the House passed the Administration bill (H.R. 9798) on the 20th of December with only one dissenting vote (that of Representative Clare Hoffman, Republican from Michigan). A somewhat different Senate version passed by voice vote on the 22nd. The two versions went to conference where a compromise bill quickly emerged. The House then passed the conference report on the 1st of January, 1951 and the Senate's approval came the following day.[74]

Congratulating Congress for "its speedy and thorough consideration of this legislation," Truman on 12 January 1951, signed into law the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, thus giving statutory authority to the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) he had created almost

six weeks earlier. In his statement issued upon signing the act into law (Public Law 920, 81st Congress), Truman called it the "Masterplan," the "blueprint for American States and cities in their preparations to safeguard American lives and homes."[75]

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950

Declaration of Policy

> Sec.2. It is the policy and intent of Congress to provide a plan of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack. It is further declared to be the policy and intent of Congress that this responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions. The Federal Government shall provide necessary coordination and guidance; shall be responsible for the operations of the Federal Civil Defense Administration as set forth in this Act; and shall provide necessary assistance as hereinafter authorized.

As enacted, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 established a permanent Federal Civil Defense Administration and gave to it the authority to (1) draw up plans and programs; (2) provide the States and their political subdivisions with guidance, coordination and assistance; (3) conduct training programs; (4) provide matching grants to the States on a fifty-fifty basis with allocations to be made to each State in proportion to the size of its critical target area population; (5) delegate various civil defense reaponsibilities to other Federal agencies and departments; (6) provide for civil defense communications and for the dissemination of attack warnings to the population; (7) conduct research and development in civil defense protection; and (8) "assist and encourage the States to negotiate and enter into interstate civil defense compacts...". The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized $250 million to make fifty-year loans for the financing of civil defense projects. And, of much importance for the development of an effective

civil defense policy, the act called for "the construction or preparation of shelter, shelter areas, and control centers; and when appropriate, the non-military evacuation of civil population...".[76]

Civil defense was still conceived as basically a State and local responsibility, but with the passage of the Act the Federal Government was now prepared to go much further than before in helping to meet this responsibility.

Even so, the civil defense act did not receive the complete approval of those across the country responsible for civil defense at the grass roots. While it was greeted as an overdue step forward, two potentially major problems were foreseen. First, some questioned the Federal premise that civil defense was primarily the responsibility of State and local jurisdictions. Secondly, there was broad disapproval of a provision in the bill that required the new FCDA to communicate and operate solely with State governments to the exclusion of local communities.[77]

Voicing the concerns of many local administrators, the Mayor of Milwaukee, Frank Zeidler, wrote in the February 1951 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that "the States--even the best of them with good administrators such as my own state--have not met the problem." They were neither staffed nor set up to meet the diverse needs of the local administrations within the State. Furthermore "the states have not transmitted civil defense information to the cities; they have obtained it from the cities....The emphasis they tend to give civil defense is on what they will do after a catastrophe has occured rather than on what should be done now to reduce the vulnerability of the critical targets."[78] A final concern was that many rurally dominated State

legislatures would not come through with the necessary finances for a civil defense program that benefitted the large urban areas primarily, even if the funds were matched by the FCDA.

The FY 1951 Appropriation

For those working in civil defense at the Federal level there was little time to do anything but take note of the concerns of State and local civil defense officials. All energies were devoted to laying the groundwork for a civil defense system and to preparing a budget to present before Congress in March. Estimates of potential casualties from hypothetical attacks had to be determined as well as shelter needs, designs, and costs. Lehigh University, which had undertaken extensive research work in protective construction for the Army Corps of Engineers, was contracted to work on the shelter program. With their help a program of critical target area shelter construction was worked out which was estimated to cost $1,730,000,000 and would require two years to complete. As half the cost would be born by the States, the annual Federal share would amount to $432,500,000.[79]

This was comparable to the figures discussed during the hearings and floor debates on the enactment of H.R. 9798. Then, appropriation authorization discussion had centered on an estimate that $3.1 billion would be spent for civil defense over a three-year period and that roughly one-half of this would be contributed by the States (leaving $1.6 billion as the Federal share). Of the $3.1 billion, $2.25 billion was earmarked for shelters and protective facilities (the Federal share being $1.125 billion).

Both the figures and the policy would change more than once over the next few months, however. At first, there was talk of constructing

huge underground shelters for the protection of entire communities. In February, the FCDA announced at a national meeting of State civil defense directors that matching Federal funds would also be available for the construction of individual or family-size shelters within the critical target areas.[81] Consideration was given to the encouragement of private and public dual-use shelter construction--the building of structures that would be used for one thing (such as a garage or community center) but would also incorporate shelter protective techniques. Then there was talk of only allowing dual-use shelter construction funds if the projects in question were not self-liquidating (would not pay for themselves in a given period of time). By 16 March 1951, when the FCDA appeared before the House to present its first budget appropriation request, the Congress had been deluged with requests for matching Federal shelter funds from private and public concerns across the nation.[82]

Appearing before the House Appropriation Committee's Special Subcommittee on Emergency Defense Appropriations (presided over by Clarence Cannon, chairman of the full Committee), FCDA Director Millard Caldwell presented a $403 million appropriation request. (Caldwell's original request had been for $730,215,200 but this had been cut back to $403 million by the Bureau of the Budget.)[83] He explained that this would "not provide for a total program" but it would provide a start, after which, "as plans develop, additional requests will be made for funds." Towards this end the FCDA sought $250 million for "protective facilities" (by far the largest item in the request). With this fund the FCDA would apportion to the States, on a matching basis, money with which to begin construction of a nationwide shelter system in the Nation's potential target cities.[84] In addition, Caldwell informed the Committee that

plans were being drawn up to implement a stockpile program for medical supplies and other "materials and supplies which would be required in a post-attack period." Funds were sought for firefighting equipment to be provided to the States on a matching basis (the fear of firestorms being quite prevalent at the time). Funds were included in the request for the establishment of a "Civil Defense Staff College" and a technical training school (primarily to be concerned with firefighting and rescue operations). /See Table I-17

The Committee members gave little indication during this rather short hearing of their positions on these civil defense matters. Questions on most items were few and never deep or probing, with some exceptions in the shelter area. Representative Taber (Rep.,N.Y.), the ranking Republican on the Committee, opened the discussion on this section of the request by asking: "On this $250,000,000...you really do not know what you want to do with that do you?" Interestingly enough, James J. Wadsworth, the Acting Deputy Director responded, "That is correct, we do not." To this Taber stated: "There is hardly any reason to begin your operation on that; is there?....Unless we have some idea what you are going to do, it would seem to me...quite peculiar for us to allow anything of that character." Wadsworth defended the request by noting that the requirements for a shelter system would be large. Of that there was no doubt. The agency had "a fairly educated guess as to the number of people who will need shelter...We have a pretty good idea what this is going to cost; and, unless we start off with something, the States cannot come up with their part of the matching funds to start their program along."[85]

That the shelter program would loom large in terms of money was a

TABLE I-1

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1951 FCDA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

1) Protective Facilities		$250,000,000
2) Supplies, Material, and Equipment		25,000,000
3) Operations		128,000,000
Communications and attack warning system /a/	$ 5,758,500	
Training and education /b/	787,000	
Fire-fighting services /c/	6,840,000	
Warden services /d/	2,773,000	
Engineering services /e/	11,330,000	
Transportation services /f/	1,500,000	
Rescue service /g/	500,000	
Reserve supply operations /h/	2,058,000	
Medical services /i/	75,638,000	
Welfare services /j/	15,426,000	
Research and development /k/	3,875,000	
Office and personnel	1,515,000	
Total	$128,000,000	
Grand total		$403,000,000

Derived from: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Emergency Defense Appropriations, Hearings, Third Supplemental Appropriation Bill For 1951, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pp. 586-636.

[a]Attack-warning system: To provide a nation-wide alerting system in conjunction with the Air Defense Command. The FCDA would provide a communications and message-handling system with a staff in each of the air defense control centers. It would be their job to disseminate an attack warning upon notification by the Air Force. Under the communications section, the FCDA planned on purchasing and providing to the States (on a matching basis), communication equipment such as transmitters, radio-controlled relays, etc. The FCDA projected a total Communications program of $32 million eventually.

[b]Under this program the FCDA envisioned the eventual establishment of one staff college for the training of State and city CD directors, and three technical schools for the training of the instructors who would go back to their communities and instruct the volunteers. One school would be near Washington, D.C., one in the Mid-west, and one on the West Coast.

[c]This program would entail the purchase of 1000 "pumpers" (firetrucks), 1000 sets of equipment for the pumpers, and 2000 feet of hose per pumper. Would be distributed on a matching basis to the States.

TABLE I-1 Continued

[d]Wardens, or volunteer block managers, would organize families in their neighborhood for civil defense. They were to be equipped with hand held firefighting equipment (200,000 hand pumps, 200,000 back pumps, 1000 resuscitators). This request would cover about half of the projected program and would be distributed on a matching basis.

[e]Would entail the stockpiling of such items as light steel pipe, couplings, valves, chlorinators, water purification and disinfection units, etc.

[f]Would enable procurement of "conversion units" used in adapting existing vehicles for emergency ambulance service.

[g]Would enable procurement of hand-held rescue equipment (picks, shovels, etc.). Current request would filfill about 20% of estimated program needs. Would be distributed on a matching basis.

[h]Basically rental of warehouse space (provided by the General Services Administration) for storage of various stockpiles.

[i]Would enable procurement of radiological detection equipment and medical stockpiles.

[j]Would enable procurement of stockpiles of items such as blankets, cots, mattress pads, cooking utensils, stoves, and emergency rations.

[k]Would pay for R&D on protective construction techniques, attack warning systems (sirens), personal reaction studies and medical research.

perception that had already gotten across to the Committee members. Mr. Wadsworth had mentioned the sum of $2.125 billion as a possible program total, and Caldwell earlier had noted that it might cost as much as $300 billion to provide shelter protection for everyone. This would be the potential total for a program to provide deep community shelters for everyone. He went on to add that for a variety of reasons the FCDA did not propose or advocate such a "fantastic" expenditure: "In the first place, we will probably not be able to give adequate warning to all the people who could get in such shelters. In the second place, it will take too long to construct them. In the third place, they will use too

much in the way of labor and critical materials, steel, and concrete." He therefore proposed "making the most out of whatever we have wherever we find it, identifying those places that are relatively safe such as the basements of reinforced concrete buildings, and then identifying those places which can be made fairly safe by shoring up. They are available now. We cannot wait for a deep shelter program."[86]

When the House Appropriations Committee reported out H.R. 3587 containing the civil defense appropriation, however, it appeared that the FCDA would have to reevaluate its shelter program proposal and time table. Out of the $403 million request, House Appropriations deemed it sufficient to appropriate only $186.75 million. Of this, the largest share--$100 million--could only be used in case of a state of national emergency due to actual or anticipated attack. Of the remainder, $75 million was ear-marked for the shelter program, $5 million for a procurement fund to be reserve as working capital, and $6.75 million was to go for administrative expences and everything else.[87]

The language and arguments contained in the House Report prompted Director Caldwell to respond in the form of an April 13 letter to Governor Frank Lausche of Ohio for the Governor's Conference on Civil Defense. In the open letter Caldwell took issue with the House Report and rebutted the arguments contained therein. Both the report and letter are worth quoting in some detail. In the House Report, the Committee stated:

> The problem facing the civil defense authorities and the Congress at the present time is one of concept. It would seem that the most urgent need is to educate the general public in matters of self-protection and to mold into one whole the individual efforts now being made by the states and municipalities.
>
> The plans upon which the estimates submitted to the committee were based, appeared to be of a nebulous nature and to have been

coordinated only slightly with the military forces of the nation. For example, funds were requested for an attack warning system to be operated by civil defense personnel. At the present time there exists a wholly adequate and efficient civilian attack warning system in the air force, and the committee can see no need for the civil defense personnel to take over this work.

Caldwell: Estimates were not nebulous but represented concretely how to start civilian defense and the money needed to do so, and were fully coordinated with the military.

Not even the Air Force claims their warning system wholly adequate. The civil defense program would relieve them of responsibility which is theirs neither by statute nor propriety. /Moreover, the Air Force system was a military and Executive warning system. The FCDA system would have undertaken to warn regional and State civil defense centers throughout the country./

House Report: The present plans of the Civil Defense Administration contemplate fulfillment not in the present calendar year, but after 1951. The committee received testimony from leaders in the government which emphasized the point that the nation faces its greatest danger from enemy action during the present calendar year. In other words, even if vast sums were appropriated for civil defense they would be of no practical value since with the current planning of the Civil Defense Administration, they could not be effectively expended in time to meet the present emergency.

Caldwell: If we cannot complete the job during '51, then don't start! The same committee has appropriated funds for long-range military preparedness.

House Report: In the face of these facts the committee feels that the best approach to the civil defense problem is to provide the various states and municipalities with a trained corps of personnel skilled in the various phases of civil defense, qualified to activate and administer a sound civil defense program when it is formulated by the federal government. This calls for the establishment of the necessary training schools by the federal government to train local leaders as well as to disseminate information and guidance to the states for the education of the general public. /In this regard the Committee not only approved the entire $787 thousand FCDA request for training and education but upped it by an additional $103 thousand./

House Report: The committee is well aware of the fact that the departmental staff for the Civil Defense Administration must be highly skilled. It is obvious, however, that the organizational structure, as envisioned by the estimates, appears to be unrealistic and top-heavy. A more realistic approach to the organization of the departmental staff of the administration in Washington would result in substantial savings and in a more highly efficient organization.

Caldwell: A smaller staff would be completely inadequate for the program envisioned.

House Report: The availability of protective facilities is vital to the protection of the civilian populace in our key industrial and population centers. Such a program is by its very nature costly. With atomic bombing an ever present factor to be considered, the type of shelter needed has not yet been fully developed. Sufficient information is available to enable a start to be made on a survey of existing facilities and where possible, to strengthen them to serve as shelter areas.

Caldwell: True, but no money has been appropriated by the committee to do the job.

House Report /referring to FCDA requests for funds for firetrucks, a warden service, engineering supplies, medical stockpiles, and the welfare service/: The committee is rather amazed at the approach the Civil Defense Administration appears to be taking with reference to these activities. Instead of seeking to have the states and municipalities start their own programs, the position of the federal civil defense authorities appears to be that of having the states wait until the federal government can make contributions to allow them to go ahead with their programs. Such a position is diametrically opposed to the basic intent of the enabling legislation.

Caldwell: The states have already appropriated $128,525,785 and $73,717,270 is pending. This statement, therefore, was based on conjecture rather than fact. Any federal lag will be reflected in state efforts.

Caldwell summed up his letter to the Governors' Conference by stating:

> We can make no prediction as to the future of federal civil defense appropriations. This agency will do no lobbying with the Congress on the matter. The Congress must make the policy, appropriate the money, and take the responsibility for what happens if attack comes. If our funds are unduly limited, there will be a needless number of casualties and unnecessary slow-down in defense production if an attack occurs. The Congress must assume that risk.

The Senate Appeal

Still stinging from the action of the House, Director Caldwell took his agency's case to the Senate Appropriations Committee on 23 April seeking support. In his written statement to the committee (chaired by McKellar of Tennessee) Caldwell noted that in the bill which

authorized the FCDA, responsibilities for civil defense activities had been divided into two major categories: (1) Preemergency preparations, and (2) Emergency activities. He argued that the action of the House prevented his agency from effective action in the first area:

> In our assigned duty of helping the States and cities get ready for enemy attacks, we can do nothing in the following areas: fire-fighting services, warden services, engineering services, transportation, rescue, attack warning system, ware-housing, Federal stockpiling of medical and welfare materials and equipment, and the entire program of research and development.

This House "obliteration," he charged, had left the FCDA "severely crippled." In terms of the second area Caldwell criticized the House appropriation of $100 million for post-attack emergency use (which had not been requested by the FCDA) as "just an idle gesture." After an attack, Caldwell pointed out, the FCDA would get whatever was left anyway. Appropriations would not be a problem then.[88]

In light of this, Caldwell appealed to the Committee to restore those funds cut by the House and thereby demonstrate to the country that "the Congress and official Washington regards civil defense as a necessary part of the total effort." This was of vital importance, he argued, in that the "severe blow" dealt by the House had "left the country feeling that Washington does not regard this as being important."[89] Unfortunate side effects were already rippling across the country. Twenty-eight State legislatures were considering civil defense appropriations at the time and the House action, it was feared, would adversely effect their decisions. As proof, Caldwell pointed to Oregon, which had approved a $688,000 appropriation for civil defense purposes before the House action. After the House cuts Oregon rescinded its appropriation.[90]

After Caldwell's appeal, the Committee began to look into the

specifics of the budget request. While criticisms were made on a variety of points, two major areas soon stood out: (1) the firmness of FCDA planning and, (2) the ability of the FCDA to spend all the money requested within the fiscal year. In the first area the Committee was interested in various levels of protection that various levels of funding would buy. The FCDA officials, however, were unable to say that "X" number of people would be protected given an appropriation of $403 million, for example. Senator Homer Ferguson (Rep.,Mich.) asked: "If you could get all of the money you wanted with your proposed plans what would it cost?" As he did in the House hearings, Caldwell brought up the figure of $300 billion which "would include relocation and dispersion of virtually all important industry and concentrations of population..." He added that such a program was "not contemplated at this time." Nevertheless, the impression had been left that ultimately, if the FCDA's plans were approved, over a period of years such an enormous expenditure of funds might be approached. When Ferguson asked what percentage of the population would be saved as the result of such an expenditure, Caldwell indicated: "That would be the imponderable....The only answer I can give is that it would save the maximum number." Ferguson then asked: "What is the maximum number?" After an answer that Ferguson found unenlightening, he concluded: "Your $300,000,000,000 does not amount to much."[91] To the impression that an enormous amount of money might be involved here, was thus added the impression that the FCDA was not sure just what they would receive for it.

In the second area of notable criticism the colloquy was just as interesting. As the hearing was taking place in late April, 1951, and the current fiscal year would end in just over two months (June 30th),

Senator Ferguson wanted to know, "can you intelligently spend the amount that you are asking now in the next two months?" Referring to FCDA planning in regard to the expenditure of these funds, Senator Cordon added: "Has that been worked out to the point where you have outlined what you expect to do in the several States?" Caldwell responded in the negative. This prompted Senator Cordon to ask, "If you have not got that plan worked out, how can you go about either spending your money--and I am quite sure you cannot spend it--or obligating it, which is another problem..." Senator Ferguson then asked "how much can you obligate?" Caldwell replied "nobody knows."[92]

The point that Caldwell was trying to make was that the expenditure was complicated by the State-Federal matching-fund process. The States wanted to know how much Federal money would be available before they earmarked funds for civil defense. On the other hand, the FCDA wanted to know how much the States would put up so that a solid figure earmarked for matching funds could be presented to Congress. The impression that Caldwell left, however, must have been one of ignorance, for when the Committee reported out its bill to the Senate on April 30, it further cut the House appropriation of $186.75 million down to $84 million, completely cutting out the shelter program and the $100 million emergency fund.[93] Moreover, after the two conflicting House and Senate appropriation reports were sent to conference, the FCDA appropriation was further cut to $31.75 million--out of a $403 million request--a cut of 92 percent.[94] It had been decided there not to appropriate to FCDA funds to be used in the post-June 1952 fiscal year, even though that had been the intention of the original budget request. The FCDA was instructed to prepare a separate FY 1952 appropriation request which would be presented in August.

TABLE I-2

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1951 FCDA APPROPRIATION PROCESS

Submitted to the BOB	Approved by BOB	House Action	Senate Action	Conference Action
$730,215,200	$403,000,000	$186,750,000	$84,000,000	$31,750,000

In explanation of the Congressional treatment of the FY 1951 FCDA appropriation request (which, according to House Appropriations Chairman Clarence Cannon, had been cut "more drastically than any appropriation of this character has been cut before within my recollection..."[95]), there are three dominating factors. The first relates to Director Caldwell's statement that it had been estimated that it would take approximately $300 billion to provide the ultimate civil defense system. In the committee mark-ups and in the floor debates on the civil defense request, the Director's explanations and qualifications of this figure were dropped by the wayside--what had been described as an unsought and unachievable "ultimate" system came to be portrayed as a mere "adequate" system. Thus, during Senate consideration of an amendment to restore $25 million of the cut shelter funds, Senator Knowland of California stated:

> ...no one should vote for the amendment with the conception that it would afford the American people adequate protection against atomic attack, because the fact of the matter is that the testimony shows that the cost of a program which would give a reasonable degree of adequacy of protection in the shelter development would exceed $300,000,000,000...[96]
> [Emphasis added]

Arguing against the amendment, Senator Bridges of New Hampshire stated that the prospect of spending $300 billion for shelters scared him. As for the $25 million: "I do not want to take any step that will lead the

communities, the States, or the people to believe that the Federal Government is ready to start any $300,000,000,000 program which might, on top of everything else, ruin the Nation."[97] Senator Wherry of Nebraska was of a similar mind. Noting "what a tremendous task would be involved and what the total cost would be," he argued that "$25,000,000 is only a drop in the bucket as compared with the total amount which may be required." This was simply too much money, he contended, for so little return.[98]

The second explanation of the Congressional treatment of the FY 1951 FCDA appropriation request relates to the quality of the FCDA's request and its presentation as perceived by the Appropriations Committees. During the Senate floor debate on the FCDA request, for example, Senator Cordon of Oregon (who had attended the appropriation hearings) stated:

> Those who appeared on behalf of the Government simply had not themselves the information necessary to present to the committee. I have never seen any request for an appropriation before the Appropriations Committee since I have been a member of it with less information to support it than did this one.

To support his contention, Cordon cited several paragraphs from the FCDA justification statement accompanying the appropriation request (which were not included in the transcript of the hearings):

> The engineering profession is not yet able to provide the Federal Civil Defense Administration with accurate criteria and standards for the construction of shelters. This is true of every country of which knowledge is available. Thus it is impossible to make an intelligent estimate of per capita cost....
>
> Research and test projects now being conducted will give us more definite answers to the problems posed...Until then this Administration will not be able to spell out in every detail the exact purposes for which the needed sum will be spent, nor the exact date by which it may be obligated....
>
> Therefore, to activate a shelter program, certain funds must be allocated to this Administration without particularizing their use; but with the assurance of the Administrator that they will be expended only on projects in accordance

> with criteria and standards developed through research and test projects.

Thus, according to Cordon:

> In this case the committee followed the practice it has always followed, namely, when application is made to it for the appropriation of funds, and when those who apply for the appropriation say, "We do not have our plans made...we do not know what we shall do with the money when it is appropriated; but give it to us and we assure you we will do the best we can with it," then we do not recommend its appropriation...[99]

The third explanation for the drastic cut in the FCDA's FY 1951 request goes deeper than the confusion and misconception caused by Caldwell's "$300 billion" statements and the seeming inability of FCDA officials to explain and defend their plans and programs. These same Congressmen were aware of the testimony given during the hearings establishing the FCDA that indicated that as much as $3.1 billion was contemplated as the three-year cost of an adequate civil defense program. Testimony at that time had been much vaguer in regards to specific programs and related expenditures than had been the case during the FY 1951 budget hearings just completed; yet these same Congressmen voted for the civil defense enabling bill.

Much of the explanation of this cut, then, can be found in the fact that during the hearings creating the FCDA a crisis atmosphere hung over Washington. The Korean War and the Chinese intervention had created a cloud of anxiety. Rumors of a war with the Soviet Union were in the air. By the time the appropriations committees met in March and April to consider the civil defense budget, however, much of this crisis atmosphere had dissipated. After initial setbacks caused by the Chinese entry into the war, the United Nations forces had been able to regroup to the point that by mid-February the Chinese and North Korean forces were in full retreat. By late February these forces had been ousted

from all their positions south of the Han River. General Ridgeway began his successful offensive in early March soon retaking Seoul, the capital of South Korea, and, by late March the UN forces were back along the 38th parallel and were preparing to cross it a second time.[100]

The state of national emergency and crisis had psychologically lifted. The war had gone on for some months and the Soviet Union had not shown its hand anywhere else. The possibility of escalation involving them seemed more and more remote. Thus it was more a feeling of optimism that pervaded Washington in March and April, not anxiety. This atmosphere was clearly not conducive to the planning for Armageaddon. Sensing this, Senator McMahon, during the Senate floor debate on the FY 1951 FCDA appropriation request, warned:

> I trust that no Member of the Senate doubts Russia's ability to drop a number of atomic bombs upon American citizens now, today. With all the solemnity at my command, I wish--in my capacity as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy--to assure the Senate that the Soviets are stockpiling real atomic bombs in an ever-increasing number. No one who has had access to the evidence can believe otherwise. This is a matter of fact, not a matter of opinion....It is also a fact that Stalin has the means of delivering these weapons to targets within our country. In these days of long-range bombers, the Atlantic and the Pacific no longer furnish our cities with immunity against devastation.[101]

The perceptions of most Congressmen, however, were more in line with the thinking of Representative Clarence Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, who, in explaining his committee's cuts of the civil defense bill in terms of "the drastic changes in the program which seem to obviate the necessity of the amount agreed upon when the authorization bill was before the House...," stated that:

> I think all Members of the House will agree that their mail in recent weeks reflects an easing of the tension, a relaxing of the anxiety which gripped the entire Nation at a time when we felt that we might be engulfed in a holocaust of war at any minute. The public and some high officials of Government have begun to feel that there will be no war this year.[102]

From Cannon's continued remarks it is clear that he thought the emergency situation was over. This was the "drastic" change in the program he had referred to, not a change made by FCDA officials. In that the emergency was passing there was no longer a need to implement the civil defense program authorized a few months earlier. Moreover, Cannon did not feel that there would be such a future need for civil defense activity as to warrant the expenditure of funds as significant as those proposed by the Administration:

> Up until this time, up until this year, while America still slept, time worked to the advantage of the enemy. Every day with the enemy steadily and relentlessly increasing its war potentiality, and every day with our armament deteriorating and obsolescent, we grew relatively weaker and Russia grew relatively stronger.
>
> But now that America is at last alert, the situation has changed, and time is working for America. Every day we grow relatively stronger, and with all her efforts, Russia grows relatively weaker..../in/ 2 more years, America will be impregnable and invincible.[103]

While Representative Cannon was far from the mark in his perception of approaching U.S. impregnability and invulnerability, his assessment of the international environment was accurate; tensions were easing. Because the emergency atmosphere had waned, considerations which earlier had been overshadowed by the crisis could now come to the fore. Thus, the stabilization of the Korean War in early 1951 and the rapidly decreasing anticipation of general war brought an end to the prospect of a three-year, three billion dollar civil defense effort which the outbreak of the Korean War had helped to create.

Even so, the Korean War and the scare it caused went a long way towards creating a civil defense system in the United States. Not only was a Federal civil defense agency created but many States were also galvanized into action. Before the outbreak of the Korean War, only

sixteen States had their own civil defense directors. Nineteen States and one territory had neither civil defense legislation on the books nor an executive framework through which plans could be funded and implemented. There were, in addition, no arrangements between bordering States, facilitating emergency assistance in times of crisis. By April 1951 every State had a full-time director of civil defense and either executive authorization or legislation enabling him to act.[104]

The Public Education Campaign

In an attempt to keep the above-mentioned momentum in the States going and hopefully offset the damage done by the FY 1951 Congressional budget cuts, the FCDA began a public education campaign in early 1951. Congressional hearings on the FCDA's FY 1952 appropriation request were coming up in August, 1951. If the public could be aroused to the danger confronting them and convinced that civil defense offered a way to mitigate the destructiveness of an atomic attack, a repetition of the FY 1951 appropriation cuts might be avoided. The kickoff for this campaign was a May 7 conference on civil defense called by Caldwell of the FCDA and attended by approximately one thousand leaders of three hundred national organizations. Its purpose: to urge these leaders to "spearhead a program of education" across the country. Among the speakers was President Truman who pointed out the inadequacy of the nation's air defense and the danger of war. It was firmly believed, the conferees were told, that should the United States become involved in another major war, American cities would be bombed, and the bombs would no doubt be atomic. He therefore urged an intensive organization for civil defense. These perceptions were supported by a Department of Defense official who added that by working toward the creation of an ability of cities across the

nation to absorb and recover from a nuclear attack, and thus to go on fighting, civil defense would add to the nation's ability to deter attack. If deterrence failed then casualty rates could be cut by fifty percent.[105]

Also in May, Stewart Alsop reported that in an attempt to combat both public apathy and the prevalent myth of total destruction, Caldwell was proposing that a mock city be built with the intent of exploding an atomic bomb over it. The event would be carried on television in order to visually make two quite different points: (1) to demonstrate the destructiveness and the seriousness of nuclear explosives, and (2) to demonstrate that despite this destructiveness the radius of damage was limited and of manageable proportions. The site would thereafter be maintained for public inspection.[106] The proposal received little support though and was eventually shelved.

It must be granted that the detonation of a nuclear device over a mock city would have been an interesting way to bring home to the public the importance of civil defense, though one may question the long-term impact such a demonstration would have made. Another FCDA proposal, which got somewhat further than the mock city detonation, would have remedied this shortcoming by providing for every man, woman, and child a constant reminder of civil defense. This FCDA proposal, which was recommended in an advisory bulletin to State civil defense directors, urged that every U.S. citizen wear an identification tag bearing his name and address as well as the name and address of someone to be notified in case of injury or death. This would greatly simplify body identification and disposition following an atomic attack.[107] No doubt such civil defense "dog-tags" would be of benefit during post-attack reorganization;

not many people wanted to wear them, however, and this idea too died of disinterest.

Other public opinion efforts made by the FCDA involved the production of a wide range of "public education materials," and a corresponding campaign to have these materials distributed and duplicated by public service organizations nationwide. This program met with more acceptance. For example, the FCDA bulletin "Survival Under Atomic Atack," though originally produced in only 250,000 copies, would within one year attain a distribution of over 20 million copies due to private duplication.[108]

A somewhat more imaginative campaign was the result of a recommendation made by the National Advisory Council on Civil Defense.[109] Meeting in mid-June to study civil defense problems, the Council issued a statement voicing criticism of the failure of the public and the Congress to face up to their responsibilities in civil defense: "Failure to perform the duties of civil defense for reasons of apathy or disinterest is as clearly treasonable behavior as would be the failure of a soldier to go to the aid of his fellows." In order to remedy this state of affairs the Council urged the inauguration of "an 'Alert America' campaign to inform the public of their grave danger and the need for civil defense for their protection."[110] The FCDA took this suggestion and proceeded to develop "Alert America" convoys in cooperation with the Freedom Foundation of Valley Forge. These informational exhibits-on-wheels covered 36,000 miles during the last nine months of 1951 and were seen by 1.2 million people. During 1952 these Alert America convoys became the primary focus of the FCDA campaign against public apathy and ignorence.

Rounding out the FCDA educational program were, as FCDA put it, two other major efforts: "(a) the continuing program in all media to get both the motivation and the specifics of survival information to the public, and (b) a grassroots Pledge For Home Defense Campaign designed to highlight civil defense as a home and family responsibility."[111]

The FY 1952 Appropriation

When one looks at the fiscal year 1952 appropriations request for civil defense as it progressed before the Congress, one must conclude that the FCDA's efforts to influence the public (and through the public, the Congress) were, for the most part, unsuccessful.

Seemingly undaunted by the FY 1951 Congressional cuts of his civil defense bill, President Truman, on 21 June 1951, asked Congress for $535 million for FY 1952 (it will be remembered that $403 million had been sought the previous FY and that $31.75 million had been appropriated).[112] FCDA Director Caldwell then appeared first before the House (8 August) and afterwards before the Senate (12 September) to defend this budget request.[113] Actually it is not entirely accurate to state that Caldwell defended his appropriation request in that his approach was to go on the offensive before both appropriations committees, especially the House Appropriations Committee (to which he had one belonged as a Congressman from Florida). In his opening statement before House Appropriations he chastised the committee members for their actions earlier in the year when they drastically cut his request.

> Last spring the Federal Civil Defense Administration appeared before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee in support of the $403,000,000 initial budget for the agency. The request represented our best thinking and was a sound estimate of our initial minimum requirements. That estimate was designed to accomplish primary purposes at the national level and to foster active interest on the part of the States,

> municipalities, and the public generally.....The committee recommended and the House approved a supplemental appropriation bill which failed to provide for a worth-while civil defense program...114

After reciting the programs the Committee had not funded and the problems this had caused, Caldwell charged that,

> The Congress, by its failure to provide funds necessary for a civil-defense program, discouraged what little interest had been aroused in the States and cities of the Nation. Also, the congressional action which in effect said to the world that civil defense was of little importance, made it extremely difficult to attract to our staff persons of outstanding worth and competance for special services. Capable leadership and manpower is essential to a sound and well-ordered program throughout the country...115

Caldwell pointed out that since 1 July 1950 the NSRB and the FCDA together had spent only $2,417,631 on civil defense--the equivalent of a B-36 bomber or a radar installation. This was not a time in which Congress could get by with just paying lip service to civil defense. He warned that two new developments since the last budget hearings made such minimal appropriations all the more inexcusable. One had to do with "certain vital and new information from the Central Intelligence Agency concerning Russian capabilities." (He failed to note what this information was, however.) The other "new development" was the belief that the weapons U.S. civil defense would have to deal with in the event of war would be "several times more powerful than the Hiroshima-Nagasaki, or nominal weapons" that had been the basis for planning in the past. Therefore:

> The time has come for the Congress to decide whether civil defense is a necessary part of the over-all defense program. If it is, then adequate provision must be made for it. If civil defense is not essential, no further effort and funds should be wasted on it. We have lost much precious time in the development of this program because of the lack of funds and staff, and how much time we have left is uncertain. It may be a matter of days or years. But each day of full-scale civil defense action will be counted in lives saved. The

faster civil defense moves the less likely the enemy will be to risk an attack...[116]

After this almost combative opening statement, the Director presented his appropriation request. Notably, it appeared to be basically the same budget that had been presented in the spring and had been turned down; only this one was $132 million larger. (See Table I-3) Much of the following discussion, however, dealt not with the specifics of the appropriation request but with Caldwell's opening statement and his concept of civil defense. Several committee members took exception to the Director's statement, or portions thereof. Norris Cotton (Rep., N.H.) disagreed "that the mere fact that Congress does or does not express confidence in the program by the liberality of its appropriations is going to impress the people of this country and sell the program to them." Civil defense, he felt, would only be considered "a vital and integral part of the /defense/ effort" if it were transferred to the Defense Department. Only then would public apathy wane and acceptance rise.[117]

While the relationship of civil defense to the Defense Department and the effect of this relationship on public acceptance is an important concern and one in which Congressman Cotton may have had a point (to be dealt with latter), he was not entirely accurate in his perception that Congressional appropriations had little effect on public acceptance. There is no doubt that the enormous Congressional cut in civil defense funds in the Spring had an adverse impact on State and local interest and appropriations. Caldwell cited several examples of State or city rollbacks and appropriations cuts from California to Pennsylvania following the Congressional action.[118] Moreover, he was concerned that these rollbacks would continue unless Congress approved his request.

TABLE I-3

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1952 FCDA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

1) Operations		$ 19,745,000
Attack warning	$ 240,000	
Communications	4,170,000	
Reserve Supply	4,154,000	
Training & education	1,545,000	
Research and development	2,515,000	
Executive direction	7,121,000	
Total	19,745,000	
2) Federal Contributions		$ 45,255,000
Attack warning	$ 4,200,000	
Communications	4,425,000	
Fire-fighting	21,106,000	
Warden service	2,773,000	
Rescue service	12,751,000	
Total	45,255,000	
3) Emergency Supplies and Equipment		$200,000,000
Medical supplies and equipment	$141,000,000	
Welfare service	21,800,000	
Engineering service	35,100,000	
Transportation service	2,100,000	
Total	200,000,000	
4) Procurement Fund		$ 20,000,000
5) Protective Facilities		$250,000,000
Grand Total-		$535,000,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Emergency Defense Appropriations, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill For 1952, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pp. 604-689.

Glenn Davis (Rep., Wisc.) felt compelled to defend the committee's past action as one in which their best judgement had been exercised and took exception to Caldwell's "placing the responsibility for lack of civil defense in the lap of Congress." Caldwell retorted, "I do credit you with using your best judgement, but it was a mistaken judgement.... the fact remains that you very nearly destroyed all semblance of civil defense by what you failed to do on the original bill." Representative Davis then shifted from defense to offense and implied that the "blame" for the past cuts could just as easily fall on the shoulders of the FCDA itself; it depended on one's point of view. He indicated as an example that the committee's concept of civil defense was defined basically in terms of training and education whereas the FCDA concept seemed to center on the purchase of expensive "things" which should perhaps be the responsibility of State and local agencies. In this regard FCDA planning and programming might benefit from more study. The past presentation had not been "enough to get our teeth into as the basis for making large appropriations," he concluded.

Caldwell would not accept this viewpoint. He wanted more than a paper or passive program. Action was demanded: "To ask the American people, after what happened in World War II, to again engage in civil defense with the fan dancing and the other things, that in the best of good faith were indulged in then, is to simply bark at the moon unless those people can be convinced that we are in real danger of attack in this country, and that there are certain things that must be done."[119]

The chairman of the committee, Clarence Cannon, pointed out that "every dollar which goes into this program must be borrowed." He argued that there was not even enough in the Federal till to pay for the $56 billion defense bill which had just recently been approved; money

would have to be borrowed for that. Given such a tight budget and a reluctance to run the deficit up any more than was absolutely necessary, his personal view was that the best defense was a good offense. In other words, the best way to provide for the civilian defense was to provide the armed services with the arms they wanted so that "no nation dare attack us." That, he argued, was the first priority, for "if war comes we must lose entire cities. Billions of dollars worth of property must be destroyed, and millions will die. Any preparation we make for fire fighting and for hospitalization is a drop in the bucket. Our only hope, and our present hope is to altogether avoid war."[120] Cannon was not completely unsympathetic to civil defense, but his concept differed radically from Caldwell's (and from the concept embodied in the enabling legislation). According to Cannon, "the only practical way to handle this /is/ by voluntary community leaders, contributing their time and services, without cost to the Government."[121]

Given such differences in basic conceptions of civil defense, it should come as no surprise that the House Committee reported out a heavily cut civil defense bill. Of the requested $535 million, only $65,255,000 was recommended--a cut of 87 percent. When Caldwell appeared before Senate Appropriations to appeal this decision he noted that the House had justified this action in their report on the grounds that the FCDA program was neither well coordinated nor realistic. Caldwell argued "I am quite certain that what the House committee meant was that it disagrees with the fundamental principles of civil defense as laid down in the basic law."[122]

Completely eliminated by the House were funds for firefighting equipment,[123] the warden service, the stockpiling of welfare,

engineering, and transportation equipment, and the shelter program. Funds for the rescue service were all but eliminated.[124] Research and development,[125] medical stockpiles,[126] and State contributions fared only somewhat better. (See Table I-4)

TABLE I-4

SUMMARY OF SENATE APPEAL OF FY 1952 APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Appropriation title	Estimate	House action	Reduction	Appeal
Operations	$19,745,000	$10,755,000	$8,990,000	$8,990,000
Federal contributions	45,255,000	4,500,000	40,755,000	40,755,000
Emergency supplies and equipment [1]	200,000,000	50,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000
Procurement fund	20,000,000	0	20,000,000	20,000,000
Protective facilities	250,000,000	0	250,000,000	250,000,000
Total	535,000,000	65,255,000	469,745,000	469,745,000

[1] House action makes available the unobligated balance of funds appropriated for Federal contributions in the Third Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1951, under the appropriation title, "Emergency Supplies."

Materials and equipment	Estimate	House action	Program reduction
Medical supplies and equipment	$141,000,000	$50,000,000	$91,000,000
Welfare service	21,800,000	----------	21,800,000
Engineering service	35,100,000	----------	35,100,000
Transportation service	2,100,000	----------	2,100,000
Total	200,000,000	50,000,000	150,000,000

Operation programs	Estimate	House action	Program reduction
Attack warning	$240,000	$240,000	0
Communications	4,170,000	4,170,000	0
Reserve supply	4,154,000	1,000,000	$3,154,000
Training and education	1,545,000	1,545,000	0
Research and development	2,515,000	200,000	2,315,000
Executive direction	7,121,000	3,600,000	3,521,000
Total	19,745,000	10,755,000	8,990,000

Federal contributions programs	Estimate	House action	Program reductions
Attack warning	$4,200,000	$2,000,000	$2,200,000
Communications	4,425,000	1,500,000	2,925,000
Fire fighting	21,106,000	----------	21,106,000
Warden	2,773,000	----------	2,773,000
Rescue	12,751,000	1,000,000	11,751,000
Total	45,255,000	4,500,000	40,755,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, Committee on Appropriations (Senate), Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations For 1952, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pp. 664-668.

The most damaging cut, as perceived by the FCDA, was the complete elimination of the shelter program--the very heart of the FCDA civil defense concept. In his opening statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Caldwell argued that "the shelter program has been the subject of a great deal of misunderstanding and misinterpretation. It has not been, and will not be, the intent of this Administration to invest shelter funds in a program of deep holes in the ground."[127] Rather, it was a well thought out, three stage program. The first phase (for which $6.5 million was being sought) involved surveys of critical target cities in cooperation with State and city civil defense officials who were to actually perform the surveys. After determining the extent of already existing shelter it was proposed in the second phase that modifications be made in substandard but potential shelters, where needed, in 54 of the critical target cities. In those areas where existing and modified shelters did not cover the potential demand, the third phase contemplated the construction of "a limited number of group shelters in those areas where skilled industrial personnel have absolutely no shelter in case of attack."[128] This part of the program would also be restricted to 54 of the critical target cities. And, where group shelters were needed, it was planned that the construction would be in the form of "dual purpose facilities and communal type protective structures."[129] It was no longer proposed that funds would be made available for individual or family type shelters. (See Table I-5)

Caldwell admitted that the FCDA did "not have every answer to every possible question that may be raised regarding shelters." But, he argued, "this is an area where we can all learn by doing, and no amount of drawing board technique is going to provide better answers than those gained in experience through application of present knowledge."[130]

TABLE I-5

BREAKDOWN OF SHELTER PROGRAM IN FY 1952 FCDA APPROPRIATION REQUEST[a]

1) Minor modification to existing structures: Potential shelter capacity, 6,000,000 people; cost per person, $10	$ 60,000,000
2) Major modification to existing structures: Potential shelter capacity, 8,000,000 people; cost per person, $40	320,000,000
3) New construction required: Totally unsheltered population exposed at critical targets, 15,000,000 people; cost per person, $90	1,350,000,000
Total cost for 31,000,000 daytime workers in critical target areas	1,730,000,000
Federal portion for contemplated program	865,000,000
Estimated part of Federal portion required in fiscal year 1952, considering State survey completion and approval of their actual construction program in conjunction with the availability of material required and application for material allocation which have been requested from NPA is	$ 250,000,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee of Appropriations, Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations For 1952, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 671.

[a]These figures pertain only to 54 of the 200 critical target cities and do not contain survey costs.

The Senate, however, disagreed with Caldwell and went along with the House. When the Senate reported out its recommendations it left out altogether any funds for protective facilities. The Senate did recommend, though, that the House appropriation of $65.255 million be increased to roughly $97 million. The Conference Committee compromise between the House and Senate figures resulted in a final appropriation of $74.945 million--far below the original $535 million request.[131] Noting the 86 percent cut in civil defense funds, President Truman, upon signing the bill, deemed this amount "tragically insufficient:" "It is reckless to evade, under the pretense of economy, the national responsibility for initiating a balanced Federal-State civil defense program."[132]

TABLE I-6

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1952 FCDA APPROPRIATION PROCESS

Submitted to the BOB	Approved by BOB	House Action	Senate Action	Conference Action
$588,389,000	$535,000,000	$ 65,255,000	$ 97,000,000	$ 74,945,000

The 1951 Kefauver Hearings

In an attempt to resolve the impasse between the Congress and the FCDA over civil defense concepts and appropriations following the FY 1952 appropriations cuts in the House, the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee instructed its Civilian Defense Task Force (comprised of Estes Kefauver, John Stennis, and Leverett Saltonstall) to reinvestigate the civil defense issue and the soundness of the basic legislation passed the year before.[138] In that one of the concerns voiced by the House Appropriations Committee was the relationship of the FCDA to the Defense Department, several officials from the Department of Defense were requested to attend, including Robert A. Lovett, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Millard Caldwell and a FCDA delegation were also in attendance.

As chairman, Senator Kefauver opened the hearings by referring to the deliberations made at the time the Federal Civil Defense Act had been passed: "After full consideration, we felt that the act which was passed by the Congress setting up the civil defense law was what we needed to prepare our Nation so far as civil defense is concerned....Now we run into this predicament." It appeared, he went on, that House Appropriations had since decided that "there was no use tackling this problem on a big scale...because what we could do would only scratch the

surface and therefore just a paper organization should be kept in force and that the original plans as adopted by the Congress were not justified." This had created a problem in the States in that they had been told to expect various civil defense programs and to gear up. This they had done and now virtually nothing was coming through from the Federal Government.

This same point had been made during the recent Senate Appropriations hearings by local civil defense officials. For example, Fred A. Schuckman of the American Municipal Association had written the committee expressing local concern and disillusionment and had stated that:

> We wish to reinterate that the civil defense program, as set forth in the Federal Civil Defense Act, is a Federal program, adopted by the Congress after full discussion and with full knowledge of what it entailed. The Congress created it, urged it, and asked the States and municipalities to undertake their share of it. This they did willingly and, for the most part, enthusiastically. They were told that the program was essential to national defense and to national survival. They have appropriated their own funds, built up civil defense organizations, and enlisted a million volunteers. They believed in the good faith of the Congress and have largely performed their part of what they regarded as a contract. Now, however, they find themselves confronted with the threat of the contract being abrogated by the failure of the Congress to meet its obligation to appropriate Federal funds for its own share of its own program. In fact, unfairly and unjustly, they even find themselves looked upon by some as supplicants for a Federal handout...[134]

This problem was being exacerbated by the military, Kefauver added, "by virtue of testimony or remarks which have gotten in public print in connection with defense hearings that we are in a position of so much strength militarily that we have no great fear of attack upon our mainland and destruction of our cities and little need of civil defense." Therefore, Kefauver felt it useful to pose several questions to be dealt with during the course of the hearing: (1) What would be the working relationship between the FCDA and the Defense Establishment?

(2) Did the Defense Establishment feel that civil defense was necessary? (3) Was there need for the program envisioned in the basic legislation and advocated by the FCDA?

Caldwell responded and argued that the Congress had thus far failed to provide the necessary funds "because the membership of Congress appears to be convinced that a strong military organization is all that is needed to assure victory in a major conflict." The reason they felt this way, he continued, was "attributable to the fact that the Defense Department...has not emphasized the fact that civil defense is an integral and essential part of over-all defense..." The only way to get civil defense moving would be for the Defense Department to make it clear that civil defense was needed.

Speaking for the military, Secretary Lovett assured the committee that "the Department of Defense has consistently felt that the Civil Defense was a partner and a coequal partner in national defense." If there were an attack on the United States the military would not be able to prevent air attacks on American cities. "There exists, then, a requirement for an organization, planned and staffed beforehand, to take over in the event of an emergency of this nature." Lovett disagreed, though, with Caldwell's statement that the military had given the impression before Congress that civil defense was not needed. Chairman Kefauver took issue with this and defended Caldwell's observation, though he was not prepared to provide specific quotations from the record.

After going back and looking at some of the testimony that had been given before various Congressional committees and the newspaper reports that had been written as a result, it seemed that the problem

was one of misinterpretation of testimony given and newspaper reports based on quotations taken out of context. The Defense Department officials present indicated a desire to avoid such confusion in the future and a desire to work with the FCDA in any way they could. It was in their interest also that the FCDA receive the appropriations necessary to do a good job. The hearing then ended on a note of optimisim and with the hope that next year's civil defense appropriation cuts would be more reasonable.

This same attitude was reflected by President Truman on 24 April 1951, upon the occasion of his submission to the Congress on the First Annual Report of the FCDA. Noting the severe cut in appropriations the previous year he indicated his earnest "hope the Congress will provide the full amount this time."[135]

> I want to be as clear about this as I can. We simply cannot afford a penny-wise pound-foolish attitude about the cost of adequate civil defense. Everyone in this country--all of us --must face the fact that civil defense is, and will continue to be, just as vital to American security as our armed forces, our defense production and our aid to allies and friends abroad. Civil defense is another indispensable part of our total security program. I really believe that anyone who reflects upon this matter will understand why that is so. Every weakness in our civil defense adds to the strength of a potential enemy's stockpile of atomic bombs...

To do this job the country needed shelters, stockpiles, training, and more Congressional attention than had been given up to this time: "I hope that every member will do his part to speed our progress on this vital program."[136]

The FY 1953 Appropriation

Following the favorable conclusion of the Kefauver hearings and the supportive statements of President Truman and Defense officials in relation to civil defense, FCDA officials were optimistic in early 1952

that the FY 1953 appropriation process would be more fruitful and enjoyable than the previous year's. Just how optimistic the FCDA was, is indicated by the size of their appropriation request for FY 1953--$600 million. This was their largest request yet. In a rather brief and uneventful hearing before the Emergency Defense Subcommittee of House Appropriations on 12 June 1952, Caldwell noted the statements of support given by the Civil Defense Task Force of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and representatives of the Defense Department.[137]

During the presentation of the request that followed only two areas drew notable discussion: (1) the shelter program, and (2) State and local contributions. Caldwell reinterated what the shelter program envisioned and what could be done with an initial $250 million appropriation. The program's first phase would do two things--(1) locate and mark adequate existing shelter through engineering surveys, and (2) identify buildings which could be modified to provide adequate shelter (as yet still undefined). The second phase contained two parts also: (1) a minor modification program, and (2) a major modification program; both only within potential target areas. The third phase would entail construction of small group shelters for crucial workers where deficiencies remained. The $250 million, when matched by the States, would pay for the first phase surveys and the minor modification program of the second phase. This would provide protection for fifteen million people within these target areas.[138]

Chairman Cannon wanted to know how the $250 million figure was derived. An FCDA official responded that it was "a more or less arbitrary figure to start with."[139] More funds than this would be needed eventually and this was considered a good start. Thus, for the third year of hearings before the House Appropriations Committee this question had

TABLE I-7

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1953 FCDA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

1) Operations		$ 32,000,000
Attack warning	$ 590,000	
Communications	1,580,000	
Supply service	6,000,000	
Training	2,160,000	
Technical guidance to States	6,500,000	
Health and special weapons defense	2,600,000	
Public information	5,375,000	
Research	2,805,000	
Executive direction	2,390,000	
Unobligated FY 1952 funds	2,000,000	
Total	$ 32,000,000	
2) Federal Contributions		$ 50,000,000
Attack warning	$ 4,750,000	
Communications	5,980,000	
Fire-fighting	16,870,000	
Rescue service	11,000,000	
Training	5,000,000	
Warden service	0	
Unobligated FY 1952 funds	6,300,000	
Total	$ 50,000,000	
3) Emergency Supplies and Equipment		$243,000,000
Medical supplies and equipment	$193,000,000	
Welfare service	20,000,000	
Engineering service	14,500,000	
Transportation service	0	
Unobligated FY 1952 funds	15,500,000	
Total	$243,000,000	
4) Procurement Fund		$ 25,000,000
5) Protective Facilities		$250,000,000
Grand Total		$600,000,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Emergency Defense Appropriations, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill For 1953, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, pp. 1-5.

been asked and for the third time the FCDA failed to answer it to the satisfaction of the committee members--a serious mistake and failure.

Albert Thomas (Dem., Texas) was unconvinced there was a need for a shelter program regardless of how it was justified. He recounted a conversation he had had a few months earlier in Germany with the Mayor of Hamburg, in which the subject of shelters came up. According to Thomas, the Mayor stated that "you are getting ready to throw away a whole lot of money...Do you know, we lost perhaps as many people, if not more people, in bomb shelters from bombing as we lost on the outside of the bomb shelters?...In case of a bombing raid the best place to be is right out there...Right in the middle of that street. That is the safest place to be." The Mayor also thought the warehousing of emergency supplies "a foolish waste of money." The best place to have these supplies, he told Thomas, was in "the corner drug store."[140] Thomas urged the FCDA to study these recommendations.

In the area of contributions to the States a letter from a New York City civil defense official was included in the record, pleading the case of local administrations:

> It is time to stop worrying over whether a community may get some permanent benefit at Federal expense out of improvements which will furnish some measure of relief in case of bombing. We should not delay construction of facilities which might save 1 million lives in New York City just because we do not know what will happen to the other 7 million.
>
> New York City, and for that matter all cities, have limited taxing powers because the soverign Federal and State Governments have preemptied all available fields of taxation. The cities cannot build anything in the way of shelters without State and Federal funds...[141]

The Committee, however, remained unconvinced, for when they reported out their recommendation on the $600 million request they had cut it by 92 percent, to $37.5 million.[142] Not only were items cut from the

budget that had been cut in the previous two budgets but items that in the past had received some support were also cut completely out. Such was the fate of the medical stockpiling program, for example. Besides presenting a severe blow to the FCDA civil defense program, the cuts were so severe as to cause a maintenance problem. Items procured in the last two years had to be distributed, warehoused, and maintained, yet not enough had been appropriated by the House to do even this. Despite this, the Appropriations Committee stated in its report on the civil defense bill that:

> The funds recommended represent continued implementation of the concept of civil defense envisaged by the committee and the Congress in making appropriations for this agency in the past two fiscal years. This concept has as its basis the development of adequate attack warning and communications systems, and the training and education of the American people in matters of self protection. The continued development of this program together with the proper coordination of the civil defense programs of the various states should provide a realistic civil defense plan without the expenditure of large sums of money.[143]

Caldwell, in appealing the cuts before the Senate on July 2nd, argued that unless appropriations were made to at least maintain supplies and equipment already bought, "Civil Defense will have to fold up and stop....Either the Congress supports the program," he continued, "or it should kill it and stop harassing the States, the cities, and the private citizens of the country in an effort to get them to move on a program which the Congress apparently does not believe is necessary."[144]

Chairman McKellar asked Caldwell if he could explain the House cuts, to which Caldwell responded, "yes...I think it is apparent that the House has not seen the necessity for civil defense...Further, the House evidently is not clear as to what civil defense means....I am afraid the House does not have the picture."[145]

Not all members of the Senate Committee had the "picture" either, it would seem. Senator Edward J. Thye (Rep., Montana) told the civil defense officials present that "the only time we will need Civilian Defense, in my humble opinion, is when the world situation is so unsettled that we are fearful of becoming involved in a shooting war which will bring the war to us." Even with U.S. forces in Korea, there was apparently little danger of that at the present time.

Senate Appropriations did, however, recommend that the House appropriation be increased--more than doubled as a matter of fact. Reporting out their recommendation on 2 July 1952, the Senate recommended a civil defense appropriation of $85 million--an improvement over the House figure of $37.5 million to be sure, but still far below the requested $600 million.[146] The House had the better of the Senate in Conference, however, as the final appropriation was cut back to but $43 million--an increase over the original House figure of only enough to take care of the maintenance problem.[147] As signed into law this was roughly $32 million less than the previous year.

President Truman, referring to the act containing the bill, stated: "In a number of ways this act falls so far short of what is required in the national interest that I cannot let it go without comment. ...This repeats the gross error of the last 2 years by postponing once again the construction of key shelters in our most vulnerable cities and the stockpiling of adequate medical and other supplies to save and sustain life in case of attack."[148] He could only hope that next year's appropriation request would fare better.

Caldwell would not wait to see if this would happen though. This latest cut was more than he could take. He resigned his post in November

and returned to the sunnier skies of Florida.[149] Two months later when Truman too left office the first era of U.S. civil defense in the atomic age would come to a close.

TABLE I-8

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1953 FCDA APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

	Submitted to BOB	Approved by BOB	House Action	Senate Action	Conference Action
1) Operations	----	$ 32,000	$ 8,000	$20,000	$ 8,000
2) Contributions	----	50,000	29,500	15,000	15,000
3) Supplies and Equipment	----	243,000	0	50,000	20,000
4) Protective Facilities	----	250,000	0	0	0
5) Procurement Fund	----	25,000	0	0	0
TOTAL	$1,032,700	$600,000	$37,500	$85,000	$43,000

SOURCES: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1953, Senate Report 2076, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 July 1952, p. 22; and, U.S. Congress, House, Committee of Conference, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1953, House Report 2494, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 5 July 1952, p. 10

Postscript

The Truman years were turbulent years for civil defense. The early supporters of civil defense fought an uphill battle to get the message across that civil defense measures could save lives in an atomic attack, even though every study of civil defense supported their

arguments. Some felt the threat was nonexistent or remote, others felt that the military could handle any potential threat, and still others felt that it was up to the citizen and his local community to account for their own protection. Civil defense was simply not a high priority consideration. This situation changed rapidly, however, following the early Soviet acquisition of an atomic capability, the outbreak of the Korean War, and the Chinese intervention into that war. Reacting to the perception that the country faced a national emergency, President Truman established a Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Congress quickly passed enabling legislation.

This emergency situation began to wane, however, during early 1951, and by the end of 1952 the air of crisis had passed entirely. Because of this, the $3 billion emergency civil defense program package, which had been envisaged at the time of the creation of the FCDA, was scrapped. Millard Caldwell, the FCDA Director, evidenced an inability to deal effectively with this changed situation. Director Caldwell came to his Office with an expectation of implementing a $3 billion civil defense program over a three year period. He did not believe that because the initial emergency had passed so too had the need for the program. When Appropriations Committees in the House and Senate slashed his requests in early 1951 he reacted angrily and adopted a combattive attitude in subsequent appropriations hearings. This was a mistake. So too was Caldwell's insistence on sticking to the original appropriation request estimates that were envisaged when the FCDA was created. He refused to modify his requests when it was very apparent that the Congressional Appropriations Committees were opposed to the program he presented. Exacerbating this problem was the surprising inadequacy of

Caldwell's testimony, given his background as a former Congressman and Governor. He failed to rectify the false impression that he had given the Committees concerning an ultimate $300 billion civil defense program; he failed in explaining his $250 million shelter program request in terms that did not appear abritrary; and he and his aides failed in explaining their planning efforts in terms that did not appear nebulous.

If the performance of Federal civil defense officials was not exemplary during the Truman Administration, neither was the performance of the Congress after the passage of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. A few Congressmen, such as Estes Kefauver and Brien McMahon, sought to resolve the differences between the FCDA and the Appropriations Committees. They were incredulous that the Appropriations Committees should cut the civil defense requests so drastically and sought to amend these bills on the floor, but with little or no success. Loose planning and loose justification language worked to the detriment of the FCDA during these floor debates, examples of which were repeatedly brought up by Appropriations Committee members. Concerned with balanced budgets, economy, eliminating waste, and preoccupied with current appropriation requests, these Committeemen were lax in taking a long-term view of the need for civil defense at some future point, for some future era or crisis. Some, such as Cannon and Thomas in the House, held conceptions of civil defense that differed radically from the intent of the basic legislation. They believed that the FCDA was trying to undertake tasks that were more properly the responsibility of the citizen, the local community, and the State.

For his part, President Truman supported the programs sponsored by the FCDA--after the Korean War had convinced him of the need for an

operational Federal organization. He approved civil defense appropriation requests totaling more than one and a half billion dollars over three years, and scolded the Congress when it refused to appropriate more than a small fraction of this amount. He did not, however, make an issue of the Congressional cuts or move beyond his statements critical of the extent of the cuts, as some thought he should. There were, for Truman, other and higher priority concerns if choices were to be made.

From the military perspective the same was true. There were other and higher priority concerns than civil defense. Before the Korean War, defense policy revolved around containment of the Soviet Union, while defense budgets were constrained in an effort to balance the budget and provide economic aid to Europe. After the outbreak of the War, rearmament became the central focus of the military, as concern over the prospect of general war increased. In this context, military leaders, before the war, were unresponsive to suggestions that civil defense become a responsibility of the Military Establishment--their fear was that civil defense would eat into already meager defense budgets. After the Korean outbreak, statements of support for civil defense were more forthcoming from military men, though it was still felt that civilian defense was a civilian responsibility. Defense policy focused on offensive force and, in this regard, had a detrimental impact upon civil defense. Given a military preoccupation with the projection of offensive power, defensive programs (continental defense, civil defense) were relegated the status of secondary or even tertiary priority. This indirect effect would become more direct during the Eisenhower Administration--the subject of Chapters Two and Three.

NOTES

1 Many have referred to the Hiroshima fire as a "firestorm." The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), in its pamphlet DCPA Attack Environment Manual (Chapter 3: "What the Planner Needs to Know About Fire Ignition and Spread"), disputes this characterization. The DCPA, instead, refers to the Hiroshima fire as a "group fire" (on conflagration). According to the DCPA:

> Group fires burn outward with spread from the initial fires determined by the closeness of buildings and the wind conditions prevailing at the time. Firestorms apparently involve rapid spread within the firestorm area to initially unignited structures, aided most probably by...high inrush winds. This one hundred percent involvement in firestorms is confirmed by observer reports. /Panel 11/

For further clarification of the distinction between group fires or conflagrations and firestorms, see the above mentioned pamphlet, especially panels 9 through 11. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973)

2 I have seen estimates of the kiloton size of the Hiroshima (and Nagasaki) bombs ranging from 12.5 to 20 kilotons (KTs). The 20 KT figure is thought to be the most reliable approximation.

3 Data from: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, pp. 347-348.

4 Civil defense, as defined by the Department of Defense upon the creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, means all those activities and measures which are designed either (1) to minimize the effects which might otherwise be caused by, (2) to deal with the immediate emergency conditions created by, or (3) to repair any vital damage resulting from, an enemy attack which is successful in reaching a target within the United States, its Territories, or possessions and which effects the civilian population. The principal activities in this field are (1) protection (such as shelters, fire services, sanitation, panic prevention and control, nonmilitary evacuations, dissemination of warnings, and the like); (2) relief (such as rescue, emergency feeding and housing, emergency medical care and the like); and (3) rehabilitation (such as restoration of essential services, utilities, communications, housing and the like).

5 Donald W. Mitchell, Civil Defense Planning For Survival And Recovery, (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1962), p. 17. For a discussion of pre-atomic age civil defense see,

Nehemiah Jordan, U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950: The Roots of Public Law 920, (Institute for Defense Analyses, Economic and Political Subdivision, May 1966), especially pp. 1-10 and 31-54. See also, James Thomas Kerr, "The Civil Defense Shelter Program: A Case Study of the Politics of National Security Policy-Making" (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1970), especially pp. 19-36.

6 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Civil Defense, Hearings, Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Part 1), 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., December 1950, p. 76. Hereafter referred to as Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 Hearings (Part 1).

7 See, for example, H.C. Urey, "A Scientist Views the World," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago, Vol. 1, No. 5, 15 February 1946, p. 4.

8 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Atomic Bombs On Hiroshima And Nagasaki, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 30 June 1946) p. 36. Hereafter referred to as Strategic Bombing Survey.

9 Ibid., p. 38.

10 Ibid.

11 For a summary of the Survey Report, see: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, New Civil Defense Program, House Report 1249, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 September 1961, pp. 37-38.

12 William Higinbotham, "The Road to Security," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (hereafter referred to as BAS), Vol. 2, No. 3-4, 1 August 1946, p. 27.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., p. 28.

15 U.S., War Department, Civil Defense Board, A Study of Civil Defense, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1948), p. 2.

16 Ibid., p. 1.

17 Ibid., pp. 10, 12, and 17.

18 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations For 1952, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 1401. Hereafter referred to as Senate, Supplemental Appropriations, 1952.

19 U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense Planning, Civil Defense For National Security, (A Report to the Secretary of Defense), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 Oct. 1948) p. 1. Hereafter referred to as Hopley Report.

20 U.S., Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Mobilization Planning And The National Security (1950-1960): Problems And Issues, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 71.

21 Hopley Report, p. 2.

22 Ibid., p. 18.

23 Horatio Bond, "Military and Civil Confusion About Civil Defense," BAS, Vol. V, No. 11, November 1949, p. 295.

24 Ansley J. Coale, The Problem Of Reducing Vulnerability To Atomic Bombs, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), Foreword.

25 Ibid., especially pp. 31-34.

26 Ibid., p. xii.

27 Ibid., p. 1.

28 U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1965), Harry S. Truman--1951, p. 162. Hereafter referred to as Public Papers...Truman--1951.

29 Neal Fitzsimons, "Brief History of American Civil Defense," in Who Speaks For Civil Defense?, Eugene P. Wigner (ed.), (NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 35.

30 Quoted in, Legislative Reference Service, Mobilization Planning..., p. 66.

31 U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearing, Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack (Part 1), 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 23 March 1950, p. 5. Hereafter referred to as Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack Hearings.

32 Ibid.

33 Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Mutusow (eds.), The Truman Administration--A Documentary History, (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 267-269. Named after its chairman, Thomas K. Finletter, the Finletter Commission (officially, the President's Air Policy Commission) dated its report entitled Survival In the Air Age, 1 January 1948.

34 BAS editorial, "The City of Washington and An Atomic Attack," Vol. VI, No. 1, January 1950.

35 Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 4, 13 April 1950, p. 5155.

36 Quoted in Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack Hearings (Part 4), 20 March 1950, p. 95.

37 Elwyn A. Mauck, "History of Civil Defense in the United States," BAS, Vol. VI, No. 8-9, Aug-Sep 1950, p. 270.

38 Bernstein and Matusow, p. 287.

39 Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1965), p. 263. Hereafter referred to as CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964.

40 Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack Hearings (Part 3), P. 63. Also of note, on 2 March 1950, a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), consisting of Senators Russell, Cain, and Kefauver as chairman, was formed "for the purpose of studying the problem of civil defense." It was only after both committees had already begun their own series of meetings and/or hearings that each learned of the efforts of the other, thereby initiating a jurisdictional dispute which, after several months, led to a compromise jurisdictional understanding. See correspondence between McMahon and Kefauver, reprinted in the Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 4, 13 April 1950, pp. 5155-5156.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., Part 5, p. 178.

43 Ibid., pp. 141-152.

44 See, for example, the recommendations of Murray S. Levine, Chairman of the New York Committee on Atomic Information. Ibid., p. 134.

45 Ibid., Part 2, p. 34.

46 In 1950, at least, no one could accuse the NSRB of overdramatising the danger of atomic warfare. For example, one NSRB publication on Survival Under Atomic Attack, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), begins by stating: "You Can Survive. You can live through an atom bomb raid and you won't have to have a Geiger counter, protective clothing, or special training in order to do it." (p.1) Elsewhere it states that "atom splitting is just another way of causing explosion." (p. 4).

47 Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack Hearings (Part 2), p. 35.

48 Ibid.

49 See, "Preliminary Report of the Subcommittee on Civil Defense," presented as Exhibit 2 in the Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 4, 13 April 1950, pp. 5155-5156.

50 Ibid.

51 Mauck, p. 270.

52 U.S., Atomic Energy Commission, The Effects of Atomic Weapons, (Washington, D.C.: The Combat Forces Press, August 1950).

53 Fitzsimons, p. 36.

54 U.S., National Security Resources Board, United States Civil Defense, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950). Hereafter referred to as NSRB, USCD.

55 Ibid., pp. 1 and 6.

56 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

57 Frank Zeidler, "Civil Defense: Community Problems and the NSRB Plan," BAS, Vol. VI, No. 11, November 1950, p. 337.

58 BAS, "Civil Defense News," Ibid., p. 338.

59 Ibid.

60 Eugene Rabinowitch, "The Long-Range View," BAS special issue, Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack, Vol. VI, No. 8-9, August-September 1950, p. 230.

61 Stuart Symington, "The Importance of Civil Defense Planning," in Ibid., p. 231.

62 See Hanson W. Baldwin, "Our Civil Defense Isn't," New York Times, 11 August 1950.

63 Survey Research Center, Defense of Our Cities: A Study of Public Attitudes on Civil Defense, (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, December, 1951), p. 6; noted in Kerr, p. 84.

64 CQS, Congress and the Nation 1945-1964, p. 263.

65 22 Aug. 1950: H.R. 9485 is introduced in the House by Gordon L. McDonough of California. Bill sought to create within the Defense Department a "Central Agency" responsible for civil defense. (See, the Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 17, 22 August 1950, p. A5992.
25 Aug. 1950: The House raises its District of Columbia civil defense appropriation from $30,000 to $290,000. (See, the Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 10, 25 August 1950, pp. 13520-13523.
18 Sep. 1950: H.R. 9689, "To Authorize a Federal Civil Defense Program," is introduced in the House by Carl T. Durham (N.C.).
19 Sep. 1950: S. 4162 containing a similar proposal is introduced in the Senate.
29 Oct. 1950: The NSRB issues Survival Under Atomic Attack.
30 Nov. 1950: Revised bills H.R. 9798 and S. 4219 are introduced in the House and Senate, respectively.
1 Dec. 1950:
19 Dec. 1950: S. 4268 is introduced in the Senate as a companion bill to H.R. 9798.

66 Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals--America and Russia Since World War II, (N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 283.

67 Truman's action in setting up the FCDA was explained at a

House Hearing on 5 December 1950 as a temporary expedient taken by the President under the authority of the War Powers Act passed during WW II and not yet expired, until such time that the Congress could pass the enabling legislation. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Civil Defense, Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 9798--To Authorize A Federal Civil Defense Program, Armed Services Paper No. 224, 5 December 1950, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 7707.

68 Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack Hearings, p. 184.

69 HASC, Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 9798..., pp. 7780-7781.

70 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1973), pp. 63-64.

71 Council on Foreign Relations, United States in World Affairs, 1951, (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 26.

72 SASC, Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 Hearings, p. 13.

73 Ulam, p. 190.

74 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 263. What little debate there was centered on two issues: (1) the utility of a shelter proposal in the bill. This was questioned by Governors Frank J. Lausche (Dem., Ohio) and Val Peterson (Rep., Nebraska), and (2) the powers of the Administrator--some felt he would have too much power; others felt he would have not enough; and some felt that regardless of the scope of the Administrator's powers during the current emergency period, his powers should be curtailed with the passing of the emergency (there being some opposition to creating a strong permanent agency as opposed to a strong temporary agency).

The House version of H.R. 9798 can be found in the Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 12, 20 December 1950, pp. 16841-16843. The Senate version in the Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 12, 21 December 1950, pp. 16918-16923. The final conference bill is in the Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 12, 1 January 1951, pp. 17034-17038, with an identification of the differences between the House and Senate versions, pp. 17038-17040.

75 Public Papers...Truman--1951, pp. 26-27.

76 Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 12, 1 January 1951, pp. 17035-36, and 17038.

77 During the floor debates on the enactment of H.R. 9798, Senator Saltonstall explained the rationale for this provision when he stated:

> One of the great /civil defense/ problems which developed during World War II was brought about by the Federal Administrator, the late Mayor La Guardia, of New York, who, when called upon by a municipal, or other local official, would sometimes say things and make understandings and agreements

which would completely upset the whole program developed with the State. The result was that one community would get one idea, another community would get another idea, and at the same time the State would be trying to encourage still another idea through municipalities and communities.

Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 12, 22 December 1950, p. 16972.

78 Frank P. Zeidler, "Local Government Looks At The Civil Defense Act," BAS, Vol. VII, No. 2, February 1951, p. 58.

79 Project East River, Reduction of Urban Vulnerability, (N.Y.: Associated Universities, Inc., July 1952), pp. 89-90.

80 Congressional Record, Vol. 96, Part 12, 22 December 1950, pp. 16827 and 16829.

81 "Selected Significant Events in U.S. Civil Defense, 1946-1976," (compiled by John Chwat), Appendix A in U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, Civil Preparedness Review, Part 1: Emergency Preparedness and Industrial Mobilization, Report, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., February 1977, p. 102.

82 See complaint of Representative Cannon on this matter in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Special Subcommittee on Emergency Defense Appropriations, Hearings, Third Supplemental Appropriation Bill For 1951, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 590. Hereafter referred to as House Appropriations, Third Supplemental...1951.

83 See Appendix 9A, "OCDM Appropriations History (1951 through 1961)," in HGOC, Civil Defense - 1961, p. 397.

84 The Department of Defense had drawn up a list of 200 perceived "critical" targets (primarily military related). The FCDA periodically added to and subtracted from this list cities perceived as "critical" civilian targets.

85 House Appropriations, Third Supplemental...1951, pp. 586-587.

86 Ibid., p. 589.

87 This and following paragraphs on the House Report and the FCDA reply are adapted from "Civil Defense News," BAS, Vol. VII, No. 5, May 1951, pp. 158-160, wherein are reprinted the House Appropriations Committee Report and Caldwell's letter to Governor Lausche of 13 April 1951.

88 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Third Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1951, pp. 665-667. Hereafter referred to as Senate Appropriations, Third Supplemental...1951.

89 Ibid., p. 666.

90 Ibid., pp. 665-666, 672-673, and 688.

91 Ibid., pp. 682-683.

92 Ibid., pp. 685-686.

93 BAS, "Civil Defense News," May 1951, p. 158.

94 See "OCDM Appropriations History...," in HGOC, Civil Defense--1961. p. 396.

95 Congressional Record, Vol. 97, Part 3, 9 April 1951, p. 3530.

96 Ibid., Part 4, 9 May 1951, p. 5106.

97 Ibid., p. 5107.

98 Ibid., 8 May 1951, p. 5064.

99 Ibid., 9 May 1951, pp. 5110-5111.

100 Account of Korean War in Brodie, pp. 80-81.

101 Congressional Record, Vol. 97, Part 4, 8 May 1951, p. 5063.

102 Ibid., Part 3, 9 April 1951, pp. 3530-3531.

103 Ibid., p. 3531.

104 BAS, "Civil Defense News," Vol. VII, No. 3, March 1951, p. 94.

105 This Conference was covered in BAS, "Civil Defense News," Vol. VII, No. 6, June 1951, p. 192.

106 Stewart Alsop's 20 May 1951 column in the New York Herald Tribune was covered in BAS, "Civil Defense News," Ibid.

107 See BAS, "Civil Defense News," Vol. VIII, No. 2, February 1952, p. 62.

108 Information on public education programs is derived from background statement of Val Peterson (FCDA Director at the time) before U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Civil Defense, Hearings, Civil Defense Program (Parts 1, 2, and Appendix), 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, Part 1, pp. 146-147. Hereafter referred to as SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955.

109 The National Advisory Council was created by Congress in Public Law 920. At the time the membership included three governors and three mayors--all appointed by the President.

110 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Special Subcommittee on Emergency Defense Appropriations, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill For 1952 (Part 1), 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 614. Hereafter referred to as House Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation...1952.

111 SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, pp. 146-147.

112 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, pp. 267-268.

113 House Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation...1952, pp. 604-689. Senate Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation...1952, pp. 661-718.

114 House, Supplemental Appropriation...1952, p. 608.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid., pp. 610-612.

117 Ibid., pp. 635-636.

118 Ibid., pp. 608-609.

119 Ibid., pp. 630-631.

120 Ibid., pp. 696-698.

121 Ibid., p. 622.

122 Senate, Supplemental Appropriations...1952, p. 672.

123 In support of this program FCDA argued that "the amount of fire equipment available to any critical target area is only that equipment which is available to meet the everyday requirements. Much of this equipment will be lost as a direct result of enemy action. It is necessary to provide fire equipment above and beyond the normal needs of the communities if property losses are to be kept at a minimum. It is not the objective of this program to meet the present deficiencies of everyday fire-fighting equipment in the communities, but rather to augment the equipment of those cities which have satisfied their normal requirements." The equipment would be stationed for training use around the peripheries of the critical target cities. Ibid., p. 667.

124 The House Report stated that rescue vehicles and equipment would be of use in peacetime and should be procured by the localities themselves. Ibid.

125 The House Report indicated that it had received testimony that the FCDA's "contemplated projects are, in the main, duplication of work being performed by other agencies of the Federal government." The FCDA responded that this allegation was "contrary to fact...The Administration performs its research through three other agencies. Our testimony specifically indicated that the possibility of duplication was carefully examined, both to the satisfaction of the Bureau of the Budget and ourselves, and all areas of duplication were eliminated prior to the submission of the estimates to the Congress." Ibid., p. 663.

126 Caldwell argued that "the House has again failed to recognize that these materials must be procured and stored prior to an attack.

Surveys show that there are not enough medical supples in the hands of manufacturers, wholesalers, and users in the whole country to meet even one heavy bombing." Ibid.

During the House hearings he noted that the military had requested $425 million worth of medical supplies that year to support an armed force of 3½ million. FCDA was requesting only $141 million to support the entire country if the need arose. House, Supplemental Appropriation ...1952, p. 611.

127 Senate, Supplemental Appropriation...1952, p. 662.

128 Ibid.

129 Senate, Third Supplemental...1951, p. 670.

130 Senate, Supplemental Appropriation...1952, p. 664. During the House hearing Caldwell had argued that "$250 million appropriated for shelter will do more to save lives and skins than any $250 million you can spend in this country in any way..." House, Supplemental Appropriation...1952, pp. 627-628.

131 Senate Appropriation figures derive from the Congressional Record, Vol. 97, Part 10, 8 October 1951, p. 12784.

Out of the $75 million finally appropriated, $56 million was for the stocking of medical and other emergency supplies. This left $19 million for salaries, operations, training, education, as well as everything else. CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, pp. 267-268.

132 "Statement by the President Upon Signing the First and Second Supplemental Appropriations Acts, 1952," 2 November 1951; in Public Papers...Truman--1951, p. 614.

133 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Preparedness Subcommittee's Civil Defense Task Force, Hearings, Civil Defense Program, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 5 September 1951, p. 1. (The Preparedness Subcommittee had reported out and steered through the Senate the Civilian Defense Act of 1950.)

134 Senate, Supplemental Appropriation...1952, p. 1402.

135 "Message to the Congress Transmitting the First Annual Report of the Federal Civil Defense Administration," Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman--1952-1953, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 289-290.

136 Ibid., p. 290.

137 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Emergency Agencies Appropriations, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill For 1953 (Part 2), 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, pp. 1-57.

138 Ibid., p. 10.

139 Ibid., p. 42.

140 Ibid., p. 26.

141 Ibid., p. 56.

142 A summary of the House action can be found in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1953, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, pp. 428-440.

143 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1953, House Report 2316, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 26 June 1952, p. 63.

144 Senate Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation...1953, pp. 429 and 432.

145 Ibid., p. 433.

146 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1953, Senate Report 2076, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 July 1952, p. 22.

147 U.S., Congress, House, Committee of Conference, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1953, House Report 2494, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 5 July 1952, pp. 10-11.

148 "Statement by the President Upon Signing the Supplemental Appropriation Act," 15 July 1952; in Public Papers...Truman--1952-1953, p. 478.

149 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on General and Temporary Activities, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1954 (Part 1), 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, p. 263.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EISENHOWER YEARS--FIRST TERM

A New Era?

Shortly after assuming office in late January 1953, President Eisenhower began to make an impact in the civil defense field. By his actions and statements relating to civil defense it began to become apparent that Eisenhower's concept of civil defense differed from that of President Truman and his civil defense director Millard Caldwell. In his first State of the Union message to Congress on 2 February 1953, Eisenhower said:

> There is but one sure way to avoid total war--and that is to win the cold war. While retaliatory power is one strong deterrent to a would-be aggressor, another powerful deterrent is defense power. No enemy is likely to attempt an attack foredoomed to failure.
>
> Because the building of a completely impenetrable defense against attack is still not possible, total defensive strength must include civil defense preparedness. Because we have incontrovertible evidence that Soviet Russia possesses atomic weapons, this kind of protection becomes sheer necessity.
>
> Civil defense responsibilities primarily belong to the State and local governments--recruiting, training, and organizing volunteers to meet any emergency. The immediate job of the federal government is to provide leadership, to supply technical guidance, and to continue to strengthen its civil defense stockpile of medical, engineering and related supplies and equipment.1

In this rather short section dealing with civil defense there were indications that changes in Federal policy would be forthcoming. Notably absent were any references to sheltering. When Eisenhower, on February 20th, appointed Val E. Peterson the new Director of the FCDA (the post having been held by James J. Wadsworth as Acting Director since

Caldwell's resignation), any thought that the omission of sheltering was an oversight, was undercut.[2] Peterson, as Governor of Nebraska, had spoken out against the inclusion of a sheltering provision in the 1950 legislation creating the FCDA. It must be assumed that Eisenhower was aware of this and chose a new Director with views similar to his own.

It would be hasty, though, to draw the conclusion that Eisenhower had little faith in civil defense only because he was unprepared to support a shelter program. As Presidnet-elect, Eisenhower had assured the civil defense community that his Administration would encourage the development of an adequate civil defense system.[3] This assurance was reinforced when, during the swearing in of Val Peterson as FCDA Director on March 4th, Eisenhower stated:

> The task of civil defense is vital to our national life. It demands a preparedness that can do more than limit the danger of a wartime disaster. It means developing a preparedness, a vigilance, so impressive as to deter aggression itself.[4]

Yet despite Eisenhower's stated belief that civil defense was "vital to our national life," he did not feel it was necessary to push for a large and visable program, as had Truman. His 1954 fiscal year appropriation request reflected this view. Truman, citing the need to "complete the air-raid warning system in the 191 cities which are likely to be the principal targets in the event of an enemy attack," had left behind a $150 million budget request for FY 1954. President Eisenhower cut this request back to $125 million, stating that under the basic legislation "civil defense responsibilities primarily belong to the state and local governments."[5]

As significant as this cut was for civil defense, Eisenhower's action should be viewed against the backdrop of his campaign platform of economy (especially in the area of defense). After assuming office,

Eisenhower made cuts across the entire spectrum of the Truman FY 1954 budget--five billion dollars was cut from the defense sector alone. Balanced budgets and economy would be a major theme throughout the Eisenhower Administration. For the defense sector, this would be especially true during the 1953 - 1955 period as economy became the crucial factor in the budget crunch. As Secretary of the Treasury Humphreys would state more than once:

> A healthy vital economy is the nation's first line of defense. There would be no defense but disaster in a military program that scorned the resources and problems of our economy--creating majestic defenses and battlements for the protection of a country that was bankrupt.[6]

As might be imagined, this focus by Eisenhower on economy, and the effect this focus had on defense (and civil defense) budgets, provoked disagreements both in and out of government. As these disagreements developed, the new civil defense Administrator, Val Peterson, would not always find himself in accord with the President. This would be particularly notable as the controversy over offensive nuclear force priorities versus continental defense priorities evolved.

Project East River

An early indication of Peterson's position on this issue was given on 19 March 1953, just two weeks after having been sworn in as civil defense Administrator. At this time he made public the recommendations of Project East River, which included a call for a DEW LINE crash building program and the development of an active continental defense force capable of shooting down a minimum of seven out of every ten attacking bombers should the U.S. come under attack.[7]

Primarily a study of passive defenses, this government sponsored study, conducted by Associated Universities, Inc., employed more than

one hundred scientists and experts and took eighteen months to complete. It was the most in-depth study of United States vulnerability and civil defense conducted up to that time.[8] The ten volume report concluded that "an attack with modern weapons would be much more damaging to our population, our property, our way of life, and to our democratic institutions generally, than is realized by the public or even by many responsible Government officials." However, the report continued, "Project East River believes...that the situation is far from hopeless...Effective and specific corrective measures can be taken."[9] Working toward these ends the report made 286 specific recommendations, fifteen general recommendations, and three over-all recommendations:

> 1. Development of a national program for reduction of urban vulnerability, through decentralization and replanning of cities and industrial areas, with new standards of construction, shelters, and wide spacing.
>
> 2. Continuing improvement in the effectiveness of continental air defense to the point where at least an hour's advance warning is provided, where a 'saturation' attack is impossible, and where a 'crippling' attack is highly unlikely.
>
> 3. Construction of a permanent civil defense system capable of minimizing the loss of life and destruction of property, with civilian volunteer groups organized around a permanent core of policemen, firemen, and other regular city employees.[10]

Most specific proposals stressed population and industrial dispersal, and the importance of a shelter program--an undertaking deemed affordable.[11] Project East River urged that the shelter surveys, which Congress had thus far been loath to fund, be completed even if the work had to be done completely at the local level. After this had been accomplished, "a study should be made of the cost and feasibility of a comprehensive shelter program to provide a reasonable level of protection for those within vulnerable urban districts."[12] In closing, the report warned that as few as one hundred enemy aircraft could now carry

a "total destructive potential equivalent to the total bombing effort of the British and United States Air Forces throughout all of World War II." It further warned that this threat was both immediate as well as long-term.[13]

President Eisenhower, however, chose to ignore the East River recommendations. The Report's call for more funds for both passive and active defense flew directly in the face of Eisenhower's economy drive. Neither would the recommendations fit well with Eisenhower's defense policy, as it unfolded.

The FY 1954 Appropriation and the House Committee

It would appear from the FY 1954 FCDA appropriations process that the Congress (newly dominated by the Republican Party) was not disposed to accept the recommendations of Project East River, just as President Eisenhower had not.

Appearing before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on General and Temporary Activities (chaired by John Taber, Rep., N.Y.) on 4 June 1953, Director Peterson presented the Administration's FY 1954 appropriation request of $125 million. (See Table II-1) His statement and testimony was notable in three related areas: (1) his stress on the East River recommendations, the existence and nature of the Soviet threat, and the need for civil defense; (2) his stress on the Administration's (and his own) recognition of the need for prudence and economy, and efforts to empathize (if not ingratiate himself) with the committee; and, (3) his discussion of a new evolution in, and his own concept of, civil defense.

East River, the threat, and the need for civil defense: In his opening statement to the committee, Peterson pointed out:

> During the past several years many intensive, valuable studies have been made on the problems of continental defense of the United States...I think it is important that you understand the emphasis that our security planners and the administration place on these nonmilitary measures for the defense of our continent.
>
> Recently the President has had completed for him an overall study of our security programs. This has resulted in a reduced emphasis on certain programs, including some aspects of military programs. In that same study, however, it was explicitly stated that the nonmilitary defensive measures should receive increased emphasis and civil defense was spelled out as a major part of these nonmilitary defensive measures.
>
> I hope I have made it clear to you that civil defense is not being deemphasized by the new administration or by the facts of the dangers we face. On the contrary it is being reemphasized as an essential element of national security which America must have now and in the future as a long-range element of total security.[14]

Peterson then told the committee that Project East River supported these conclusions. After summarizing East River for the committee, he pointed our that the military indicated that it could stop no more than thirty percent of an enemy aerial attack, at best. Even if this figure could be improved to the seventy percent urged by East River, the destruction resulting from the remaining thirty percent would still be awesome. Thus, the need for a "well-organized, well-trained, and well-equipped civil defense force to cope with that portion of the damage which our military cannot prevent."[15]

On a new and more economical civil defense policy: The two strands of fiscal responsibility and a "new look" in civil defense policy intertwined throughout Peterson's presentation. In Peterson's words:

> I don't see anything new in civil defense at all. Civil defense is simply the extension of already existing civic services. It is the extension and expansion of those services to meet unprecedented problems. In other words, every American city has a good fire department, a good police department. It has transportation services, communication services, mass feeding facilities. It has medical services.[16]

According to Peterson, the responsibilities of the Federal Government should be: (1) to provide information, guidance, training, coordination and leadership to the States, and (2) to stockpile needed medical and engineering supplies and equipment for emergency use.[17]

Peterson did not support a Federal shelter program. In fact, he told the subcommittee that they had acted "wisely" in refusing to fund this program in the past. Continuing on this subject he indicated:

> You will find no such request in this budget for a very sound reason. The vast improvement in the destructive power of nuclear weapons could turn such public shelters into death traps in our large cities. Our research in this whole public-shelter area is inadequate and too imcomplete at this time for me to ask you to invest that kind of money in large public shelters.[18]

Peterson noted, though, that individual and family shelters might be very valuable, as recent testing at the Nevada test site had indicated.[19] The FCDA would continue to encourage the development of this type of shelter, but no Federal funds would be spent. He further remarked that as test data came in, the protective facilities program could be re-evaluated.[20]

The programs that Peterson seemed to advocate most strongly were the stockpile program and the contributions program. It was currently envisioned that the total Federal share for these programs would come to $507,807.000 and $148,000,000 respectively.

> We require the States and cities to maintain stockpiles to meet their requirements for the first four hours. The Federal stockpile is the backup for their stocks. When the program is completed it will provide medical supplies, blood plasma, antibiotics, and emergency hospital equipment to take care of 5 million casualties for 3 weeks and provide 5,000 emergency-type hospitals of the 200 bed type...[21]

Taking into account past appropriations, these two programs could be completed in FY 1957 if the level of appropriations in the request under consideration was maintained for the next three years. If this was

TABLE II-1

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1954 ORIGINAL FCDA APPROPRIATION REQUEST[a]

1) Operations		$ 12,000,000
Attack warning	$ 1,022,000	
Communications	873,000	
Supply service	1,225,000	
Training	907,000	
Public information	1,329,000	
Research and development	1,562,000	
Technical guidance	2,528,000	
Health and welfare	656,000	
Executive direction	180,000	
General administration	1,718,000	
Total	$ 12,000,000	
2) Contributions		$ 30,000,000
Communications	$ 2,500,000	
Attack warning	12,000,000	
Public safety services	2,000,000	
Medical supples and equipment	12,000,000	
Training and education	1,000,000	
Welfare services	500,000	
Total	$ 30,000,000	
3) Emergency Supplies and Equipment		$100,000,000
Medical supplies and equipment	$ 82,000,000	
Engineering service	18,000,000	
Total	$100,000,000	
4) Protective Facilities		$ 8,000,000
Grand Total		$150,000,000

Source: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on General and Temporary Activities, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1954 (Part 1), 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, pp. 254, 265, 271.

[a]The modification of Truman's budget was made too late for the FCDA to change its prepared estimates. These were made clear during the hearings and consisted basically of (1) a 10% reduction of the Operations program, (2) a 50% Contributions reduction, (3) shelter funds elimination.

done, Peterson pointed out, "it is my hope that Federal Civil Defense can be phased out of the picture in a large measure," for when these large nonrecurring appropriations had been gotten out of the way then "...we could cut the Federal program back to simply the amount of money that is needed to carry on the operational activities of Federal Civil Defense." He estimated that this might be in the neighborhood of $20 million a year or less and that "if it can be less than that, it would suit me fine, personally."[22] In the meantime, Peterson stated:

> In view of the scientific studies that have helped shape a balanced, long-range program of total security with civil defense as a major element, I believe Congress will see the wisdom of investing the nominal funds that are necessary to bring about a civil defense program that is sternly realistic and in balance with our military and mobilization programs. (Emphasis added)

He reiterated his assurance that "there will be no digging holes...in the new civil defense program," and that there would be "no rush to sign up volunteers who will have to sit and wait and then do nothing."[23] His program would be more low-keyed than the previous one. In fact, Peterson told the committee, one of his first acts as FCDA Director was to order a reorganization of the FCDA in order to streamline the organization through personnel cutbacks (approximately 750 at the time), and to close two of the FCDA's regional offices (Seattle and Cleveland).[24] Stressing "the long haul," Peterson urged that the committee approve the funds for stockpiling and training that would serve the purposes of the new program.

When it came to the "streamlining" of civil defense, however, Director Peterson was not the only "stern realist" in the room. Though this was the smallest FCDA appropriation request to date, Clarence Cannon indicated at several points that there was still room for

"streamlining". On the topic of research funds, for example, Cannon stated:

> There is no way in which the Government is wasting more money than on research. Research has become sort of a catchword. It is a remedy for everything in the world. You'd think when you listen to these people talk about research it means research is going to get something. It is very seldom that they get anything...[25]

More significantly, Cannon continued to maintain a concept of civil defense that differed widely from those of any FCDA official. At one point, he told the Director "about the only service your agency could render, Governor Peterson, is first warning and second, education." This ruled our sheltering as well as stockpiling. As Cannon related to Peterson:

> We reached the conclusion here at one time that the only effective stockpiling would have to be done through cooperation with the industry, that if we established great warehouses over the country as centers of distribution of drugs and other supplies, access to them would be confined to comparatively small areas and if we tried to supply bases of supplies that would adequately serve each locality, that would of course be out of the question.[26]

The only problem with that, Peterson answered, was that the volume of medical supplies carried in industrial pipelines, hospital reserves, and drugstore stocks was "practically nothing in terms of view of a problem of this kind." Continuing, Peterson argued that "there would be no way in the world that we could get these stockpiles except by the very plan that we are following."[27] He indicated that if 9 to 22 million Americans were killed as a result of a Soviet attack (as had been estimated by the Defense Department), then at least the same number, if not a greater number, would be injured. The existing medical system would not be able to cope with this.

Peterson's arguments for medical stockpiling were of little avail, however, as House Appropriations recommended only $20 million of the

requested $100 million for this program--the same amount granted the previous year. For all the other FCDA programs $17.7 million had been appropriated, for a total of $37.7 million. In reaction, Peterson remarked that the U.S. was "living in a fool's paradise."[28]

The Senate Appeal

On 21 July 1953, Peterson appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee asking that all except $546 thousand of his $125 million request be approved despite the House action. He reiterated his House testimony, stressing the importance of East River and the seriousness of the Soviet threat. In relation to this the Director reminded the committee that as early as July 1952 General Nathan Twining (future Chief of Staff of the Air Force) had warned that the Soviets could launch more than 400 long-range TU-4 heavy bombers against the United States in a first strike.[29] (The current Air Force Chief of Staff, General Vandenberg, had noted elsewhere that U.S. air defense could not stop more than thirty percent of such an attacking force.[30]) In light of these statistics, Peterson continued, the paramount need for a civil defense system was obvious. Moreover, the threat of U.S. retaliation was no substitute for a civil defense system:

> The plain truth now is that Russia has less to lose and more to gain in an atomic duel than we do. All evidence indicates that Russia's military and civil defenses are in a high state of operational readiness--for the simple reason that they have never been demobilized or deemphasized....As each day passes, retaliation becomes less and less of a deterrent to war....we must accept the sobering fact that the ability to devastate an enemy--after he has badly hurt us--will not bring back the millions of dead in our country nor be of much consolation to their survivors....[31] (Emphasis added)

Moreover, Peterson warned:

> Internal upheaval may become so violent in the communist world that the masters of the Kremlin will decide that they have one

> desperate chance for their own survival--to start World War III before they are destroyed from within. That has been the pattern of totalitarianism down through history. They would start the war in the hope of uniting their disaffected people in a common cause against their 'enemies'.[32]

If such an occurence should ever come to pass, the Director continued, "a modern civil-defense program could well mean the difference between victory or defeat."[33]

In summation, Peterson noted that (1) nuclear war was a possible and real threat, (2) civil defense contributed to the deterrence of such a war, (3) should deterrence fail, civil defense would serve as "national survival insurance," and (4) even if civil defense was never put to the test in wartime, it was nevertheless more than cost effective during peacetime through its disaster planning, rescue, and relief work.[34]

In contrast to these strong positive points, however, it should be noted that the Administration obviously did not share Peterson's enthusiasm. In fact, the Administration had at this point: (1) cut the Truman civil defense budget by nearly twenty percent, (2) ignored the East River Report, and (3) rejected a major Federal role in civil defense preparedness.

Nevertheless, Peterson's arguments did have some impact on the Senate Committee. The Senate voted $61 million for civil defense, which, while only half of the FCDA's request, was still almost twice the House appropriation recommendation. After being sent to Conference, however, the Senate bill was cut back to $46.5 million--a $1.5 million increase over the previous fiscal year.[35] (See Table II-2) Reacting to this level of appropriations, Representative Price stated on the floor of the House that "Evidently, it will take an atomic bomb dropped on the dome of the Capitol, before this Congress will recognize its responsibility to provide adequate appropriations for civil defense."[36]

TABLE II-2

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1954 FCDA APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

	Operations	Contributions	Supplies & Equip.	Protective Facilities	Totals
FY 1953 Appropriation	$ 8,000	15,000	20,000	-0-	$ 43,000
Submitted to BOB[a]					$285,000
Approved[b] by BOB	$ 12,000	30,000	100,000	8,000	$150,000
Eisenhower[b] Revision	$ 10,900	14,300	100,000	-0-	$125,200
House Action[b]	$ 7,900	9,870	20,000	-0-	$ 37,770
Senate[c] Action	$ 9,150	12,000	40,000	-0-	$ 61,000
Conference[d] Final	$ 8,526	10,500	27,500	-0-	$ 46,526

SOURCES: [a]"OCDM Appropriation History (1951 Through 1961)," (Appendix 9A), in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 397.

[b]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1954, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, pp. 136 and 140.

[c]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1954, Senate Report 667, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 27 July 1953, p. 24.

[d]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1955 (Part 2), 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, p. 155.

The Soviet H-Bomb

Just a few weeks after the FY 1954 appropriation one of those events transpired, which from time to time cause an increased awareness of and interest in civil defense. On 8 August 1953 Soviet Premier Georgi M. Malenkov announced to the Supreme Soviet that:

> It is known that abroad the partisans of war have, for a long time, cherished illusions of the United States' monopoly in the production of the atomic bomb....The United States of America has long since ceased to have the monopoly in the matter of the production of atomic bombs....The government /Soviet/ deems it necessary to report that the United States has no monopoly in the production of the hydrogen bomb either.[37]

The Soviets had exploded their first hydrogen bomb sooner than most had expected, and, as in the case of the Chinese intervention into the Korean War, this inspired activity in the civil defense field. President Eisenhower warned that the Soviets now possessed "the capability of atomic attack upon us, and such capability will increase with the passage of time."[38] In December, the President told a mayor's conference at the White House that the most important problem facing the nation was civil defense.[39] Meanwhile, Val Peterson was quoted in the New York Times to the effect that "Atomic warfare is inevitable, as mankind will not be sensible enough to escape this disaster."[40] Shortly thereafter, he announced in a radio broadcast that he would seek a $650 million appropriation for FY 1955--$525 million more than he had requested in the current fiscal year.[41]

In contrast to the tone of these statements, however, Secretary of Defense Wilson, at an October 9 press conference, stated that "the USSR is three years behind the United States in the development of atomic and hydrogen bombs and could not win a war against the free world...Their H-bomb is not in droppable form...they don't have planes that can deliver

them and return to base." Wilson went on to state that the U.S. would not, therefore, "unbalance" the defense budget in favor of defensive programs.[42]

If the contrasts between the above statements led to some ambiguity, this situation was clarified in January upon the announcements of the "New Look" and "Massive Retaliation" policies, and the submission of the FY 1955 budget. Speaking on January 7th on "the State of the Union," President Eisenhower indicated that as part of the New Look defense policy: (1) substantial cuts would be made in the size of the Army's ground forces; (2) increased emphasis would be given to offensive atomic firepower (both strategically and tactically); and, (3) the continental defense program would be expanded (though not to the extent advocated by many of the more vocal continental defense proponents).[43] On 12 January 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City, announced the Massive Retaliation policy which would serve as the backbone of U.S. strategic policy for the next several years. Dulles told the Council that "the way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing."[44] Such a policy, as it was perceived to evolve, would allow the U.S. to deter Soviet conventional aggression without having to spend vast sums building up and maintaining a large conventional force of its own. The U.S. would spend relatively smaller sums on nuclear weapons which could be used against the Soviet homeland should the Soviets attempt aggression elsewhere.

Nine days after the Dulles announcement, President Eisenhower presented his FY 1955 budget to the Congress. In the active defense field,

funds requested for continental defense were increased over the previous fiscal year, as Eisenhower had indicated during his "State of the Union Message". (Funds requested for this area rose from $1.9 to $2.4 billion.[45]) With these funds, construction of the nation's third radar screen, the DEW Line, could be accelerated.[46] This, it was estimated, would give the U.S. a four to six hour warning of an over-the-Arctic Soviet air attack, when completed.[47] Besides the DEW Line, other defensive expenditures would involve the purchase of additional Nike anti-aircraft units to be placed around major cities, and more Air Force interceptor fighters.

In the civil defense field, however, there was no corresponding increase in requested funds. In fact, there was a thirty-one percent decrease--from $125 million in FY 1954, to $87.75 million for FY 1955. From Eisenhower's budget message it was apparent that the Administration's perception of the Federal role in civil defense had not changed:

> It will be the Federal responsibility as reflected in this budget to provide warning of impending attacks, and to stockpile medical supplies. The Federal Government will not assume the responsibilities which belong to local governments and volunteer forces, but will supplement State and local resources, provide necessary information on weapons effects, and advise and assist States and localities.[48]

The role of Federal-level civil defense responsibilities had not changed. Policy, however, was another matter.

Evacuation Is Emphasized

Within the FCDA, the development of the hydrogen bomb by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as continuing Soviet efforts to improve their ability to deliver these weapons, brought about a significant change in civil defense planning. President Eisenhower, in his budget message to the Congress referred to earlier, indicated this new

era of civil defense policy when he told the Congress that:

> This budget reflects a new concept of civil defense which takes account of the destructive threat of modern weapons, and which emphasizes improved warning of impending attack and planning for the dispersal of populations of potential target cities in advance of enemy attack...[49]

Thus, the shelter policy which had been downgraded when Eisenhower came to office, was now being replaced by an evacuation policy made feasible by the Distant Early Warning Line and made desirable because of the development of hydrogen weapons, which meant, according to Peterson, that "the cities are finished."[50]

Evacuation was not a new concept, actually. It had been noted as one possible civil defense measure from the time of the Strategic Bombing Survey onward. It had never been the basic policy of the FCDA, however, because of the short warning time it was assumed the U.S. would have in the event of a Soviet attack. If the U.S. had several hours warning, though, the best policy would be to try to move people away from the potential targets rather than try to provide bomb shelters for them.

In fact, the FCDA had recently begun to receive some criticism for not being candid enough concerning the shortcomings of shelters. One critic, for example, who had worked on air target analysis and evaluation of structural damage during World War II, had written in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that there was really only one situation in which "the general use of shelters appears certain to be useful...": (1) where short warning time would not permit evacuation (cited was fifteen minutes), (2) where people did not "panic" and try to evacuate when time permited only sheltering, and (3) in cities in which the dangers of fire storm or conflagration were not high, for if there was a firestorm

then many would die of carbon monoxide poisoning or heat prostration or suffocation in their shelters.[51]

In another Bulletin article, FCDA Director Val Peterson indicated how the new evacuation system would work:

> 1) The public will be notified of Warning Yellow /the designation that enemy attack is expected/ either through Conelrad or other than audible signals. If dispersal has been ordered, a special dispersal warning will be given.
>
> 2) Most of the areas of greatest concentration will be able to move an average of two miles on foot in an hour or farther on wheels.
>
> 3) Adequate traffic control plans will be worked out for the movement.
>
> 4) Means of informing the public via Conelrad radio, mobile units, etc., on the emergency situation and the protective actions to be taken will be developed.
>
> 5) Some type of shelter will be available /it was hoped/ for those who for one reason or another are not able to move or who have to seek shelter along the route when Warning Red /imminent danger/ sounds...[52]

Peterson went on to indicate that in case of attack many people would still be caught out of doors before being able to outdistance the effects of the bomb. Nonetheless, "it is estimated that the casualty total would still be considerably less than if the normal concentration had not been partially dispersed."[53]

Critics of the FCDA's new evacuation policy, however, were quick to add that dispersal could only save lives if it worked:

> If you wished to outline a method of inducing the complete collapse of industrial defense in this country, how could you do better than to arrange for thirty million panic-stricken refugees to rush away from key centers of production, supply and transportation?....Philadelphia, for example, has two million inhabitants. Officials talk glibly of evacuating the city on anything from one to six hours warning. No staff officer in his right mind would undertake to move two million disciplined soldiers any considerable distance in under three days. How will things go in the case of a heterogeneous crowd in haphazard vehicles, bearing the lame, the hurt, the sick, infants and

> children and aged pensioners, in addition to all the able-bodied: What happens when cars break down or run out of gas? Isn't mass evacuation an infallible prescription for a colossal catastrophe...?[54]

To such charges, Peterson responded that the fact that evacuation would be difficult to accomplish and would present enormous logistical problems in terms of food, clothing, shelter, etc. afterwords, did "not detract from the fact that without it millions of Americans will die unnecessarily..." Protestations of impossibility, he argued, were shots in the dark: "In Chicago, for instance, the Loop population shrinks from a peak of 900,000 to an afterwork population of 85,000 in a few hours."[55] Once the DEW Line was completed, a few hours would be enough to save millions who would otherwise die in an attack on the cities.[56]

Civil defense exercises held in various cities throughout the year confirmed that, at least under test conditions, Peterson's claims concerning the feasibility of evacuation were justified. In Spokane, Washington, in the first U.S. atomic-age civil defense exercise, reportedly all the people in the downtown area were moved on foot to "loading perimeters" where during a real emergency they would have been transported to safer areas. The "evacuation" took twenty minutes![57] In a Mobile, Alabama evacuation June 14th, it was reported that approximately 40,000 people were moved by automobile out of a downtown area of 480 blocks to the edge of town. This operation supposedly took just eighteen minutes.[58]

A skeptical student of human affairs may well feel justified in attributing a degree of exaggeration to such claims of success. Nevertheless, an analysis of these and other evacuations executed during 1954 indicated that with careful planning evacuation would work if it was needed.[59] Less than two months after Eisenhower's enunciation of the new evacuation policy, though, a development in the U.S. nuclear program

caused major questioning of the evacuation policy and a refocus by some on the concept of sheltering.

Fallout and Civil Defense

At 6:45 A.M. on 1 March 1954, the U.S. dropped a hydrogen bomb with a yield of approximately 15-20 megatons on a coral island in the Pacific known as Namu (part of the Bikini Atoll). Tons of coral were sucked up into the mushroom cloud of the explosion where it was contaminated and later deposited over an area of the Pacific totaling nearly 14,000 square miles.[60] The hazardous phenomenon of long-range lethal fallout was thus discovered.[61] The fallout phenomenon had actually been known to exist since the first Alamogordo explosion in July of 1945, but it was thought to exist only as a local danger (or inconvenience) restricted to the immediate blast vicinity.[62] Contamination beyond the blast vicinity was considered a minor immediate concern.

According to an FCDA "Advisory Bulletin" issued in February 1955, the Bikini Atoll explosion (code-named BRAVO) caused heavy contamination (500 roentgens or more) covering "an area extending approximately 160 miles downwind and up to 40 miles in width." The FCDA estimated that had the fallout fallen over populated land it "would have been fatal to nearly all persons remaining there 24-48 hours" in an area of about 140 miles long by 20 miles wide, providing no protective measures were taken: "Thus about 7000 square miles of territory would have been so severely contaminated that survival would depend upon the most prompt protective measures." The FCDA went on to note that as far as 190 miles downwind, the radiation accumulation at the end of 36 hours would be sufficient to kill five to ten percent of an unprotected population.[63] Fortunately, this explosion was not near heavily populated areas and

most of the fallout fell harmlessly into the Pacific Ocean. Unfortunately, not all the fallout fell harmlessly in the ocean; three different groups of people, as it turned out, received contaminating doses of radiation.

According to Edward Teller (regarded by many as the father of the atomic bomb) in his account of this mishap, hardly had the bomb been dropped when the wind, that had been blowing predominately to the northeast, veered to blow more directly to the east.[64] About six hours later radioactive fallout reached Rongerik Island where it was visable as a misty dust. Twenty-eight American servicemen stationed there realized the danger and took precautionary steps and protective measures. They nevertheless received an exposure of approximately 80 R. Heavier fallout reached Rongelap, a nearby island inhabited by approximately 300 natives (both islands were about one hundred miles from the test site). These natives received an estimated 175 R radiation dose--enough to cause sickness, burns, and loss of hair effecting some 84 of the islanders who, according to the AEC, received a "severe exposure."[65] They were lucky, for by the time of the evacuation some sections of the atoll had received 400 R (which would have been fatal to about half of the islanders), and the northern tip of the atoll, some thirty miles away, received a 1000 R dose (which would have been 100 percent fatal). According to Teller, "if the wind had veered a little more to the south, all the people on Rongelap and Rongerick probably would have been killed."[66] As it was, though, no serious (immediately life-threatening) effects were found after the inhabitants of both islands were removed to Kwajalein Island for examination.[67] Within several weeks all the islanders had returned to an apparent state of normal health.[68]

CHART II-1

FALLOUT FROM 1 MARCH 1954 BIKINI HYDROGEN BOMB



SOURCE: Sidney D. Drell and Frank Von Hippel, "Limited Nuclear War," Scientific American, Vol. 235, No. 5, November 1976, p. 31.

The measurements (black numbers) give the total dose, in rems, that had accumulated 96 hours after the explosion. Contour lines calculated on the basis of those measurements outline the fallout pattern.

The third group was not as lucky. Eighty miles away from the test site a Japanese fishing vessel, the Fukuryu Maru (Fortunate Dragon), had entered the restricted waters, not knowing of the explosion about to take place and undetected by patrol boats and planes. Three hours after the explosion the chalk white radioactive "ash" began to fall on the boat and its crew of twenty-three. Still not aware of the danger, and ignorent of the nature of the substance falling on them and their boat, the fishermen continued their work. A short time later, though, they began to show symptoms of radiation sickness--nauseau, weakness, fever, and eventually skin burn and bleeding gums followed by loss of hair. It would be two weeks before the world would learn of their plight, however, for that is when the Fortunate Dragon made it back to port with

twenty-three sick men aboard. It was later estimated that they had received an exposure of about 200 R. All but one quickly recovered and returned to work. The twenty-third crewman died several months later from hepatitis contracted from a blood transfusion given as treatment for the fallout sickness.[69] In a way the Fortunate Dragon was indeed a fortunate boat in that only one life was lost as a consequence of its brush with fallout, for it has been estimated that had the boat been much larger, a greater concentration of fallout would have accumulated and all might well have died.[70]

In light of this very serious development one might expect that the FCDA would have ordered a reevaluation of its new evacuation policy. The prospect of millions of evacuees playing a cat and mouse game with lethal fallout would be reason enough to take a new look at evacuation. When the FCDA appeared before the House Appropriations Committee almost six weeks after the BRAVO mishap, however, it appeared that such a reevaluation had not been ordered. As a matter of fact, absolutely no mention was made of the fallout danger that hydrogen bombs were now known to present. When references were made to hydrogen weapons, it was in the context of the destructiveness of the blast effects of these weapons and the danger this posed for cities--thus the need for evacuation.

In his written statement to the committee, Peterson referred to a 21 August 1953 announcement he had made following the Soviet hydrogen bomb explosion:

> The hydrogen bomb is a finite weapon. It has definite limitations. The basic guidance which civil defense has given the American people for self-protection and for organized civil defense is still valid. The disaster created by a hydrogen bomb would not be a different kind of disaster--but a larger one...[71]

In August of 1953 Peterson may have believed this statement to be true,

CHART II-2

THE HYDROGEN BOMB CLOUD

NUCLEAR CLOUDS		
YIELD	DIAMETER	HEIGHT
1 MT	20 miles	13 miles
5 MT	40 miles	16 miles
25 MT	80 miles	20 miles



SOURCE: U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, DCPA Attack Environment Manual, Chapter 6, "What The Planner Needs To Know About Fallout," June 1973, Panel 7.

but by May 1954 it clearly was not accurate--at least in terms of ground detonated hydrogen weapons. The March explosion had clearly demonstrated that hydrogen bombs were so much more powerful than nominal atomic bombs that when detonated over land hundreds of tons of soil could be lifted into the upper atmosphere where continuous and frequently swift winds would carry this radioactive material hundreds of miles downwind where it would contaminate the land as fallout.[72] Nominal atomic bombs seldom vent the upper atmosphere in this manner, and carry considerably less radioactive material.[73] Peterson was aware of this as he testified on a later occasion.[74]

In fairness to Peterson, however, he was not aware of the full ramifications of the radiation hazard. As will be seen later, the

official government position following the March 1954 hydrogen bomb explosion was one of secrecy--even within the Administration. Moreover, it was not until June that AEC scientists at the Bikini test site returned to Washington to file an extensive report. Several weeks later (on June 29th), an "informal classified briefing on fallout hazards" was given to FCDA staff members by the AEC.[75] Much of Peterson's knowledge of the fallout hazard, up until that time, was derived from press and periodical reports on the Marshalese Islanders and Japanese fishermen. Even what little was known about the hazard of fallout, however, was greatly overshadowed by implications derivative of the immediate destructive potential of the hydrogen bomb. It was upon the immediate blast and fire hazards of the "super-bomb" that press, periodical, and public attention was focused for the first few months following the March explosion. Only after perceptive scientists began to realize the full potential of the fallout threat and began to publicize this information late in 1954, did concern over fallout begin to mount.[76]

The FY 1955 Appropriation

Thus, during the FY 1955 appropriation hearings, Director Peterson focused upon measures to protect against the immediate effects of hydrogen bomb explosions. From the evidence he had seen from the recently released material on the 1952 H-bomb explosion, and from what he knew concerning the more recent Soviet and U.S. detonations, he concluded that "in the face of the increased destructive capacity of hydrogen bombs, planned evacuation of our cities, as a new dimension in civil defense becomes an urgent necessity."[77]

Notably, however, the FY 1955 appropriation request of $87.75 million did little to further the implementation of the FCDA's new policy.

TABLE II-3

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1955 FCDA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

1) Operations		$ 11,000,000
Civil defense planning[a]	$ 210,500	
Research and development	525,000	
CD education services	2,808,000	
Operations control service	3,740,000	
Technical advisory service	812,000	
Field representation	1,324,000	
Executive direction	203,500	
General administration	1,377,000	
Total	$11,000,000	
2) Contributions		$ 14,750,000
Attack warning[b]	$ 1,300,000	
Communications	2,000,000	
Public safety services	850,000	
Medical supplies and equipment	3,600,000	
Education services	1,500,000	
Mass care equipment	500,000	
Engineering supplies and equipment	5,000,000	
Total	$14,750,000	
3) Emergency Supplies and Equipment		$ 60,000,000
Medical supplies and equipment	$60,000,000	
Engineering service	0	
Total	$60,000,000	
Grand Total		$ 85,750,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid, General and Temporary Activities, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1955 (Part 2), 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, p. 155.

[a]A new heading for the staff and travel cost of the FCDA planning staff, which was responsible for overall planning, development of Agency policy, and coordination of intelligence and research activity.

[b]No longer full Federally financed programs. These programs would have to be matched by the States.

At the most, it was but a condensed version of the FY 1954 request. No mention was made during the hearings in the House or Senate of Peterson's reported intent to seek $650 million this fiscal year. The figures presented to the Bureau of the Budget were far from this, at $138,845,000.[78] If the report was accurate, one possible explanation of the discrepancy is that after Eisenhower's massive retaliation decision, he vetoed such a huge expenditure in the belief that the threat of massive retaliation would prove a successful deterrent. Neither the implications deriving from the 1952 U.S. hydrogen bomb, nor the 1953 Soviet hydrogen bomb, budged the Administration from its tight fiscal policy and position on civil defense. Presumably, the Administration's perception of the Soviet threat was much less than that of the civil defense Administrator.

The same may also have been true for the Congressional Appropriations Committees. When the House reported its bill out on the 19th of July, the civil defense request had been cut by nearly 48 percent--to $45,325,000. The House Report indicated that it was their desire to maintain civil defense at approximately the FY 1954 level ($46,526,000 had been appropriated for FY 1954).[79] As reported out on the 31st of July, the Senate recommendation of $57,850,000 was only a moderate improvement.[80] In conference, these recommendations were compromised, leading to a final appropriation of $48,025,000--a $1.5 million increase over the previous fiscal year. In reaction to this appropriation, Representative Rogers of Massachusetts stated on the floor of the House, that "We have made a start at building civil defense, but there is a long way to go. I regret to say, the Congress, in repeatedly slashing the appropriations made for the Federal civil defense has been...the major brake on our progress toward that goal."[81]

TABLE II-4

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1955 FCDA APPROPRIATION PROCESS

	Operations	Contributions	Supplies & Equipment	Totals
FY 1954 Appropriation	$ 8,525,000	$ 10,500,000	$27,500,000	$ 46,525,000[a]
Submitted to BOB FY 1955	$ -	-	-	$138,845,000[b]
Approved by the BOB	$11,000,000	14,750,000	60,000,000	$ 85,750,000[c]
House Action	$ 8,525,000	10,500,000	25,000,000	$ 45,325,000[c]
Senate Action	$11,000,000	14,750,000	32,100,000	$ 57,850,000[c]
Conference Final	$10,025,000	12,000,000	26,000,000	$ 48,025,000[d,*]

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1955 (Part 2), 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, p. 155.

[b]"OCDM Appropriation History (1951 Through 1961)," (Appendix 9A), In U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 397.

[c]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1955, Senate Report 2034, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, pp. 55-56.

[d]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Civil Defense, Hearings, Civil Defense Program (Part 1), 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 112.

*The House also approved the reappropriation of $1,300,000 in unused FY 1954 funds to be carried over for use in FY 1955. The Senate agreed and stipulated that the funds should be used in the Contributions Program. See the Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Part 8, 1954, p. 10937.

Concern Over H-Bomb and Fallout Builds

Despite the seeming low priority given to civil defense by the Administration and the Congressional appropriations committees, throughout 1954 and into 1955, interest in, and activities concerning, civil defense increased. This was due in large measure to concern over the hydrogen bomb, its immediate effects, and the fallout phenomenon. For example, the 5 April 1954 edition of Newsweek reported that as a result of the news of the destructiveness of the U.S. H-bomb explosion in March, Chairman W. Sterling Cole of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee had teamed up with FCDA Director Peterson to "strenuously" urge Presidential approval of a much-improved system of detecting enemy planes.[82]

In May, Representative R. Walter Riehlman of New York introduced a concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President provide a positive program of civil defense by establishing a Department of Civil Defense within the Defense Department, "to be headed by a Secretary with a status equivalent to that of the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force." In June, Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr. of New Jersey introduced a joint resolution seeking the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Civil Defense, whose Secretary would be a member of the National Security Council.[83] In July, Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota introduced a concurrent resolution to create a Joint Committee on Civil Defense.[84] And, in January 1955, Representative Chet Holifield of California introduced a joint resolution to constitute the Federal Civil Defense Administration as an Executive department. According to Holifield:

> The Federal Civil Defense Administration is lacking in prestige and effectiveness and proper type of legislation, proper

> type of financial support, and does not at this time have /an/ important part in our overall national defense...[85]

Holifield was particularly concerned about fallout and its impact upon the FCDA's evacuation policy.

However, not much was known about fallout as there had been no official release of information on this subject. The information that was available on fallout was due to the efforts of scientists outside of the government.[86] With this backdrop of concern and secrecy it is not surprising that at least three independent studies of civil defense were made in 1955: one by the Senate Armed Services Committee, one by the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and one by the National Planning Association.[87] The SASC Hearings were the most comprehensive of the three and will be looked at in some detail.

The 1955 Kefauver Hearings

This study began on January 8th, when the SASC appointed a Subcommittee on Civil Defense "for the purpose of examining the policies and operations of the civil defense program," under the chairmanship of Estes Kefauver.[88] (Stuart Symington, Henry Jackson, Leverett Saltonstall, and Margaret Chase Smith filled out the remainder of the subcommittee.) On 22 February the committee held the first of a series of hearings which would continue on through June. From the first day of hearings the Kefauver Committee indicated that it was not only interested in civil defense policies and operations strictly defined, but in related subjects such as the safeguards of the U.S. nuclear testing program, weapons effects of hydrogen weapons (especially the fallout phenomenon), and the reasons behind the delay in getting this information to the country. Various accounts of the fallout phenomenon and the peril it

represented had been published in various newspapers and magazines by this time and, even though the BRAVO explosion had taken place almost one year earlier, it was not until 15 February 1955--after this committee had been formed and had requested AEC officials to appear--that any official indication was given that a serious fallout problem existed.[89] (The AEC officials who later appeared before the Committee denied that the fact that the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the New Republic had both published articles on radioactive fallout in their early February editions, had anything to do with the publication of their official statement on the 15th.)[90]

The fallout problem was thus high on the agenda of the Committee, as indicated by the fact that the first witness to appear before the Committee was Commissioner Willard Libby of the AEC. When asked by Chairman Kefauver why it took the AEC so long to publicize this information, Commissioner Libby responded that "one of the reasons for the delay is that we wanted to be correct, we wanted to be right, and we think the statement we have released last Tuesday is right."[91] Yet even after virtually an entire year of careful analysis, the AEC report was, at best, less than completely candid. At worst, it was misleading. For example, in a May 1955 article in the Bulletin, Dr. Ralph Lapp charged that the AEC had minimized the persistence, and thus the danger, of fallout. In describing the accumulation of fallout after the BRAVO explosion, the AEC provided data only for the first thirty-six hours. Of longer term radioactivity, the AEC only noted that "the main radioactivity of a bomb's fall-out decreases very rapidly with time--for the most part, within the first hours after detonation."[92] By using specific data provided by the AEC on the BRAVO explosion (2000 roentgens 110 miles

downwind 36 hours later) Lapp extrapolated and indicated that the following cumulative doses would result over time:

From 1 day to 1 week - 1,360 roentgens
From 1 week to 1 month - 720 roentgens
From 1 month to 1 year - 840 roentgens

These would be lethal to dangerous accumulations for humans. As Lapp pointed out, "there can be little doubt that an area subject to fallout from high-yield thermonuclear weapons is denied to normal occupation for many weeks and even months."[93]

However, Dr. Libby, when appearing before the Kefauver Committee, minimized the long-term fallout danger, just as the AEC had in its report.

> One of the characteristics of fallout radiation is that it decreases rapidly with time. An approximate rule is that it drops in intensity...tenfold every time the age increases sevenfold...That is, a fallout that occured at the end of 1 hour after the bomb had been detonated would at 7 hours, be one-tenth as strong...
>
> Following the cooling period--that is people would stay protected for the first hours or a day or so perhaps--following this the populace could stay behind shelters as much as possible. Certain measures could be taken to remove radioactive material and reduce the general hazard according to the FCDA directions. It would seem that simple measures are likely to be effective...[94]

As Dr. Lapp had pointed out, the fallout problem was much more serious than the above statements would indicate. Moreover, some might say that the "simple measures" advocated by the AEC (and the FCDA) to combat radioactive fallout were more likely "simple minded." For example, during the hearings officials of both the AEC and the FCDA indicated that decontamination measures such as washing down one's house, turning over the earth to cover radioactive material, and sweeping the sidewalks and pavement near one's home, would decrease the fallout's radiation level. For areas experiencing only very mild fallout, such

recommendations may be more relevant than evacuation. For areas experiencing dangerous levels of fallout, however, the prospect that an entire community could successfully decontaminate the land to a point where it would be safe to stay rather than evacuate, seems remote. It has been estimated that the successful decontamination of an area fifty feet in diameter would still only reduce the radiation dose received by a person standing in the middle of the decontaminated area by fifty percent.[95] Moreover, fallout is similar to snow in that it can be driven by the wind. Therefore it is possible that decontamination of the land would only be temporarily successful. Wind or rain could bring contaminated particles back from outside the area of decontamination.

Despite this lack of complete candor, information about fallout was now being released. Thanks in large measure to the efforts of Dr. Lapp and the Kefauver Hearings, some of the secrecy surrounding thermonuclear weapons effects was lifted. For the FCDA this meant that the "ridiculous enigma" could end.[96] FCDA officials had some knowledge of the fallout problem soon after the BRAVO test, but had been forbidden to pass news of this important weapons effect along to the public or even to State or local civil defense officials--thus Peterson's silence on the fallout problem during the FY 1955 appropriations hearings. Now, more open planning could take place.

During the course of the Kefauver Hearings the Committee heard an array of Federal, State, and local officials interested in various aspects of civil defense. Many of the, by now, usual recommendations were made calling for greater Presidential attention, the establishment of the FCDA on a Cabinet level or within the Defense Department, and for greater Congressional support. After six months of studying such

recommendations, the Committee came to several conclusions. The Committee questioned whether the FCDA was "too insignificant in size to perform its job." (Noted was the fact that the FCDA employed 700 people, whereas the Smithsonian Institute employed closer to one thousand.)[98] The Committee was also troubled by the fact that the FCDA was perhaps too dispersed. Most of FCDA's Washington manpower had been moved out to Battle Creek, Michigan during the latter part of 1954 in line with the Government's policy on dispersal.[99] This had happened even though the Senate had voted by a large majority against the move.[100] Only enough personnel had been retained in Washington to provide liaison with other Federal agencies involved in aspects of civil defense. According to the Committee...

> The Administrator testified that while final judgement on the move should be withheld pending a fair period of trial, that as of today it would appear that the disruption caused by the relocation has been far greater than any advantages. As a result of the move FCDA lost a large percentage of its trained employees who refused to move with the agency.[101]

Among other matters of criticism were the lack of evacuation plans throughout the country, the lack of plans for feeding and caring for fleeing populations, and the lack of medical preparations for total war.[102]

The Committee might well have criticized the quality of FCDA evacuation and post-evacuation plans, as well. It will be recalled that one of the major problems of civil defense during the Truman Administration had been the overly general nature of planning in regard to sheltering. As it came to light during these hearings, the FCDA now had some rather definite ideas on sheltering--at least in terms of the sheltering of evacuating populations--which took some of the committee-members by surprise.

As described by Peterson before the Committee, in time of crisis in which evacuations were taking place, it was planned that as many evacuees as possible would be put up in schools, churches and any other available places that could be found along the evacuation routes. Everyone could not be accomodated in such a manner, however. Therefore, as Peterson explained, "it would be my plan to employ trenching machines and go along the public highways and dig miles of trenches 2 feet wide and 3 feet deep which can be dug at a cost of about 25 cents a running foot, and place people in those shelters."[103] Then, "over the top of these trenches...I would suggest using boards and cover the boards with a foot or more of dirt." An alternative to the board covering, he continued, might be to place tar paper over the trenches so that "a person standing in one of those trenches could flap that thing every 20 or 30 minutes and shake that stuff /fallout/ on the ground." It was thought that such trenches would offer a "considerable" amount of fallout protection--perhaps up to 90 percent.

The Senators present, however, indicated some concern over this plan. For example:

> Chrm. Kefauver: As I understood Dr. Libby's testimony and others, it would take at least 3 days before the lethal effect of the fallout would diminish sufficiently so you would be able to move around.
>
> Peterson: No, I believe it is more correct to say, Mr. Chairman, that depending upon the dosage, it might be a matter of hours to days and probably not over 4 or 5 days--but a matter of hours.
>
> Kefauver: You have no provision for food, water, or sanitation?
>
> Peterson: Obviously in these trenches, if they are built on an emergency basis, there would be no provision for sanitation.

Peterson went on to remind the Committee that the trenches would only be needed in time of war, and in time of war only "stark survival" would

matter. These other considerations raised by the Committee "would become utterly secondary in view of the threat of atomic attack." He then indicated that an alternative to this plan would provide even greater protection. This would be to lay concrete pipe (mentioned was pipe four feet in diameter) along the highways and bury these after they had been filled with evacuees:

> Peterson: Now the logic of that, of course, or the improvement in that over the other is very obvious, because immediately you have given those people complete protection against radioactivity and they have a much better shelter against the elements.

The disadvantage of this system would be that the cost was estimated at $40 per person, whereas the first option was estimated at 25 cents a foot, or 75 cents a person since the FCDA was planning on the basis of three feet per person. Peterson realized these were not "ideal solutions," as he put it, but they were "the simplest, the most inexpensive, the most easily accomplished."

None of the Senators present were very happy with this plan, however. The vision of hundreds of thousands or millions of evacuees all across the country sitting in these dark trenches and pipes (perhaps cold or wet also) for days at a time, and with no sanitation, was not encouraging. In fact, Senator Saltonstall indicated:

> I would rather take my chances lying on my face on the ground than get into a concrete pipe a mile long, with no exit, with some people coming this way and some that way.

Bearing in mind this exchange of views, it is not surprising that the basic finding of the Committee was that "the civil defense effort is presently inadequate to deal with an H-bomb attack on this country."[104] The Committee therefore recommended that "the Federal Government must assume a drastically increased responsibility for the Federal civil

defense program."[105] More specifically, the Committee recommended that "The President assume the personal responsibility for providing the leadership which will develop an adequate civil defense program.[106] The Committee also concluded that State and local governments should increase their participation; but, as the Committee Report pointed out, the legislation which created the FCDA and apportioned major responsibility for civil defense to the States and local governments "was enacted before the existence of the hydrogen bomb." Present circumstances therefore demanded greater Federal responsibility and support.[107]

A month earlier the major recommendation of the Kestnbaum Commission (on Intergovernmental Relations) reflected this same viewpoint:

> It is recommended that congressional action be taken to reallocate responsibility for civil defense from a primary State and local responsibility to a joint responsibility of the National Government on the one hand, and the States and their political subdivisions on the other...

The Commission further recommended that Congress "liberalize" national financial support for civil defense.[108]

Finally, the report of the National Planning Association, released in May, also recommended a greatly strengthened Federal program as well as greater financial support on the part of the Congress.[109] On this there was unanimity.

The Humphrey Article

Besides the three studies just noted, an excellent article by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey appeared in late 1955 analyzing the problems of civil defense and the role of the Government in this matter.[110] Referring to the Constitution, Humphrey noted the responsibility of the Congress "to provide for the common defense..." Yet in the area of civil defense Congress had thus far "fallen woefully short" in this

responsibility. By insisting that civil defense was primarily a State and local responsibility the Congress was suffering from a "pre-uranium mentality." The dangers of thermonuclear weapons loomed so large that only the Federal Government was equipped to provide civilian defensive protective measures.

How had this "unfortunate situation" developed, he asked. The answer, for the most part, centered on the fact that Congress was generally ignorant of nuclear weapons effects and civil defense measures. The reason for this was that there was "no committee in Congress that concerns itself primarily with these matters." Infrequently, an ad-hoc group would be formed for a short period due to some pressing problem, but more than this was needed. Because there was no permanent civil defense committee, "no group of congressmen concern themselves solely with pre-attack and post-attack defense of the civilian population and industry." Civil defense suffered as a consequence. Lacking information and guidance, all too frequently appropriations committee members found it convenient to cut civil defense bills in an attempt to control escalating budgets.

Now it was time for a change, Humphrey argued: "The time has long since passed when we can continue to ignore these urgent matters." For this reason Humphrey, along with Senator Symington, had recently introduced in the Senate a resolution calling for the establishment in Congress of a Joint Committee on Civil Defense.[111] Humphrey warned "it is only with the establishment of such a committee that nonmilitary defense will start to get the attention it deserves..." Moreover,

> if we are to depend on hydrogen bombs and the ability of our Strategic Air Command to deter the Communists from aggression, we must take measures that indicate we ourselves are prepared to withstand such an attack. Otherwise, as the Soviet ability

> to strike us with thermonuclear weapons increases, our threats of thermonuclear retaliation appear to be more bluff and will cease to have a deterrent effect.

Soviet Military Developments

That the Soviet Union was improving its "ability to strike us with thermonuclear weapons" was beyond doubt. In April U.S. observers in Moscow for the up-coming May Day parade observed a formation of ten of the new Soviet M-4 jet bombers practicing for the parade fly-over. This indicated that the Soviets were probably in full production of this craft.[112] Moreover, during the May Day parade fly-over the Soviets displayed a formation of nine of their new IL-38 prop-jet bombers. This led to speculation that these also were in full production.[113] The most disturbing military news from the Soviet Union came a few months later, however, when the U.S. radar site in Diyarbakin, Turkey received data indicating that the Soviets were testing intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from a test site in Kapustan Yar. As Philip Klass has put it:

> Recent events in Moscow indicated that the Soviets already seemed to be pulling abreast of the U.S. in long range jet bombers. If they should also achieve an operational ICBM force a year or two ahead of the U.S., as seemed likely, the Massive Retaliation foreign policy would be stripped of its deterrent value.[114]

The newly constructed DEW Line would be useless against an ICBM attack and the U.S. would be completely vulnerable.

Eisenhower's Reaction

Given the apparent improvements being made in the Soviet force structure, the dawning of a realization of what hydrogen bomb explosions might entail, and the studies, hearings, and Congressional interest in civil defense, what was the Administration response? In the military

field, Eisenhower, in September 1955, ordered that Atlas ICBM development be given the highest priority in the nation.[115] In November, he followed this up by ordering that the same "highest priority" be given to the development of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the hope that success here would be easier and quicker and thus provide a stop-gap until the ICBM could be successfully developed.[116]

In the civil defense field, 1955 began on an inauspicious note. In presenting his FY 1956 budget request to the Congress, President Eisenhower included only $59.3 million for civil defense--the smallest FCDA request yet. After the Kefauver hearings began to focus attention on civil defense, however, indications that progressive actions would be taken towards the improvement of civil defense capabilities, were noticeable. On 18 March 1955 (while the Kefauver hearings were being held) Eisenhower sent to the Congress a supplemental appropriation request for $12 million, to enable the FCDA...

> to develop evacuation, shelter, and operational plans for cities in critical target and related areas of danger, and to conduct research into the most pressing problems resulting from radiological fallout in order to determine prompt and effective measures to meet such hazards...[117] (Emphasis added)

In May, Eisenhower established a Civil Defense Coordinating Board, "to assist in the development of an orderly, integrated plan for the participation of all Federal departments and agencies in the civil defense of the Nation..." Key agencies and departments would be represented on this Board, and were to cooperate and coordinate with the Administrator of the FCDA for the improvement of civil defense.[118] It appeared that the Executive branch was gearing up for concerted action in the civil defense field. Would the Legislative branch follow suit? Would the FCDA receive the appropriations which they felt would enable them to get civil defense off the ground?

The FY 1956 Appropriation

The first notable aspect of the FCDA budget request process for FY 1956 is that for the first time since its establishment the FCDA was assigned to a regular appropriations subcommittee and was scheduled to be included in the regular budget hearings rather than in a supplemental hearing. Prior to this, as Peterson would later remark, the FCDA had been "considered incidental and thrown into a miscellaneous group."[119] It was thus on 15 February 1955 that the FCDA appeared before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Independent Offices (under the chairmanship of Albert Thomas) and presented its FY 1956 appropriation request of $59.3 million.[120] (See Table II-5)

It soon became apparent, both during this hearing and a later supplemental hearing before the Thomas committee, that not much had changed in the minds of the committee members in their perception of civil defense. After his opening statement to the committee, in which relaxed censorship restrictions had at last allowed Peterson to note the serious existence of the fallout problem,[121] Thomas set the tone for the rest of the hearing by the nature of his remarks. At that time Thomas once again reiterated his conversation with the Mayor of Hamburg on civil defense matters. Amazingly, in an age of hydrogen weapons which could create hundreds of square miles of physical destruction and thousands of square miles of radioactive contamination, Thomas could still advocate that the best place to be in case of nuclear attack was "out in the street." He similarly continued to oppose the medical stockpile program in favor of reliance on the normal stocks found in the "average corner drugstore."[122] In area after area Thomas found cause to criticize the FCDA's proposals. He categorized the entire FCDA Operations Program

TABLE II-5

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1956 FCDA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

1) Operations		$ 11,600,000
Civil defense planning	$ 243,000	
Research and development	650,000	
Education services	2,157,000	
Operations control services	4,870,000	
Technical advisory services	840,000	
Field representation	1,361,000	
Executive direction	255,000	
General administration	1,224,000	
Total	$11,600,000	
2) Contributions		$ 12,400,000
Attack warning	$ 1,000,000	
Communications	3,500,000	
Public safety services	1,000,000	
Medical supplies and equipment	2,000,000	
Education services	2,500,000	
Mass care equipment	1,000,000	
Engineering supplies and equipment	1,000,000	
Unobligated balance	400,000	
Total	$12,400,000	
3) Emergency Supplies and Equipment (Medical)		$ 35,300,000
Grand Total		$ 59,300,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations --1956, (Part 1), 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, pp. 370-373.

(for which the FCDA was requesting $11.6 million) as "nothing but an educational proposition."[123] He disputed the contention that civil defense should be a joint Federal and State/local concern and criticized the FCDA for fostering that perception:

> I think Civil Defense has done more than everybody else put together to give the impression to local people in Massachusetts,

> Illinois, California, and Texas, that this is a Federal problem, when in truth and in fact...in the final analysis this is a local problem and it is very local to the individual. There is no bureau on earth in Washington that is going to be able to save the man in Massachusetts...That man is going to have to save himself; therefore it is purely a local problem in the final analysis...[124]

It was clear that if Chairman Thomas could have his way that situation would not change.

Just as Thomas had opposed sheltering he now also opposed that concept's replacement--evacuation. He claimed that with thirty minutes to two hours warning the typical American city could not be evacuated. He personally did not think a city the size of Washington, for example, could be evacuated in less than a week's time. Even if cities could be evacuated in less time, as Peterson argued, Thomas was still opposed to providing money for evacuation planning because, as he put it, when the bombs went off it would be everyman for himself--it would be "a question of survival of the fittest..." Therefore, "all the plans which you can make for them from now until kingdom come will be thrown out the window ..."[125] The entire hearing proceeded in this fashion with Thomas dominating the discussion. Typically, when another committee member spoke it was only to support Thomas.[126]

This perception of the way Thomas conducted his subcommittee is one others have also noted and have written about. In referring to Thomas, one study of civil defense written in the early 1960s indicated that "his approach to civil defense was purely political....possessed of remarkably poor technical understanding he took full advantage of the political situation to make pleasing and easy budget cuts."[127] This study does not differ with those conclusions.

Given this situation it is somewhat surprising that the House

Committee did not cut the FCDA appropriation request more than it did. Out of the $59.3 million initial request, $53.4 million was approved. Only $5.3 million for medical stockpiling and $.6 million from Operations were cut. The supplemental request did not fare as well--only $4.6 million of the $12 million requested was approved.[128] Though the House Appropriation Committee's action was more generous than had been the case the past three years, a warning note was sounded by the Committee in its report on the basic appropriation:

> More emphasis should be placed on the use of matching funds since there is no possibility of the Federal government supporting the entire program, even if it desired to do so.
>
> The value of civil defense fostered by this agency is the effectiveness of the job that can be accomplished by the States and local communities. The Committee believes too often this is considered a Federal program and the point is missed that it is the efforts of the individual citizen at the local level which will make the program effective.[129]

Interestingly, the House Appropriations Committee was urging a cutback in the Federal share of the civil defense program and a buildup of citizen and local community responsibility, while at the same time the Kefauver investigative hearings in the Senate were reaching diametrically opposite conclusions. Noting the "inadequacy" of the present system and the destructive potential of hydrogen weapons, the Kefauver Committee argued that the Federal Government "must assume a drastically increased responsibility" for civil defense.

Apparently, the Senate Appropriations Committee lent an ear to the recommendations of the Kefauver Committee, for when it reported out its civil defense recommendations on 2 June 1955, it had restored the initial appropriation cuts made by the House, granting the FCDA its entire $59.3 million request for the regular budget as well as the entire $12 million supplemental.[130] After sending both versions to conference, a compromise

was agreed to, granting the FCDA a regular appropriation of $56,350,000, a supplemental of $10,000,000 for evacuation and shelter studies, as well as $2,325,000 for administering the supplemental, for a total of $68,675,000--the largest FCDA appropriation in four years.[131]

TABLE II-6

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1956 FCDA APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

	FY 1955 Grant[a]	Submitted to BOB[b]	Approved by BOB[a]	House Action[a]	Senate Action[a]	Conference Final[c]
Operations	$10,025	---	$11,600	$11,000	$11,600	$11,300
Contributions	12,000	---	12,400	12,400	12,400	12,400
Supplies & Equipment	26,000	---	35,300	30,000	35,300	32,650
Sub-total	48,025	---	59,300	53,400	59,300	56,350
Supplemental[d]	---	---	12,000	4,600	12,000	12,325
TOTAL	$48,025	$93,938	$71,300	$58,000	$71,300	$68,675

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1956, Senate Report 411, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 June 1955, p. 13.

[b]"OCDM Appropriation History (1951 Through 1961)," (Appendix 9A), in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 397.

[c]U.S., Congress, House, Committee of Conference, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1956, House Report 871, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 June 1955, p. 8.

[d]Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XI, 1955, p. 208.

East River Review Report

The FY 1956 FCDA appropriation was a full thirty percent improvement over the appropriation levels of the previous three years. But, was this enough? According to two civil defense studies released in 1956, it was not. The first of these was the report of the 1955 Review Committee of Project East River. The Review Committee had been formed early in 1955 as rumors of the fallout danger spread. They were "to review the recommendations of the Project East River Report in the light of subsequent developments and to determine where we stand today with respect to these recommendations." Chaired by Major General Otto L. Nelson, the Committee, in its Review Report, released in early January 1956, was critical of the extent of action taken on the original study's recommendations. In their view, these had not been given the attention they deserved.[132] Because of this deficiency in recommendation implementation, as well as the nature of the now known fallout peril, the Review Report reiterated the criticism made by its predecessor Project East River Report on the lack of civil defense preparedness in the United States.[133] In concluding, the Report indicated that:

> Steps should be taken to improve the organizational framework and to increase the status, prestige, and funds available to the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Defense Mobilization.[134]

As has been noted, several bills had been introduced during the 84th Congress the year before with these very purposes in mind. By early 1956 these measures were still awaiting Congressional action. It was, in part, due to this situation that the second civil defense study, noted above, emerged in 1956. This might not have happened, however, had it not been for the efforts and resolve of one particular Congressman--Representative Chet Holifield of California.

Holifield Hearings--1956

In June of 1955, in one of several speeches on civil defense he would give that year, Representative Chet Holifield charged that:

> The administration has miserably failed the American people.... They are placing the principle of a balanced budget ahead of protecting up to 60 million people now living in the critical target areas of our country.[135]

In line with his concerns, Holifield had proposed legislation which sought to reconstitute the FCDA as a Cabinet level Executive department, thus "allowing the head of that organization to sit in with the National Security Council in order that he may know thoroughly, currently, and completely the problems of offense and defense from a military standpoint."[136] Others had proposed similar bills.[137] Because of these bills and because of Holifield's convictions, the House Committee on Government Operations instructed its Subcommittee on Military Operations (chaired by Holifield) to take testimony on the merits of the legislation which had been introduced.

In the hearings that followed, though, the scope of the Holifield Committee broadeded appreciably. In the words of the Committee's report:

> It became quickly apparent...that the civil defense inquiry demanded more than a consideration of organizational changes. Civil defense was a neglected field. The 1950 legislation which created the Federal Civil Defense Administration, outdated from the start, was left far behind by the swift march of atomic-hydrogen weapons technology and the evidence that Soviet Russia produces such weapons and can deliver them, careful review of the basic legislation was indicated...[138]

The result was a full-scale investigation into civil defense. After six months of staff investigation, public hearings began in January of 1956. During the next six months, 46 public hearings were held in 8 cities across the United States.[139] In addition, the Committee received briefings

in executive session at the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command in Omaha, the Continental Air Defense Command in Colorado Springs, the FCDA in Battle Creek, and the Pentagon in Washington. The witnesses before the Committee read like a Who's Who in civil defense--scientists, doctors, engineers, public officials, and renowned private citizens--two hundred and eleven witnesses in all. Communications were received from thirty-six State Governors and thirty-three city mayors replying to a questionaire sent out by the Committee on civil defense issues. In all, the record of just the public hearings totaled over three thousand pages and filled seven volumes.

These landmark hearings merit attention. The tone was set by Chairman Holifield in his opening statement in January:

> There is a widespread belief in this country that civil defense is either futile against sudden massive assaults with nuclear weapons, or is hopelessly inadequate under present arrangements. Whichever is the case, the members of this subcommittee are convinced that it is about time that the people of this Nation are informed and an intelligent course of action formulated...[140]

In line with Holifield's opening statement, three broad lines of testimony emerged in the three thousand plus pages of unclassified transcript which followed: First, why was civil defense needed, how significant was this need, and was the need for civil defense indeed a "futile" one, as some had alleged? Secondly, why was the standing civil defense arrangement considered to be "hopelessly inadequate"? What were the criticisms and problems of civil defense? And, thirdly, what "intelligent courses of action" could be formulated for the future?

Civil Defense: Why or Why Not?

Dr. Willard Libby of the AEC was the first witness to appear before the Committee. He had been requested to brief the Committee on

the effects of nuclear weapons, including fallout. In a briefing that lasted most of this first day of hearings, Libby indicated the vast destructive potential of atomic and hydrogen weapons. He noted the damage that could be inflicted by flying glass from broken windows twenty miles away from the detonation of a 10-megaton nuclear bomb. In terms of thermal effects, this same bomb would create a fireball three miles wide and hotter than the sun. For a ground-burst weapon this would be sufficient to "produce...third-degree burns at distances on a clear day out to about 11 or 12 miles." For an air-burst, "almost twice as much energy will appear in the fireball as in the case of surface bursts, and third-degree burns would appear out to 15 miles."[141] If a person were lucky enough to survive these blast and thermal effects within the lethal area of destruction, due to sheltering, he still might succumb to the release of initial radiation: "For example, at 3,000 feet from a 20-kiloton bomb,...this prompt neutron and gamma ray radiation...would probably prove fatal to 50 percent of human beings if protected by 12 inches of concrete."[142] As for fallout, Dr. Libby reiterated that the March 1954 BRAVO explosion caused the lethal contamination of seven thousand square miles. He further noted that this fallout degenerated at a fairly rapid rate. In later testimony, however, Dr. Ralph Lapp stressed the long-term nature of radioactive danger despite its rapid initial decay.

On this section of the hearings the Committee's report (hereafter referred to as the Holifield Report) was critical of the way the AEC had handled the release of information of nuclear weapons effects in the past. Cited was the year of secrecy on lethal fallout and the way in which AEC data minimized the fallout hazard, particularly the cutoff of

discussion on fallout persistence at the 36 hour mark. On this the report stated:

> Dr. Libby acknowledged that there was no reason to confine the discussion in that manner and stated it 'was an inadvertant omission.' The subcommittee sees no excuse for inadvertencies or casual treatment of atomic energy when life and death matters such as this are involved. The AEC displays a kind of easy optimism about nuclear explosion effects. The AEC spokesmen dwell upon the effects of 'nominal' bombs rather than on those of the high yield megaton weapons. Data presented to the subcommittee on the intensity of local radiation hazards are diluted by resort to global averages and other minimizing assumptions. The genetic effects of radioactivity are passed by with the comment that 'there is a wide range of admissible opinion on this subject.' Important information on atomic energy often is released in driblets, through speeches of AEC Commissioners, and couched in highly technical and hypothetical terms rather than in authoritative, concise, plain-spoken facts...[143]

After being apprised of the nature of nuclear weapon destructiveness, the Committee looked to the Military Establishment for a determination of the military's capability to mitigate the effectiveness of an attack. As was the case with the Kefauver Committee, the Holifield Committee was told that only 25 to 30 percent of an enemy's incoming bombers could be stopped. As the Soviets moved to IREMs which could be fired by submarine off the coasts, and to ICBMs fired from the Soviet Union, even this would vanish as there was no effective defense against these weapons. Moreover, the DEW Line nearing completion would be next to useless in terms of warning time. Instead of two, four, or six hours of warning there would be fifteen minutes at the most. And of deterrence? As Dr. Albert Hill, the Scientific Director of the Weapons System Evaluation Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put: "Wars never start for logical and good reasons...They start for a complex of reasons, many of which are emotional." Therefore, he concluded, "One can never count on a potential enemy being completely logical and deciding he won't attack us because he himself will be destroyed."[144]

In light of the nuclear danger and the military's inability to significantly mitigate the scale of an attack, the Committee was persuaded that civil defense was needed. The question remained, though, was it possible? The great majority of witnesses testified that it was --at least theoretically. Changes would have to be made, however, given the general consensus that the present system, for whatever reasons, was inadequate.

Criticisms and Problems

A wide range of opinion existed on the subject of the inadequacies of the existing civil defense arrangement. According to the testimony, of these there were many. Some blamed the leadership of the FCDA for the existing state of affairs. Others blamed Congress, or the Administration, or public apathy, ignorence, and complacency. For example, Dr. Merle A. Tuve, the Director of the Research Laboratory of the Carnegie Institute of Washington, and the Chairman of the Committee on Civil Defense of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council, testified that civil defense was possible, however:

> I regard the present national civil defense effort as a failure. In fact it seems to have been so fumbling and inconsistent as to have lost public confidence and made a difficult situation more difficult.[145]

What was needed to improve this state of affairs, he argued, was a change in leadership within the FCDA. Too many of its employees had attained their positions via political influence. This was true of its Director, who had had virtually no civil defense experience before being given the job as FCDA Director, and was true of others within the agency: "Simply changing the position of the present group in the executive branch or enlarging the budget as have been repeatedly suggested,

cannot be expected to produce an effective civil defense."[146]

Dr. Willard Bascom, Technical Director of the Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of the National Academy of Sciences, thought Congress was primarily to blame with the Executive running a close second. In his opinion, much of this difficulty could be traced to the "erroneous concept" that civil defense was basically a State, community, and citizen problem. Modern nuclear warfare transcended such boundaries, he argued. Exacerbating this problem was the perception the Congress fostered by failing to provide for its own protection or participating in test exercises.[147] By budgeting for the Capital's civil defense less than one-sixth of what was budgeted for the national zoo, the impression was given that Congress was paying only lip service to civil defense.[148]

Lloyd V. Berkner, President of Associated Universities, Inc., and a member of the Project East River group, indicated his belief that the problem with civil defense resided in public apathy. If the average citizen could be made to feel that "aside from defending or protecting himself, his actions are in defense of the whole country" and not something that could be "branded as cowardly," then the people would get behind civil defense. Once the people were there, the Congress and the Executive would follow.[149]

Murray S. Levine, an attorney and the superviser of the Selective Service Section of the Manhattan Project, vehemently disagreed with the baisc philosophy of the FCDA leadership, which in his opinion focused too heavily on saving individuals (and money) as opposed to saving the Nation. He used as an example the FCDA pamphlet Four Wheels For Survival:

> The contents of this pamphlet to the average layman could only be interpreted in one way. Keep your car ready--use it as a

> 'small movable house in an emergency....live, eat, and sleep in it.'...This pamphlet--and others like it--are actually promoting a state of mind which could easily lead to anarchy. This is a Government pamphlet not aimed at preserving the Government, but at turning the people loose on the country, without any thought of their country.

Such an approach, he argued, "may save the Government a lot of money but it may cost the Nation's life." Levine proposed that the Selective Service System be used to fill the ranks of civil defense, drafting citizens for civil defense training and duty just as in the military.[150] A similar proposal was submitted by the Governor of New Hampshire, Lane Dwinell, who advocated the development of a National Guard type organization for civil defense in that neither the regular military nor the National Guard could be counted on for civil defense missions in case of attack--their missions would be military ones.[151]

Several local civil defense officials were critical of the administration of the FCDA and of the agency's relationship with local civil defense organizations. Walter P. Halstead, for example, the Executive Director of the Minneapolis Office of Civil Defense, wrote the subcommittee stating that:

> Today the FCDA persists in carrying on their program only through the State civil defense agency. This has been reduced to the ridiculous situation where regional FCDA directors will not directly answer letters from target area civil defense directors, but will direct their answers only through the State Director.

Halstead charged that such a working relationship between the two levels of civil defense had resulted in "negligible" coordination: "In our own instance...our relationship to the FCDA has deteriorated to a point where we make every effort possible to avoid contact with that agency."[152] Similarly, the Civil Defense Director of Syracuse, N.Y., indicated to the subcommittee that even though the FCDA field representative's

headquarters for his area was in nearby Buffalo, "as far as we are concerned he might as well be in Alaska.[153]

A final view was expressed by Major General Otto L. Nelson, Jr. (USA, Ret.) who had been a director of the 1952 Project East River, as well as the Chairman of the 1955 review. General Nelson was scornful of attitudes held both in the public and government domains that were often ignorent or complacent. Two were particularly upsetting: (1) the attitude that the country should focus all its defensive funds into strictly military fighting forces;[154] and, (2) the attitude that there was nothing that could be done, that civil defense would be hopelessly ineffective.[155]

The FCDA view. In that several of the criticisms discussed above centered on the FCDA, it is relevant at this point to ask what was the reaction of the FCDA to these criticisms? It would be difficult to categorize the approach of Peterson and the FCDA to these hearings with the use of a single adjective. At times Peterson was defensive, at times combattive, and at other times almost apologetic. At one point he reminded the subcommittee of the sheer enormity of the job entrusted to the FCDA:

> In the last analysis we must judge the performance /of FCDA/ not against any absolute scale but in relation to the size, the nature, and the difficulty of the problem.[156]

"I have been staring into hell for 3 years," Peterson told the subcommittee. This had convinced him that "there are no magic solutions to the grave problems of our national civil defense, and that in the laborious search for the means of our Nation's ultimate survival there are no glamorous substitutes for experience, patience, and hard work."[157] It was in such a manner that Peterson attempted to explain away the

criticisms that had been laid at his doorstep. Not that those at the FCDA did not "recognize our shortcomings," he argued, "but we also recognize our accomplishments."[158]

Shifting to the offensive in referring to his critics, Peterson told the Congressmen present:

> I am also conscious of the fact that we seem to be developing in this country and in the world, a new set of delphic oracles who, because of great attainment in one area begin to speak with authority in other areas. I know of no area that is more difficult than dealing with human action and human relations and in government, particularly.[159]

Peterson's position was that the FCDA was doing the best job that it could considering the restrictions they at the FCDA were working under. Two of these in particular Peterson singled out as noteworthy: the lack of power the FCDA had over State level civil defense, and the lack of sufficient Congressional interest and appropriations. The Director told the subcommittee that the FCDA collected information and provided that to the States along with advice and matching funds "to stimulate the States and cities in certain activities of civil defense," but the FCDA had no control or command authority over lower level civil defense organizations. The FCDA could not force participation in civil defense or enforce compliance with standards which were set out: "We are pretty much in the position of the minister who exhorts his flock on Sunday to be good people the rest of the week, but we have very little means of following up to see that they are good people."[160]

Not all who addressed themselves to this problem, however, agreed with Peterson that the FCDA was lacking in authority. Herbert Roback, the subcommittee's Director of Investigations, questioned Peterson whether the root cause of this problem was a lack of FCDA authority or the failure of Peterson "to exercise the duties and functions of your

office." Chairman Holifield noted at another point that even if it were the case that further legislation were needed to ameliorate this problem, the FCDA had been in existence since 1950 and...

> ...during that period of five years the impact of weapons increased tremendously /yet/ neither Governor Caldwell nor Governor Peterson, as far as I know, have come to the Congress, as is the duty of the heads of all departments of Government, and requested a change in the legislation.[162]

In terms of Peterson's second area of criticism--that of insufficient Congressional concern and appropriations--there was also disagreement. Peterson noted the lack of Congressional participation in the annual nationwide alerts, and the fact that "just two /sic/ congressional committees...have paid any attention to Civil Defense aside from the Appropriations Committees."[163] Critical comments of Congressional appropriations were made at several points. Noted, for example, was "the failure of the United States to provide adequate funds..." and the "failure to understand the problem and appreciate the consequences of this situation..."[164]

After listening to this for awhile Chairman Holifield indicated that he felt compelled to respond on behalf of the Congress to this criticism:

> Mr. Peterson, I am not going to quarrel with you about the lack of money and I am not going to try to escape my proportionate share of responsibility on the point of money. But it is your responsibility to do this planning and to place these plans before the Congress in a tangible way, and then if the Congress fails after you have done these things, it is off your shoulders and on to the Congress.
>
> But in these areas where it is obvious that adequate planning has not been done, or at least if it has been done it has not been presented to the Congress, then I insist that you be as fairminded as I am and share your part of the responsibility as the Administrator charged with this responsibility...[165]

On this same subject, another subcommittee member, R. Walter Riehlman

(Rep., N.Y.) related to Peterson his conversations with various House Appropriations Committee members. In summary, Riehlman indicated:

> The main argument that they have always made to me is that they would not support requests for Federal civil defense because they didn't have an adequate program and they didn't feel that the program would support the expenditure of the funds that were requested...[166]

Additionally, Glenard P. Lipscomb (Rep., Cal.), referring to the FY 1956 appropriation request, criticized Peterson for "pattering your program after what you thought Congress would go along with, which I do not believe is the right policy."[167]

It should be apparent by now that the relationship between Peterson and the subcommittee was not always amicable. This perception is no where more clear than in the shelter versus evacuation debate that developed as the hearings progressed.

Shelter versus evacuation. Due to the fallout hazard and the development of the ICBM, which loomed only a few years over the horizon, as well as the already existing threat of submarine launched IREMs, which could threaten without warning such cities as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Atlanta, Norfolk, Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, and New York, several subcommittee members were concerned with the ballance between sheltering and evacuation as determined by the FCDA.[168] In this regard, statements that Peterson had made in the past in defending the evacuation concept, which seemed to indicate his perception that there was no alternative ("we would have to go down in the ground 100 or more feet, we would have to build concrete catacombs"), had given some subcommittee members the feeling that there was no balance whatsoever in FCDA planning--it was evacuation one hundred percent.[169] This perception was reinforced during the hearings as the result of testimony

given by some local civil defense officials who indicated that FCDA sponsored survival studies were being conducted in their localities and that these "survival" studies seemed to them to be synonymous with "evacuation" studies.[170]

Peterson, when confronted with these concerns, assured the subcommittee that there was within the FCDA a balance between evacuation and sheltering. Holifield wondered aloud, however, "is it 95 percent evacuation and 5 percent shelter?"[171] Both he and Mr. Roback continued to question Peterson deeper and deeper into the shelter/evacuation area unrelentingly, despite Peterson's assurances:

> Holifield: Did you advocate or request funds to inaugurate a shelter program in your last 2 or 3 budgets?
>
> Peterson: No sir, and we are not prepared to initiate such a request yet as of today.
>
> Holifield: How long are you going to keep on studying this problem? You have had your tests in Nevada /where various shelter designs of various expense were tested and determinations made as to the p.s.i. each could withstand/ of which you have reports estimating that 80 percent of the casualties could be avoided by these shelters. They are within the bounds of economic possibility. Why haven't you come forth as an advocate to the American people, to the Congress, of a program of this type in view of the hazard of possible nuclear war?
>
> Peterson: Well for several reasons. First, we have not come up with what we hope will be the best type of shelter under the circumstances of nuclear war.
>
> Holifield: We don't have the best types of anything in the military field, but we take what is possible to cope with, the problem of the day. The question is not waiting for a perfect solution.[172]

Peterson responded that he wanted his evidence to be "in the best possible shape" before presenting it before an appropriations committee, given a history of "cavalier" appropriation cuts. Besides, a new dome designed shelter had, "within the last 60 days," been proposed as a better design than the ones tested in Nevada. Peterson wanted time to

schedule this design for future Nevada testing. Moreover, many of the critical target cities were in the process of conducting survival studies and Peterson did not want to move on a shelter program proposal until these were completed--perhaps in a year or two, or three.[173] He further reminded the subcommittee that:

> Even though you build shelters, and elaborate shelters, bear in mind that the enemy will constantly have more weapons and instead of having one burst over a town you may reach a point where you may have 5, 10, or 15 bursts over a town and then shelter and all is gone.[174]

In such a case evacuation would be a preferable alternative.

This prompted Holifield to make several points in response. First: "A statement like that makes me believe that you don't believe in civilian defense." Peterson replied that he did believe in civil defense, but:

> I don't believe in kidding anybody about what is going to happen to the world and the people of the world in the event of a thermonuclear war, and I have contempt for anybody who attempts to minimize the sheer destructiveness and death and desolution that will befall mankind if these weapons are dropped.[175]

Holifield's second point was that he had "some very serious doubts as to the effectiveness of evacuation in the face of the radioactive fallout pattern."[176] Exacerbating this problem was the fact that the U.S. was unprepared "to take care of evacuees either through shelter in the wintertime from the elements..../or to provide for/ the ordinary care of feeding and water and medical supplies and so forth..."[177] Holifield was convinced that for some cities, such as New York or his hometown of Los Angeles, evacuation was just a bad proposition:

> Holifield: I don't want to evacuate my family out in the Mojave Desert outside of Los Angeles in the summertime when it is 125 to 130 degrees out there, I would rather take a chance in a scientifically devised shelter.
>
> Peterson: I would rather be in the desert when the bombs go off.

> Holifield: I have had the job of getting from the Rose Bowl parade to my home, which is 10 miles away, and that has taken me 4 or 5 hours. I doubt if we would have that much warning-time if a submarine started to shell the city with atomic shells.

Peterson's final statement on this discussion was to point out that if one lived ten miles from the center of a city where it was expected that a bomb would go off, then sheltering would be safe. However, if the bomb missed the center of the city by several miles in the shelteree's direction, then he would be killed.[178] This statement, while true, ignored the point Holifield was trying to make--that sometimes circumstances and short warning time ruled evacuation out. In light of this, shelter must be available to fall back on. In addition, Peterson's comment on the possibility of the bomb missing the center of the city (where it could only be assumed the Soviets would target it) was not really relevant in that for everyone killed as a result of a supposed missed aiming point, others, not otherwise expected to survive, would survive.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In essence, Chairman Holifield's position in his disagreements with Director Peterson (as stated in response to Peterson's frequent claim that there were no perfect solutions) was that "we are not seeking a perfect solution but we are not willing to retire behind the assertion that there is no perfect solution as an excuse for not adopting solutions which commonsense tells us are reasonably justified at the present time."[179] This attitude was reflected in the subcommittee's 103 page report compiled upon the conclusion of this year long study. The concise Summary of the report merits quotation:

> The Nation spends yearly for direct military purposes $35 billion to $40 billion. The FCDA gets a yearly appropriation of

> $60 million to $80 million, something like one five-hundredth of the military budget. /Actually, the average FCDA budget for the period FY 1951 through FY 1956 was $52,614,000./
>
> The faults of civil defense lie not in lack of dollars alone. The Congress has refused to commit large funds for civil defense in the absence of an effectively planned national program. In the opinion of the subcommittee, Congress has not given to this problem the attention it has deserved.
>
> The FCDA has not fully grasped the technical, administrative, or economic requirements of an effective civil defense program. The subcommittee believes that the key measure in civil defense against nuclear attack is shelter. This is based on the testimony received and on studies of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory /to be dealt with in the next chapter/.
>
> Proper construction and location of shelters in heavily populated target areas can reduce casualties by two thirds, according to analyses by shelter design experts in industry and Government.
>
> The FCDA's policy of reliance on evacuation as the key civil defense measure is weak and ineffective and indeed dangerously shortsighted. Evacuation requires hours or days of advance warning, which would be unavailable when intercontinental ballistic missiles are developed.
>
> The FCDA policy of promoting local evacuation plans and backyard family shelters is an inexpensive budgetary substitute for an effective civil defense....
>
> The FCDA Administrator never has construed his statutory authority to develop a realistic national plan for civil defense. Too many planning responsibilities are delegated to other Federal agencies or to outside organizations or to State-local groups....
>
> After consideration of the various alternatives to reorganization, the subcommittee concludes that a Federal department with Cabinet level prestige and authority should be created. /More will be said of this in the next chapter./
>
> All recent studies of civil defense, the unanimous resolution of the 1956 governors' conference, and the testimony of numerous informed witnesses before the subcommittee recommend a shift in basic responsibility for civil defense from States and localities to the Federal Government....180

After providing a listing of recommendations based upon these conclusions, the report urged their adoption and noted further that doing so would not only make the United States a safer place to live but a better one as well. For unlike military armament, "roads, overpasses,

recreation areas and other measures having civil defense utility, foster and strengthen the economy rather than drain away its resources."[181] Shelters could be used for community centers, food and other stockpiles could be valuable in peacetime emergencies. In short, the Congress was told that there was no way to lose in following through on these recommendations.

Aftermath of the Holifield Hearings

The 1956 Holifield Hearings and Report intensified interest in civil defense across the Nation for several months following the conclusion of its investigation. Newspapers carried accounts of the proceedings during the hearings, and afterwards magazine articles appeared debating the implications of this or that section of the hearings.[182] Probably more important, was the official interest given civil defense following the hearings. In mid-July, President Eisenhower, in a letter to Peterson, indicating his desire that the U.S. civil defense system be improved. After noting the recent and potential advances in weapons technology and destructiveness, the President stated:

> It is...clear that no matter how crushing a blow we can strike in retaliation for an attack upon us, to permit our great centers of population and industry to lie exposed to the weapons of modern war is to invite both an attack and national catastrophe. Therefore, our whole civil defense effort needs both strengthening and modernizing.[183]

Following this letter by a few days, the Fourth National Civil Defense Exercise was held during the week of 20-26 July 1956. Significantly, for the first time since these excercises were begun, the military, with Eisenhower's approval, participated in the test, designed "to acquaint personnel with the types of problems which a nuclear attack against the United States might generate and to test our readiness to

deal with such problems."[184] Later, on September 9th, Eisenhower proclaimed the following week "National Civil Defense Week":

> Through working together in Civil Defense we become better citizens. We earn the right to live in peace, purchased in large part by our own vigilance and preparedness. We make it plain, as only a united people can, that aggression will not pay; and by discouraging aggression we will strengthen the hands of men of good will in all nations...[185]

In this atmosphere of heightened civil defense awareness, the FCDA followed through on Eisenhower's instructions to strengthen and modernize civil defense. On 21 December 1956, the FCDA reversed the position it had taken four years earlier (shortly after Eisenhower assumed office) and submitted a "proposed national shelter program" to the Administration.[186] And, as Samuel Huntington has put it, "it did so with a vengence," recommending to Eisenhower that both fallout and blast shelters be constructed as part of a $32 billion shelter program.[187] The proposal advocated the provision of blast shelters that could withstand an overpressure of 30 p.s.i. in all 315 potential target areas now recognized by the FCDA.[188] Fallout shelters would be provided for much of the remainder of the country.[189]

How would Eisenhower react to this program? The FCDA (as well as the rest of the country) would have to wait until Eisenhower's second term to find out. One thing was certain, however, the FCDA's timing was propitious. The months of October and November preceeding this proposal had been particularly volatile and thus served as a balance to the easy optimism that had sprung up in some circles as a result of events that had transpired earlier in the year. Up until October it had seemed that 1956 would be a year of "peaceful cooexistence." In January, Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin had proposed to Eisenhower that the United States and the Soviet Union put aside their differences and sign a

twenty-year treaty of friendship and economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation. Seemingly in the same spirit of harmony and peaceful co-existence, a notable softening of Soviet control over its satellite states was occuring.[190] In February, Khrushchev gave his famous anti-Stalin speech before the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union, and in April Mikoyan announced the dissolution of the Cominform.[191] One commentator, in looking back over this period has stated:

> Here in this country as in the free world generally, wishes became fathers to great hopes. Optimism and blandness of outlook rose and climbed like a bull market. One of the most remarkable examples was the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who predicted a liberal evolution within the Soviet Union in 10 years time.[192]

Such optimisim began to wither in late October, however, and by the end of the year had suffered greatly. On October 29th the Israli army attacked Egypt, nearly destroying Nasser's army and conquering much of the Sinai. Within a few days France and England began landing their own forces in the Suez Canal Zone and began to pressure Egypt in conjunction with Israel. The Soviet Union, in response, began its own saber rattling to the point of threatening to fire rockets on London. United States pressure on its allies, however, led to a withdrawal (but not to an end of hostility) in the area.[193] At the same time, a crisis in Hungary arose, spurred by the liberalization efforts of the Nagy regime and Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. As a result Soviet troops and tanks invaded Hungary on 4 November and quickly crushed the uprising. Nagy was arrested and flown to the Soviet Union where he was executed a few months later.[194]

It was in this international environment that Peterson forwarded his shelter proposal to Eisenhower in December. Much had happened effecting civil defense since Peterson's turning away from sheltering in

1952. The knowledge of the destructiveness of hydrogen weapons began to spread, the severe fallout phenomenon was discovered, and ICBM range missiles entered the development stage. Given Eisenhower's supportive statements and actions following the Holifield hearings the FCDA must have been encouraged over the probability that their proposal would be accepted.

The FY 1957 Appropriation

The FCDA could also take encouragement in 1956 from the fact that their appropriations, granted in that year for the 1957 fiscal year, were the highest appropriations granted FCDA up to that time. (See Table II-7 for a statistical summary of the request.) Of the $123.2 million requested, the House granted $86.1 million.[195] The Senate, though, granted the entire amount asked for.[196] The compromise, worked out in Conference, resulted in an appropriation of $93,560,000 for the FCDA for the upcoming fiscal year, in what was by this time an almost predictable evolution of the appropriation request through the Congress.[197] (See Table II-8)

Postscript

Several developments stand out when looking at civil defense during the first term of the Eisenhower Administration. For one thing, civil defense changed three times during these first four years. The first change was made shortly after Eisenhower assumed office when the concept of sheltering was virtually abandoned. The role of the Federal Government would not be to engage in expensive operational programs, but would be that of providing guidance, training, and education to State and local political subdivisions, where the primary responsibility of civil

TABLE II-7

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1957 FCDA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Appropriations	1955 actual	1956 estimate	1957 estimate
Operations:			
Civil defense planning	$203,713	$273,236	$376,000
(a) Research	884,214	422,000	(1)
Education services	1,593,887	2,046,982	5,200,000
Operations control services	3,107,781	4,557,451	9,040,000
Technical advisory services	766,466	911,802	1,458,000
Field representation	1,320,847	1,996,532	3,064,000
Executive direction	274,532	329,013	447,000
General administration	1,953,418	1,617,684	2,115,000
Total, operations	[2] 10,104,858	[3] 12,487,000	21,700,000
Federal contributions:			
Attack warning	1,189,483	1,000,000	1,500,000
Communications	1,858,953	2,150,000	4,450,000
Public safety services	176,994	1,000,000	1,400,000
Medical supplies and equipment	345,944	2,150,000	1,709,000
Education services	339,919	2,500,000	2,500,000
Mass care equipment	43,758	1,000,000	500,000
Engineering equipment and supplies	57,384	1,250,000	750,000
Construction and General equipment	0	1,350,000	4,200,000
Unobligated	[4] 9,177,048	0	0
Total Federal contributions	[5] 13,189,483	12,400,000	17,000,000
Emergency supplies and equipment:			
Medical supplies and equipment	25,859,382	23,462,000	58,400,000
Radiological and chemical warfare defense equipment	([6])	3,910,000	5,300,000
Relocation and maintenance of stockpile	0	278,000	300,000
Total, emergency supplies and equipment	25,859,382	32,650,000	64,000,000
Surveys, plans and research:			
Survey plans	0	8,333,000	10,000,000
Research	0	1,667,000	4,500,000
Total, survey plans and research	0	10,000,000	14,500,000
Civil defense functions of Federal agencies:			
Housing and Home Finance Agency	0	26,500	600,000
Department of Agriculture	0	0	540,000
Department of Commerce	0	190,000	700,000
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare	889,972	1,259,300	3,490,000
Department of Interior	0	20,000	110,000
Department of Justice	0	0	100,000
Department of Labor	0	69,200	460,000
Total, civil defense functions of Federal agencies	889,972	[7] 1,565,000	6,000,000
Total, all appropriations	50,043,695	[8] 69,102,000	123,200,000
Less civil defense procurement fund return	0	2,500,000	0
Total available	50,043,695	[9] 66,602,000	123,200,000

[1] Research now budgeted under surveys, plans, and research.
[2] Includes $80,512 transferred from Federal contributions.
[3] Includes $362,000 anticipated supplemental for pay raise.
[4] Unobligated balance available in fiscal year 1956.
[5] Includes reappropriation of $1,300,000, excludes transfer of $80,512 to operations for pay raise, excludes unobligated $30,005 of $1,300,000 reappropriation.
[6] Previously grouped under "Medical supplies and equipment."
[7] Includes $65,000 anticipated supplemental for pay raise.
[8] Includes $427,600 anticipated supplementals for pay raise.

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, for 1957, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 167.

TABLE II-8

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1957 FCDA APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1956[a] Grant	Submitted[b] to BOB	Approved[a] by BOB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	Conference[c] Final
Operations	$12,125	----	$21,700	$15,560	$21,700	$15,560
Contributions	12,400	----	17,000	17,000	17,000	17,000
Supplies & Equipment	32,650	----	64,000	42,000	64,000	47,000
Surveys,* Plans, and Research	10,000	----	14,500	10,000	14,500	10,000
Delega-** tions	1,500	----	6,000	1,540	6,000	4,000
TOTAL	$68,675	$134,809	$123,200	$86,100	$123,200	$93,560

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1957, Senate Report 2041, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 24 May 1956, p. 13.

[b]"OCDM Appropriation History (1951 Through 1961)," Appendix 9A), in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 397.

[c]Congressional Record, Vol. 102, Part 8, 20 June 1956, p. 10680.

*In prior years carried under "Civil Defense Planning" in the Operations Program.

**For salaries and expenses of civil defense functions delegated to other Federal agencies.

defense was seen to abide. This policy was modified after the explosion of a Soviet hydrogen weapon in 1953 and the release of information soon thereafter on the effects of the 1952 U.S. hydrogen explosion. The immediate blast and thermal destructiveness of these weapons was so enormous that FCDA Director Val Peterson decided that the cities would be doomed in a nuclear attack. Therefore, the only alternative was to replace the side-tracked shelter concept with an evacuation policy. Hardly had this policy been publicized, however, when the March 1954 BRAVO hydrogen bomb explosion brought to the forefront the lethal hazard of radioactive fallout. Given the knowledge that lethal radioactive fallout could cover thousands of square miles, sheltering regained its importance--evacuated populations would need to be sheltered from this hazard. The extent of the Federal role in providing a shelter system, however, would be a decision that would be made during Eisenhower's second term.

Besides the changes in civil defense planning, another development which stands out is the extent to which international instability and war were omnipresent during Eisenhower's first term. Whereas the Berlin uprisings and the Korean War were benchmarks of the beginning of Eisenhower's first term, the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Middle East War were benchmarks of its ending. Such turbulent developments served as uneasy reminders of the volatile nature of the international system. Director Peterson would cite such occurances more than once in his efforts to heighten awareness of the need for civil defense.

A third notable aspect of Eisenhower's first term which was of interest to civil defense was the extent of Congressional concern. Two lengthy Congressional investigations of civil defense were undertaken. Notably, both the Kefauver investigation and the Holifield investigation

heightened interest in civil defense and precipitated Administration initiatives. On the other hand, the Congressional Appropriations Committees (particularly the House committee) continued to cut civil defense requests by significant percentages. (For a summary of appropriations see Table II-9.) Though the level of appropriations for civil defense during Eisenhower's first term was an improvement over the Truman-era appropriation level (appropriations rose from an average of $50 million to an average of almost $65 million--a 28 percent improvement) the House Appropriations Committee continued to maintain a concept of civil defense that differed from the concept held by the FCDA. This, in large measure, accounted for the sharp House reductions in FCDA requests.

Similarly, President Eisenhower maintained a concept of civil defense that limited its operational effectiveness. Eisenhower strongly maintained the precept of the basic legislation, holding that civil defense was primarily a State and local responsibility--even after the introduction of hydrogen weapons into the equation. It took Congressional pressure (in the form of the Kefauver and Holifield hearings) to cause a modification in Eisenhower's position in the direction of larger budget approvals and instructions to strengthen and modernize civil defense. Even so, the budget requests approved by the Eisenhower Administration for submission to the Congress, were, during this first term, significantly less than those approved during the Truman Administration. In fact, the Truman Administration's yearly <u>average</u> approval for civil defense was more than the <u>total</u> approved during the first four years of the Eisenhower Administration. (See Table II-10.) Several factors help explain this situation. First, Eisenhower strongly believed in balanced budgets and economy. Secondly, the Nation's defense policy of massive

TABLE II-9

SUMMARY OF FCDA APPROPRIATIONS DURING EISENHOWER'S FIRST TERM

	FY 1954	FY 1955	FY 1956	FY 1957	Truman Average	Eisenhower 1st Term Average
Operations	$ 8,526,000	$10,025,000	$12,125,000	$15,560,000	$12,700,000	$11,559,000
Contributions	10,500,000	12,000,000	12,400,000	17,000,000	13,300,000	12,975,000
Supplies & Equipment	27,500,000	26,000,000	32,650,000	47,000,000	24,000,000	33,287,500
Surveys, Plans & Research	---	---	10,000,000	10,000,000	---	5,000,000
Delegated Functions	---	---	1,500,000	4,000,000	---	1,375,000
Totals	$46,526,000	$48,025,000	$68,675,000[a]	$93,560,000	$50,000,000	$64,196,000

[a]Includes $12 million supplemental appropriation.

TABLE II-10

COMPARISON OF TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (FIRST TERM)
FCDA BUDGET APPROVAL RATES

	Truman	Eisenhower (First Term)
Budget Approvals	$ 403,000,000 FY 1951 535,000,000 FY 1952 600,000,000 FY 1953	$125,200,000 FY 1954 85,750,000 FY 1955 71,300,000 FY 1956 123,200,000 FY 1957
Total	$1,538,000,000	$405,450,000
Average Approval	$ 512,666,000	$101,362,500

retaliation stressed offensive priorities. And, thirdly, the military continued to oppose placement of civil defense responsibilities within the Defense Department.

A final notable civil defense development during Eisenhower's first term involves the nature of the FCDA's relationship with Congressional committees. Despite attempts by the new FCDA Director, Val Peterson, to improve the FCDA's relationship with the House Appropriations Committee, this relationship remained strained. Moreover, a similar relationship developed with Representative Holifield's House Subcommittee on Military Operations--a committee that was strongly pro civil defense. Before the House Appropriations subcommittee Peterson was criticized for trying to do too much. Before Holifield's subcommittee he was criticized for not trying to do more and for not doing better with the limited resources at his disposal. Clearly, the Administration's position on civil defense put the FCDA in an unenviable position before both committees.

NOTES

1 Quoted in BAS, "Civil Defense News," Vol. IX, No. 2, March 1953, p. 61.

2 Frederich Valedemar Erastus Peterson was born in Oakland Nebraska, graduated from Wayne State Teachers College and received an M.A. from the University of Nebraska, where he went on to teach political science. After serving as a plans and operations officer in the Army during the war, Peterson returned to Nebraska where he was elected Governor in 1947. He was reelected twice after that, serving as Governor until 1953 when to took over Directorship of the FCDA upon expiration of his third term. See bibliography to Peterson article "Preparedness Against Panic," in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, Soviet Total War (Part 1), House Document 227, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 September 1956, p. 325. See, also, John Modell, The Politics of Safety: American Civil Defense (N.Y.: Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1963), p. 13.

Peterson was confirmed as FCDA Director 2 March 1953, and was sworn in by President Eisenhower on 4 March. He was a Republican.

3 Congressional Record, Vol. 99, Part 7, 15 July 1953, pp. 8900-8901.

4 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower--1953, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 75.

5 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 277.

6 New York Times, 21 October 1953. Quoted by: Frans R. Bax in "Decision-Making For Defense--An Analysis of the Huntington Theory," (Typewritten paper, Harvard, 1970), pp. 92 and 93.

7 New York Times, 17 March 1953, p. 21. Noted by Bax, p. 89.

8 Project East River was sponsored by the FCDA, the NSRB, and the Defense Department "to evaluate and recommend the optimum combination of nonmilitary measures which would assist:

> 1) the FCDA in discharging its responsibilities for preparing to minimize the effects of attack by atomic, biological, chemical, or other weapons on the population and industry of the United States;
> 2) the NSRB in discharging its responsibilities of advising the President concerning the strategic location of industries, services, government and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the nation's security; and

3) the Department of Defense in collaborating with FCDA and NSRB in discharging their responsibilities."

Under Government contract, the Associated Universities, Inc., (nine universities including Harvard, Yale, and Princeton) worked under the direction of Otto L. Nelson, Jr. The various reports comprising the ten volume study were published during the summer and fall of 1952 but were not released until early January, 1953 (except for parts III and IV which remained classified). The various reports were:

Part	I	General Report
Part	II	Measures to Make Civil Defense Manageable
Part	II-A	Military Measures Precedent to a Manageable Civil Defense
Part	II-B	Federal Leadership to Reduce Urban Vulnerability
Part	III	The Destructive Threat of Atomic Weapons
Part	IV	Civil Defense Aspects of Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Warfare
Part	V	Reduction of Urban Vulnerability
Part	VI	Disaster Services and Operations
Part	VII	Warning and Communications for Civil Defense
Part	VIII	Civil Defense Health and Welfare
Part	IX	Information and Training for Civil Defense
Part	X	Selected References for Civil Defense

For a more detailed summary of the Report than will be given here, see Joseph E. McLean (a participant in the study), "Project East River--Survival in the Atomic Age," in the special edition of BAS: Project East River--The Strategy of Civil Defense, Vol. IX, No. 7, September 1953.

9 Quoted by Val Peterson in his written statement before the House Appropriations Committee on 4 June 1953, (House, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1954, p. 219).

10 Quoted in BAS, "Civil Defense News," Vol. IX, No. 2, March 1953, p. 60.

11 Project East River, Reduction of Urban Vulnerability, Part V, (N.Y.: Associated Universities, Inc., July 1952) p. 15.

12 Ibid., p. 102.

13 Quoted by Val Peterson before Senate Appropriations Committee in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1954, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, p. 130. Hereafter referred to as Senate, Supplemental Appropriations... 1954.

14 House, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1954, p. 219.

15 Ibid., p. 220.

16 Ibid., p. 225.

17 Ibid., p. 226.

18 Ibid., p. 221. Peterson, of course, was referring to the hydrogen bomb and its effects. After assuming his post Peterson had taken a "good and hard look" at the blast and heat effects of the 1 November 1952 hydrogen bomb explosion (MIKE) and decided that the best policy was to be somewhere else when an H-bomb went off. The 10 megaton MIKE explosion "obliterated" an entire island measuring over a mile in diameter, and left behind "a huge crater in the ocean floor." See Ralph E. Lapp, "Civil Defense Faces New Peril," BAS, Vol. X, No. 9, November 1954, p. 349; and, Robert A. Divine, Blowing On the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1978) p. 16.

19 Peterson was referring to Operation Doorstep, part of the Upshot Knothole series of explosions carried out in Yucca Flats, Nevada in March of 1953. Several buildings were tested for exposure resistance during this test. See Kerr, p. 128.

20 House, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1954, pp. 221, 228.

21 Ibid., p. 224. It was explained to the committee that the reasoning behind the 5 million figure derived from the fact that "as far as we can find out from the people in the medical business, there are not now, and will not be in the foreseeable future, enough doctors, hospitals, nurses, medically trained people, to ever take care of more than 5 million casualties." (Ibid., p. 227.)

22 Ibid., pp. 236 and 227.

23 Ibid., pp. 220-221.

24 Ibid., pp. 227-228.

25 Ibid., p. 247.

26 Ibid., pp. 242-243.

27 Ibid., p. 243.

28 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 277.

29 Senate, Supplemental Appropriations...1954, p. 131. The Tupolev 4 had a speed of 300 m.p.h. and a range of 3000 miles. The TU-4 was actually a copy of the WW II vintage U.S. B-29, several of which fell into Soviet hands during the war. With such a low range these planes actually presented very little threat to the U.S. with the possible exception of targets in the Pacific Northwest region. See Philip J. Klass, Secret Sentries In Space, (N.Y.: Random House, 1971) p. 76. See, also, William D. Jackson, "The Soviets and Strategic Arms: Toward An Evaluation of the Record," Political Science Quarterly, No. 2, Summer 1979, p. 245.

30 See Murray S. Levine, "Civil Defense vs. Public Apathy," BAS, Vol. IX, No. 1, February 1953, p. 27. (It must be assumed

that the military was not opposed to exaggerating the nature of the Soviet threat.)

31 Senate, Supplemental Appropriations...1954, p. 131. Clearly Peterson was arguing his own position rather than that of the Administration. His statements on retaliation were contrary to Administration defense policy (which favored the Air Force emphasis on a good offense as the best defense).

32 Ibid., p. 132. A rather far-fetched augument, but it provoked no negative comment from any of the Senators present.

33 Ibid., p. 134.

34 Ibid., pp. 134-135. In relation to disaster work Peterson stated that "the civil-defense program which we bring before you today is not an inert, unproductive, standby facility, which the Nation may never use. Civil defense's performance during the past 6 months in peacetime disasters has already given the taxpayers a high return on their limited investment to date. Civil defense has now proven beyond question its value in peacetime disasters." (Ibid., p. 135.)

35 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 277.

36 Congressional Record, Vol. 97, Part 7, 15 July 1953, p. 8900.

37 BAS, "News and Notes," Vol. IX, No. 7, September 1953, p. 285. Newsweek, in its 19 October 1953 edition (p. 34), reported that this first Soviet H-bomb produced a blast damage area of 160 square miles. Cited in Hornell Hart, "The Remedies Versus the Menace," BAS, Vol. X, No. 6, June 1954, p. 197.

38 Divine, p. 16.

39 Noted in the Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Part 3, 23 March 1954, p. 3692.

40 New York Times, 7 October 1953. Quoted by Bax, p. 103.

41 The 25 October 1953 broadcast was reported in "Civil Defense News," BAS, Vol. IX, No. 10, December 1953, p. 388. Soon afterwards the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) extended the rapid tax write-off privilege to cover the full cost of protective construction undertaken by a defense-supporting plant in any of the, at the time, 193 potential target areas. This privilege had been restricted to 70 "critical target areas" (listed in "FCDA 1953 Annual Report").

Among numerous city responses, the San Antonio Express, for example, reported on 8 February that that foresighted "strategic" city would "plan and build as many traffic outlets--preferably 4-lane or wider super highways--as possible, leading from downtown into the open country." (Quoted in "Civil Defense News," BAS, Vol. X, No. 5, May 1954.)

42 New York Times, 9 October 1953; quoted by Bax, p. 104. What Wilson did not say, however, was that the U.S. had not tested a

deliverable hydrogen bomb either. Moreover, the Soviet H-bomb was technologically more sophisticated than the "device" the U.S. had tested in 1952, leading some to conclude that the Soviets were closer to building a deliverable H-bomb than the U.S. See Divine, pp. 16-17.

43 Noted in Bax, p. 111.

44 Klass, p. 3.

45 Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 6, 15 June 1955, p. 8282.

46 The U.S. and Canada had announced on 19 November 1954 their intention to build this screen from Alaska to Greenland. (CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 281.)

The first radar line consisted of fragmentary links adjacent to military bases in the Aleutians, Alaska, and Greenland with a large gap between Thule and Fairbanks. The second line was known as the Pinetree Radar Chain. Pinetree ranged through settled Canada and was geared to provide a one-hour warning of aircraft approach. (From "Planning An Effective Civilian Defense," BAS, Vol. X, No. 7, September 1954, p. 293.)

47 The 4-hour figure comes from Klass, p. 6. The 6-hour figure is from "Civil Defense News," BAS, Vol. 18, No. 10, December 1953, p. 388.

48 Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Part 8, 14 July 1954, p. 10474.

49 Quoted by Val Peterson before a House Appropriations Subcommittee. Noted in House, Supplemental Appropriations...1955, p. 153.

50 Peterson quote from CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 281.

51 Ellery Husted, "Shelter in the Atomic Age," BAS, Vol. IX, No. 7, September 1953, p. 273.

52 Val Peterson, "Mass Evacuation," BAS, Vol. X, No. 7, September 1954, p. 294.

Conelrad was the designation of the system of radio broadcasting imposed on civilian communications by the Air Force. Upon detection of enemy attack all civilian broadcasting stations would be instructed to cease broadcasting until they could change their transmitting frequency crystals to 640 or 1240 kilocycles and arrange to alternate their transmissions periodically among geographically separated antennas. It was estimated that this would take 15 to 30 minutes. The rationale was to prevent enemy bombers from homing in on a city's radio broadcasting signal. (House, Civil Defense For National Survival Hearings, pp. 380-381.)

53 Peterson, "Mass Evacuation," p. 294.

54 Paul Jones, "The Fashion for Fear," Freeman, Vol. V, August 1955, pp. 597-598; quoted by Kerr, p. 174.

55 Peterson, "Mass Evacuation," p. 294.

56 See "An Interview With Governor Val Peterson," BAS, Vol. X, No. 10, December 1954, p. 375.

57 SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, p. 81.

58 "An Interview With Governmor Val Peterson," p. 376.

59 Peterson, "Mass Evacuation," p. 294. The analysis was performed by civil defense experts as well as disinterested experts from other fields.

60 "Contamination," in this case, was defined as 100 roentgens (R, pronounced rent-gen) or more cumulative dose 24-48 hours after the detonation. Account in SASC Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, p. 70.

A Roentgen is defined as "the amount of gamma (or X) radiation which produces in 0.001293 gram of dry air, i.e., 1 cubic centimeter at 0 degrees C. and 1 atm. pressure, electrically charged particles carrying a total of 1 electrostatic unit of charge of either sign." (AEC. The Effects of Atomic Weapons, p. 234.) A dose of 400-550 roetgens is referred to as the LD 50 (or lethal dose-50), and is the dose of radiation at which 50% fatalities would be expected.

61 Because of the high radioactive content of this bomb, later popular reports of the detonation sometimes referred to this bomb as a U-bomb rather than an H-bomb. It was felt that its construction differed so significantly from the 1952 Eniwetok bomb as to justify a unique nomenclature. See Warren Unna, "Dangers of Fallout Cited--U-bomb Is Said To Render Atom Defense Obsolete," the Washington Post and Times Herald, 13 June 1955; reprinted in the Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 6, 15 June 1955, p. 8285.

62 See, for example, the AEC's The Effects of Atmoic Weapons, 1950; or, Joseph O. Hirshfelder (Chairman of the Board of the editors of The Effects..., "The Effects of Atomic Weapons," BAS, Vol. VI, No. 8-9, 1950. Neither mention the possibility of non-local fallout. See, also, the testimony of Dr. Ralph Lapp, given before a Congressional committee in 1960, on fallout. Referring to the Alamogordo explosion Dr. Lapp told the committee: "There was fallout in that very first shot, but it didn't come down there, it went over 10 miles or so and landed on the backs of cattle. But here we were scientists working quantitatively with this stuff, and we still didn't become aware of this. In fact, fallout didn't become recognized as a hazard until 1954." (U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense, 1960, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, p. 237.

63 Quoted in SASC, Civil Defense Program (Part 1), 1955, p. 70.

64 Account of Bikini explosion can be found in Edward Teller and Allen Brown, The Legacy of Hiroshima, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962) pp. 171-174.

65 See testimony of Dr. John C. Burger, Director of Biology and Medicine, AEC, before a SASC subcommittee in 1955. Upon questioning Burger told the subcommittee that "had the islanders not been evacuated in time the radiation dose would have accumulated to a lethal dose. (U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Civil Defense, Hearings, Civil Defense Program (in 2 parts), 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, pp. 10-11.)

66 Teller, p. 164.

67 In all, 236 natives were evacuated from the islands of Rongerik, Rongelap, Ailinginae, and Utirik to the hospitals at Kwajalein. (Divine, p. 4.)

68 According to a 30 July 1954 AEC report: "The medical observations to date indicate that there is no reason to expect any permanent after effects on the general health of these people." (Quoted by Divine, p. 29.) Divine goes on to note, however, that nearly a year after the AEC's 30 July 1954 medical report on the Marshallese islanders,

> ...a Navy doctor who had treated the victims reported to the American Medical Association that the injuries had in fact been much more serious than the AEC had admitted at the time. Most of the Marshallese had experienced only skin lesions and loss of hair, conditions which cleared up in a few months, but the 64 people on Rongelap, who had been exposed to 175 roentgens developed serious blood disorders. Their white cell counts fell to 50 per cent of normal in some cases, and several of the children nearly died.

More recent medical reports indicate that several of the islanders have had surgery for thyroid abnormalities and that some of the children have had to be treated for thyroid-related growth retardation. See "Fallout and Marshallese," BAS, March 1970, p. 45.

69 SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, p. 173. One might also consult Ralph E. Lapp, "Civil Defense Faces New Peril," BAS, Vol. X, No. 9, November 1954, especially p. 349; and "Radiation Exposures in Recent Weapons Tests," p. 352.

On 4 January 1955 the U.S. "agreed to pay two million dollars as compensation for the loss of Japanese life and property occasioned by the fallout from American nuclear tests." Divine, p. 31.

70 See Mary M. Simpson, "A Long Hard Look At Civil Defense," BAS, Vol. XII, No. 9, November 1956, p. 344.

71 House, Supplemental Appropriations...1955, p. 147.

72 In one of the "Castle" series of hydrogen tests, of which Bikini was one, over 400 million tons of soil, for example, was lifted into the atmosphere. (See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense For National Survival (Part 1 of 7 parts), 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 22.

73 Such is not always the case. In testimony before a House Government Operations subcommittee in March of 1956, for example, Dr. Ralph Lapp, told the committee "we tested a small bomb in Nevada, and the cloud went up and hit the jet stream, and then I think within 1 to 2 days it traveled from Nevada and suddenly there was fallout over the city of Troy, N.Y., and the fallout was quite severe..." It was further noted that film at an Eastman Laboratories plant was ruined because of the radioactivity in the area. (Ibid., p. 777.)

74 See testimony of Val Peterson before SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings (Part 1), p. 67.

75 U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on Security, Hearings, AEC-FCDA Relationship, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 March 1955, p. 9.

76 See Divine, pp. 3-116.

77 House, Supplemental Appropriations...1955, p. 147.

78 House, Hearings on Civil Defense, 1961, p. 397.

79 House Report in Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Part 8, 19 July 1954, p. 10937.

80 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1955, Senate Report 2034, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 31 July 1954, pp. 55-56. For Peterson's Senate testimony given on 10 July, see U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1955, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, pp. 459-489.

81 Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Part 7, 14 July 1954, p. 8810.

82 "H-Bomb Odds: 1 Million To 1--And Thats What May Save Us," Newsweek, 5 April 1954, p. 28.

83 Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Part 5, 6 May 1954, pp. 6179-6180; and Part 6, 1 June 1954, pp. 7474-7475.

84 Ibid., Part 8, 14 July 1954, p. 10472.

85 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense For National Survival, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 96.

86 The most noteworthy of these accounts were those of Dr. Ralph Lapp appearing in BAS, especially, "Civil Defense Faces New Peril," in Vol. XI, No. 2, February 1955. Lapp was a physicist and had been the Assistant Director of the Metallurgical Laboratory for the Manhattan Project, and a scientific adviser to the War Dept. (General Staff).

87 SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955. U.S., Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Staff Report on Civil Defense and

Urban Vulnerability, (The Kestnbaum Report), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1955. (The 25-member Commission was established in 1953, at the request of President Eisenhower, to make the first full-scale study of the complex relations among federal, state, and local governments since the Constitutional Convention of 1787.) National Planning Association, The Tasks of Nonmilitary Defense and the Present Status of Planning, NPA Pamphlet No. 92, May 1955.

88 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Civil Defense, Interim Report on Civil Defense, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 1.

89 Chairman Lewis L. Strauss of the AEC issued a statement on 15 February summarizing the Bikini developments and elaborating somewhat on the fallout problem. See Exhibit 1: "Statement By Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, United States Atomic Energy Commission," in "Apendix," SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, pp. 231-233.

90 SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, p. 52.

91 Ibid., p. 49. AEC Chairman Strauss told another Congressional subcommittee that the report had been intentionally delayed for "nearly 3 months" due to concern that it would adversely effect "certain international situations." It was not reported what these international situations were. (Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 6, 15 June 1955, p. 8283.)

Divine gives a more complete picture of the delay:

> The Eisenhower administration debated the wisdom of a full public disclosure of the fallout peril throughout the fall of 1954 and the early winter of 1955. The AEC, surprisingly, favored a report to the American people. The military at first objected, but after a special interagency task force recommended a policy of disclosure to the National Security Council, the Pentagon acquiesced. The AEC completed its fallout statement by late November only to face opposition from the State Department. Secretary Dulles feared that revelations of the extent of fallout from H-bombs would interfere with his delicate negotiations to persuade NATO countries to accept a rearmed West Germany as a member of the Western alliance. Chairman Strauss agreed to withhold the report pending the completion of the NATO arrangements, but he warned President Eisenhower on December 10, 1954, about leaks to the press of information which was 'being treated in a sensational manner.' Upon Dulles' return from Europe, Strauss concluded, 'we should release the information we have now evaluated and which it is desirable for the public to know....'
>
> When Dulles continued to assert that the report would 'adversely affect certain international situations,' Strauss received strong support from Val Peterson....on January 28, 1955, Peterson informed the Civil Defense Advisory Council...of the details contained in the...AEC report. They joined him in urging the President to override the State Department...The debate within the administration reached its climax in early February. Strauss and Peterson presented their arguments to the /NSC/, and Eisenhower

finally told them to consult with public relations experts on how best to inform the people. Last minute objections from the deputy director of the Bureau of the Budget, who feared that 'one certain consequence will be an increased demand for the banning of atomic weapons,' and from William Robinson, the president of Coca-Cola, Inc., whom Ike considered the 'best public relations man' in the country, led to further delay. Robinson argued that the report would create an adverse reaction abroad. ....Later...however, after the AEC had made a few changes in the report to satisfy Robinson, and Dulles, the President told Strauss to 'go ahead' with publication.

The administration had waited too long. On February 10, both the /BAS/ and the New Republic published a long article by Ralph Lapp describing in detail the fallout pattern from BRAVO.

(Divine, pp. 36-38.)

92 Quoted by Ralph Lapp, "Fallout and Candor," BAS, Vol. XI, No. 5, May 1955, p. 170.

93 Ibid.

94 SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, p. 47.

95 Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 6, 15 June 1955, p. 8284.

96 Lapp's terminology, "Fallout and Candor," p. 170.

97 See, for example, "Statement of Joseph S. Clark, Mayor of Philadelphia," in SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, pp. 385-6.

98 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Civil Defense, Interim Report on Civil Defense, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., July 1955, p. 4. Hereafter referred to as Kefauver Report.

99 The FCDA had been housed in temporary housing that had been civilian owned but was comandeered in 1950 during the Korean War when it was feared that a broader war might break out. As these facilities were temporary and were becoming insufficient, the FCDA began to look elsewhere. FCDA Director Peterson wanted to move to near-by Olney, Md. in that the FCDA already had a training facility there. However, the Office of Defense Mobilization had a standing directive that any new agencies or transferals must locate not closer than 30 miles to Washington in keeping with the dispersal program. Olney was a few miles inside this perimeter. The closest adequate facility was reported to be a vacant Veterans Hospital in Battle Creek (the Percy L. Jones General Hospital) which had been taken over by the Army in World War II. This facility had one million square feet of space of which the FCDA would use about 25%. (See SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, pp. 155-164. See also the Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 4, 13 April 1955, P. 4359; and, Vol. 101, Part 6, 15 June 1955, p. 8287.

The ODM directive had been drawn up not long after President Truman, on 10 August 1951, promulgated the "National Industrial Dispersion

Policy," directing that applications for aid for industrial expansion of defense plants, as well as allocation of critical materials for construction purposes, be reviewed so that new essential defense industry would be dispersed 10 to 20 miles outside potential target areas. (See Project East River, Reduction of Urban Vulnerability, p. 18.)

Since this study deals with civil defense, as distinct from other passive defensive measures such as dispersal, an elaboration into the history and other aspects of dispersal will not be made here. For more information along these lines the reader is advised to consult the Bibliography for a select listing of dispersal-related material.

100 Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 4, 13 April 1955, p. 4359.

101 Kefauver Report, p. 5. Of 467 Washington employees, only 235 made the move. (Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 6, 15 June 1955, p. 8287.

102 Kefauver Report, p. 12.

103 See House, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, pp. 117-125 for quotations in this and following paragraphs dealing with trench and pipe shelters.

104 Kefauver Report, p. 9.

105 Ibid., p. 8.

106 Congressional Record, "Summary of Report of Armed Services Subcommittee on Civil Defense by Senator Kefauver," Vol., 101, Part 5, 19 May 1955, p. 6599.

107 Kefauver Report, p. 9.

108 Kestnbaum Report, p. 2.

109 National Planning Association, The Tasks of Nonmilitary Defense and the Present Status of Planning, 1955.

110 Hubert H. Humphrey, "To Provide For The Common Defense," BAS, Vol. XI, No. 7, September 1955. The Humphrey quotations in the following paragraphs derive from this article. The reader might also consult the Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 6, 15 June 1955, pp. 8276-8280 for coverage of Humphrey speech elaborating on many of these same matters.

111 In the House a similar proposal was introduced by Congressman Ashley on 19 April 1956. See the Congressional Record, Vol. 102, Part 5, 19 April 1956, p. 6667.

112 Klass, p. 7. (The U.S. had about 30 B-52s by this time.)

113 Ibid., p. 8. With a 4500 mile range, the Il-38, however, was not a long range bomber, and thus not a serious threat to most of the United States.

114 Ibid., p. 16.

115 Ibid. (The Eisenhower Administration had already ordered the start of this program back in February 1954 in line with the recommendations of a top-secret report drawn up by the Teapot Committee.)

116 Ibid., p. 17.

117 U.S., Congress, Senate, "Communication From The President of the United States transmitting A Proposed Supplemental Appropriation for the Federal Civil Defense Administration, Fiscal Year 1955, Amounting to $12,000,000," Senate Document No. 14, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 March 1955, p. 2.

118 Represented on the Board were the ten executive departments, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Bureau of the Budget, the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the General Services Administration, and the Veteran's Administration. An FCDA official would chair Board functions. See Executive Order 10611 reproduced in House, Civil Defense For National Survival Hearings, p. 1193.

119 Ibid., Part 4, p. 1343.

120 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1956 (Part 1), 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, pp. 370-445.

121 Even so, Peterson, as had the AEC, chose to minimize the nature of this danger when he remarked "first I should say this radioactive material decays fairly rapidly, and suitable cover is required during the first hours or day after fallout begins." See Ibid., p. 381.

122 Ibid., p. 384.

123 Ibid., p. 399.

124 U.S., House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 791.

125 Ibid., pp. 773-774.

126 Refer, for example, to the discussion of Federal versus State and local responsibility, Ibid., pp. 791-794. After the Thomas criticism of the FCDA and contentions of Federal responsibility in civil defense, Representative Charles W. Vursell (Rep., Ill,) and John Phillips (Rep., Cal.) joined in, adding support to Thomas. Phillips, it should be mentioned, was basically opposed to civil defense expenditures for any contengency other than sabatage. It was his conviction that a nuclear exchange would be mutual suicide. Since no nation would commit suicide there was no reason to spend money for civil defense. (Ibid., p. 794.

127 John Modell, The Politics of Safety: American Civil Defense, (N.Y.: Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1963) p. 17.

128 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 376. See, also, U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 742.

129 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1956, House Report 304, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 March 1955, p. 5.

130 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1956, Senate Report 411, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 June 1955, p. 13.

131 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XI, 1955, p. 208. See, also, CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 287.

132 Summarized in Civil Defense For National Survival Hearings, Part 1, pp. 2-3.

133 Ibid., pp. 2-3, and 97.

134 Quoted in Ibid., p. 718.

135 Representative Chet Holifield, "Administration Has Woefully Failed The American People In Civilian Defense," Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 6, 15 June 1955, pp. 8360-8361.

136 Quoted in House, Civil Defense For National Survival Hearings, Part 1, pp. 2-3.

137 See Ibid., p. 2.

138 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Civil Defense For National Survival, House Report No. 2946, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 1956, p. 6. Hereafter referred to as Holifield Report, 1956.

139 These were Washington, D.C.; Baltimore; Detroit; Syracuse, N.Y.; New York City; Milwaukee; San Francisco; and Los Angeles.

140 House, Civil Defense For National Survival Hearings, p. 1.

141 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

142 Ibid., p. 12.

143 Holifield Report, 1956, p. 12.

144 House, Civil Defense For National Survival Hearings, p. 69.

145 On this subject Chairman Holifield at one point stated:

> ...we do not want the appalling problems which face us to contribute any further to the apathy and indifference and fatalism which are now so extant among the American people that as we go from city to city we find a hearing room without a citizen present in many instances, unless they are witnesses, to hear the discussion and to hear the questions and answers of the committee. (Ibid., p. 1314.)

146 Ibid., p. 205.

147 Each year since 1952 (generally during June) the FCDA would hold a Civil Defense Alert Exercise lasting several days, during which State, local, and Federal participants were graded according to their response to a mock nuclear attack. The Congress had declined participation in any of the Alerts, including the last one in which Eisenhower and much of the Executive Branch participated.

148 Ibid., p. 134. In relation to the Washington civil defense budget it should be noted that Congress was the final arbiter of the capitol's budgets. Just as it was the fate of the FCDA to appear before an unsympathetic House Appropriations Subcommittee, so was it the fate of the District of Columbia Civil Defense Office. During the FY 1955 appropriation hearings, for example, Representative Earl Wilson, the chairman of the appropriations subcommittee before which the District OCD had to appear, made it clear he thought civil defense was "mostly nonsense." (Reported in 28 May 1954 edition of the Washington Post and noted in SASC, Civil Defense Program Hearings, 1955, p. 176.)

149 House, Civil Defense For National Survival, Part 1, p. 112. John E. Fondrell, Director of the District of Columbia Office of Civil Defense, referred to this as the "vicious circle proposition." It was his contention that civil defense would not catch on until the Congress indicated its seriousness with higher appropriations. (Ibid., Part 2, p. 516.)

150 Ibid., pp. 2630-2631. A similar proposal was the subject of House Concurrent Resolution 108, presently under consideration by the Holifield subcommittee. This proposal contained a mandatory proviso that any individual not accepted for military duty via the selective service process would instead be automatically drafted into civil defense service. It was not widely favored however. Among the criticisms of this proposal those of then Governor of Maine, Edmund S. Muskie, were typical: (1) Many military "rejects"might also be unsuitable, or even undesirable, in civil defense; and (2) If the "selectees' were paid, existing volunteers would feel discriminated against, and quickly drop out of the program. (See Ibid., pp. 2872 and 2884.)

151 From letter of Governor Dwinell to Chairman Holifield dated 13 December 1955. Included in Ibid., pp. 2886-2887.

152 Halstead quotes are from his 6 January 1956 letter to the subcommittee. Reprinted in Ibid., p. 2961.

153 From a 9 January 1956 letter to Holifield. Reprinted in Ibid., p. 2997.

154 See, for example, the arguments of Governor E. C. Johnson of Colorado, who, in a 30 December 1955 letter to the subcommittee, stated:

> I want every potential target in the United States prepared to ward off an attack with the latest guided missiles and fighter planes. I do not believe in hiding or running. I believe in fighting! (Reprinted in Ibid., p. 2862.

155 Ibid., Part 3, p. 670. See, for example, the viewpoint expressed to the subcommittee by Mrs. Alexander Stewart of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom on Civil Defense:

> All people of the world have the right to a clear, unambiguous understanding of the suicidal and inescapable devastation that a nuclear war must entail....Every responsible scientist who sees how the winds blow tells us there is no defense. It is for us, too, to recognize finally that civil defense, however conscientiously devised, is a cruel delusion, an expense of spirit in a waste of shame, and a relic of wars already passed into history. (Quoted in Ibid., p. 2847.)

156 Ibid., Part 4, p. 1162.

157 Ibid., p. 1160.

158 Ibid., p. 1162. According to Peterson:

> The shortcomings of civil defense are nowhere more apparent than from the offices of those who are responsible for it. I believe we see the shortcomings in our progress across the Nation with much greater clarity than do our critics. But we also see our problems with much greater clarity. (Ibid.)

159 Ibid., pp. 1400-1401.

160 Ibid., pp. 1378-1379. Others before the subcommittee had also noted this "weakness" in FCDA authority and had proposed that something be done about this situation. Dr. Walter L. Cronin, for example, a civil defense notable from Cambridge, Mass. proposed that the FCDA "deny to any local community all matching funds, grants, loans, or gifts from Federal sources, when said State or local community fails to meet Federal requirements." (See Ibid., pp. 2621-2624.) It was assumed that such punishment would force compliance. Dr. Cronin did not address himself to the problem that would remain should this punishment not foster compliance. In that case, the cutting off of all Federal assistance would bring forth a situation similar to cutting off one's nose to spite one's face.

161 Ibid., Part 4, pp. 1380-1381.

162 Ibid., Part 1, p. 208.

163 Ibid., Part 4, pp. 1327-1328 and 1160. Actually there were three: the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and now the House Committee on Government Operations.

164 Ibid., p. 1208. In line with this, Peterson stated:

> Mr. Chairman, I would just like to mention this filthy thing that we call money...it is going to require more staff, more dollars, and we are asking for these things all the time, but maybe too modestly. Maybe we should be pounding the table a little bit more, but it does take more money, it is going to take more activity all across the line. (Ibid., p. 1309.)

165 Ibid., p. 1309. On this same point, Holifield stated elsewhere that:

> Over the years, if the FCDA had come forward with sensible plans, they might have received different treatment...as of yet the Federal Civil Defense Administration has not presented a plan either to the Congress or to the cities of our Nation which has been practical enough in its application and well implemented enough, from the standpoint of Federal direction, planning, and financing, to impress the cities and States of the Nation that the Federal Government believes this is a real problem. They have been presented with scare features, protestations of different kinds, and yet they have not been presented with firm remedies... (Ibid., p. 1209.)

166 Ibid., p. 1209. James F. Eckhart, the subcommittee Assistant Council, indicated elsewhere the same finding derived from his conversations with Appropriations members. (Ibid., p. 1302.)

167 Ibid., p. 1323. Lipscomb quoted from one of Peterson's statements before the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee considering the FY 1956 FCDA appropriation request in which he indicated: "I have...tried to make requests in keeping with the pattern of amounts the Congress made available, which was about $49 million to $50 million..."

168 For example, on page 1228 of the hearings Holifield states:

> We have your estimate and other estimates from the military that in 5 to 7 years we will have the ICBM, and possibly sooner than that we will have the intermediate missile of 1,000 to 1,500 miles.
>
> We have the testimony of Admiral Burke that it is possible now for a submarine to rise off our coast at a distance of less than 200 miles and launch this type of missile into our port cities. That is an immediate danger now, not in

the future. Yet we sit here not doing the things which could be done to appreciate the possibility of survival.

169 Peterson statement made before House Appropriations Subcommittee holding hearings on FCDA appropriation request for FY 1955. (See Senate, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1955 Hearings, p. 472.)

170 For example, see House, Civil Defense For National Survival Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1344-1345.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid., p. 1212.

173 Ibid., pp. 1212-1213.

174 Ibid., p. 1227.

175 Ibid., pp. 1227-1228. Peterson more than once would describe the effects of nuclear war before the subcommittee in stark, if not Hobbesian, terms:

> I think the best we will be able to do in the United States is to run soup kitchens. We won't eat canned foods, we won't eat refrigerated foods. We will eat gruel made of wheat cooked as it comes out of the fields and corn parched and animals slaughtered as we catch them before radioactivity destroys them....if this kind of war occurs life is going to be stark, elemental, brutal, filthy, and miserable. (Ibid., pp. 1313-1314.)

176 Ibid., p. 1340. In this regard Peterson exclusively referred to shelters in the context of blast protection. It was Holifield who stressed the need for shelter against the fallout hazard also.

177 Ibid., p. 1341.

178 Ibid., pp. 1178-1179. Elsewhere, Peterson further elaborated on this line of thought by implying that Holifield's concern with submarine launched missiles was exaggerated, given that "the American Navy was making some progress in this field." Holifield responded that Navy officials had briefed the subcommittee and had indicated that their "defensive measures at this time are not any more adequate...than our air defense measures..." (Ibid., p. 1349.)

179 Ibid., p. 1351.

180 See Holifield Report, 1956, pp. 1-5 for complete summary of the report.

181 Ibid., p. 18.

182 For example, see James W. Deer, "The Unavoidable International Shelter Race," BAS, Vol. XIII, No. 2, February 1957; and Paul G. Steinbicker, "Shelter or Evacuation?," BAS, Vol. XIII, No. 5, May 1957.

183 Quoted by Val Peterson in opening statement before House Appropriations subcommittee holding hearings on the FCDA FY 1958 appropriation request. See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1958 (Part I), 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 545.

184 From testimony of Dr. Authur S. Flemming, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, given 10 April 1956 before Holifield subcommittee on the future planned exercise. (House, Civil Defense For National Survival, Part 4, pp. 1044-1045.)

185 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower--1956, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958) p. 749.

186 From testimony of Gerald Gallagher, Assistant Administrator, Research and Development, FCDA, before the Holifield Military Operations Subcommittee, holding hearings on the technical feasibility of a national shelter program. (U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1958 (Parts 1 and 2), 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 153.)

187 Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense--Strategic Programs In National Politics, (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 360.

188 An overpressure of 3 to 5 p.s.i. will destroy a typical frame house. A blast shelter of 30 p.s.i., then, would offer a significant degree of protection. In terms of a 20-megaton burst it would provide protection up to 3 miles from the point of burst. For the much more common kiloton and 1 to 5-megaton range weapons, protection would of course extend even closer to the point of burst. The FCDA stated that attempts to provide more significant blast protection than this was simply not cost effective.

189 House, Civil Defense Hearings--1958, pp. 98, 153, and 183.

190 Ulam, pp. 239-241.

191 Walter La Feber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966, (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967) p. 187.

192 From statement of Dr. Charles Wesley Lowry speaking before the HASC in favor of CD legislation. (U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings, Civil Defense--Fallout Shelter Program (in 2 volumes), 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, Part 2, Vol. 1, p. 3634.)

193 For accounts of this incident see LaFeber, p. 193; Ulam, p. 254; and, Isaac Deutscher, Russia, China, and the West, 1953-1966, (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1970) p. 83.

194 See LaFeber, p. 193; Bliss, p. 269; and, Seyom Brown, New Forces In World Politics, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1974) pp. 47-48.

195 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1957, House Report 1847, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 March 1956, pp. 4-5. For information on the House hearings see: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1957, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, pp. 154-229.

196 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1957, Senate Report 2041, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 24 May 1956, pp 2-3. For information on Senate hearings see: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1957, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, pp. 59-87.

197 Congressional Record, Vol. 102, Part 8, 20 June 1956, p. 10680.

CHAPTER THREE

THE EISENHOWER YEARS--SECOND TERM

The problems facing civil defense grew significantly during the first four years of the Eisenhower Administration. This led in 1956 to a major reexamination of civil defense in the United States. As a result of criticism leveled against the Federal Civil Defense Administration during this period, and to improvements in nuclear weapons systems and a better understanding of the effects of nuclear detonations, the FCDA proposed a change of policy incorporating the development of a shelter policy. The $32 billion estimated price tag associated with this program made this a most serious proposal. President Eisenhower would have to make a decision on this proposal in the course of his second term. This, and other civil defense related problems, ensured that the examination of civil defense begun during Eisenhower's first term, would continue during the second term as well. Determined to see the examination continue was Representative Chet Holifield of California --the driving force behind the 1956 House hearings on Civil Defense For National Survival.

The 1957 Holifield Hearings

Congressman Holifield was not content to rest on his laurels after orchestrating the 1956 hearings. Following up his subcommittee's report to the Congress, Holifield drafted new legislation seeking to reorganize the FCDA. When the 85th Congress convened in January, this bill was submitted, as were fourteen other similar (or identical) bills calling

for civil defense reorganization.[1] H.R. 2125 proposed the reconstitution of the FCDA as "an executive department of the Government, to be known as the Department of Civil Defense...at the head of which shall be a Secretary of Civil Defense."[2] The bill mandated that civil defense would henceforth become primarily the responsibility of the Federal Government, rather than that of the State and local political subdivisions. The bill further mandated that "the Secretary shall, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense and with the appropriate State and local officials, prepare and execute a national plan of civil defense for the United States," and, as part of this plan, "Construct group shelters in each target area..."[3]

Hearings on the bill were held in open session during February and March, and interested Federal agencies, private organizations, and State and local civil defense officials testified. On the first day of these hearings, Chairman Holifield stated that "the public response to the subcommittee's endeavor has been encouraging." Holifield further noted that "there is more positive public interest in civil defense than some persons in places of responsibility are inclined to see."[4] The subcommittee intended to stimulate this interest to the point where it could no longer be ignored.

Throughout the hearings that followed it was very clear that while the subcommittee thought that the establishment of a Cabinet level Department was very important, the most important consideration was the establishment of a nationwide shelter program. Thus the first witnesses to appear before the subcommittee were representatives of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory located near San Francisco, California. The NRDL had been established ten years earlier in 1946 "as a result of

the first atomic weapons tests at Bikini," which resulted in the deliberate contamination of a number of Navy ships. The mission of the NRDL originally was to decontaminate these ships specifically, and to use the knowledge gained to set up procedures for the protection and decontamination of naval ships and facilities under atomic attack conditions. Since then the NRDL had broadened the scope of its investigations into a number of civil defense related fields, such as the requirements of facilities which would offer both blast and radiation protection. According to Captain Richard Mandelkorn, the Commanding Officer of the NRDL:

> Based on our 10 years of experience in studying the problem we are convinced that an effective defense against the effects of nuclear attack is entirely feasible. We further believe that a maximum effort to create such a defense in this country is essential if a satisfactory national defense posture is to be achieved.[5]

Captain Mandelkorn then presented the outline of a three stage "national civil defense countermeasure system."[6] The three phases--the emergency, operational recovery, and final recovery phases--were summarized by Captain Mandelkorn in this manner:

> The emergency phase has as its purpose the survival of personnel and critical facilities. To achieve this purpose...protective shelter is the most important single countermeasure. Other measures, such as dispersal, fire fighting, rescue and medical aid, will be useful but shelter remains the central countermeasure... Once shelters are in hand, an effective recovery phase is feasible. The operational recovery phase is devoted to the recovery and operation of essential functions. The central countermeasure in this phase is reclamation. This includes decontamination where fallout occurs and repairs to vital facilities that have been damaged. About 1 or 2 years after an attack, the hazards of gamma radiation from fallout will become insignificant. The final recovery phase begins at this time. The objective of this phase is to recover the normal functions of the economy and life of the country. The main problems in this phase are the long-term hazards of radioactive materials in fallout, such as strontium 90. Ecological and other research is needed to develop satisfactory ways of raising crops and livestock so that our food supply is safe. A major public-health program will probably be required to

> control the contaminated environment that will probably exist for many years after a massive thermonuclear attack...Our research indicates that all of the above problems can be solved with a reasonable and concerted effort.[7]

In the first phase of the program, three types of shelters could be constructed nationwide which would, it was estimated, provide approximately eighty percent protection for the people of the United States. Mandelkorn noted that the sum total of this program would be "something less than the annual expenditure of the Department of Defense and certainly of the order of magnitude of the Federal roadbuilding program."[8] As outlined by Captain Mandelkorn and by W. E. Strope, Head of the Military Evaluation Group of the NRDL, fallout shelter protection could be provided for the approximately 100 million people living in nontarget areas for $30 a person, or approximately $3 billion. An additional 35 million people living in urban areas near potential target sites could be provided with shelters incorporating 25 psi blast protection and protection against fire hazards for $60 per person, for a total of $2.1 billion. Finally, for the 35 million people residing within potential zones of severe destruction, underground hardened shelters could be constructed at prices ranging up to $300 per person, for a total of an additional $10.5 billion. The total for the entire shelter construction program would be roughly $16 billion. Outfitting these shelters would run an additional $1 to $4 billion for a grand total of approximately $20 billion.[9] (It was thought that $20 billion would be a top figure in that these estimates did not take into account existing shelter which could be found in many of the sturdier-built structures throughout the country. The requirements for shelter construction would, or course, be lessened commensurate with whatever existing shelter protection could be found.)

A somewhat similar program was proposed by Dr. Edward Teller, then at the Radiation Laboratory of the University of California. Dr. Teller proposed a blast and fallout shelter program for the major part of the population, providing one atmosphere (about 14 psi) overpressure of protection and estimated that the entire program-cost for construction would run about $7.25 billion.[10] This proposal, however, was not as comprehensive in its coverage as the NRDL program and was the result of rougher estimations.

Among the Federal Government witnesses who followed these presentations, the Bureau of the Budget was the only agency which recommended against passage of H.R. 2125. Other agencies were either supportive or noncommittal. As the representative of the President before the subcommittee, though, the Budget Bureau's testimony was very significant. Robert E. Merriam, the Assistant Director of BOB, indicated that three provisions of the bill, in particular, caused Executive concern--the scope of Federal responsibility, the creation of an executive Department, and the shelter proposal. Merriam told the subcommittee that in relation to the "organizational status" of civil defense within the Government a recent administration review had been made asking the question: "Would departmental stature for the Federal Civil Defense Administration significantly improve its capacity to carry out the mission assigned to it?" It was concluded that "This step is not necessary at this time;" that "the problems and inadequacies of civil defense appear to stem largely from...factors such as dramatic development of weapons capability...rather than from organizational difficulties."[11] Merriam further indicated that the Executive thought H.R. 2125 went too far in mandating that civil defense become primarily a Federal responsibility. It was

admitted that the basic law mandating primary State and local responsibility was out of date and in need of revision. Therefore, the Executive would propose ammending the legislation to mandate that civil defense responsibility become a "joint" Federal and State/local one.[12]

On the shelter program proposal Merriam noted that this subject was "now under active consideration at the highest levels within the executive branch...," therefore, the Administration would make its views on this subject known at a later date after completion of the review. For these reasons, he continued, "I am authorized to advise you that the Bureau of the Budget recommends against enactment of H.R. 2125."[13]

FCDA Administrator Val Peterson testified that he was "largely" in agreement with the bill. He, too, thought that civil defense responsibility should be a joint Federal and State/local effort rather than primarily Federal, though. He was concerned that State/local participation would drop if the Federal Government was given the primary role.[14] He also thought that the executive Department proposal might be unneeded in that since the previous summer he had been invited to all Cabinet meetings and those National Security Council meetings which had some relation to civil defense, as if he were the head of a Department. Holifield responded that the subcommittee was aware of "the extraordinary courtesy which is being given you at this time...but this arrangement is an informal arrangement by invitation of the President, and it is conceivable that in the case of a different President or a different Administrator the same courtesy might not be extended."[15]

Of final note, both in these hearings and in the preceeding 1956 hearings, the impression had taken hold in the subcommittee that the military was not as serious about civil defense as it could be or as it

said it was. Indeed, military views toward civil defense appear to have changed but little since the days of the Bull Board, as can be seen in the testimony of Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil-Military Affairs) George H. Roderick, who told the subcommittee that "the Department of Defense strongly endorses the need for an effective civil defense program in the United States." Nevertheless, he continued, "the Department of Defense does not agree" with proposals to place civil defense within the Department.[16]

General Nathan Twining, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, summed up the military view of its civil defense responsibility during the 1956 Holifield hearings this way:

> The military services have been guided by the basic philosophy that responsibility for maintaining internal security and relieving the effects of enemy action rests primarily on the civilian agencies. The military services will, however, provide such emergency support as is practicable in the event that civilian agencies are unable to cope with disaster conditions and to an extent consistent with the execution of the primary missions of the services...[17]

In fact, the testimony of military and civilian Defense Department officials had been so overwhelmingly opposed to any suggestion that the Department take on any statutory responsibility for civil defense that the subcommittee quickly shelved the proposals it was considering with this in mind. On this subject, Val Peterson once remarked:

> The military.../has/ somewhat the feeling toward civil defense that I assume the New York Yankees have toward a neighborhood softball team.[18]

Holifield, in a similar vein, at one point remarked:

> We feel that unless the military department gets behind the principle that civil defense is an integral part of the national defense they are jeopardizing their ability to carry out their own missions...This committee would welcome some real thinking on this matter...[19]

Many of the reasons explaining the reluctance of the military to

become involved in civil defense were covered in Chapter One. These considerations were just as relevant at this time as they had been then. In addition, one expert in civil defense has noted that in this 1956-1957 period another consideration relating to the Army had a bearing on the reluctance of that branch of the services to "become embroiled" in civil defense. In Nonmilitary Defense For the U.S.--Strategic, Operational, Legal and Constitutional Aspects (1961) by William K. Chipman, it is noted that the concern in the Army at this time was that "this process, once begun, could lead to the Army's being relegated to the role of home defense."[20] Mr. Chipman cites, for example, General Maxwell Taylor's book, The Uncertain Trumpet, in which General Taylor notes that in 1956, "the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs proposed that pursuant to the New Look doctrine of massive retaliation, the Army overseas be reduced to small atomic task forces, and in the United States 'greatly reduced and limited primarily to civil defense missions...'"[21] Understandably, such a proposal would be cause for great alarm in the Army, though the probability of its acceptance was very low. The real concern in the Army was that civil defense responsibilities would require a diversion of funds from other defense programs. It was not felt that the overall defense budget would increase due to the transferal of civil defense responsibilities to the Defense Department. Thus, only lukewarm military support for civil defense.

Some have argued that the lukewarm attitude of military experts towards civil defense was probably the most important reason that H.R. 2125 never got off the ground.[22] While indirectly this may be a significant factor, the direct cause was that the Eisenhower Administration was able to short-circuit this Holifield project by submitting its own

amendments to the basic legislation before the Holifield review had reached its conclusion. In that these amendments (the most important of which called for a new era of "joint" Federal and State/local responsibility) were not as far-reaching as Holifield's bill and were Presidentially supported, they received a wider range of Congressional support. Subsequently, they were passed by the House as H.R. 7576 on 15 July 1957.[23]

In that the Administration bill had been pushed to a vote just seven days before the publication of the subcommittee's report on these recent hearings, some subcommittee members were somewhat distressed by the fact that they had been unable to acquaint the House with their published findings before the vote. Some indication of this can be gleaned from the following quotation taken from the subcommittee's report:

> The subcommittee believes that the amendments proposed by the FCDA /on behalf of the Administration/ are a vain attempt to patch up an outmoded and unrealistic law. It is the considered judgement of the subcommittee that only a completely new approach, as embodied in H.R. 2125, can provide the basic civil-defense policy and program required in this age of possible thermonuclear war.[24]

The FY 1958 Appropriation

The Holifield subcommittee was not the only Congressional committee to utter critical comments of the FCDA in early 1957. While these hearings were taking place the Appropriations Committees were holding their own hearings on the FCDA's FY 1958 appropriation request. Submitted to the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee on February 6th, the FCDA appropriation request for FY 1958 totaled $130 million--$6.8 million more than the previous request and $36.44 million more than had been appropriated then.[25] (See Table III-1.) In the rather short and brusque hearings that followed before the Thomas

TABLE III-1

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1958 FCDA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Appropriations	1956 actual	1957 estimate	1958 estimate
Operations:			
1. Civil defense planning	$280,411	$479,000	$824,000
(a) Research	372,289		
2. Civil defense education services	2,677,820	2,916,415	8,000,000
3. Operations control services	2,422,044	2,753,395	4,679,000
4. Technical advisory services	796,833	1,035,385	1,738,000
5. Field representation	1,780,104	2,850,805	4,745,000
6. Executive direction	414,935	440,000	642,000
7. General administration	1,910,753	2,085,000	4,372,000
Total	10,654,998	12,560,000	25,000,000
Adjustments:			
Comparative transfers to other accounts	1,682,151	3,000,000	
Unobligated balance no longer available	149,851		
Appropriation (adjusted)	12,487,000	15,560,000	25,000,000
Federal contributions	12,193,902	20,993,083	20,000,000
Adjustments:			
Unobligated balance brought forward	−9,177,048	−8,993,083	−5,000,000
Unobligated balance carried forward	8,993,083	5,000,000	2,000,000
Unobligated balance no longer available	390,063		
Appropriation (adjusted)	12,400,000	17,000,000	17,000,000
Emergency supplies and equipment:			
1. Medical supplies and equipment:			
(a) Emergency hospitals	3,704,890	19,125,000	42,250,000
(b) Medical and surgical	14,577,920	13,125,000	8,750,000
(c) Blood and shock therapy	4,861,893	8,170,700	9,700,000
(d) Other	3,734,746	1,360,300	1,300,000
Total medical supplies and equipment	26,969,449	41,790,000	62,000,000
2. Radiological and chemical warfare defense equipment	4,804,677	4,910,000	8,000,000
3. Warehousing and maintenance of stockpile	2,053,629	3,300,000	5,000,000
Total	33,827,755	50,000,000	75,000,000
Adjustments:			
Comparative transfers to other accounts	−1,682,151	−3,000,000	
Unobligated balance no longer available	102,396		
Appropriation (adjusted)	32,248,000	47,000,000	75,000,000
Surveys, plans, and research:			
1. Survey plans	1,454,328	6,208,672	6,095,000
2. Research	1,517,092	4,724,908	6,700,000
Total	2,971,420	10,933,580	12,795,000
Adjustments:			
Unobligated balance brought forward		−7,028,580	−6,095,000
Unobligated balance carried forward	7,028,580	6,095,000	
Appropriation (adjusted)	10,000,000	10,000,000	6,700,000
Civil defense functions of Federal agencies:			
Total	1,478,115	4,000,000	6,300,000
Adjustments: Unobligated balance no longer available	61,885		
Appropriation (adjusted)	1,540,000	4,000,000	6,300,000
Total all appropriations	68,675,000	93,560,000	130,000,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1958, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 559.

Subcommittee, any FCDA hopes for a generous appropriation approval this year must have been dampened--and with reason, for when the House committee reported out its civil defense appropriation recommendation on March 15th, the $130 million request had been cut to $39.3 million, a $90.7 million cut.[26]

In explaining their cuts on the floor of the House, subcommittee members noted warehousing problems, planning problems, and policy problems within the FCDA. One member, Sidney Yates (Dem., Ill.), noted that Holifield was pushing for shelters while Peterson was sticking to evacuation. This led him to believe that "there is still no definite program. We thought there ought to be more unanimity of opinion before we approved the vast sums requested."[27] This statement was not quite accurate however. The House subcommittee was aware that Peterson had forwarded a shelter proposal to Eisenhower, just as they were aware of his request for shelter study funds in the appropriation request under consideration. Moreover, at one point, Peterson had made the following statement before the Appropriations subcommittee, which proved false the perception noted above:

> The enlarging effects of modern weapons, including the widespread effects of fallout and the imminence of the intercontinental ballistic missile, make it important that shelter assume an increasingly significant role as a means for survival. The preliminary planning for a national shelter program is already under way, but it is to be intensified during fiscal year 1958.[28]

It would appear from the above statement that the explanation given by Congressman Yates on the Appropriations Committee action was more excuse than explanation. This perception is supported by the fact that the House Appropriations Committee, in its report on the civil defense appropriation recommendation to the Congress, quoted the following statement

by President Eisenhower on the likelihood of nuclear war:

> The likelihood of any Nation possessing these great weapons of massive destruction (using them in an attack) grows less, I think, every year....I believe as their understanding of them grows, then the less chance that they would go on an adventure that brought these things into play, because as I see it, any such operation today is just another way of committing suicide.[29]

Referring to this, Representative Edmondson from Oklahoma stated on the House Floor:

> If this action is an expression of the dissatisfaction of the Committee on Appropriations with the present program of civil defense...that is one thing. But if it represents a congressional finding that civil defense today is of diminishing importance and concern to our people, that the program of civil defense is not as important as it was last year or the year before, then I say to you with all seriousness that this is probably the most critical decision which we may make this year.[30]

Edmondson posited that the latter was more likely the case.

This attitude could not be ascribed to Chet Holifield, who, nonetheless, supported the House cuts. During the Floor debate on the FCDA budget Holifield professed:

> I regret that I cannot in good conscience fight to restore the cut in the FCDA budget...To continue wasting millions on ineffective, confusing programs geared to a World War II concept of protection from conventional weapons is to delude ourselves into oblivion.[31]

Contrary to usual procedure, the Senate this year did not recommend more than the House.[32] The House action stood and the $39.3 million became the FCDA appropriation as enacted in H.R. 6070 on June 29th. (See Table III-2.)

FCDA Administrator Val Peterson had clearly lost his effectiveness and thus resigned shortly after this appropriation.[33] His job had been an unenviable one from the start. He came into office trying to win support in the Congress by praising their past shelter program appropriation cuts. But, not only did he not win much Congressional favor, he

TABLE III-2

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1958 FCDA APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1957[a] Grant	Submitted[b] to BOB	Approved[a] by BOB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1958 Grant
Operations	$15,560	----	$25,000	$17,000	$17,000	$17,000
Contributions	17,000	----	17,000	17,000	17,000	17,000
Supplies & Equipment	47,000	----	75,000	3,300	3,300	3,300
Surveys, Plans, and Research	10,000	----	6,700	2,000	2,000	2,000
Delegations	4,000	----	6,300	-0-	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	$93,560	$144,786	$130,000	$39,300	$39,300	$39,300

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1958, Senate Report 414, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 June 1957, p. 10.

[b]"OCDM Appropriation History (1951 Through 1961)," Appendix 9A), in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Governemnt Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 397.

also could not have picked a worse way to start out on the wrong foot with Congressman Holifield. His relationship with Holifield never really improved despite an apparent shift in Peterson's views on sheltering. With Holifield, one was either for a Federal fallout protection system or against a fallout protection system. There was no room for half-measures, and under Eisenhower Peterson had little choice but to propose half-measures. Peterson, it seems, was too much of a team player and Eisenhower admirer to fight with his boss for FCDA programs.

A New FCDA Administrator--A New Era?

Peterson was quickly replaced by ex-Governor Leo Hoegh of Iowa who was confirmed July 1st. Hoegh, it should be mentioned, was a one-term Governor, having been defeated in his reelection bid, and was the third consecutive ex-Governor chosen to direct the Nation's civil defense.[34] He would have his work cut out for him, for military developments in 1957 would complicate civil defense planning for the future sooner than had been anticipated.

On 26 August 1957 the Soviet Union fired the world's first successful ICBM.[35] The U.S. first attempt had been two months earlier but had been a failure, as would be the second attempt in September. It would not be until December--almost four months after the Soviet success --that the U.S. would fire its first successful ICBM. Even then, the Atlas missile being tested flew only 500 miles--far from an intercontinental range.[36] The August Soviet first was followed on 4 October 1957 by another world's first--the first successful launching of an earth-orbiting satellite, the 184 pound Sputnik-1.[37] The U.S. had been working on the development of a satellite since March 1955. Two months after the Soviet Sputnik the U.S. attempted its first launch, but it was

a failure. The first successful launch would come on 31 January 1958 with the launch of Explorer I, to be followed in March with the launching of the first Vanguard satellite. It should be noted, however, that these satellites were quite small. Vanguard, for example, weighed in at three pounds. By this time the Soviets had already launched their second Sputnik, this one weighing 1,120 pounds.[38]

Three days after Sputnik the Soviets issued a statement indicating they had just tested a new and "mighty" hydrogen bomb and that it had been exploded at a great altitude.[39] Was this an air drop, or could it have been a missile launch? The Soviets never indicated, as concern continued to increase in the United States over the apparent Soviet technological superiority in this area. This concern turned into a "frantic" questioning of the U.S. technological effort following the second Soviet Sputnik in November carrying a dog on board: "For the first time in history," declared Newsweek, "the Western world finds itself mortally in danger from the East."[40] Rumors of a "missile gap" were beginning to spread.[41] The Soviets were the first to launch successful ICBMs, satellites, and IRBMs. In fact, by the time the U.S. launched its first successful IRBM (a Jupiter in May of 1957), the Soviets had been launching theirs at a rate of several a month since the preceeding fall.[42]

For civil defense this meant that warning time would once again be reduced to zero, or to a matter of minutes at the most. These Soviet developments contributed to the creation by the FCDA, in November, of an office to administer and promote a continuity of government program which would include the development of emergency operating sites in an arc around Washington and plans for constructing underground control

centers for the eight FCDA regional offices.[43] These developments also facilitated a reorientation of civil defense under the new Director of the FCDA. Before considering this redirection, however, it is necessary to look at one other development which, as 1957 drew to a close, would also have a significant impact upon civil defense.

The Gaither Report

One of the arguments used by Eisenhower's spokesmen before Congressional Committees in February and March in supporting the Administration's civil defense amendments (as opposed to the Holifield Bill) was that the shelter program concept was under "close scrutiny." A Presidential decision had been promised in due time. In line with this obligation Eisenhower, in April, appointed a committee, known as the "Security Resources Panel" of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, to study the nation's "passive" defense system and to make a determination on the feasibility and need of a shelter protection system as proposed by the FCDA.[44] Under the chairmanship of H. Rowan Gaither (Chairman of the Board, Ford Foundation), the panel soon widened the scope of its investigation to include national security policy in general.[45] Beginning its work in May, the Gaither Committee studied U.S. strategic policy throughout the summer and into the fall of 1957. The committee forwarded their report to a meeting of the National Security Council on 7 November. The findings and conclusions presented at that NSC meeting were quite dramatic:

> We have found no evidence in Russian foreign and military policy since 1945 to refute the conclusion that USSR intentions are expansionist, and that her great efforts to build military power go beyond any concepts of Soviet defense... The evidence clearly indicates an increasing threat which may become critical in 1959 or early 1960.[46]

Specifically, the committee noted with concern: (1) that even though the Gross National Product (GNP) of the USSR was only somewhat more than one-third as large as that of the U.S., it was "increasing half again as fast." (2) That the USSR was currently spending on its military and heavy industry an amount "roughly equal" to that of the U.S. and increasing annually: "If the USSR continues to expand its military expenditures throughout the next decade, as it has during the 1950s, and ours remains constant, its annual military expenditures may double ours..." (3) "They have developed a spectrum of A- and H-bombs and produced fissionable material sufficient for at least 1500 nuclear weapons." These could be carried to target by "1500 B-29 type bombers," and 3000 short-range jet bombers. (4) In the missile field "they have weapons of 700 n.m. range, in production for at least a year; successfully tested a number of 950 n.m. missiles; and probably surpassed us in ICBM development." (5) In terms of air and sea defense "they have developed air-to-surface and probably submarine-launched cruise missiles; built 250 to 300 new long-range submarines and partially modernized 200 others. They have created an air defense system composed of 1500 all-weather and 8500 day jet fighters; equipped at least 60 sites, each with 60 launchers, for a total of over 3600 launching pads for surface-to-air missiles provided with a sophisticated and original guidance system and a ground environment of 4000 radars."[47]

After providing an analysis of the low state of active and passive U.S. defenses, the committee made a series of recommendations calling for improvements in the SAC force; a speedup of work on IRBMs, ICBMs, and the Polaris IRBM system; the hardening of ICBM sites; the improvement of tactical warning systems; the provision of an ABM system; and an

increase in our conventional force size and capability. The Gaither Committee accorded the highest priority to these military measures but also noted that these would be "insufficient" unless they were--

> coupled with measures to reduce the extreme vulnerability of our people and our cities. As long as the U.S. population is wide open to Soviet attack, both the Russians and our allies may believe that we shall feel increasing reluctance to employ SAC in any circumstance other than when the United States is directly attacked.[48]

The committee therefore proposed programs for both active and passive defense. In terms of passive defense, the committee recommended:

> A nationwide fallout shelter program to protect the civil population. This seems the only feasible protection for millions of people who will be increasingly exposed to the hazards of radiation. The Panel has been unable to identify any other type of defense likely to save more lives for the same money in the event of a nuclear attack.[49]

Blast shelters were not recommended at this time, though research into this area was advocated. The committee felt that blast shelters suffered from two problems: (1) It appeared that active defenses might save more lives for the money, and (2) adequate warning time might not exist to enable effective utilization of blast shelters. Fallout shelters did not suffer from this constraint in that "those who survive the effects of the blast will have adequate time (one to five hours) to get into fallout shelters.[50]

These conclusions were reached after studying several fallout and blast shelter proposals geared to protect a 1966 population of 200 million. (See Chart III-1.) It was estimated that the fallout shelter program which was recommended would cost "about $25 billion and would save nearly half the casualties" should nuclear war break out. "Such a program would be equally, or more, effective in saving lives (perhaps fifty million) under an attack directed entirely at military targets."

CHART III-1

THE GAITHER REPORT ON



SOURCE: Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (The Gaither Report), 1957. Reprinted by U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., April 1976.

This cost estimate included the "provision of over $10 billions' worth of equipment and the supplies to maintain the sheltered population for approximately two to three weeks."[51] The estimate did not take into account existing fallout protection which when found would decrease the total program needs and cost over its proposed five year implementation span. In conclusion, the Gaither Report argued that not only was a fallout shelter program the most effective way of saving lives in the event of attack, but also:

> Of itself, a shelter program would, in the Panel's opinion, forcibly augment our deterrent power in two ways: first, by discouraging the enemy from attempting an attack on what might otherwise seem to him a temptingly unprepared target; second, by reinforcing his belief in our readiness to use, if necessary, our strategic retaliatory power.
>
> Further, a shelter program might symbolize to the nation the urgency of the threat, and would demonstrate to the world our appraisal of the situation and our willingness to cope with it in strength. It would symbolize our will to survive, and our understanding of our responsibilities in a nuclear age.[52]

It should be noted, before turning to the reception accorded these recommendations, that at the same time the Gaither study was being conducted, Chet Holifield was holding yet another series of hearings. Pursuant to his responsibilities as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Holifield, during the spring and summer, chaired a series of hearings under the auspices of the Special Subcommittee on Radiation, on The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man.[53] After hearing testimony from many experts in the atomic energy field and compiling over 2000 pages of transcripts, the Special Subcommittee noted in its report that:

> Multiweapon attacks (say 200 to 300 bombs of megaton size, 2500 to 3000 megatons total yield), can blanket half or more of the continental United States with lethal (death producing) or near-lethal radiation levels from local fallout alone.[54]

The subcommittee concluded that this danger was such that "for an attack of the sort mentioned here, countermeasures based on shelters, for early survival, plus reclamation measures, are necessary to cope with the situation."[55]

It was rather a strong case for fallout shelters, therefore, that was presented to the NSC during its November 7 meeting on the Gaither Report. In its entirety, however, the Report and its recommendations were not well received by Eisenhower and the NSC. Eisenhower later wrote in his memoir, Waging Peace, that the Gaither Report did contain "certain useful distillations of data and some interesting suggestions," but he, nevertheless, did not agree with many of its recommendations, including the proposed fallout shelter program. This was despite the efforts of the new FCDA Director, Leo Hoegh, who argued that the $22.5 billion recommended by Gaither for fallout shelter protection would be "a good investment--one which might save fifty million American lives." According to Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles "emphatically" disagreed with Hoegh, however, and argued...

> ...that if the United States should embark on a massive shelter program to protect itself, despite the fact that our allies could not afford such protection, we could "just write off our friends in Europe." Furthermore, he said, the United States should not overdevote resources to defense, only to lose the world economic competition.[56]

On Eisenhower's part, it appears from the literature devoted to the meeting that he had three basic objections to the Gaither recommendations: (1) "...he expressed a nagging fear that the American people would not be willing to pay the bill;" (2) he "was anxious to maintain his image as a man of peace;" and, (3) he "had no wish to approve a major expansion in the American military forces."[57]

It is reported that when Eisenhower and the NSC failed to respond

favorably to the Gaither Report, members of the Security Resources Panel sought to lobby for their report with the State, Defense, and Treasury Departments and with the Bureau of the Budget--but with little success.[58] According to Samuel Huntington, the Budget Bureau and the Treasury opposed fallout shelters for economic reasons. The Defense Department thought it might encourage a "Maginot line mentality," or might result in lower appropriations for their programs. And the State Department was opposed because (in Huntington's words) "of the psychological impact it would have on our allies and encouragement it might give to neutralist tendencies."[59] Secretary of State Dulles was also apprehensive that a shelter program would call for the use of funds that could otherwise be used to buildup the foreign aid program.[60]

Having failed in their efforts to gather support in key government agencies, some members of the Gaither Panel resorted to leaking the Report's essential contents to selected Congressmen and the press in the hope that Congressional and public pressure would force an Administration reevaluation. Despite attempts by Senator L. B. Johnson and other leading Democrats (as well as a few Republicans) to have Eisenhower relinquish the Gaither Report, it remained classified and Eisenhower's position remained the same.[61]

Thus, President Eisenhower was able to veto the Holifield, FCDA, and Gaither shelter proposals. As noted, he did so far a variety of reasons. The proposals flew in the face of his economic and foreign policies. He was trying to create an atmosphere of peace by easing Cold War tensions. A significant (or massive) stepup in defense (or civil defense) expenditures might jeopardize this budding environment. These views were buttressed by close advisers, such as John Foster Dulles, who

came out in opposition to a shelter program for a variety of reasons. Moreover, Eisenhower must have been aware of the problems a multi-billion dollar shelter program would have faced with the current Congress. Finally, the perception embodied in the Eisenhower statement made earlier in the year on the likelihood of nuclear war, might also shed some light on his decision.[62] Spending billions for civil defense against nuclear weapons whose use was considered so improbable, was evidently out of the question. Not even the Soviet ICBM and Sputnik developments were serious enough to sway the Administration towards approval of a multi-billion civil defense fallout shelter program.[63] Regardless of the weight of the factors involved in Eisenhower's decision, the decision itself was clearly a major setback for the FCDA.

The FY 1959 Appropriation

As 1958 began, the FCDA, under Leo Hoegh, began seeking to reorient the direction of the Federal civil defense program. Appearing before the Thomas Appropriations subcommittee on February 17, Hoegh presented a $41.8 million request--considerable reduced from the $130 million requested the year before--and informed the committee of this reorientation. Responding to Congressional criticism, more emphasis in the future would be put into management of a national plan of civil defense (already under development), continuity of government programs, and radiological defense. Less emphasis would be put on stockpiling until warehousing and rotation of stock efficiency could be improved.[65] On the evacuation-shelter controversy, Hoegh indicated that both concepts had a place in the FCDA. When sufficient warning time permitted, evacuation would be stressed. In that tactical warning time capabilities would decrease during the next several years as operational ICBMs became

TABLE III-3

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1959 FCDA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

	1957 actual	1958 estimate	1959 estimate
APPROPRIATIONS			
Operations:			
1. Executive direction	$419,019	$493,900	$513,000
2. Planning and intelligence	256,518	294,100	308,000
3. Research and development	1,055,876	1,025,000	1,263,000
4. Warning and operations plans	3,048,011	4,528,100	5,202,000
5. Resources and requirements	205,539	331,000	485,000
6. Education and training	2,806,473	2,513,300	2,700,000
7. Specialized liaison	195,093	198,100	200,000
8. General administration and stockpile operations	2,269,422	3,522,500	3,765,000
9. Field operations	2,621,274	3,972,000	4,964,000
Total	12,877,230	16,870,000	19,400,000
Adjustments:			
Comparative transfers to other accounts	2,333,266	130,000	----------
Unobligated balance no longer available	349,504	----------	----------
Appropriation	15,560,000	17,000,000	19,400,000
Emergency supplies and equipment:			
1. Medical supplies and equipment:			
(a) Emergency hospitals	20,325,606	----------	----------
(b) Medical and surgical	12,690,624	----------	----------
(c) Blood and shock therapy	7,477,541	----------	----------
(d) Other	67,016	----------	----------
Total medical supplies and equipment	40,560,787	----------	----------
2. Radiological and chemical warfare defense equipment	4,325,825	----------	----------
3. Warehousing and maintenance of stockpile	2,860,694	3,300,000	18,000,000
Total	47,747,306	3,300,000	18,000,000
Adjustments:			
Comparative transfers from other accounts	−2,333,266	----------	----------
Unobligated balance no longer available	1,585,960	----------	----------
Appropriation	47,000,000	3,300,000	18,000,000
Research and development:			
1. Survival planning	5,767,241	5,121,720	----------
2. Research:			
(a) Warning and communications	105,555	856,000	1,100,000
(b) Radiological defense	145,000	730,000	1,160,000
(c) Engineering and nuclear testing	2,147,219	1,685,147	2,575,000
(d) Health and medical	20,000	500,000	575,000
(e) Damage assessment	301,560	500,000	300,000
(f) Other	110,458	150,000	190,000
Total	8,596,978	9,542,867	5,900,000
Adjustments:			
Advances and reimbursements from other accounts	−711,000	----------	----------
Unobligated balance brought forward	−6,923,843	−9,042,367	−1,500,000
Unobligated balance carried forward	9,042,867	1,500,000	----------
Appropriation	10,000,000	2,000,000	4,400,000
Federal contributions	11,754,134	14,021,527	17,000,000
Adjustments:			
Unobligated balance brought forward	−8,993,082	−14,021,527	−17,000,000
Unobligated balance carried forward	14,021,527	17,000,000	----------
Unobligated balance no longer available	217,421	----------	----------
Total	17,000,000	17,000,000	----------
Civil defense functions of Federal agencies:			
Total	3,190,777	----------	----------
Adjustments:			
Comparative transfers to other accounts	81,669	----------	----------
Unobligated balance no longer available	727,554	----------	----------
Appropriation	4,000,000	----------	----------
Total, all appropriations	93,560,000	39,300,000	41,800,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1959 (Part 2), 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 429.

a reality, shelter would be more urgent. However, no funds for sheltering would be sought in the current fiscal year in that the FCDA was, at the time, involved with the States in a "federally financed operations planning program which will be concluded in fiscal year 1958." These plans would "include an analysis of possible shelter requirements in terms of daytime and nighttime population." Continuing, Hoegh indicated that:

> Information developed in this planning effort, and new technical data from nuclear tests will require FCDA to continue to appraise both blast and fallout shelter designs, and to incorporate new information into current shelter and movement plans.[66]

Though Hoegh did not say so, he was in fact unable to ask for shelter funds because of Eisenhower's decision against a fallout or blast shelter system.

Subcommittee Chairman Albert Thomas was unimpressed, however. He indicated that he perceived no difference in FCDA direction than from preceeding years and that he favored a shift in emphasis "from the national headquarters to the responsibility of the local individuals... only that change is going to make your program workable."[67] He further indicated that all the debate over shelter or evacuation was a tempest in a teapot--neither would work. In terms of evacuation, Thomas argued that "if you had a week's notice you might be able to get one-tenth of your people out of any large urban area..." As for sheltering, in that this was Hoegh's first appearance before the subcommittee, Thomas informed him of his conversation with the Mayor of Hamburg, mentioned previously, making the point that shelters would not save lives.[68]

On March 21st, the House Appropriations Committee forwarded the FY 1959 Independent Offices Appropriations Bill to the House. The FCDA had been granted a recommendation of $38,250,000 out of a $44.8 million

request. In its report, the Appropriations Committee noted with disapproval that $6.7 million of antibiotics in the present stockpile had deteriorated and might have to be destroyed: "This vividly demonstrates the need for better policy in the civil defense stockpile program before the stockpile is increased."[69]

The FCDA appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee on April 30th, seeking a restoration of the House cuts.[70] The Senate did go along with several of the FCDA appeals (see Table III-4) and on June 5th voted out an Independent Offices Appropriations Bill which contained $42,915,000 for the FCDA.[71] After sending both these bills to Conference, the final compromise granted FCDA an FY 1959 appropriation of $38.5 million.[72] With these "maintenance" level funds the Congress insured that any FCDA reorientation would be a slow process indeed.

While these appropropriation hearings had been going on in the early part of 1958, other activities related to civil defense had also been taking place. Chet Holifield, for example, had scheduled a series of hearings for his Military Operations Subcommittee on the technical feasibility of a shelter program for the U.S. These would begin in late April. This action was indicative of his intention to continue to apply pressure and focus attention on civil defense until meaningful results were forthcoming from the Administration.

Due in large measure to the attention which had been focused on civil defense for several years by Holifield and his subcommittees, it was with increasing frequency that comments critical of the FCDA and of the Eisenhower Administration could be found in the Congressional Record. The following statement, made by Representative Johnson of South Carolina, is illustrative of this growing concern: "One of the most glaring

TABLE III-4

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1959 FCDA APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1958[a] Grant	Submitted[b] to BOB	Approved[a] by BOB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1959[c] Grant
Operations	$17,000	----	$22,315	$18,250	$21,915	$18,500
Contributions	17,000	----	0	0	0	0
Supplies & Equipment	3,300	----	18,000	18,000	18,000	18,000
Surveys, Plans, & Research	2,000	----	4,400	2,000	3,000	2,000
Delagations	0	----	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	$39,300	$112,997	$44,715	$38,250	$42,915	$38,500

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1959, Senate Report 1656, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 5 June 1958, p. 18.

[b]"OCDM Appropriation History (1951 Through 1961)," Appendix 9A), in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 397.

[c]U.S., Congress, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1959 --Conference Report, House Report 2237, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 22 July 1958. Reprinted in the Congressional Record, Vol. 104, 1958, p. 14633.

deficiencies of the Eisenhower administration is the way it has made civilian defense an abused stepchild of the Federal family. It would be hard to find anywhere a group of people with poorer morale than the employees of the Civilian Defense Administration, through no fault of their own."[73]

The Reorganization Plan of 1958

In an attempt to do something about the situation referred to by Congressman Johnson, President Eisenhower, on April 24th, just six days before Holifield's latest series of hearings were to begin, submitted to the Congress "Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, Providing New Arrangements For The Conduct of Federal Defense Mobilization and Civil Defense Functions."[74] Quoting from the President's message to the Congress accompanying this reorganization plan, the primary provisions were:

> First, it transfers to the President the functions vested by law in the Federal Civil Defense Administration and those so vested in the Office of Defense Mobilization....
>
> Second, the reorganization plan consolidates the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration to form a new Office Of Defense and Civilian Mobilization in the Executive Office of the President...
>
> Third, the reorganization plan transfers the membership of the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization on the National Security Council to the Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization...[75]

In making these recommendations, Eisenhower was following closely the advice of the management consultant firm, McKinsey & Co., which had been hired by the Bureau of the Budget five months earlier to:

> 1. Examine existing organizational arrangements for the conduct of the Federal Government's defense mobilization and civil defense functions and ascertain the problems resulting from these arrangements.
>
> 2. Consider possible alternative solutions to these problems.

3. Recommend improved organizational arrangements for the conduct of these functions.[76]

In making their report to the Budget Bureau a few months later, McKinsey & Co. argued against acceptance of the Holifield reorganization bill on the grounds that it would create a "standby department." Civil defense would only become operational in time of crisis or attack, the report's authors felt. For whatever current operational duties as might exist, the report advocated "the essentiality of utilizing the capabilities for nonmilitary defense in existing departments."[77]

Subsequently, both the House and the Senate instructed an appropriate committee to study Eisenhower's proposal. In the House, the job was given to Holifield's Military Operations Subcommittee, and in the Senate, Hubert Humphrey, chairing the Subcommittee on Reorganization, was tapped.[78] Appearing before Holifield's subcommittee, both Gorden Dean, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, and Leo Hoegh of the FCDA indicated support for the Administration plan. Hoegh testified that he believed the plan would:

1. Strengthen the Nation's nonmilitary defense organization.

2. Increase the stature of civil defense and mobilization.

3. Provide the best overall coordination and supervision of the nonmilitary defense activities within the Federal Government.

4. Provide unified guidance and assistance to State and local governments.

5. Promote more efficient and economical administration.[79]

The committee was doubtful that this would be the case. In its report to the House, the committee noted that the reorganization would not create any new authority for civil defense not already provided in existing law, as had been sought by the committee for some time. Therefore, this measure would fail to "create new civil defense functions or

increase the degree of Federal responsibility for civil defense."[80] The report added that:

> So far, these responsibilities have not been effectively discharged. The enabling legislation is outmoded, the funds insufficient, the executive leadership lacking, and the American people unprepared. No reorganization plan by itself can overcome these heavy drawbacks. The most it can do is make a start.

Despite these reservations, the committee recommended that the reorganization be approved. In explaining their decision the committee noted:

> In evaluating the President's plan, the subcommittee is confronted with this practical situation: There is little likelihood that the subcommittee's own legislative recommendations (H.R. 2125) will be enacted against the President's opposition.
>
> The plain facts of life also suggest that civil defense is in so low a state that nothing could make it worse and something could make it better.
>
> For these reasons the subcommittee dares hope, despite its doubts and reservations, that some improvement might be effected by this reorganization plan....
>
> In the subcommittee's view, this plan should be considered as a trial effort by the President in a complex and difficult area of Federal activity. The responsibility is placed squarely upon his shoulders.[81]

The Senate subcommittee report was not as pessimistic in recommending favorable action, despite receiving unfavorable testimony to the effect that it was "unwise to place an operating agency under the arm of the Chief Executive."[82] Responding to this and other criticisms of the proposal, a subcommittee staff study argued:

> It seems to the staff that vesting civil-defense functions in the highest authority in the executive branch, viz, the President, himself, is entirely compatible with their vast importance to the Nation. No function of Government, other than military preparedness to prevent attack, is more significant to survival in the missile age.
>
> The argument that Plan 1 is a blank check to the President to delegate nonmilitary defense functions without continuing congressional supervision does not appear especially valid. Both the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization and the

> Federal Civil Defense Administration presently have statutory authority to delegate their operating functions to various other executive agencies....
>
> Nor, in the view of the staff, is the contention convincing that vesting authority in the President would envelop the civil-defense program in a climate of executive or Presidential privilege which might make it inaccessable to congressional scrutiny.[83]

Subsequently, since neither chamber of the Congress voted against the measure, the ODM and the FCDA officially merged on 1 July 1958. Leo Hoegh was designated the first Director of the new Office of Civilian and Defense Mobilization. Pursuiant to Executive Order No. 10773, Hoegh was delegated the President's civil defense functions.[84]

The 1958 Holifield Hearings and Related Studies

By this time other activities related to civil defense were beginning to bear fruit, and it began to appear that civil defense might pick up momentum. The first indication of this came during the Holifield subcommittee hearings on the technical feasibility of designing shelter protection against the hazards of nuclear attack, which began on April 30th. Various atomic shelter tests had been conducted in Nevada during the past year, several of which were designed to test and offer an operational evaluation on the radiological defense system proposed by the NRDL. Both government and nongovernment officials and experts appeared. Putting the broad issue of shelter protection into perspective, Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, Director of the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University (which had analyzed the shelter problem the year before), testified that the ICBM age was just around the corner. This meant that eight to twenty minutes of warning time was all that could be expected. While it was true that blast shelters which would offer significant levels of protection could be constructed with the present

degree of knowledge, Dr. Johnson indicated that "the case for blast shelters is marginal, not because they won't do the job mechanically, but because we won't be able to get a big fraction of the population into them in time."[85] Coming to the same conclusion as the Gaither Panel, Dr. Johnson noted that fallout shelters did not suffer from this problem and could save from ten to fifty million lives:

> Civil defense against fallout performs a function that is not performed by anything else....We simply must have fallout shelters.[86]

Representatives of the Department of Defense, the Services, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Naval Radiological Detection Laboratory, and others all provided testimony to the committee supportive of the technical feasibility of various shelter systems, from fallout shelters to elaborate blast shelters; some of which, though technically feasible, quite unrealistic.[87]

During the hearings, FCDA Administrator Leo Hoegh informed the committee that a new national shelter policy had been adopted by the Eisenhower Administration. Hoegh referred to the series of studies conducted in the last several years on the shelter concept and the favorable recommendations which had been forthcoming:

> These several analyses and studies have indicated that there is a great potential for the saving of life by fallout shelters. In the event of a nuclear attack on this country, fallout shelters would offer the best single nonmilitary defense measure for the protection of the greatest number of people.
>
> Furthermore, a nation with adequate fallout protection is a nation which would be more difficult to successfully attack. This alone would substantially lessen the temptation of an aggressor to launch an attack.[88]

In referring to the need for fallout protection, Hoegh sounded much like Holifield, but in the implementation of this new policy the FCDA was not proposing as much as Holifield desired--as can be gathered from their

program summary:

> 1. Step up information and education programs to acquaint the American people with the nuclear fallout hazard and with possible measures of self-help.
>
> 2. Initiate a survey of existing structures on a sampling basis to determine their capabilities for protection against fallout.
>
> 3. Accelerate research and perfect designs for incorporating fallout shelter in existing and new buildings.
>
> 4. Construct a limited number of prototype shelters in underground garages, school buildings and other structures and institutions for testing and demonstration, and possibly for dual (peacetime) use.
>
> 5. Incorporate fallout shelters in new Federal buildings, by way of example to State and local governments.[89]

Hoegh informed the committee that "there will be no massive federally financed shelter construction program."[90] Continuing, Hoegh told the committee that this program would be expensive, nonetheless, and estimated its cost to be in the neighborhood of "$10 billion or less." However, this sum included the costs to be borne by private citizens (in terms of backyard shelters and provisions), as well as the State and local costs.[91]

After the summarization of the shelter program by Governor Hoegh, Holifield indicated his opinion:

> You are not going to get a shelter program for the people... by advising them to build their own shelters, any more than you can get an army or a navy or an air force by advising each one to buy himself a jet plane.[92]

This line of thought was continued in the subcommittee report:

> The subcommittee favors education and demonstration for self-help. The national shelter policy at least recognizes that atomic shelters are essential to civil defense. But the subcommittee will not lend its endorsement to any pretense that this policy promises nationwide protection against nuclear weapons effects in the foreseeable future....An ostrichlike policy will not save American lives and property. Self-help cannot provide nationwide protection against the deadly

> effects of exploding nuclear bombs any more than self-help can build the bombs. Unless the Federal Government accepts the major responsibility for planning, financing, and building atomic shelters, we will have no effective civil defense program.[93]

(A similar conclusion was reached by the Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council in their report on The Adequacy of Government Research Programs In Non-Military Defense, 1958, forwarded to the FCDA/OCDM during the summer of 1958.)[94]

There was not complete unanimity on this subject, however. For example, the Holifield subcommittee, during these most recent hearings, had received from the RAND Corporation, a "Report on a Study of Nonmilitary Defense," which recommended further study before a shelter construction program was initiated.[95] This study had been "initiated, directed, and formulated in its central features" by Herhan Kahn. Among its contributors were Leon Goure (an expert on Soviet civil defense) and Fred Ikle, later Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Nixon Administration. While the report supported the creation of a civil defense capability for the usual reasons (involving deterrence and protection of the population should deterrence fail), as well as for the less frequently heard argument that it would facilitate a "willingness to make foreign policy decisions carrying a risk of war,"[96] it stressed that "it does not appear sensible to embark on a comprehensive non-military defense program now without...prior research."[97] The reason for this conclusion, the report noted, revolved around the variety of alternative civil defense programs as well as their interrelationships, i.e. tactical evacuation, strategic evacuation, fallout sheltering, blast sheltering, and post-attack recovery operations. Should fallout protective factors of 25, 50, 100, 1000, or X be sought?

What psi blast protection was the most cost efficient--10, 30, 100, or X?

> ...each of these possibilities is at present surrounded by considerable uncertainty, with respect to both performance and cost. There is a wide range in the probable costs of alternative non-military defense systems, and such systems must be evaluated in conjunction with other elements in the United States national-defense posture. Further investigation is indicated, to pin down the uncertainties, to make sure that serious difficulties haven't been overlooked, and to provide a sounder basis for evaluation.[98]

Between the lines the report implicitly suggested that the RAND group was available for "further investigative" efforts.

The suggestion that action in civil defense should wait for further research was not one well-received by Congressman Holifield. For Holifield, the issue was clear--ten years of research had been conducted already and it was time to begin the construction of shelters to protect at least against the fallout hazard.[99] Not everyone on the Military Operations Subcommittee continued to agree with Holifield, though. The newest member, William Minshall (Rep., Ohio), argued:

> I am just as much interested in the welfare of the citizens of this country as you are, Mr. Chairman, but I sometimes wonder if the boys in the Kremlin don't clap their hands and say, 'Well there they go, spending themselves to death into bankruptcy,' which is what they have been hoping for and which we will do if we get into too many of these tremendous, federally financed programs...to go along with a federally financed program that would involve initially $20 billion is ridiculous.[100]

The contention that the expenditure of $20 billion for a shelter program would be "ridiculous," is debatable. It was also, in a sense, immaterial in that Eisenhower had already decided against this proposal and had by this time approved another one. The views of the RAND analysts and of Minshall, however, did indicate that the civil defense issue was not as "clear" as Holifield frequently postulated. Civil

defense was a complicated issue then and would only become even more complicated in the future.

The National Plan

During the remainder of 1958, the OCDM began implementing the new shelter program. On September 29, the OCDM issued a directive to the heads of all non-military Federal departments and agencies "to include in their budget estimates for new Federal buildings for fiscal year 1960 and subsequent years the additional sums of money required for the incorporation of fallout shelter into such buildings."[101] On October 24, the long-awaited "National Plan For Civil Defense" was promulgated by the OCDM.[102] The ultimate goal of this plan--the establishment of "a sound and effective civil defense structure for the Nation"--was indeed an impressive one. Whether or not the plan could accomplish what it proposed was another question. The Holifield Military Operations Subcommittee thought the plan was merely a "paper" one:

> This is a paper plan, not a plan for performance. In general terms it defines and assigns responsibilities, but it cannot and does not evaluate the ability of parties with assigned responsibilities to perform. The 'National Plan,' so-called, tells us who is to do what in civil defense, but it does not tell us how--or how well--the tasks will be done. Measured against the enormity of the need for civil defense, the directives in the 'National Plan' are at best exhortations; they do not provide tools or benchmarks for performance.[103]

Certainly, without funds to actually implement it, the National Plan would count for little. During the latter part of 1958, Leo Hoegh prepared his case for the Appropriations Committees of Congress.

The FY 1960 Appropriation

On 16 March 1959 the OCDM presented its FY 1960 appropriation request of $74,970,000.[104] (See Table III-5.) This was only $2.8 million

TABLE III-5

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1960 OCDM APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Operations	1958 actual	1959 estimate	1960 estimate
1. Executive direction and policy planning	$931,369	$934,000	$951,000
2. Research and development	754,241	734,000	997,000
3. Emergency planning	1,543,329	2,298,000	2,599,000
4. Warning and communications	3,189,607	4,159,500	3,502,000
5. Training, education, and public affairs	3,432,966	4,037,000	8,630,000
6. Resources and production planning	1,467,302	1,759,000	1,940,000
7. Field operations	3,574,506	4,834,800	6,384,000
8. Management services and stockpile operations	4,071,310	4,008,700	3,797,000
9. Functions performed by other Federal agencies	253,100	500,000	
10. 1959 program obligated in 1958	139,832	−139,832	
Total	19,337,562	23,145,168	28,800,000

Contributions	1958 actual	1959 estimate	1960 estimate
Program by activities:			
1. Attack warning	$1,360,142	$1,135,000	$950,000
2. Communications	8,970,522	7,475,000	6,235,000
3. Public safety devices	554,072	378,000	386,000
4. Medical supplies and equipment	355,888	295,000	310,000
5. Education services	673,378	560,000	480,000
6. Mass care equipment	9,630	10,000	10,000
7. Engineering supplies and equipment	1,209,259	1,010,000	860,000
8. Construction and general equipment	3,716,819	3,107,097	3,340,000
9. Preservation of vital records		300,000	430,000
10. Personnal and administrative costs			12,000,000
Total obligations	16,750,310	14,270,097	25,000,000

Research & Development	1958 actual	1959 estimate	1960 estimate
Program by activities:			
1. Survival planning	$5,367,544	$756,000	
2. Research:			
(a) Shelter, engineering, and testing	628,409	2,414,000	$5,770,000
(b) Radiological defense	867,000	1,140,000	835,000
(c) Operations	363,000	545,000	515,000
(d) Health and medical	230,000	179,000	
(e) Warning and communications	610,000	184,914	
(f) Economic, social, and other	210,000	200,000	150,000
Total obligations	8,275,953	5,418,914	7,270,000

Supplies & Equipment	1958 actual	1959 estimate	1960 estimate
Program by activities:			
1. Radiological defense equipment		$1,800,000	$8,500,000
2. Stockpile management	$3,172,031	18,200,000	5,400,000
3. 1959 program obligated in 1958	9,960	−9,960	
Total obligations	3,181,991	19,990,040	13,900,000

TOTAL---------- $74,970,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1960 (Part 2), 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, pp. 392, 466, 488, & 510.

less than the old FCDA had received in its last two appropriations combined. It was also $32.5 million more than the FCDA and the ODM together had received for the current fiscal year. Of the $75 million request, $42.9 million was for the continuation of previous programs and $32 million was for new programs.[105] Given the number of new programs and concepts, Hoegh went into some detail in justifying his request. On a proposed shelter program, Hoegh noted work had already begun to implement pilot surveys in four cities. With the requested funds, work could begin immediately to determine the extent of existing shelters in these four cities. He indicated that many sturdily built structures afforded appreciable fallout protection. Once these studies were completed, a basis would be gained to estimate the extent of existing shelter nationwide. It was estimated that in three years and with fifty million dollars the entire country could be surveyed.[106] Chairman Thomas, however, wondered why the Federal government should get involved in this. It was his belief that surveys should be conducted at local expense.[107]

On a prototype shelter program, Hoegh indicated that with the three million under request and with an additional three million in FY 1961, the OCDM would be able to have shelter protection incorporated in some sixty new construction projects spread over all fifty states, with the OCDM reimbursing the extra cost of adding the fallout shelter capability. It was currently planned to incorporate this shelter capability in two underground garages, five schools, a hospital, an underground community shelter for 1300 people, and thirty-one family homes. These projects could then be used as examples to persuade others to provide sheltering on their own.[108] Thomas had doubts on this program also, as might be expected given his past statements on the sheltering concept.

On a matching fund program for personnel and administrative (P&A) expenses, Governor Hoegh sought to allay the committee's doubts as to the merits of the program, but with little success. Thomas believed that the program was conceived as a vehicle to buy public support and build public pressure on the Congress for funds, support, and interest that did not exist at the time. He made it clear through further comment that in his opinion this program was inappropriate and would also be a waste of funds.[109]

Throughout the hearings the questioning of the subcommittee proceeded in this skeptical manner.[110] In fact, after two days of cross-examination, one committee member, Charles R. Jonas (Rep., N.C.) remarked to Hoegh: "Mr. Director, I have never seen an agency subjected to any more severe examination than you have had yesterday and today."[111]

Predictably, the May 8th subcommittee report imposed several "severe" cuts. Of the seven new programs proposed, only two were funded: the prototype shelter program (at $2.5 million), and a program to develop and distribute better radiation detection meters (at $1.5 million).[112] On the P&A program cut the committee added this explanation:

> The Committee has...denied the funds requested to initiate a program of Federal contributions for jobs at various city halls. The Members have received many pressure letters, telegrams and phone calls in the last three weeks dealing with this subject. The purpose of this interest is to use Federal funds to put 4,000 more jobs in the city halls. It is a program that would cost $24,000,000 each year within the next two years and could only be wasteful. The bureaucracy it would create would be independent and divorced from responsibility to either Federal or local governments and would continually exert pressure on Members for more money.[113]

As passed by the House, the OCDM recommendation came to $43.7 million--an amount the House report noted would "provide the same level of operation as in the current year."[114] This ignored, however, the fact that

in FY 1959 the FCDA/OCDM benefitted from an unexpended balance from the prior year amounting to approximately $14 million, raising expended funds for FY 1959 to more like $59,285,000. The OCDM in FY 1960 would not benefit from such unexpended balances.[115]

The Senate, as usual, was more generous than the House. In its report on civil defense appropriations, released June 22nd, the Senate approved $59,735,000 for the OCDM--$16 million more than the House. Notably $15 million of the increase was in the matching fund contributions program: $3 million for equipment, training, and education, and, $12 million for the P&A matching funds program. The report noted that all the States had submitted an approved plan in accord with the national plan and that "each State has a civil service system or a joint merit system under standards similar to those now participated in by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Department of Labor." It was further noted that the committee understood "that if such merit standards are not complied with, the law would prohibit the matching of funds in that event."[116]

The House, however, stuck to its guns on this issue and a deadlock developed in conference. The House conferees then reported back to the House where their position was upheld, as was the position of the Senate conferees when they reported back to the Senate. On July 30th, this became an item of debate on the Floor of the Senate. Senator Warren Magnuson (Dem., Wash.), the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, informed the Senate that the attempt to compromise with the House had been unsuccessful. He noted that he and the other Senate conferees...

> ...felt that we were duty bound to stand by this amendment, because the Senate had said, not once, but twice, that it wanted this provision in the bill.[117]

The debate ensued when Senator Stephen Young (Dem., Ohio) motioned that the Senate recede from its disagreement with the House. Young's position was similar to that of the House report in that he foresaw "city hall" and "courthouse" patronage jobs as a consequence. Even if this were not the case, though, he would still oppose these funds:

> I say that because it is my belief that the eligible civil-service employees who are on the lists in the States and nationally can be employed in more useful service and can render more real and needful public service than would be possible in the civil defense organization.
>
> Civil Defense, Mr. President, might have been of some value during World War II and for some years thereafter. However, we are now in an age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, hydrogen bombs, and space satellites. Civil defense as it is now being operated in this country is about as useful as flintlock muskets, tallow dips, mustache cups, or Civil War cannon balls.[118]

In support of the Senate's position Senator Magnuson argued that (1) the Senate had, in essence, made a commitment to the States to support this program when it was authorized in Public Law 85-606 in August 1958. Since then many States and local areas had expended their own funds in gearing up for their portion of the program. (2) During the appropriations hearings on this measure "the more testimony we received, the more we became convinced that this procedure was the core of the whole matter, that unless we moved this program of civil defense out to the people, and unless they administered it themselves, we would never have any cooperation."[119]

Senator Young's motion was subsequently defeated by a vote of 71 to 12. Even so, the effort was ultimately in vain. The House, on August 14th, again voted against P&A funds.[120] This prompted a twelfth hour appeal by Eisenhower urging a reconsideration and arguing that:

> It would be unwise to neglect our civil defense mission because our total defense is incomplete and meaningless

> without reliable and responsible home defense. Survival cannot be guaranteed merely with a capacity for reprisal. Equally important is our ability to recover. This means staying power and endurance beyond that ever before required of this nation or any nation.[121]

The House, nevertheless, refused to compromise and thus the Senate, on September 4th, broke the deadlock and accepted the House position on voice vote. As finally authorized the OCDM received $44.2 million for FY 1960.[122] (See Table III-6.) Senator Humphrey, in apparent disgust, called this appropriation "nothing more than a gesture," and noted that it amounted to less than one tenth of one percent of the military budget that year.[123]

In related appropriations activities in FY 1960 the OCDM track record was equally dismal. The General Services Administration had by this time studied ten Federal buildings to determine their fallout shielding potential, in what the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House would later call a "halfhearted" effort to cooperate with the OCDM in setting a Federal example. Five of these were found to have promise,[124] and $2 million was sought to modify at least one of these buildings, incorporating fallout shelter.[125] The Appropriations Committees refused to appropriate the funds, however.[126]

The 1959 Holifield Hearings

In the House, and elsewhere, during 1959, the seemingly unending process of investigations, hearings, reviews, and studies of civil defense continued. For example, the Joint Committee on Defense Production, which had held hearings the year before on the adequacy of government preparedness programs to meet nuclear attack or limited-scale war,[127] held further hearings in 1959 on civil defense and mobilization.[128] The hearings which drew the most attention in 1959, however,

TABLE III-6

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1960 OCDM APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1959[a] Grant	Submitted[b] to BOB	Approved[a] by BOB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1960 Grant
Operations	$23,285	----	$28,800	$23,285	$23,285	$23,285
Contributions	0	----	25,000	10,000	25,000	10,000
Supplies & Equipment	20,000	----	13,900	6,950	6,950	6,950
Surveys, Plans, & Research	2,000	----	7,270	3,500	4,500	4,000
TOTAL	$45,285	$259,039	$74,970	$43,735	$59,735	$46,635*

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1960, Senate Report 423, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 June 1959, p. 13.

[b]"OCDM Appropriation History (1951 Through 1961)," Appendix 9A), in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 397.

*Includes $2.4 million granted in supplemental for construction of a regional OCDM headquarters in Denton Texas. Funds for this program had also been requested in the 16 July 1959 request but had been turned down. In supplemental form the House again refused the request. The Senate, on the other hand, approved this program and was able to gain the approval of the House in conference. The long range program planned the construction of a network of eight civilian command posts for the OCDM "located in the general area of the present eight regional offices" of the OCDM. These would be "austere structures designed for 200 persons on a day-to-day basis and for an augmentation staff of 300." The command posts would be designed to offer a blast protection of 30 psi and fallout protection of approximately 1000 PF. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Supplemental Appropriation Bill For 1960, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 163.

were those held by Congressman Chet Holifield's Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.[129] During five days of hearings in June this subcommittee sought testimony on the biological and environmental effects of a possible nuclear war. To make the testimony of the various witnesses as useful as possible the committee posited a "moderate" attack on the U.S. of 1,446 megatons delivered by 260 weapons on 224 targets across the Nation. Included were military, atomic energy, and industrial targets which were, of course, coterminous with population concentrations.[130]

TABLE III-7

HOLIFIELD ATTACK DISTRIBUTION

Type of Target	Number	Number of weapons	Weight (megatons)
Air Force installations	111	111	645
Critical target areas	71	110	567
AEC installations	21	21	168
Army installations	12	12	24
Navy installations	5	5	28
Marine Corps installations	4	4	14
TOTAL	224	263	1,446

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, (Summary-Analysis of Hearings, 22-26 June 1959), 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 10

The specific targets, form of attack, size of warheads, and other relevant information was provided to the witnesses in order to facilitate the comparison of their testimony. According to Holifield:

> We took into consideration every military factor known in order to set up a feasible attack, and then we submitted it to some of our military experts. They looked at it and said it was quite practical, that such a type of attack could happen. Gen. James Gavin sent me a letter in which he said that this is a thoroughly feasible attack at this time.

> We fed all this information into computing machines. The figures that came out...showed that we would lose 25 million people on the first day, that we would lose 25 million more as a result of injuries received the first day but which would prove fatal within the next 2 or 3 weeks. That means there would be 50 million of our 175 million people we would lose from that attack. Then it showed also that there would be 22 million people who would be irradiated. So there is practically half of the population of the United States either killed or seriously irradiated.[131]

> Under conditions existing today, more than one-fourth of the dwellings in the United States would have been destroyed or damaged beyond repair. Another one-fourth would require major repairs. Outside the areas of blast and thermal damage, another one-fourth...would have been so severely contaminated by radioactive fallout that they would require major decontamination. Of these, some 2½ million dwellings would have to be abandoned for periods...extending up to several months.[132]

On the fallout hazard, Holifield reported:

> From the hypothetical attack pattern...our analyses showed that 54 percent of the national land area had initial dose rates less than 10 roentgens per hour. For practical purposes ...this portion of the country could be considered unaffected by fallout. Thirty-one percent of the national land area had initial dose rates ranging between 10 and 100 roentgens per hour. In these areas the first floor of the home would provide sufficient protection to keep the radiation dose during the first 2 weeks below 200 roentgens, a sickness dose. Almost 4 percent of the national land area had initial dose rates between 100 and 500 roentgens per hour. In these areas the home basement would provide sufficient protection to prevent radiation sickness during the first two weeks. However, about 11 percent of the national land area had initial dose rates exceeding 500 roentgens per hour. Hence the home, by itself, would not provide sufficient protection to prevent casualties ...more than 25 percent of the surviving population was located in these zones of heavy fallout.[133]

Given such an attack, what were the conclusions of the experts who testified on the effects of nuclear weapons detonations on biological systems and the environment? Their general conclusion, as recounted by Holifield on the Floor of the House, was that "the impact of this assumed attack on the lives and homes of Americans would have been catastrophic." It would not have been "nuclear extinction," though, as some commentators have claimed.[134] On this point the committee concluded

that "although much remains to be learned about the long-range impact of a nuclear war on 'the balance of nature,' the consensus of the testimony was that, despite the severe shock, life would continue and full ecological recovery would eventually occur."[135] On the widely discussed issue of genetic effects the committee noted that:

> It was stated that although the long-term genetic effects of radioactive fallout would be severe, these effects would be spread out over hundreds of years. Even though the total is large, the percentage of people affected in any one generation would be small.[136]

While the primary purpose of the subcommittee's investigation was to determine the biological and environmental effects of a possible nuclear war on the U.S. under current conditions, it was noted that the subcommittee also received "extremely important testimony on the technical possibility of reducing those effects through nonmilitary protective measures."[137] According to the subcommittee report:

> Expert testimony presented to the subcommittee indicated that moderate shelter protection against the fallout effects would have saved not only the fallout casualties but also a great many of the blast and thermal casualties. This is because the vast majority of blast and thermal casualties would be caused by the relatively low blast pressures and thermal intensities occurring over wide regions surrounding the immediate target areas.[138]

Holifield estimated that with "high performance shelter protection for 200 million people...estimated at between $15 billion and $20 billion,"[139] the fatality level of fifty million in this attack scenario could have been reduced to fifteen million.[140] Thus,

> the main conclusion presented to the subcommittee was that the country must have a national radiological defense system if the Nation is to withstand and recover from an attack of the scale which is possible in all-out nuclear war.[141]

The problem for Holifield (and for the OCDM) was in getting the Appropriations Committees and the Administration to accept this conclusion.

The Politicization of Civil Defense

The Governor of New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller, was thoroughly in agreement with "the main conclusion" of the Holifield subcommittee on the need for shelter protection. But, it did not appear that the Federal Government was going to move quite this far in the foreseeable future. Thus, not long after the publication of this Holifield report, Governor Rockefeller proposed for the State of New York a bill which would make compulsory the provision of fallout shelter protection in every home in the State--at the owner's expense.[142]

The timing of the two events was coincidental, it would seem, for Rockefeller had been concerned with civil defense for several years. In January 1958, for example, Rockefeller had forwarded to Eisenhower a report which he had helped to sponsor entitled International Security: The Military Aspect. Section IX of the "Rockefeller Report" dealt, in part, with civil defense problems. Among the observations and recommendations made, the following are noteworthy:

> In the age of the ballistic missile the known capability of a society to withstand attack will become an increasingly important deterrent....while it may be impossible to protect the population against the blast and heat of an atomic explosion, protection against radioactive fallout and other contamination appears to be much more feasible....
>
> The main feature to note with respect to civil defense is that it is overdue. It does not make sense for the free world to engage in a major military effort without at the same time protecting its most important resources: its civilian population.[143]

Eisenhower, however, chose not to approve the report's recommendation urging the development of a nationwide fallout shelter system.

Thus, shortly after becoming Governor of New York, Rockefeller decided to pursue this issue on his own and created a "Special Task Force on Protection From Radioactive Fallout" to determine if

"substantial protection for the people of New York State" could be provided. On 6 July 1959 this Task Force forwarded its conclusions and recommendations to Rockefeller:

> We have concluded our inquiry with the conviction that a very high degree of protection from fallout can be achieved, that it is achievable now and achievable at a cost within the reach of our people and our State. We are satisfied that, although the thermonuclear war would be a major disaster, the magnitude of the disaster can be markedly limited by protective measures.

It was therefore recommended that:

> ...legislation be enacted to require the provision of shielding from fallout up to a minimum specified standard in existing dwellings as well as in all new construction in the State of New York.[144]

Not only did Rockefeller seek to implement the recommendations of his Task Force in the State of New York, but as the freshman Chairman of the Special Committee on Civil Defense at the 51st annual Conference of Governors in August, he sought to persuade the Governors of their "personal and official responsibility, as Governors, for the protection of their people against the hazards of fallout in the event of a nuclear war."[145] In what was reported as "a skillfully handled victory" for Rockefeller,[146] the Conference went on to overwhelmingly adopt both the report of his special committee and a four point resolution on civil defense calling for:

> First--Vigorous state initiative in a campaign of education about the fallout hazard and protection against it.
>
> Second--Immediate steps by all levels of government...to assist their citizens to survive radioactive fallout and the related consequences of a nuclear attack upon our country.
>
> Third--State initiative to survey the adequacy of fallout protection in state owned or operated facilities and the steps which should be taken to achieve such protection.
>
> Fourth--State initiative in developing a protected seat of state government to assure government leadership and functioning both during and after a nuclear attack.[147]

Following his success at the Governor's Conference, Rockefeller's next move was to propose to President Eisenhower that he hold a Conference on Fallout Protection at the White House. Despite the fact that relations between Rockefeller and Eisenhower were somewhat strained as a result of Rockefeller's mounting public criticisms of the President's military and civil defense policies, the President agreed. It may well be that the President felt he had little choice. A refusal might have been interpreted by some as a callous disregard for the welfare of the American people--especially in that election time was drawing near. It is in this regard that Rockefeller's actions at the Governors Conference and his White House Conference suggestion may indicate concerns that were not necessarily restricted to an effort to provide fallout protection for the citizens of New York. It was no secret that Rockefeller was interested in running for President in 1960. His proposals on civil defense, therefore, could be seen as an effort to stake out a national security issue for himself for 1960. Whereas Eisenhower (and Nixon) could be criticized by the Democrats for failing to pay sufficient attention to civil defense, Rockefeller could not.[148]

It was thus with these potential concerns in the background that the Governors' Committee on Civil Defense (chaired by Rockefeller) met on 25 January 1960 at the White House with President Eisenhower, OCDM Director Hoegh, CIA Director Allen Dulles, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas, AEC Commissioner John A. McCone, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Administration officials. Their purpose was "to review the nature of the nuclear hazard and the steps which should be taken for protection from fallout."[149]

Unlike the negative (and restrained) reactions that greeted the Gaither recommendations on civil defense two years earlier, this high-level government assemblage was surprisingly encouraging in their support for a better civil defense program. John McCone, for example, gave his support to the resolution of the Governor's Conference calling for a nationwide fallout shelter program:

> Let me state at the outset that it is my belief that our nation will continue to be able to control its own destiny after a nuclear attack. This prospect, I believe, is not destroyed by the awful realities of the effects of nuclear weapons...It is, however, entirely dependent upon our energetically carrying out a substantial fallout shelter program and associated protective measures.[150] (Emphasis added.)

Christian Herter, unlike his predecessor John Foster Dulles, also favored a beefed-up civil defense program:

> There is evidence that the USSR is stepping up its civil defense program. Combined with a substantial program for air defense, it provides Soviet negotiators with a good deal of assurance that their homeland will be able to withstand attack. A similar assurance with respect to our own country would clearly strengthen our defensive position.[151]

General Nathan Twining, the Chairman of the JCS, said that he considered "fallout protection for our citizens to be essential to the defense of our country."[152]

In general, the overall consensus of the participants was one of support for a more effective civil defense system, including much support for the Rockefeller resolution.[153] For the Administration, however, the Fallout Conference was just so much window-dressing. President Eisenhower refused to budge from his position of opposition to a large Federally-financed fallout shelter system and he rejected the Rockefeller proposal. A short time thereafter, the New York State Legislature also turned down Rockefeller's civil defense proposals.[154]

After this second defeat for Governor Rockefeller in the space of

a few months, he made one last public effort to bring action to the fallout shelter program. As has been mentioned, the year 1960 was a Presidential election year and President Eisenhower would be stepping down the following January. For a while, it is reported, Governor Rockefeller was considered by many as the front runner for the Republican Presidential nomination. In fact, several polls indicated he could have beaten Kennedy. But, as a liberal Republican, and, in a sense a maverick as well, he could not gather the support he needed, especially in business and political circles. Richard Nixon became the front runner by the summer of 1960. It was at this time that Rockefeller announced on June 8th that in order for Nixon to receive his support, Nixon would have to accept nine anti-administration propositions dealing primarily with defense issues. It is reported that two days of secret meetings between Nixon and Rockefeller followed, concluding with Nixon's agreement to, in effect, turn his back on Eisenhower, under whom he had served as Vice President, and accept Rockefeller's propositions.[155] Following this, on July 23rd Nixon and Rockefeller issued a joint statement proposing:

> ...more and improved bombers, airborne alert, speeded production of missiles and Polaris submarines, accelerated dispersal and hardening of bases, full modernization of the equipment of our ground forces, and an intensified program for civil defense.[156] (Emphasis added.)

While Nixon did lose the election that November, as we will see in the next chapter, many of the proposals in the above statement, including the proposal for an intensified civil defense program, would be acted on by President Kennedy. Meanwhile, work would continue during 1960 which would help to lay the groundwork for the Kennedy civil defense program. Several investigations and reports were completed during

1960, which, while adding little new and significant input into the civil defense issue, did, however, serve to reinforce the numerous studies which had gone before.

The 1960 Holifield Hearings and Related Studies

Several Congressional investigations touching upon civil defense issues were conducted during 1960. In the Senate, hearings were held by the Armed Services Committee on "Assistance to Civil Defense By Reserves," in response to Senate Resolution No. 67 (86th Cong., 2nd Sess.) which proposed that specific civil defense functions be allocated to Reserve units. The military was opposed, however, and the measure did not pass.[157] In addition, for the fifth year in a row Congressman Chet Holifield held hearings on civil defense. And, once again, both of his subcommittees--the Special Subcommittee on Radiation, and the Subcommittee on Military Operations--were involved in the hearings.

Our attention here will be focused on the Military Operations Subcommittee hearings in that the Special Subcommittee Hearings on Radiation Protection Criteria and Standards, while useful for technical data, added little conceptually to civil defense other than coming to the conclusion that "any nuclear attack on the U.S. is more likely to be a limited than an all-out attack."[158] Heretofore, virtually every nuclear war scenario revolved around a massive strike "from out of the blue." Little attention had been given in public to the possibility of an attack restricted primarily to military targets. Most commentators just assumed that an enemy first strike would take as its goal the all-out destruction of the country as a Nation. In the years to come commentators would begin to move away from this simplistic conception to various considerations of more limited attacks and strategies.

Congressman Holifield's Civil Defense, 1960 Hearings were actually three separate investigations conducted by his Subcommittee on Military Operations. Held during the later part of March, Part I investigated the OCDM's shelter policy, Part II looked at the state of post-attack planning, and Part III studied the relation of civil defense to the missile program.

In opening Part I of the hearings, Holifield noted for the record that:

> Two years have passed since the national shelter policy was announced before our subcommittee. Today we expect to hear what has been accomplished. Frankly, we don't expect much, because this shelter policy was a policy of 'education,' not a policy of 'construction.'[159]

Holifield was reinforced in this perception by the findings of a subcommittee questionaire which had been sent, in early February, to all the State Governors and many of the Mayors of the country's largest cities, asking them:

> 1. How many civil defense home shelters have been constructed in your State?
>
> 2. How many buildings in your State have been modified to provide shielding from fallout?
>
> 3. Does your State civil defense agency have an underground control center?
>
> 4. Have any underground structures having a dual civil defense purpose, such as parking garages, been constructed in your State?
>
> 5. Has fallout protection, in the form of structural modifications been incorporated in your public schools?
>
> 6. Have evacuation-reception centers been prepared either within your State or in other States for use by evacuees from your State? Are such reception centers stocked with emergency supplies and do they provide adequate protection against radioactive fallout? How many people will they protect?
>
> 7. What changes in Federal policy do you think are necessary to achieve greater fallout protection for the people of your State?[160]

By the time the hearings opened, 35 States and 66 cities had responded. The answers were not very encouraging. Knowledge of 1,565 home fallout shelters was reported to the committee. A total of 14 public buildings had been modified to provide fallout protection (defined as PF 100). Five underground State civil defense control centers and nine such local centers were reported. Eight dual-purpose structures were found and four public schools had been modified to provide fallout protection. According to the committee, "on reception centers the information was that at best some States had designated areas to be reception sites but that none had been prepared."[161] In terms of recommendations, the proposal most often made called for the provision of Federal income tax deductions for personal expenditures for home fallout shelters as well as a general and widespread sentiment for some type of Federal assistance in the construction of all types of sheltering.[162] At least one Governor responded that "until our State legislatures see shelters incorporated in new Federal buildings and existing Federal buildings...they are unwilling to appropriate State money for this purpose."[163] Thus, the subcommittee was fairly convinced that "civil defense throughout the country as a whole is in a deplorable state," even before the hearings began.[164]

OCDM Director Hoegh took a somewhat more optimistic view. Hoegh reported that as a result of local surveys made throughout the country, the OCDM was "confident that as of today we have shelter spaces of sufficient protection factor for 25 percent of the people in this Nation."[165] Moreover, for a maximum of three to four additional percent in expenditures, fallout protection could be incorporated in much of the new construction which went up each year in the U.S. It was hoped that much of

the shelter deficit could be made up through a voluntary program incorporating fallout protection in this new construction.[166]

The investigation into post-attack planning was even less encouraging. Hoegh told the committee that after a nuclear attack "you are on your own initially /for at least the first four weeks according to the National Plan/. You are a soldier when this country is assaulted." Every citizen, he continued, was responsible for providing his own shelter and provisions until the Federal Government could begin to take charge--perhaps a month after an attack.[167] No mention was made of the millions who lived in apartments or homes without basements or yards, or of the poor who could not afford shelters and supplies.

Hoegh informed the committee that General Mills had developed a 4½ pound package of processed foods which could be put in a one gallon can, sealed and left for twenty years--according to the manufacturer. When supplemented with water and one vitamin C tablet per day, this product of corn and soybean mixture was promoted as sufficient to sustain a person for up to two weeks. The cost was estimated at from $1.50 to $2.50 per can. Hoegh was unreceptive, however, to the suggestion that the Federal Government stock these supplies. He reminded the committee (as if they needed reminding) that "this is an austere program."[168] On the brighter side, it should be mentioned that by this time the OCDM had stockpiled approximately $225 million worth of medical and engineering supplies, including over 2000 portable emergency hospitals.[169] In addition, much valuable planning had taken place. While it could not be said that the OCDM was prepared for nuclear attack, it could not be said either that the OCDM was completely unprepared.

In Part III of the investigation involving the relationship

between civil defense and the missile program it was apparent from the start that Chairman Holifield and other committee members were concerned with the Air Force program of establishing hardened ICBM sites throughout the Mid-West and the hardening of some Atlas and all Titan sites. As Holifield indicated, "a concentrated enemy assault against those bases would subject possibly our entire population and much of our food resources to the deadly effects of radioactive fallout."[170] The committee was more in favor of the Navy concept of deterrence which was focused on virtually invulnerable Polaris submarines. Some observers considered the missile sites "megaton Magnets" and proposed that the U.S. deterrent be moved out to sea, thus drawing enemy fire away from the U.S. The Air Force, with some degree of derision, referred to this as "minimum deterrence," and pointed out that one major drawback to this proposal was that the Polaris missiles were rather small, being in the range of one megaton, and less accurate than the land based missiles. They could not, therefore be used as counterforce weapons. Their utility lay in assuring destruction of Soviet cities after a Soviet first strike. As Dr. Ralph Lapp told the committee, this might not be enough. For example, the Soviets might attack or threaten some country to which we had guaranteed our support. If all that the U.S. could do in response was to threaten Soviet cities with Polaris missiles, "that kind of threat to the Soviet Union would not be believable..." The U.S. position in such a case would be improved if Soviet missiles and other military targets could be threatened, Lapp argued.[171] In this sense, the Air Forces' more accurate and much larger ten megaton ICBMs gave the Air Force a counterforce option that the Polaris missiles could not give the Navy.[172]

While the committee had several high-ranking military officers before it providing testimony on the missile program, it used the occasion to solicit views on fallout sheltering and civil defense in general. It became apparent that not all high-ranking military officers were prepared to give even lip-service to civil defense. When General Curtis LeMay, then the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and former SAC Commander, was queried on the advisability of spending $20 billion on a five-year program geared to create a nationwide fallout shelter system, he responded:

> I don't think I would put that much money into holes in the ground to crowd into...I would rather spend more of it on offensive weapon systems to deter the war in the first place. In other words, I see any great expenditure for this sort of thing to be what I call a maginot line concept, and I think it is doomed to failure.[173]

Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, told the committee in a similar vein that:

> Because of the improbability of having enough warning time for the major portion of our population to attain shelter /20-30 minutes even with early warning satellites/ I am not in favor of the Federal Government spending large sums of money on a full-blown shelter program. It makes sense to me, however, to encourage homeowners to provide some form of fallout shelter for their families.[174]

Subsequently, it was to be expected that the committee would take on a rather critical tone in its report:

> This report is critical but nevertheless factual. This is not a personal criticism of Governor Hoegh or any other individual. Survival of the American people is an issue too grave and too compelling for personal and partisan commentary. Governor Hoegh has acted with commendable zeal and energy to 'sell' civil defense to the American people. If films and lectures and bales of bulletins and 'alert' exercises were enough, we would say that Governor Hoegh had brilliantly succeeded. Unfortunately, these activities, however important some of them may be, will not of themselves provide shielding from deadly radiation in case of enemy attack.[175]

The subcommittee went on to note that it was not their intent to "demean

the homespun, self-help virtues and the importance of local initiative," in any Federal program, but:

> The subcommittee takes a coldly realistic view of the means for achieving nationwide shelter protection. There is no sense in living in a world of make believe. If the Federal Government doesn't supply the funds and direct a construction program for communal shelters, there will be no national shelter program.[176]

The FY 1961 Appropriation

Despite the low state of civil defense reflected in the Holifield subcommittee report, the OCDM fared significantly better in 1960 in seeking appropriations from Congress than it had in the previous three years of Eisenhower's second term. This year, as the year before, the main item of contention was the funding of State and local P&A expenses through the OCDM Contributions program. The OCDM was sticking to its guns by insisting on this program, and made two separate requests in 1960 for funding on this item. The first was in the form of a supplemental for FY 1960 in the amount of $3 million. As in the previous year the House and Senate divided on this program. The House denied the funds completely and the Senate approved the entire amount. In conference both bodies initially refused to compromise. The deadlock was finally broken when Albert Thomas of the House Appropriations Committee agreed to accept and approve $3 million in P&A funds in the FY 1961 budget request which would shortly be coming up for consideration.[177]

By this time the FY 1961 OCDM budget had already been submitted to the House but it had not been acted upon. This year's request was for $76,360,000. This was $23,465,000 more than had been approved the year before and included $12 million for the P&A program. (See Table III-8.) To the surprise of the Senate, when the House Independent Offices

Appropriation Bill was forwarded to the whole House on April 14th, no funds had been included for the P&A program in the $51.9 million budget recommendation--$985,000 less than the FY 1960 appropriation level.[179] As it turned out, Thomas had kept his word--his subcommittee had approved $3 million for the P&A program, but, the full Committee cut the funds from the budget afterwards.[180]

With this as background, the OCDM appeared before a Senate Appropriatiations subcommittee on May 23rd, seeking support for its budget and appeal of the thirty-two percent House cut.[181] On June 17th, this Senate Appropriations Committee filed its report on the OCDM appropriation request and recommended $68,850,000 for FY 1961--a $15,965,000 increase over the House recommendation. Included was the entire $12 million P&A request, which the Committee viewed as "the heart of the civil defense organization."[182] Significantly, when the two versions went to conference, the House conferees did not insist on their position on these funds and $6 million was finally authorized for the P&A program out of a final FY 1961 appropriation of $60.1 million.[183] (See Table III-8.)

In other related developments, civil defense funds requested by various government agencies for shelter provisioning in government buildings were not approved, primarily at the insistence of the House. The GSA, for example, had requested $2 million for minor alterations in existing government buildings, $3.8 million for additional hardening of existing government relocation sites, and approximately $10 million to include shelter protection in forty to fifty new government construction projects.[184]

TABLE III-8

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1961 OCDM APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1960[a] Funding	Request[b] to BOB	FY 1961[a] Request	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1961[c] Grant
Operations	$29,535	----	$25,750	$24,700	$25,200	$25,346*
Contributions	10,000	----	22,000	10,000	22,000	16,000
Supplies & Equipment	6,950	----	11,400	6,950	11,400	9,175
Surveys, Plans & Research	4,000	----	7,200	4,000	4,000	4,000
Delegations	0	----	10,000	6,250	6,250	6,567*
Construction of Facilities	2,400	----	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	$52,885	$93,863	$76,350	$51,900	$68,850	$61,088*

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1961, Senate Report 1611, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, p. 14.

[b]"OCDM Appropriation History (1951 Through 1961)," Appendix 9A), in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 397.

[c]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1962, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 11.

*Includes supplementals of $963,000 due to pay increases.

Postscript

This last appropriation disappointment helps illustrate the problems of civil defense throughout the Eisenhower Administration. The Congress, especially the House, was not very enthusiastic towards or supportive of civil defense. This, when combined with Presidential, military, and public disinterest (or lack of knowledge), resulted in a civil defense program that was not much better than no civil defense program at all. Indeed, both the average for Administration approval of civil defense budget submissions and the average for Congressional approval of appropriation requests, reached an all-time low at this point in the history of U.S. civil defense. (See Tables III-9 and 10.)

In terms of Presidential interest, four basic and related concerns dominated Eisenhower's position on civil defense. First was the President's desire to economize and maintain a balanced budget. Spending billions on a civil defense fallout shelter system would have wrecked that policy. Secondly, Eisenhower was concerned that signicantly augmented civil defense programs might jeopardize some of his foreign policy ambitions, primarily his attempt to de-fuse Cold War tensions. Outwardly noticeable civil defense efforts might give the wrong signal and undercut his efforts. Thirdly, Eisenhower's closest advisers had little regard for civil defense for a variety of reasons, among which were budgetary jealousies and concerns over the foreign ramifications. Lastly, the importance of strategic considerations became noticeable during the Eisenhower years and helps explain this Presidents lack of enthusiasm for civil defense. Offensive power and massive retaliation dominated defense policy during Eisenhower's tenure, especially so during the earlier years. Civil defense was thus relegated to a minor role.

TABLE III-9

COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATION APPROVAL OF FCDA/OCDM BUDGET REQUESTS

Truman Average	Eisenhower First Term Average	Eisenhower Second Term Average
$512,666,000	$101,362,500	$96,959,000

This situation would shortly change, but only because of the ground work laid during the Eisenhower Administration. The technical know-how to develop an ambitious Federal civil defense system was at hand. Eisenhower chose not to implement this system. As one observer has noted, a good indication of President Eisenhower's attitude toward civil defense can be found in his book Mandate For Change (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963) in which no substantive mention is ever made regarding civil defense.[185] It has further been reported that shortly after leaving office, Eisenhower was quoted as saying that "If I was in the finest shelter in the world, all alone, with all my family somewhere else, I think I'd just walk out. I don't want to live in that kind of world."[186]

Despite the fact that President Eisenhower refused to approve a large Federally-financed fallout shelter program and the large appropriations it would have taken to implement such a policy decision, he did approve rather significant budget requests averaging nearly $100 million. With such funds much progress could have been made in providing civil defense protection through surveys of fallout shielding potential in existing structures and other programs which never saw the light of day. The reason, of course, was because the Congress refused to appropriate the funds. As had been the case during the Truman Administration and during Eisenhower's first term, the House Appropriations Committee

continued to be the major Congressional roadblock to civil defense progress. Key committee members, such as Albert Thomas, maintained conceptions of civil defense that differed radically from those held by civil defense officials and the substantive committees which were concerned with civil defense. Civil defense programs and policy were thus shaped by the exigencies of the Executive and Congressional Appropriations environment. One wonders, however, if this knowledge was of any comfort for those Federal civil defense officials who found themselves in Representative Holifield's hotseat.

It Looks Darling!

Herblock cartoon from BAS, Vol. IX, No. 7, September 1953, p. 7.

TABLE III-10

SUMMARY OF FCDA/OCDM APPROPRIATIONS DURING EISENHOWER'S SECOND TERM

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1958	FY 1959	FY 1960	FY 1961	Truman Average	Eisenhower 1st Term Average	Eisenhower 2nd Term Average
Operations----------	$17,000	$18,500	$23,285	$25,346	$12,700	$11,559	$21,033
Contributions----------	17,000	0	10,000	16,000	13,300	12,975	10,750
Supplies & Equipment-------	3,300	18,000	6,950	9,175	24,000	33,288	9,356
Surveys, Plans & Research--	2,000	2,000	4,000	4,000	0	5,000	3,000
Delegated Functions--------	0	0	0	6,567	0	1,375	1,642
Construction of Facilities-	0	0	2,400	0	0	0	600
TOTALS	$39,300	$38,500	$46,635	$61,088	$50,000	$64,000	$46,000

NOTES

1 Twelve of these were identical bills: HR 2149 (Mrs. Griffiths); HR 2159 (Mr. Kilgore); HR 2213 (Mr. Fascell); HR 2214 (Mr. Garmatz); HR 2223 (Mr. Lipscomb); HR 2239 (Mr. Riehlman); HR 4219 (Mr. Price); HR 4295 (Mr. Minshall); HR 4415 (Mr. Porter); HR 4418 (Mr. Rodino); HR 6313 (Mr. Hemphill); and HR 6467 (Mr. Roosevelt). Two were similar in thrust: House Joint Resolution 78 (Mr. Price); and HJR 88 (Mr. Rodino). See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Hearings, New Civil Defense Legislation, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 1.

Holifield's bill received the endorcement of every member of the House Military Operations Subcommittee.

2 From HR 2125, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Ibid., p. 4.

3 Title II, Sections 201-202 (Subsection 3), in Ibid., p. 6.

4 Ibid., p. 1.

5 Ibid., pp. 15-16.

6 Quotation is the language used by the subcommittee in describing the NRDL program in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Status of Civil Defense Legislation, House Report 839, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 July 1957, p. 14.

7 New Civil Defense Legislation, p. 16.

8 At the time the defense budget was running close to $40 billion a year and the roadbuilding program was approximately $25 billion. See Ibid., pp. 34, 50, and 156.

9 Ibid., pp. 35-40. See also Status of New Civil Defense Legislation, pp. 14-15. For additional NRDL testimony consult Civil Defense For National Survival, Vol. 6, beginning at page 2433. The Appendix to these 1956 hearings should also be consulted for various NRDL papers which were submitted for the record.

10 Ibid., pp. 214-215. Dr. Teller roughly estimated the cost of these shelters at about $50 per person. For densely built-up areas, large (1000 person) shelters providing 50 to 100 psi protection could be constructed for approximately $100 per person. Stocking these shelters would run the total up several billion dollars.

11 Ibid., p. 187.

12 Ibid., p. 195.

13 Ibid., pp. 187-188.

14 Ibid., p. 146.

15 Ibid., p. 288.

16 In Ibid., p. 138.

17 Civil Defense For National Survival Hearings, p. 374.

18 Ibid., p. 1181.

19 New Civil Defense Legislation Hearings, p. 157.

20 William K. Chipman, Nonmilitary Defense For the U.S.--Strategic, Operational, Legal and Constitutional Aspects. (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin, National Security Studies Group, 1961), p. 262. Mr. Chipman went on to become the Wisconsin State Civil Defense Director before joining the FCDA as Director of the State and Local Division, Directorate For Federal Assistance. Mr. Chipman now holds the position of Deputy Assistant Director (Plans), the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (as of March 1979).

21 See General Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (N.Y.: Harper, 1960) p. 40. Quoted in Ibid.

22 Comment of Dr. Frans Bax, University of Virginia.

23 These amendments had originally been presented as HR 4910 and HR 4911 on February 8th, but were later replaced by HR 7576, which, as has been indicated, passed. See, Status of Civil Defense Legislation, pp. 11-12.

24 Ibid., p. 13. Of interest is that every Republican on the full Committee took exception to this statement with the exception of Representative Lipscomb and Representative Riehlman, who were both on the subcommittee. (See "Minority Report" to Ibid., pp. 28-29.

25 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1958 (Part 1), 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 547.

26 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 295. The largest cut was, as in the year before, in the stockpiling program. Seventy-five million had been sought but only $3.3 million was granted; and even this was not for stockpiling but for the warehousing of previously acquired stocks. In his report to the House, Chairman Thomas of the subcommittee indicated that:

> Inasmuch as we have on hand and on order $219½ million worth in supplies, some of which are 6 years old, the committee felt that funding of additional stockpiling material could be safely deferred at this time. (C.R., 103-3, 19 March 1957, p. 3978.)

Elsewhere it was indicated that another consideration involved in this decision was the perception of the subcommittee that the FCDA had thus far failed to establish an efficient warehousing system. (Noted in Status of New Civil Defense Legislation, p. 24.) Other cuts were primarily in FCDA plans to beef up their regional staffs and operations, and in their plans to expand their training school program. (U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1958 (Part 1), 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 547.

27 Congressional Record, Vol. 103, Part 3, 9 March 1957, p. 3992.

28 House, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1958 Hearings, p. 3992. Before another Congressional committee a few weeks later, Peterson complained that the FCDA was not getting from any of the Government branches, the cooperation it needed to put the concept of sheltering across:

> If the Government of the United States is not sufficiently convinced about the necessity for shelters to put shelters in buildings that are being built such as the Senate Office Building, or such as the State Department Building, then you are going to find it very difficult, the people are going to find it very difficult to accept the concepts themselves.

Peterson estimated that a sheltering capability of 30 psi could have been built in these buildings for about an additional 15% in cost. (Senate, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1958 Hearings, p. 230.)

29 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1958, House Report 197, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 March 1957, p. 3.

30 Congressional Record, Vol. 103, Part 3, 19 March 1957, p. 4004.

31 Ibid., p. 3998. This view was elaborated on in the Holifield subcommittee report on the Status of New Civil Defense Legislation, in which it is noted that:

> The subcommittee believes that the FCDA will continue to be restricted by congressional appropriations until it devises a sound, realistic program and recommends to the Congress the type of comprehensive legislation required to put this program into operation. In the opinion of the subcommittee the FCDA budget appropriation for fiscal year 1958 represents a vote of no convidence in the program of the FCDA. (p. 25.)

32 The Senate Committee, in its report did not elaborate on its decision. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1958, Senate Report 414, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 June 1957.

33 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 295. Some confusion over the circumstances of Peterson's departure have arisen in that

John Modell, in his study, The Politics of Safety: American Civil Defense (previously cited), states that Peterson was fired. In any event, it was announced in June that he would become Ambassador to Denmark. (Modell, pp. 23 and 28.)

34 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 295. Without a doubt, this pattern of political appointments did nothing to increase the stature of civil defense.

35 Bliss, p. 269. The timing of the test coincided with the East-West disarmament talks just getting underway in London. An announcement of the test concluded with a reference to disarmament and blamed the West for past failures to achieve progress in arms-control discussions. (See Klass, p. 20.)

36 Klass, pp. 19, 23, and 28.

37 Lafeber, p. 201; Klass, p. 23.

38 Bliss, p. 269; Klass, pp. 25, and 82-83.

39 Klass, p. 24.

40 Quoted by Divine, p. 172.

41 As we know now, the "missile gap" did not develop as expected. The Soviets did not exploit these technological breakthroughs and go into full-scale production of the IRBMs and ICBMs which had been tested even though Khrushchev talked of such mass production. Subsequently, the political use of these missiles to affect changes in Western Europe (particularly Berlin) did not transpire as had been forecast. One analyst has posited that the reason for this is that the newly created "Strategic Rocket" forces "were controlled by the Soviet Army, which was not very interested in ICBMs." More traditional Army programs would have had to have been cut in order to significantly fund ICBM development at a higher level. The "Strategic Rocket" forces did not have the leverage to force such a redistribution of funds. See John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy Is Made, (2nd edition), (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1978), pp. 106-107.

42 Klass, pp. 19, 23, and 27-28. This turn of events prompted Chairman Mao Tse-tung of China to state during a visit to Moscow during November that "the East Wind is now prevailing over the West wind."

43 Chipman, Nonmilitary Defense..., p. 125.

44 See cover letter to Deterence & Survival in the Nuclear Age, Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, 7 November 1957. Hereafter referred to as The Gaither Report. The Report was declassified in 1973 and subsequently reprinted in 1976 by the U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, (94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1976). See also Charles C. Alexander, Holding The Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961, (Bloomington, Indiana: University Press, 1975) pp. 227-228.

45 Alexander, pp. 227-228. See also W. W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power--1957-1972. (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1972), pp. 72-73.

46 The Gaither Report, p. 1.

47 Ibid., pp. 1 and 4-5.

48 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

49 Ibid., p. 8.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., p. 20.

52 Ibid., p. 22.

53 U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Hearings, The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man, (in 3 parts), 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.

54 U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Summary Analysis of Hearings, May 27-29 and June 3-7, 1957 on The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., August 1957, p. 7. See also Chet Holifield, "Congressional Hearings on Radioactive Fall-Out," BAS, Vol. XIV, No. 1, January 1958; and BAS, "Fall-out From A Bombing Campaign," Vol. XIV, No. 1, January 1958 (contains excerpts from the hearings).

55 Summary-Analysis of Hearings, p. 9.

56 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, (N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965) pp. 222-223.

57 Morton Halperin, "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," World Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3, April 1961, pp. 368 and 371.

58 Alexander, pp. 228-229.

59 Huntington (1961), p. 360. In relation to this State Department view, however, it is of interest to note the 4 January 1958 edition of Britain's New Statesman, which included an editorial critical of Eisenhower's reception of the report and stated that "The Gaither report has revealed that, irrespective of any efforts which America may now make, the Soviet preponderance in advanced weapons has reached such an absolute state that America's national survival will depend, until 1961 at least, on 'Russian benevolence'." (Quoted in Klass, p. 29.)

60 Halperin, p. 374. Eisenhower elaborated further on the State Department's views in Waging Peace wherein he quotes Dulles as indicating that:

> If a wave of a hand could create those shelters we'd of course be better off with them than without them. But it's hard to

sustain simultaneously an offensive and defensive mood in a population. For our security we have been relying above all on our capacity for retaliation. From this policy we should not deviate now. To do so would imply we are turning to a 'fortress America' concept. (Quoted by Herbert Roback in "Civil Defense and National Defense," (Wigner, 1968), p. 91.)

61 Alexander, pp. 228-229. Eisenhower did not respond negatively to every recommendation of the report--he accelerated dispersal of SAC bases and aircraft, increased the number of SAC planes on alert, accelerated the ICBM program and approved the hardening program of these missiles in underground silos. Of additional note, while the Gaither Report's recommendations were, at the time, largely ignored, they would, in a few years, become the basis of U.S. defense policy under the new Kennedy Administration. See Barnet, p. 181. See also Rostow, p. 73.

62 Eisenhower's statement was first made at a weekly news conference on 7 February 1957, and quoted in the Congressional Record, Vol. 103, Part 3, 19 March 1957, p. 4002.

63 In fact, several Administration sources sought to downplay Sputnik. Clarence Randall, for example, special adviser to the President on foreign trade, called Sputnik "a silly bauble." And outgoing Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson dismissed it as "a neat scientific trick." According to Divine (P. 170), "Eisenhower told the Nation that despite Sputnik, the United States was still ahead in the missile race and that no crash program was called for." Rapid progress in the Minuteman and Polaris programs would prove Eisenhower right.

64 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1959 (Part 2), 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, pp. 408-498.

65 Ibid., pp. 414-416.

66 Ibid., 440-441.

67 Ibid., p. 417.

68 Ibid., pp. 441-442.

69 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1959, House Report 1543, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 21 March 1958, pp. 5-6.

70 See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1959, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, pp. 189-212.

71 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1959, Senate Report 1656, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 5 June 1958, p. 18.

72 U.S., Congress, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1959--Conference Report, House Report 2237, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 22 July 1958. Reprinted in Congressional Record, Vol. 104, 1958, p. 14633.

73 Congressional Record, Vol. 104, 24 March 1958, p. 5072.

74 U.S., Congress, House Document No. 375, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess.

75 Congressional Record, Vol. 104, 24 April 1958, p. 7240.

76 See Exhibit A--"McKinsey & Co., Report on Nonmilitary Defense Organization," in House, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1959, Hearings, p. 410.

77 Ibid., p. 448. Part I of the McKinsey study, "A Framework For Improving Nonmilitary Defense Organization," was forwarded 31 December 1957. Part II, "Organization For Nonmilitary Defense Preparedness," followed on 21 March 1958.

78 See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1958 (Part II--"Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958"), 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958; and, U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Reorganization, Hearings, Disapproving Reorganization Plan No. 1, of 1958, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958.

79 Civil Defense--1958, Part II, p. 391.

80 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Analysis of Civil Defense Reorganization, House Report 1874, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 12 June 1958, p. 3.

81 Ibid., p. 23.

82 The concern of Senator Potter noted in Hearings, Disapproving Reorganization Plan No. 1, of 1958, p. 7.

83 Ibid., p. 9.

84 See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1960, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 38.

85 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1958 (Part I--Atomic Shelter Tests), 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1959, p. 254.

86 Ibid., p. 256. As brought out during questioning, Dr. Johnson's OSO group was similar to the RAND Corp., except only about half the size. The OSO was devoted exclusively to Government contract work, principally for the Army. (pp. 267-268.)

87 On this latter point, for example, Benjamin Taylor, the Director of the Engineering Research and Development Office of the FCDA,

discussed with the committee a possible project to provide sheltering for Manhattan Island in New York City by burrowing perhaps as far down as 800 feet into the rock stratum underneath the island and excavating shelter space for the entire population of the island at a projected cost of approximately $680 per person:

> It appears perfectly feasible to extend this system of shelter to other boroughs of New York City so that there would be an interconnected system throughout the entire city, providing not only what might be conceived of as an almost absolute shelter, but also escapeways to the suburban areas as well. (Ibid., pp. 172 and 174.)

To the relief of Holifield, who thought such studies counterproductive in that they focused attention away from more serious and practical proposals, the FCDA was not proposing that this plan be acted upon. It was merely their intention to show that technical solutions could be found for even the most difficult protection problems.

88 Ibid., Part II, p. 394.

89 U.S., Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Atomic Shelter Programs, House Report 2554, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 12 Auguse 1958, p. 11. See Hearings, Part II, p. 395. This shelter policy was formalized in December of 1958 with the publication of The National Plan For Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, which included as Annex 10 "The National Shelter Plan." This section, dealing with sheltering, reiterated that "the responsibilities assigned to the Federal Government in this annex are limited to providing 'stimulation, leadership, guidance, and example'." (Quoted in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Civil Defense Shelter Policy and Postattack Recovery Planning, House Report 2069, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1 July 1960, p. 7.)

90 Civil Defense-1958, Part II, p. 395. Hoegh later elaborated on this statement on the television program "Meet the Press" (7 September 1958), when he was asked his views on sheltering: "Of course, we have not advocated a federal construction program. We advocate this, the self-help program. That's nothing new. For instance, back in the Indian age our forebearers, when they built their homes, also, provided a foretress. In 1958 the American people in their own home should provide themselves protection from radioactive fallout. We give the guidance and direction." (Quoted by Ralph Lapp in "Fallout and Home Defense," BAS, Vol. XV, No. 5, May 1959, p. 188.)

91 Civil Defense-1958, Part II, p. 397.

92 Ibid., p. 403.

93 Atomic Shelter Programs, pp. 18-19.

94 This study was included as "Appendix 3" in: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military

Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense-1962, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962. The Committee concluded that:

> 1. Adequate shielding is the only effective means of preventing radiation casualties....
>
> 2. Postponement of basic shelter construction is not warranted in our judgement by any lack of essential technical knowledge....
>
> 3. There is need to investigate many details in order to provide a more effective and coordinated shelter system. (Ibid., p. 369.)

95 The study referred to was an advance copy of an unpublished report included as "Exhibit B" in Civil Defense-1958.

96 Ibid., pp. 477-478.

97 Ibid., p. 495.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid., Part I, p. 229.

100 Ibid., Part II, p. 404.

101 Civil Defense-1960, Part I, p. 35.

102 See summary of plan in Senate, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1960, Hearings, p. 40.

103 Civil Defense Shelter Policy and Postattack Recovery Planning, p. 27.

104 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1960 (Part 2), 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 293.

105 Of the new programs, $5.5 million was to accelerate the public education and information program on the effects of radioactive fallout and defense measures against it; $3 million for the construction of prototype shelters to provide examples throughout the country; $1 million for research to improve shelter designs and to make habitability studies; $1.8 million for studies to determine shelter availability in existing structures; $12 million for matching personnel and administrative funds for the State and local areas; $8.5 million for the purchase of radiological and chemical instruments and devices for training purposes at State and local level; and, $300,000 for student travel to OCDM training schools. (Ibid., p. 539.)

106 Ibid., pp. 512-513.

107 Ibid., p. 409.

108 Ibid., pp. 455, 520-521.

109 Ibid., p. 486. Earlier in the year, Hoegh had unsuccessfully sought a FY 1959 supplemental of $3 million for P&A funds. (See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Special Subcommittee on Deficiencies, Hearings, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1959, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 187.) In its report on this request, dated 24 March 1959, House Appropriations denied the funds and indicated:

> If the Federal Government were to start this program and provide Federal contributions for administration and jobs at various city halls it would create an independent bureaucracy that would be divorced from responsibility to either Federal or local governments, which would prove to be wasteful and this organization would continue to pressure Congress. (Noted in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Second Supplemental Appropriation For 1959, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 April 1959, p. 973.)

The Senate upheld the House, but this action was not due to a philosophical disagreement with the program. In its report the Senate noted that not all the States had submitted their plans as required by the terms of the authorizing legislation. The Senate suggested that its approval would be forthcoming as soon as all the necessary plans were in. (See the Congressional Record, Vol. 105, Part 11, 30 July 1959, p. 973.)

110 The use of the word "skeptical" may be euphemistic. Thomas' criticisms of OCDM line item requests at times reached ridiculous extremes. For example, Thomas argued that the provision of radiation detection devices was a waste of money because, as he put it, one does not buy a thermometer to cure a fever. For the same reason, he argued, radiation detection devices were useless! (See House, Independent Offices Appropriations Hearings, 1960, p. 525.)

111 Ibid., p. 538.

112 See Senate, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1960, pp. 28, 34, and 80.

113 U.S., Congress, House, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1960, House Report 350, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 May 1959, p. 2. The Committee made several factual errors in this paragraph as will be seen in a later section.

114 Ibid.

115 Noted in letter from the National Association of State and Territorial Civil Defense Directors to Senate Appropriations Committee, and reprinted in Senate, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1960, p. 568.

116 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1960, Senate Report 423, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 June 1959, p. 2.

117 Congressional Record, (105-11) 30 July 1959, p. 14700.

118 Ibid., pp. 14705 and 14708-14709. It should be noted that as a freshman Senator, Young quickly became a civil defense gadfly, making numerous (and often factually erroneous) attacks against civil defense. It would appear, however, that his attacks had little lasting impact upon civil defense.

119 Ibid., pp. 14699-14701.

120 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 305.

121 This appeal was included in a letter from Eisenhower to the Congress, dated August 25th, accompanying his second supplemental request to the Congress for OCDM funds. In this supplemental the Administration was appealing the $9 million regular appropriation cut in the funding of OCDM functions delegated to other Federal agencies ($12 million had originally been sought). In its report the House indicated:

> The committee does not believe that these responsibilities are so dissimilar from the regular functions of the agencies that they should require supplemental funds. (Quoted in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Supplemental Appropriation Bill For 1960, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 149.)

The Senate disagreed and a compromise on this first supplemental granted OCDM $3 million. In his August 25 letter Eisenhower argued that "the $3 million provided does not enable the Federal Government to carry out the responsibilities contained in the National Security Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Federal Civil Defense Act." (See the Congressional Record, Vol. 105, Part 13, 27 August 1959, pp. 17235-17237.) This area would remain a problem for the next several years.

122 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 305

123 Hubert Humphrey, "A Critical Analysis of Civil Defense," the Congressional Record, Vol. 105, Part 13, 31 August 1959, p. 17365.

124 House, New Civil Defense Program, p. 45.

125 House, Civil Defense-1960, Part I, pp. 9 and 36.

126 House, New Civil Defense Program, p. 45. This report noted that the Appropriation Committees were "adamantly opposed because of the lack of explicit statutory authorization." (Ibid.)

127 See U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, Defense Production Act, Progress Report No. 42 on "the Adequacy of Preparedness Programs To Meet Nuclear Attack and Limited Scale War," 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958.

128 See U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, Defense Production Act, Progress Report No. 44 on "Hearing on Mobilization Programs of Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization and Business and Defense Services Administrations," 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 Aug. 1959.

129 U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Hearings, Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959. Hereafter referred to as Effects of Nuclear War (Hearings).

130 The scenario envisioned an attack delivered within a 24-hour time frame, utilizing 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10 megaton bombs. (See the Congressional Record, Vol. 105, Part 10, 15 July 1959, p. 13499.)

131 Ibid., p. 13500.

132 Ibid., Part 13, 27 August 1959, p. 17234.

133 House, Hearings, Civil Defense-1960, p. 7.

134 Congressional Record, Vol. 105, Part 13, 27 August 1959, p. 17234. Bertrand Russell, for example, writing in Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, published in the same year as these hearings, claimed that a nuclear war between the U.S. and the USSR "would exterminate both." Moreover, "...if there is a war between the two blocs, the human race will be exterminated." Even on the most favorable or optimistic level, Russell claimed, the world "would consist of destitute populations, maddened by hunger, debilitated by disease, deprived of the support of modern industry and means of transport, incapable of supporting educational institutions, and rapidly sinking to the level of ignorent savages." (See Bertrand Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1959), pp. 32, 42, and 86.)

135 U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, (Summary Analysis of Hearings, June 22-26 1959), 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 8. Hereafter referred to as Effects of Nuclear War (Report).

136 Ibid., p. 50.

137 Chet Holifield, "The Effects of Nuclear War," Congressional Record, Vol. 105, Part 13, 27 August 1959, p. 17234.

138 Ibid.

139 JCAE, Effects of Nuclear War (Report).

140 Congressional Record, Vol. 105, Part 10, 15 July 1959, p. 13499.

141 JCAE, Effects of Nuclear War (Report).

142 U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, Ninth Annual Report, House Report 1193, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 13 January 1960, p. 94.

143 Quoted in Congressional Record, (105-4) 7 April 1959, pp. 5469-5470. See also Vol. 105, Part 11, 29 July 1959, p. 14599, and Part 10, 15 July 1959, p. 13498.

144 From "Report of the Special Task Force on Protection From Radioactive Fallout, July 6, 1959," Quoted in Congressional Record, Vol. 105, Part 10, 15 July 1959, p. 13498.

145 From "Introductory Statement of Nelson Rockefeller," in U.S., Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, White House Conference on Fallout Protection, 25 January 1960, (Washington, D.C.: OCDM, 1960), p. 5.

146 See Robert C. Albright, "Bomb Shelter Work Urged By Governors --Conference Sees It As Defense Against Attack or Blackmail," Washington Post and Times Herald, 5 August 1959. Reprinted in Congressional Record, Vol. 105, Part 13, 31 August 1959, p. 17367.

147 White House Conference on Fallout Protection, p. 5. Rockefeller was aided in his effort to get this resolution passed as a result of a closed session briefing by Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, before the Conference. Dulles told the Governors:

> The evidence is overwhelming that the Soviets intend to use nuclear blackmail as a major weapon to promote their objectives--namely to spread communism throughout the world.... They showed this intent at the time of the Suez crisis about a year ago. They will use the same threat against this country...
>
> If due either to any weakening of our defenses--and all forms of protection against nuclear attack are important elements of our defense--or due to any failure to maintain our retaliatory striking power, we render ourselves susceptible to such nuclear blackmail, the security of this country and of the free world would be gravely compromised.

(Congressional Record, Vol. 105, Part 13, 31 August 1959, p. 17367.)

148 I would like to thank Dr. Frans Bax of the University of Virginia for his comments on Rockefeller's politicization of the civil defense issue.

149 White House Conference on Fallout Protection, pp. iii. and 3.

150 Ibid., p. 12.

151 Ibid., p. 8. This was not the first indication of a Soviet civil defense program. Testimony had been taken on this subject during several of the Holifield hearings, for example. The question of Soviet civil defense has received its closest attention during the Ford and Carter Administrations.

152 Congressional Record, Vol. 106, Part 3, 29 Feb. 1960, p. 3735.

153 To some degree the Conference consensus was reflected in the statement of the Special Committee on Civil Defense issued upon the conclusion of the conference: "We are satisfied that, if our foreign policy

> is to be credible, if our foreign negotiations are to be successful in assuring peace, if our military deterrence is to be effective and our military strength is to be meaningful, if the American people are to have the strength and will to resist nuclear blackmail, if our nation is to survive in the event some aggressor should do the unthinkable and unleash a nuclear attack upon us, then, for each of these reasons, fallout protection for our citizens is imperative.
>
> We believe, based on the presentations we have heard today, that fallout protection for our people is essential, that, while there will be many problems, a very high degree of protection from fallout can be achieved, that it is achievable now and achievable at a cost within the reach of our people and nation. We also believe that the Federal Government should participate more actively in providing the leadership, the financial support and the inducements which must be forthcoming if an effective program of fallout protection for all our people is to be achieved in the near future."

(Cited in White House Conference on Fallout Protection, p. 3.)

154 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1965, p. 308. The Legislature did, however, pass a resolution urging the Federal Government to develop a national shelter program, including incentives for private participation in the form of tax benefits for shelter construction. For further information on Rockefeller and the New York State proposals, see "Address of Governor Nelson Rockefeller to the Members of the State Civil Defense Council," 17 February 1960, pp. 3733-3735 in the Congressional Record, Vol. 106, Part 3, 29 February 1960. See, also, Part 9, 1 June 1960, p. 11526; Part 1, 26 January 1960, p. 1367; Part 13, 20 August 1960, p. 16908; House, Hearings, Civil Defense-1960, pp. 39-41; and, House, Civil Defense Shelter Policy and Postattack Recovery Planning, p. 24.

155 William L. O'Neill, Coming Apart--An Informal History of America in the 1960s, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971) pp. 3, 13, and 19-20.

156 Theodore White, The Making Of the President, 1960, (N.Y.: Atheneum, 1961), p. 228.

157 Testifying on behalf of the military, Charles C. Finacan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserves) explained the military's opposition on the grounds that:

> It is our opinion that current plans and programs do now in fact provide for the maximum practical participation of our military forces, both active and Reserve in the civil defense effort....Although the vital importance of civil defense is fully appreciated by the Department of Defense, it is our opinion that a plan such as contemplated in Senate Resolution 67 would not be in the best interest of national security.

For more information on this subject see U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing, Assistance to Civil Defense By Reserves, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1 June 1960. Quotation from p. 22.

158 See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Atomic Energy, Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Hearings, Radiation Protection Criteria and Standards, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960.

159 House, Civil Defense-1960, Hearings, Part I, p. 2.

160 Ibid., p. 257.

161 Ibid., pp. 2 and 3.

162 Ibid., p. 3.

163 Ibid., p. 49. From letter of Governor Orville Freeman of Minnesota.

164 Ibid., p. 3.

165 Ibid., p. 57. A shelter space was defined as "an area of at least 12 square feet with a protection factor of at least 100." (p. 61.)

166 Ibid., p. 49.

167 Ibid., Part II, p. 101.

168 Ibid., Part I, p. 55; and Part II, pp. 113 and 116.

169 Congressional Record, Vol. 106, Part 13, 25 August 1960, p. 17581.

170 House, Civil Defense-1960, Hearings, Part III, p. 169.

171 Ibid., p. 231.

172 To be sure, there are other arguments against moving the land-based ICBM force out to sea, involving communication, command and control, etc., but this subject is outside the purview of this study.

173 House, Civil Defense-1960, Hearings, Part III, p. 157.

174 Ibid., p. 173.

175 House, Civil Defense Shelter Policy and Postattack Recovery Planning, p. 2.

176 Ibid., p. 5.

177 See CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 308; and, the Congressional Record, Vol. 106, Part 6, 7 April 1960, p. 7570.

178 See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,

Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1961 (Part 1), 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960.

179 See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1961, House Report 1519, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, pp. 2-3.

180 See Congressional Record, Vol. 106, Part 6, 19 April 1960, pp. 8208 and 8226.

181 See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1961, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960.

182 See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1961, Senate Report 1611, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, pp. 4-5.

183 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 308.

184 House, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1961, p. 1076; and, CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 308.

185 Neal Fitzsimons, "Brief History of American Civil Defense," in Wigner (ed.), Who Speaks For Civil Defense, p. 37.

186 Quoted in the Congressional Record, 17 September 1963, p. 17277.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE KENNEDY YEARS

> The United States shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.[1]

John F. Kennedy came to office in 1961 with a determination to be an active and strong President. Consequently, in order "to assure the survival and success of liberty," and in line with his criticisms of Eisenhower's defense policies during the campaign, Kennedy, early in his Administration, brought about a reorientation of the Nation's defense policies. Judging from Kennedy's actions and statements, he saw two basic flaws in the Nation's military posture: (1) the inadequacy of the strategic deterrent, and (2) the shortcomings of the country's conventional capabilities.[2] As a result, many of the recommendations of the Gaither Report became the basis of Kennedy's defense policy and several Committee members were given posts in the national security apparatus.[3]

Kennedy's new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, came to share many of the President's defense concerns. Soon after assuming his post, McNamara initiated a study of the countrys defense policies. On the basis of this study McNamara recommended to the President a series of changes. This was the basis of Kennedy's request, on 28 March 1961, for $2 billion more than had been sought in the Eisenhower defense budget for FY 1962. These added funds would be used to further accelerate and expand the Polaris program, to increase Minuteman production facilities, and to make the S.A.C. bomber fleet more secure against attack.[4]

Notably, however, no mention of civil defense was made during Kennedy's first Defense Message on March 28th. Similarly, as Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy's Special Council, has pointed out, no mention of civil defense was made during the Inaugural or State of the Union Messages. Nor can Sorenson recall Kennedy's ever having talked "about the subject as a Senator or candidate."[5] In less than two months, though, President Kennedy would precipitate a series of events which would bring civil defense into a new era and mark the start of a controversy over civil defense the Nation has seen neither before nor since.

Part I

25 May 1961--A New Era In Civil Defense Begins

On May 25th, 1961, President Kennedy delivered a Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs in which he spoke to the Congress and the Nation on the importance of civil defense and outlined a future course of action which would reorient the civil defense program. Before getting into the specifics of the President's message, however, some background into developments in the civil defense field during the previous four months is in order.

Background

Shortly after assuming office, President Kennedy appointed Frank B. Ellis to replace Leo Hoegh as the Director of the Nation's Federal civil defense program. In appointing Mr. Ellis the new OCDM Administrator, President Kennedy broke the chain of ex-Governors who had occupied that position in the past. This is not to say, unfortunately, that the selection was not one of patronage. Before his OCDM appointment Ellis had been a New Orleans attorney and would-be politician--having once ran

unsucessfully for the Senate. His major claim to fame up to this time was in having been instrumental in delivering a "rebellious Louisiana state delegation to Kennedy during the Democratic Presidential Convention.[6]

Having no background in civil defense, Ellis' first assignment was to conduct a thorough review of civil defense and to report back to the President with recommendations. According to Ellis, Kennedy stated that "he considered civil defense vital to this Nation, that it was a matter of grave concern to him, and he therefore ordered an immediate examination into all aspects of civil defense, and the submission of a report with this office /OCDM/ working in conjunction with the Bureau of the Budget and the military in its preparation."[7] According to one account, Ellis plunged into the civil defense review with "considerable vigor," and had, within six weeks, produced a report which noted that "although a sound basis for action has been established, civil defense has failed to attain adequate public and official support, and little actual progress has been achieved."[8] Ellis' personal opinion was that the OCDM program was "completely inadequate." Upon submission of the review report he therefore indicated that he would seek to turn this situation around. According to the New York Times, Ellis planned on requesting a substantially increased budget appropriation and was thinking about recommending Cabinet status for the OCDM.[9] Just how much of a substantial increase was contemplated was made clear a few weeks later when it was reported that Ellis was "demanding" a $300 million appropriation (as opposed to the approximately $100 million request that had been prepared under the outgoing Eisenhower Administration.) It was further reported that Ellis had threatened to resign if the $300 million budget figure was not approved.[10]

By this time Ellis had launched a full-scale "revival for survival" campaign, as he called it. He considered it a Christian's duty to provide for one's survival. By lobbying with the press and politicians for support for a fallout shelter program it became obvious that Ellis was seeking to persuade Kennedy to give him the capability to turn the civil defense program around.[11] Of those who were skeptical of the utility of fallout shelters, Ellis had this to say before a Congressional Committee:

> Certain people seem to be afflicted by a new and dreadful disease which has been called "nuclearosis" of the brain. It's a malady wherein one is so overawed by the destructive power of nuclear weapons that he can no longer think objectively on the subject of national defense.[12]

Ellis' "zealous advocacy" of improvement in the civil defense program went so far as planning a trip to Rome where he hoped to persuade the Pope to publically support the installation of fallout shelters in all church basements. When Kennedy learned of this scheme, however, he "gently suggested that it would be a mistake to bother the Pope at that time."[13]

Ellis was not the only voice urging action on civil defense during Kennedy's first four months. Chet Holifield, for example, sent a letter to Kennedy, timed to arrive on Inauguration Day, bemoaning the sad state of civil defense and voicing hope that Kennedy would reverse this situation.[14] In April a task force called the Committee on the Defense Establishment, headed by Stuart Symington and including many of the Nation's foremost authorities on defense needs, reported to the President that a unified command in charge of the National Guard and the organized reserve elements of all the services should be established and that civil defense should be made a responsibility of this command.[15] In

early May, Representative Riehlman, a member of the Holifield Military Operations Subcommittee, in a speech on the Floor of the House, argued that "the time has come to face the fact that military defense and civil defense cannot be separated." Therefore:

> Because of my firm belief that a strong civil defense program is absolutely essential to our deterrent posture and to an ultimate defense of our homeland, and because of my equally firm conviction that the framework of our present civil defense program is wholly inadequate to do the necessary job, I am introducing a concurrent resolution which would express the sense of Congress that the President, in accordance with the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended, should prepare and submit to the Congress a positive program for placing full civil defense responsibility in the Department of Defense.[16]

Of course, not everyone urging Presidential action urged expansion of the civil defense program. As might be expected, Senator Young of Ohio was urging curtailment, if not outright abolition of civil defense activities. By May 18th, Senator Young had given no fewer than eight speeches on the Floor of the Senate urging Kennedy to cut out this "wasteful boondoggle."[17]

While it is very doubtful that these appeals had much impact on Presidential decision-making, another appraisal of civil defense at the same time came to conclusions quite similar to Young's (in one respect) and were most probably of significant impact. This was a study of civil defense by Carl Kaysen of the White House staff, who concluded and reported to Kennedy that the current program was based on outmoded concepts and that continued appropriations would be a waste. Therefore, "the United States should either face up to the problem in a serious way or forget it."[18] According to Sorenson, "it was not in John Kennedy's nature to forget it."[19]

Sorenson's brief account of civil defense during the Kennedy years notes four factors he deems important in inderstanding the President's

subsequent May 25th decision:

1. It was consistent with the note of added urgency and effort he wished to sound to the Congress.

2. His obligations as President did not permit him to ignore the protection of human lives while protecting our weapons of war.

3. He was not unmindful of the fact that New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who appeared to be his most likely opponent in 1964, was criticizing the administration's "complacency" on civil defense.

4. The "agonizing reappraisal" of his administration and its policies which had been induced by the Bay of Pigs fiasco.[20]

A fifth factor might also be suggested bearing on Kennedy's perception of the Soviet Union and the future environment of international relations. On January 6th, just a few days before Kennedy assumed office, Khrushchev gave a speech in Moscow before a meeting of the world's Communist leaders which made a lasting impression on Kennedy. It has been written that Kennedy became convinced that in this speech Khrushchev was "explicitly outlining his strategy for the global victory of Communism, involving the "double-barreled" promotion of wars of national liberation alongside an economic attempt to shift the flow of Third World raw materials from the West to the East.[21] Such a strategy, Kennedy no doubt concluded, contained the seeds of potential superpower confrontation. With such a foreboding prospect, the words of Kennedy's Inaugural Address take on a meaning quite distinct from mere rhetoric.

The May 25th Speech and Its Aftermath

With this background it is now appropriate to turn to the President's "Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs," of 25 May 1961. The carefully worded section on civil defense deserves quotation:

> One major element of the national security program which this Nation has never squarely faced up to is civil defense. This

> problem arises not from present trends but from past inaction. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety of programs, but we have never adopted a consistent policy. Public considerations have been largely characterized by apathy, indifference, and skepticism; while, at the same time, many of the civil defense plans proposed have been so far reaching or unrealistic that they have not gained essential support.
>
> This administration has been looking very hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guarantee against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack.
>
> We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is so strong and so invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response. If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute.
>
> But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. The nature of modern warfare heightens these possibilities. It is on this basis that civil defense can readily be justified--as insurance for the civilian population in the event of such a miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed--but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.

Kennedy then went on to disclose "the initiation of a nationwide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures." This would require Federal funds and would include, "where appropriate, incorporation of shelter in Federal buildings, new requirements for shelter in buildings constructed with Federal financial assistance, and matching grants and other incentives for constructing shelter in State and local government and private buildings." In order "to assure effective use of these shelters, additional measures will be required for warning, training, and radiological monitoring, and stockpiling of food and medicines." To implement this program, Kennedy noted three requisites: (1) New legislative authority, (2) more funds, and (3) sound organizational

arrangements. Therefore, the President indicated that he was assigning responsibility for this program to Secretary of Defense McNamara. Ellis' OCDM would then be reconstituted as a "small staff agency" known as the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP). Its role would be to advise the President and engage in long-range planning. Kennedy further noted that as soon as these arrangements could be made, appropriations would be sought which "in all likelihood" would "be more than triple the pending budget requests; and they will increase sharply in subsequent years."[22]

According to newspaper reports, not everyone in Kennedy's Administration was happy with this development. Budget Director David Bell and National Security Policy Advisor McGeorge Bundy, for example, were reported to have opposed any "substantial increases" in civil defense funding because of the existence of other higher priority programs which needed increased funding.[23] Several sources have noted that Frank Ellis was also upset with the way things had developed. He had originally only accepted the move of the shelter program to the Defense Department. But, as a result of the President's decision, by far the greater portion of civil defense responsibilities would be transferred away from Ellis to the Pentagon, with some additional responsibilities going to Health, Education and Welfare, and to the Agriculture Department, for example. Showing increasing "ill-concealed hostility toward the Secretary of Defense,"[24] who wanted "full responsibility or none,"[25] Ellis would continue to fight for a bigger share of the civil defense pie until 20 July 1961 when Kennedy settled the matter by formally assigning virtually all civil defense functions to the Secretary of Defense by Executive Order 10952.[26] Shortly thereafter Ellis resigned to accept a Federal judgeship.[27]

Outside the Executive, reactions to the May 25th speech were varied. On the one hand, some, like Congressman Hosmer, were critical that the President's proposals did not go far enough. Hosmer was particularly upset at the section disclaiming any link between civil defense and deterrence. Exacerbating this "childlike naivete" was the poor timing of the speech, in Hosmer's opinion:

> On almost the eve of his meeting with Khrushchev /3-4 June/, the shrewd, seasoned, skilled manipulator of today's conflict, Mr. Kennedy publicly, before the world, exposed himself barren of the intellectual preparation he must have to meet such a man without running undue risks for our country....
>
> He asserted the deterrent concept assumes rational calculation by rational men and swept aside the strategic role of civil defense in influencing rational calculations be Soviet leaders whether or not to push the button for surprise nuclear attack.[28]

On the other hand, Senator Young attacked Kennedy's position on the grounds that neither sheltering nor evacuation would work; thus this was but another case of wasted taxpayer's funds.[29]

Part II

25 July 1961--A National Debate Begins

Background--Berlin

Kennedy's May 25th Address sparked little discussion in the popular press and little controversy in Washington.[30] No huge sums were asked for from the Congress, no new authorizing legislation was sought, and no Congressional investigations were held--Washington was preoccupied with other matters. Among these matters was the conflict in Laos, the aftermath of the June summit meeting with Khrushchev, and threats over Berlin. All three had troubling aspects. The conflict in Laos, in conjunction with Khrushchev's January 6th speech, must have seemed like a portent of things to come. There is no doubt that the Vienna summit was

no less troubling for the President. The position Khrushchev took at this meeting has been described as "hardline" by some, "militant" by others, and at least one account has indicated that Khrushchev sought to "bully" Kennedy on Berlin and other issues at the conference. Kennedy, himself, upon his return, told the nation: "I will tell you now that it was a very sober two days."[32]

It was the Berlin issue, though, that Kennedy would find to be the most troubling issue during the next several months--growing into a full fledged crisis. Both during the summit, and publically afterwards, Khrushchev had demanded a solution to "the Berlin problem' and once again invoked a six-month ultimatum--with a deadline of 31 December 1961.[36] With each successive statement on Berlin by Khrushchev, tensions would rise. Eventually, Kennedy came to perceive Soviet policy on this issue as "designed to neutralize West Germany as a first step in the neutralization of Western Europe." According to Kennedy, "that is what makes the present situation so dangerous. West Germany is the key as to whether Western Europe will be free."[34]

Dean Acheson, we are told, held a somewhat different perception of the problem, and, according to Schlesinger's account, sought to persuade the President, in late June, that Khrushchev's object "was not to rectify a local situation but to test the general American will to resist." Acheson was convinced that Khrushchev's "hope was that, by making us back down on a sacred commitment, he could shatter our world power and influence," and that he "had only dared precipitate the crisis...because his fear of nuclear war had declined." Acheson told the President that "our problem was to convince him that his complacency was misplaced and that we would, in fact, go to nuclear war rather than abandon the status

quo." There was a growing fear both in and out of government, and abroad as well, that this might actually come to pass. As the Economist put it on June 24th: "Unless Mr. Kennedy takes a decisive grip on the wheel, the West is in danger of by-passing one possible line of compromise after another until it reaches a dead end where neither it nor Russia has any choice except between ignominious retreat and nuclear devastation."[35]

Leading up to Kennedy's address to the Nation, Khrushchev, on July 8th, announced that he had cancelled his earlier plans to slash the size of the Soviet armed forces by a third and would instead increase the Soviet defense budget by nearly one-third. The very next day the Soviets unveiled in Moscow a new swept-wing supersonic bomber, as well as two new types of interceptor aircraft. Significantly, this was the first public display of new military aircraft in the Soviet Union in five years. This was followed on July 10th, by Kennedy's ordering of an "urgent review" to determine whether the U.S. should increase its military strength to meet the growing Soviet threat.[36] Acheson and Vice-President Johnson were unwilling to wait for the review to come in and on the 13th, at a meeting of the National Security Council, advised Kennedy to proclaim a national emergency.[37] Five days later, Kennedy formally warned the Soviet Union that the U.S. would defend its rights in Berlin.[38]

The July 25th Speech

On July 25th, Kennedy, in effect, followed the advice of Acheson and Johnson on proclaiming a national emergency. In a televised address to the Nation that day, Kennedy told the American people of the Vienna summit with Khrushchev and his threats concerning Berlin which had

solidified into the December 31st ultimatum. The country was told that the U.S. would not accept such an ultimatum. There was an unmistakable inference that a nuclear war was a possibility.[39] This impression was reinforced when Kennedy, in addition to announcing an expansion of the armed forces, announced he would seek a $3.5 billion increase in the defense budget including $207 million for civil defense:

> We have another sober responsibility. To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do or where they should go if bombs begin to fall, would be a failure of responsibility....
>
> Tomorrow, I am requesting of the Congress new funds for the following immediate objectives: to identify and mark space in existing structures--public and private--that could be used for fallout shelters in case of attack; to stock those shelters with food, water, first-aid kits, tools, sanitation facilities, and other minimum essentials for survival; to increase their capacity; to improve our air-raid warning and fallout detection systems, including a new household warning system now under development; and to take other measures that will be effective at an early date to save millions of lives if needed. In addition, new Federal buildings will include space suitable for fallout shelters, as well as normal use. In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available. We owe that kind of insurance to our families, and to our country....
>
> The time to start is now. In the coming months, I hope to let every citizen know what steps he can take without delay to protect his family in case of attack. I know you would not want to do less.[40]

This address by the President was important in two major respects; (1) for its impact on the Berlin crisis, and (2) for its impact on civil defense. In the former regard, there is no doubt that tensions were heightened as a result of the President's speech. In the days, weeks, and months that followed, successive steps were taken by both the United States and the Soviet Union which gave the impression that the two super powers were moving to the brink of war. A brief look at some of these

developments is necessary, for it is important to realize the seriousness of the Berlin crisis and the fear that accompanied each successive development, in order to better comprehend the civil defense debate that was fed by the crisis.

Berlin--A Full-Fledged Crisis

John J. McCloy met on behalf of the United States with Khrushchev to discuss disarmament matters on the day before and the day after Kennedy's speech. McCloy has reported that on the day before the speech the Soviet Premier was "in a jolly mood" and spoke of the resolution of difficulties between the two countries. The day after the speech he "emotionally" told McCloy that "the United States had declared preliminary war on the Soviet Union." On August 7th, Khrushchev went on Soviet television and indicated his "unyielding" position and made reference to the calling up of Soviet reservists.[41] (Six days earlier the Pentagon had notified sixty-four Air Force Reserve units to be ready for a possible call to active duty.) This was followed, on August 9th, by Khrushchev's famous boast that the USSR now had nuclear weapons in the one hundred megaton range and could deliver them anywhere in the United States: If you want to threaten us from a position of strength, we will show you our strength. You do not have 50 and 100 megaton bombs. We have stronger than 100 megaton bombs."[42]

On August 13th the crisis took a dramatic turn for the worse. At a few minutes past midnight East German forces began the erection of the Berlin Wall in an effort to stop the flow of East Germans into Western Berlin.[43] The next day, two Soviet army divisions, including tanks and artillery, moved into positions around Berlin to back up the East German efforts to seal off its borders.[44] Kennedy then "instantly mobilized

the resources of government." Schlesinger notes that "these were grim days and nights," and that Kennedy remarked at this point that the possibility of a nuclear war was now one chance in five.[45]

Thus, on August 16th, one hundred and thirteen Army Reserve and National Guard units were alerted for possible active duty in addition to the sixty-four Air Force units on alert. This was followed on the 17th by the announcement that fifteen-hundred additional U.S. combat troops were being sent to Berlin and that Vice President Johnson would visit the city.[46] Schlesinger has written that following this "was a weekend of anxiety in Washington while the 1st Battle Group, 8th Infantry, rolled down the Autobahn to West Berlin."[47]

On August 24th, the White House issued a "solemn warning" to the USSR that any interference with Allied access to West Berlin would be "an aggressive act" for which the Soviet Union would bear full responsibility. The next day, the Pentagon ordered seventy-six thousand reservists to active duty.[48] And, on the 30th, Kennedy appointed General Lucius Clay his personal representative in West Berlin (remembered from early postwar days, according to Schlesinger, "as a great symbol of western protection.")[49]

These actions were paralleled in the Soviet Union by an August 24 note accusing the U.S. of using the air corridors to Berlin to infiltrate "revanchists, extremists, saboteurs, and spies" into Berlin, and, on August 30, by the resumption of nuclear weapons testing by the Soviets (despite a promise made to Kennedy at Vienna not to resume testing unless the U.S. did.)[50] A few days later the U.S. followed suit and resumed its own testing series, and, at the same time, appealed to Khrushchev to cease his testing. Khrushchev replied that the Soviet

tests would end only when the West accepted the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty and complete disarmament. (By September 18th the Soviets would have exploded thirteen nuclear devices in a series that would continue and include the explosion of the largest nuclear devices detonated to date--a thirty megaton weapon on October 24th, and a fifty-eight megaton weapon on the 30th.)[51]

Meanwhile, the U.S. announced on September 9th that it would send forty-thousand more troops to Western Europe and, on September 19th, that seventy-three thousand more reservists had been called to active duty.[52] Perhaps even more importantly, it was disclosed in mid-September that the U.S. how had the capability to count, locate, and target the Soviet missile force which, it had been discovered, was not what it had been claimed to be.[53] While this did not mark the end of the crisis, tensions did decrease in the four weeks that followed. Kennedy spoke of a peaceful settlement of the crisis at the UN, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, began holding serious meetings (with Kennedy getting directly involved at one point.)[54] On October 17th, the crisis was finally defused when Khrushchev, before the 22nd Communist Party Congress meeting in Moscow, told his audience that the Soviet Union would end its nuclear test series later in the month and that he had decided to cancel his December 31st deadline for signing a German peace treaty, provided that the West show its readiness to negotiate on the German question.[55]

The Public Response

Reflecting on these events, one can understand the anxiety that resulted. The timing of Kennedy's July 25th statements on civil defense, in conjunction with rising levels of tension and anxiety, produced

dramatic results. As Theodore Sorenson has put it, "the President's aim was to bestir a still slumbering public; and he succeeded beyond his own expectations and desire. The civil defense 'balloon' not only went up, it disappeared from sight."[56] In an article in The New Republic, published shortly after the peak of the "shelter mania" had passed, it was reported that "the demand for federal literature on fallout shelters rose from 10,000 requests for all of 1960, to about 5,000 per month following the President's speech." Moreover:

> Of the 30 million copies sent out by the end of November on a how-to-do-it approach to building family fallout shelters, three-forths were shipped after the July 25 speech. The demand for the federal pamphlet, Family Food Stockpile for Survival, grew so great that there were a million requests unfilled by the end of November. In the entire month of January 1961, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization headquarters received about 4,700 queiries. On August 1, the daily mail was 5,382.[57]

According to the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, by late October 1961, almost two-thirds of the adult population claimed to have read such literature on how to construct and stock a fallout shelter.[58] FHA records reveal that during the twenty-one month period of June 1960 through February 1962, slightly more than 3,300 loans were approved for fallout shelter financing, with more than three-forths of this figure accounted for in the last four months of 1961 following Kennedy's speech.[59] Similarly, the Cincinnati Division of the Bendix Corporation, which had developed a dosimeter kit (containing radiation detection devices) for public use at the request of the OCDM back in November of 1959, reported that between that date and 25 July 1961 Bendix sold less than 5,000 of these kits. Between July 25th and October 31st, however, the company's sales jumped to over 200,000. Another such outfit, The Surviv-All Co., a manufacturer of low cost

survival food kits, reported that between February of 1961, when the company first started operating, and July 25th, only $8000 in food kits had been sold. In the four months following the President's speech, though, almost $100,000 worth of kits was sold.[60]

Hand in hand with the increased interest in civil defense were the excesses that one still hears about today when the subject of civil defense comes up. Time reported of one profiteer who was selling "Life-saving kits" containing a salve supposed to cause radiation to ricochet harmlessly off the body. This was, of course, utter nonsense. Others had advertised "radiation pills," or "fallout suits," which were actually no more useful than aspirin or a raincoat in protecting against radiation. One promoter had devised a "man-sized plastic bag, which, he said, provided complete protection against fallout." All the owner had to do was step inside and pull the zipper closed. There were two major problems with this concept, however. First, such a "fallout bag" would only protect against fallout particles coming into direct contact with the skin. It would not protect against penetrating radiation, which would prove just as lethal to the bag's occupant as to an unprotected neighbor. Actually, the neighbor would probably live somewhat longer due to the second major problem with this bag--if its owner stayed inside for more than a few minutes he would suffocate. Then there was the man who sold inexpensive and portable "survival shelters" through the mail which turned out upon receipt to consist of a crowbar and directions on how to open manhole covers.[61]

Such unscrupulous behavior led Holifield's Military Operations Subcommittee to warn the public in one of its reports to:

> Avoid fly-by-night operators with shelter building schemes and would-be sellers of expensive or useless gadgets and

> devices under the label of civil defense. Be wary of false advertising of merchandise or services, including insurance policies, which are offered as civil defense protection.
>
> Do not sign a contract for construction of a home shelter until you have consulted civil defense officials in your city....and have received reliable information on requirements and cost estimates.[62]

As the Detroit Free Press reported, however, even those citizens who heeded such admonitions sometimes did not get their money's worth. Cited was one shelter builder who had built eighteen shelters in the Detroit area, all of which leaked--including his own. One of these families had indeed checked with local civil defense officials on this firm and had been given the go-ahead. They soon had three feet of water in their shelter. According to the shelter builder, however, "Even with water in them, they're better than no shelters at all."[63]

This was only one aspect of the "National Panic" that seemed to boil up after the July 25th speech. In early August the Los Angeles Times reported a speech by the Civil Defense Coordinator of Riverside County, California to a group of local citizens in which they were warned to "arm themselves with guns to repel the hundreds of thousands of refugees who would flee that way if Los Angeles were bombed." According to the L.A. Times, the citizens of Nevada to the northeast, thereupon endeavored to seal off that egress route by forming an armed militia. "Next, the Civil Defense Coordinator of Kern Country told the Bakersfield Chamber of Commerse...on the northern route out of Los Angeles...that fleeing ill and starving Angelinos would be stopped south of town and directed into the desert by armed policemen."[64]

Similarly troubling was a pamphlet put out by the local civil defense organization of Nutley, New Jersey and distributed throughout the community by the Boy Scouts, which urged each and every citizen to

provide for his and his family's fallout protection and implied failure to do so with un-American sentiments.[65]

Alongside such demogogic harangues, a national debate ensued over whether those who had provided their own shelter should shoot those who had not and who would thus seek shelter with their prepared neighbors when the crunch came. Time, for example, reported of one Chicago suburbanite who intended to mount a machine gun at his shelter in order to keep unwelcome would-be shelterees out, and a Texas businessman who was prepared to greet uninvited trespassers with tear gas should any occupy his shelter before his family's arrival. On this issue, a former Georgetown University Professor, the Reverend L.C. McHugh, wrote in the National Catholic Weekly Review:

> I consider it the height of nonsense to say that the Christian ethic demands or even permits a man to thrust his family into the rain of fallout when unsheltered neighbors plead for entrance--I doubt that any Catholic moralist would condemn the man who used available violence to repel panicky aggressors plying crowbars at the shelter door, or who took strong measures to evict trespassers who locked themselves in the family shelter before his own family had a chance to find sanctuary therein.[66]

This prompted the Right Reverend Angus Dun, the Protestant Episcopal Biship of Washington, D.C., to respond:

> I do not see how any Christian conscience can condone a policy which puts supreme emphasis on saving your own skin, without regard for the plight of your neighbor....Justice, mercy and brotherly love do not cease to operate, even in the final apocalypse. It would be infinitely better to go down decently to the final end than to survive as less-than-human creatures.[67]

Still others wondered if there was such a thing as a "decent" nuclear death or what a warm-hearted Christian might think of his initial decision to give up his shelter to others as he watched his wife and children succumb to the slow and painful death that awaits those who have absorbed lethal doses of radiation. In an effort to avoid having

to make such decisions, some shelter owners sought to keep the fact of their shelter a secret and thus instructed their children not to tell their friends about the family fallout shelter.[68] Others decided that the safest thing to do would be to leave the country--Brazil, New Zealand, British Columbia, Australia, the South Pacific, and Mexico, being among the more popular new havens for those groups seeking "flight from doomsday."[69]

One receives many impressions from reading the civil defense related material during this period--of which there was a considerable amount.[70] Among the most forceful of these impressions are those of confusion, ignorance, fear, and anger. Experts (including all too many of the self-proclaimed variety) in fields all across the spectrum, published facts, figures, fiction, and forecasts that were frequently contradictory. Some said, as had Bertrand Russell earlier, that few, if any, would survive a nuclear war.[71] Whether it would be few, many, or none, according to Senator Young, would be something that ineffective civil defense measures would have no control over.[72]

On the other hand, Edward Teller stated that he believed "that an extensive shelter program would save the great majority of the people in the United States, even in cases of a most ferocious attack."[73] Life magazine was more specific. In an article that was preceeded by a message from President Kennedy, it was stated that 97 percent could survive a nuclear war, though no authorities were cited to back up this assertion.[74] The Mc Graw Hill publishing Company, using data from the OEP, AEC, RAND Corp., and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, came to a similar conclusion. In a sixteen page supplement titled Nuclear Attack and Industrial Survival, which ran in thirty of their journals (under

protest in one or two), it was stated that as a result of a one thousand megaton counterforce attack against only military targets (a credible scenario it was argued), casualties would reach approximately thirteen percent without fallout protection, and only seven percent with. The percent of fatalities in neither case was estimated. If half the bursts were countervalue (cities) and airbursts (to maximize physical destruction) the fatalities might reach thirty-nine percent without fallout protection and thirty-six percent with. In a strike of ten thousand megatons (a possibility in the future) against counterforce targets, it was estimated that fatalities would reach seventy-two percent without fallout protection and twenty-one percent with. Again, if half of these were diverted to countervalue air bursts the estimates would rise to eighty-nine percent without fallout protection and sixty-eight percent with.[75]

The publication of estimates of relatively small or moderate casualty figures, in the event of nuclear war, provoked a backlash of criticism. Schlesinger writes that:

> Many on the utopian left feared that the /civil defense/ program, if it were not actual preparation for a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, would at the very least give the American people a false sense of security and therefore encourage them in reckless foreign adventures. Within the United States itself they perceived it as an incitement to vigilantism if not a means by which the radical right could seize control of local communities. The program, in short, became in their minds a portent of preventive war and fascism.[76]

Sorenson substantiates these impressions. He states that "jingoist groups thrived on the level of near-hysteria which was reached." Some, believing in such figures as Life's, stated that a nuclear war would be "just another war." On the other hand, "pacifist organizations assailed shelters as though they were a substitute for our efforts on peace."[77]

Considering such developments, it is perhaps an understatement to state that Congressional interest in civil defense was aroused.

The Congressional Response

There is no doubt that Congressional interest in civil defense in 1961 was a few steps up the ladder over Congressional interest in 1960. From one researcher, who has actually taken the time to count Congressional Record entries, we learn that "in 1960 there were 89 speeches, articles, letters, statements and miscellaneous references concerning civil defense in the Congressional Record." In 1961, however, these jumped to 208. In addition, in 1960 five bills relating to civil defense were introduced in the Congress, as compared to thirty-seven bills in 1961.[78] Among these, Representative Minshall of Ohio introduced, for the third time, a bill which proposed granting tax incentives to individuals to build their own fallout shelter.[79] Representative Zelenko introduced a bill which would have made it "mandatory for approved bomb shelters to be constructed in every building in which either Federal funds or loans, in whole or in part, are used for its construction."[80] And, Representative O'hara of Illinois introduced a bill that would authorize and call on the Director of Civil Defense to "provide for the construction of family fallout shelters at each of the 175 largest public museums in the United States."[81]

Congressional interest was obviously up, but in what direction? Was there a change or were the few strongly motivated proponents and opponents of the past just being more vocal? One way to gain an insight into the direction and strength of Congressional interest is to look at appropriations. For civil defense in 1961 this becomes a somewhat complicated task, given the reorganization and the timing of Kennedy's

emergency supplemental request in July. At that time the Congress had not yet cleared the President's original civil defense request, though the House had taken action. This meant that both bills would be going through Congress at about the same time. To minimize confusion the best place to begin, though, is at the beginning.

On 1 May 1961 Frank Ellis presented to the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee an OCDM request of $104.2 million for fiscal year 1962.[82] (See Table IV-1.) Ellis noted that the request had been drawn up under the previous administration and had been forwarded "as is" to the Appropriations Committee. Basically, other than the $43.1 million increase this budget represented over the previous year's budget (a percentage increase across the board), there was nothing to distinguish this budget or this hearing from the ones that had gone before. Ellis did note, however, that his review of civil defense had been completed and forwarded, and there was an implication of supplementary requests to follow.[83]

On June 2, the Appropriations Committee forwarded to the whole House its recommendation of $79,167,000 for the OCDM--a decrease of $25,033,000 from what had been requested, but also an increase of $18 million over the FY 1961 grant.[84] This was passed by the House on June 7th, supporting, to some extent, the conclusion that the House was taking civil defense more seriously.

On June 12th, Ellis brought the OCDM before the Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee and not only sought a full restoration of the House cuts, but indicated that before year's end he would be back with "in all likelihood, budget requests for more than triple the budget currently pending before Congress."[85] Referring to the review

his office had just conducted, Ellis noted that:

> The many intelligence studies and reports available for our review are unanimous in their conclusions that the civil defense expenditures of the Soviets outstrip by many times the dollar volume of expenditures being applied by the United States for this effort.[86]

The unspoken argument was that given such a situation, the least the Senate could do would be to restore his funds.

On July 25th, the same day that Kennedy was to give his Berlin Crisis speech and the day before he would request a supplemental civil defense appropriation, the Senate Appropriations Committee went part of the way towards honoring Ellis' appeal by recommending an OCDM FY 1962 budget of $95.5 million--$16,333,000 more than the House had appropriated.[87] On July 31st the Senate passed this version of the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill. Both versions were then sent to Conference whereupon a compromise agreeing on an appropriation of $86,550,000 was soon reached and this was passed by both chambers on August 7th.[88] (See Table IV-1.)

While much of this was taking place, action had been proceeding rather swiftly on Kennedy's July 26th request for an additional $207.6 million in civil defense funds. In that by this time civil defense responsibilities had, for the most part, been transferred to the Department of Defense, a different set of Appropriations subcommittees was involved--specifically, the subcommittees on defense appropriations. By this move Representative Thomas (who was by this time sometimes referred to as "doubting Thomas" where civil defense was concerned) was rather conveniently side-stepped. This fact, along with the "top-priority" nature of the request and the crisis atmosphere, accounts for the phenomenon that happened next--on August 4th, <u>just nine days</u> after

TABLE IV-1

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1962 OCDM APPROPRIATION PROCESS

Item	Fy 1961[a] Grant	FY 1962[a] Request	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	Final[b] Action
Operations	$25,346,000	$30,500,000	$25,000,000	$25,000,000	$25,000,000
Supplies & Equipment	9,175,000	36,000,000	21,600,000	38,500,000	30,050,000
Research & Development	4,000,000	4,500,000	1,500,000	2,500,000	2,000,000
Contributions	16,000,000	22,000,000	22,000,000	22,000,000	22,000,000
Delegations	6,567,000	8,700,000	6,567,000	5,000,000	5,000,000
Construction of Facilities	0	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000
TOTAL	$61,088,000	104,200,000	$79,167,000	$95,500,000	$86,550,000

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1962, Senate Report 620, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 July 1961, p. 30.

[b]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1962, House Report 850, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 August 1961, p. 7.

submission, the Senate passed the President's civil defense request without cutting a single dollar, notwithstanding the obstructionist efforts of Senator Young. The House had already passed the Defense Appropriations Act through its doors before the President's request so the Senate and House versions went to conference where the new civil defense section

was added to the House version. The bill then went back to the House where it was scheduled for a vote on August 10th.[89]

In opening the debate on the $207.6 million measure, Representative George H. Mahon, the Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, made the following rather interesting statement:

> Mr. Speaker, when St. Paul was on the road to Damascus he was suddenly struck with a great light and he changed his viewpoint and he reversed his position from that day following. There was a time in this country--since World War II and extending over a period of years--when there was a disinclination to take seriously the possibility that there might actually be an atomic war. To some extent in recent years many of us--and I speak of myself among others--have had the inclination to brush aside with a wave of the hand the question of civil defense. But the time has arrived, the hour has struck, when the people of this Nation, if they are wise, will take steps to try to save the lives of tens of millions of civilians in the event a nuclear war should come....[90]

Mahon went on to note that, like St. Paul, he had changed his mind and he urged his colleagues to support this measure.

In the discussion that followed it became apparent that not just a few were disturbed by the circumstances surrounding the vote they were about to take. There had been little time to investigate the civil defense programs to be funded with the $207.6 million. No hearings, other than a brief session between the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and Secretary of Defense McNamara, had been held. Even this was restricted to basically generalities and a promise from McNamara that "before committing the funds which the President has requested of Congress in support of the program, I shall personally review the proposed expenditures in detail, and I shall satisfy myself as to the necessity of each program item to carry out the President's objective."[91] Representative Whitten, who had served on a civil defense appropriating subcommittee at one time, stated that "unless somebody rides close herd on these funds

we will find that a lot of money has been spent unwisely." He added that "we are all for protection and we cannot very well vote against the money request," but "with no detailed hearings" he wondered if protection would indeed follow the funds.[92] Representative Charles Jonas of North Carolina argued:

> We are getting ready to appropriate $207 million in addition to the $82 million /sic/ we have heretofore appropriated. But we do not know how the money is to be spent. I think a request for $207 million deserves a more detailed explanation or justification than has been given the House of Representatives.

Nevertheless, Jonas indicated that he too would not vote against the money.[93]

Similarly, Gerald Ford of Michigan stated "we in all sincerity cannot justify recommending this amount of money based on...the testimony that has been submitted...I say that the emergency rather than the facts justify anybody--anybody--voting for this down payment on a much larger program that will inevitably come before the Congress." But, he continued, "although I would have preferred a dollar reduction in the program, it is my view that we are in a box and we will probably have to approve it without revision."[94]

Representative Derwinski (Rep., Ill.) felt that it was "obvious that the mood of the House is such that the appropriation requested will be approved, but the point that is most disturbing to the Members is the blank-check circumstance which is apparent here." A blank check, he added, "whether it be to the military leaders of the country, or to a civilian agency operating in the domestic field--does not represent sound legislative policies."[95]

For his part, Representative Mahon sought to reinforce the impression that they were all doing the right thing. He reminded his

colleagues that "we are faced with a crisis in Berlin," and argued that it was not necessary that "an exact blueprint of how this program will be handled" be presented in order to vote on the program knowledgeably. He agreed that "a more detailed justification would be desirable....but, we do not want to be too little and too late." Changing tack, Mahon stated that he felt "that this sum of money is more or less a symbol of America's determination to remain firm even though war comes and we are attacked." Moreover, "I believe the chance for peace will be greater under the circumstances if we stand firm."[96]

On this latter point, Representative Riley quite agreed: "This action on our part /which he characterized as "a mere pittance to take care of the civilian population of America"/ will show the world we mean business."[97] Similarly, Holifield was of the opinion that "if we had an effective civil defense program today, we could take a much firmer stand at the diplomatic table in regard to Berlin, Laos, and other hot spots throughout the world."[98]

Subsequently, for all the debate, the $207.6 million passed rather easily in both House and Senate. Seven days later (17 August 1961) Kennedy signed the supplemental defense appropriation bill containing the civil defense funds.[99] With these actions civil defense seemed embarked on a new era. As Holifield noted a few days later, actual Federal expenditures for civil defense for the eleven-year period 1951 through 1961 totaled only $532 million. Now, in a matter of three days, in one fell swoop, as it were, civil defense had been appropriated over $306 million--58 percent of the total outlay for the past eleven years.[100] With these funds civil defense in the United States would begin to meet the awesome problems of nuclear war with a new vitality.

Holifield Hearings on "Civil Defense--1961"

While the President's emergency civil defense request was proceeding through Congress, Representative Chet Holifield held a series of seven hearings on civil defense beginning on August 1st and concluding on August 9th.[101] Timely as they were, however, it would appear that these hearings had little impact on the appropriations request in that the daily record of the hearings would not have been generally available and a report was not made until September 20th. The hearings were quite important in other respects though, for they laid out in greater detail than had been publically available heretofore, specifics of the President's program which he had summarized in May and July. Several important officials would appear who had figured in the development of the new program. Their thinking and some of the problems that would emerge began to become apparent.

Given the limited scope of authority of the Government Operations Committee and its Subcommittee on Military Operations, this was a typical Holifield hearing. Representatives of the Defense Department (both uniformed and civilian), the AEC, the old OCDM, the NRDL, and the RAND Corp. were invited to present their views. These included Secretary of Defense McNamara, Adam Yarmolinsky (his Special Assistant, who on August 1st was given the responsibility of organizing civil defense within the Pentagon),[102] Army General Lyman L. Lemnitzer (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Frank Ellis, Walmer Strope of the NRDL, and Herman Kahn of RAND.

Notably, during the seven days of hearings no dissenting voices were heard. It has been reported that "organizations and individuals who were opposed to the civil defense program were not invited," and

that "when they requested to be heard they were refused with the explanation that they could submit a written statement." One commentator has referred to this as Holifield's "manifest unwillingness to hear all sides of the issue."[103] Another, Representative William Fitts Ryan (Dem., NY), stated:

> Committees of the Congress have previously examined civil defense chiefly as an element in the operations of our government. The basic approach has been to ask "How effective is our organization for civil defense?" Attention has been directed to the procedures involved in building a civil defense agency rather than to the basic questions of the goals of civil defense, the effects of civil defense upon our country, and the serious question of whether the objectives sought can be achieved by any civil defense program that would be compatible with our principles and traditions.[104]

In fairness to Holifield, one should weigh the criticisms implied in the above statements with the circumstances of Holifield's position. As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Operations it was not within his jurisdiction to ask "Whether civil defense?" It was within his jurisdiction to ask "How effective is our organization for civil defense?" Thus, it was this type of question that Holifield asked as he called his subcommittee to order on the morning of 1 August 1961.

Secretary of Defense McNamara was the first witness and he elaborated for the subcommittee what it was that he hoped would be accomplished with the President's civil defense program. The largest share of the appropriation that was about to be approved involved $93 million that would be used to conduct a survey throughout the United States locating and marking existing shelter spaces. (See Table IV-2.) Personnel from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks would be trained to go out into local areas where they in turn would train local civil defense personnel and local engineering and architecture firms on how to locate and ascertain the shelter capability of

TABLE IV-2

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1962 OCD APPROPRIATION

1) Shelter Program		$169,300,000
Survey and marking	$ 93,000,000	
Modification of existing shelter	10,000,000	
Shelters in new Federal construction	7,500,000	
Equipment and supplies	58,800,000	
food ($27,800,000)		
water (7,500,000)		
tools (1,000,000)		
sanitation (4,200,000)		
first aid (15,300,000)		
radiological detection (2,000,000)		
secure storage (1,000,000)		
total ($58,800,000)		
Total	$169,300,000	
2) Warning and Detection		$ 24,800,000
Near system	$ 10,000,000	
Warning & alert/emergency operations	5,500,000	
Radiological detection	9,300,000	
Total	$ 24,800,000	
3) Research and Development		$ 13,500,000
Grand Total		$207,600,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense-1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 131.

local buildings.[105] The subcommittee learned from Frank Ellis later that it was anticipated that this shelter survey program would locate fallout shelter spaces for forty to fifty million people (about a quarter of the population.) It was also anticipated that a building modification program would extend this capacity by an additional 25 million

spaces.[106] After the shelter spaces had been located and marked with (the now familiar) black and yellow shelter signs, they would be stocked with a five-day supply of dry food crackers developed by the Department of Agriculture and a two weeks supply of water for each shelter space located.[107] In addition, first aid kits, radiation detection meters,[108] sanitation and other essential supplies would be stored in each shelter. This shelter program would, according to McNamara, provide the greatest amount of protection for the least amount of money in the shortest time.[109] It would be an important first step toward creating an effective civil defense system. There would still be a long way to go, however, McNamara told the subcommittee: "I think it is quite clear that the program of shelter that we are outlining and requesting funds for... important as it is, is not by itself, a solution to the Nation's fallout shelter problem...Additional action will be required both to provide additional public shelters, and, I am confident, eventually to provide private shelters."[110]

It was clear from Kennedy's July 25th speech and from McNarara's statements to this committee that the program being planned at this point included both private and public shelters. What was unclear was the emphasis that would be put on private shelter construction encouragement, for until the surveys were completed it would not be known with any degree of certainty how large the shelter deficit would be, nor by how much the deficit could be decreased through a minor modification program. It would appear, however, from other statements that McNamara made before this and other Congressional committees, that considerable emphasis would be placed on private shelters, for McNamara did not have in mind the expenditure of billions of dollars on this program. And, no

one yet had devised a comprehensive nationwide shelter program that did not reach into the billions--even if restricted solely to fallout protection. When questioned about the potenial cost of a shelter program before the House Armed Services Committee on July 28th, for example, McNamara related a conversation he recently had in which "a man called me on the telephone proposing $10 billion for structures of this kind." McNamara indicated he thought this amount "perfectly absurd."[111]

There were, then, at this point, two unresolved controversial issues in the Kennedy shelter program: (1) the ultimate size, scope, and cost of the effort, and (2) the role of private family fallout shelters in the program. These issues would have to be resolved. The crisis would soon pass, and with its passing it could be taken for granted that ambiguities would serve as magnets for Congressional budget cutters.

Part III

November 1961--Hyannis Port and the Future Direction

Prelude to Hyannis Port

In both his May and July civil defense statements, President Kennedy spoke of the efforts the Federal Government would take to provide fallout protection for the population of the United States. In the latter statement, however, he added in closing that "in the coming months, I hope to let every family know what steps he can take without delay to protect his family in case of attack." Many people, both in and out of government, viewed this as a reference to the provision of private family fallout shelter protection, or, in essence, every man for himself. Even on the face of the statement alone, this was not an unreasonable assumption. The crisis which prompted Kennedy's speech was immediate

and worsening. The Federal program to which Kennedy referred would be months away at the least--perhaps years. Immediate action was called for. There were those in the Government and in local civil defense organizations who encouraged this perception and urged citizens to provide their own shelter as part of the national program.[112]

In mid-August Frank Ellis of the OEP told the National Association of County Officials that the private provision of fallout shelters was "the Christian thing to do, the Godlike thing." He equated the failure to do so with the "sin" of suicide.[113] In early November, during an hour long show devoted to civil defense, Secretary of Defense McNamara, in answering Howard K. Smith's question concerning just who's responsibility was it to do what in civil defense, replied: "Certainly the federal government, the state, and local governments all have parts to play, but most importantly it's the responsibility of each individual to prepare himself and his family for that strike."[114] Then there was, of course, the Life article in September that promoted family fallout shelters and which seemed to be endorsed by President Kennedy in that it was preceeded by a message from him stating that "I urge you to read and consider seriously the contents of this issue."[115] This impression was reinforced during an October 11 press conference when Kennedy remarked that the information that he had promised in his July 25th speech would, when available, "provide directions whereby a family can take steps to protect themselves on a minimum basis and give them--the members of the family--some hope that if they're out of the blast area they could survive the fallout." He continued that "by the middle of November we hope to suggest some of the steps that every homeowner could take."[116] (Emphasis added)

This information that Kennedy was referring to (as well as the public furor over civil defense and fallout shelters that was the result, in part, of the statements Kennedy and other Administration and civil defense officials had made) was the subject of some controversy within the Administration. According to Schlesinger:

> The Pentagon hired Madison Avenue specialists to prepare a shelter instruction booklet intended for distribution to every householder. This was a singular document. In the draft submitted to the White House, it did not make clear that American policy was to avoid a holocaust; and it offered a relatively sanguine picture both of life in the shelter and of the world into which people would emerge after the attack. Moreover, it seemed to be addressed exclusively to the upper middle class--to people owning houses with gardens or basements.

Schlesinger further recounts that Kennedy asked John Kenneth Galbraith to look at the pamphlet, and that afterwards Galbraith told Kennedy:

> I am not at all attracted by a pamphlet which seeks to save the better elements of the population, but in the main writes off those who voted for you. I think it particularly injudicious, in fact it is absolutely incredible, to have a picture of a family with a cabin cruiser saving itself by going out to sea. Very few members of the UAW can go with them.[117]

Elsewhere, it has been reported that "as the turmoil mounted, some of the administration advocates of shelters began to doubt their value, although they had previously proposed civil defense as a means of saving lives or of warning the Russians of our resolve over Berlin."[118] Others had been skeptical all along. McGeorge Bundy, for example, Presidential Advisor on foreign and defense policy, told the American Management Association in January 1962:

> You cannot expect it /CD/ to make a full scale nuclear conflict anything less than the greatest catastrophe of modern times.... dollar for dollar the aggressor who is intent upon the massive annihilation of people can almost surely keep ahead of the pick-and-shovel work of moving underground for passive defense.[119]

We know from a memorandum to Kennedy from his Science Advisor, Jerome B. Wiesner, that he was troubled by the nature of the private fallout

shelter debate and by the misconceptions so loosely bandied about in the media--especially by the Life article.[120] It is also known that in the wake of Kennedy's decision to invigorate the civil defense system, that a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee undertook the task of reviewing the civil defense program and its proper role in U.S. posture. The chairman of this panel, Dr. Paul Doty, has stated that he thought Kennedy's civil defense decision "hasty" and that he had been in favor of rolling back the CD program:

> We cannot reorient the lifestyle of the United States, and ask the citizenry to undergo a continuous process of exercising a more complex system unless we are willing to generate and maintain a sense of danger that is absolutely inconsistent with all that I think we should be seeking.

It was thus the recommendation of the Panel that "a very modest and low visability fallback program" be instituted.[121]

By late November 1961, President Kennedy was coming to the same conclusion. Schlesinger writes that while Kennedy was "unshaken in his belief that defense against fallout was a necessary form of national insurance," he was nevertheless "dismayed both by the booklet and the public reaction. He remarked ruefully that he wished he had never said the things which had stirred the matter up and wanted to diminish the excitement as expeditiously as possible." For his part, Schlesinger notes that he and Carl Kaysen had been following this issue for the White House and had also "concluded that the do-it-yourself family shelter theory was a disaster and that the only fair and rational policy would be one of public community shelters."[122]

It was thus decided that these issues (the booklet and family shelters) would be settled at a defense budget meeting at Hyannis Port on 22 November 1961. Schlesinger prepared a multipage memorandum on

civil defense which Kennedy took with him to this meeting. It begins by stating that "the shelter program, in my judgement, is likely to grow into the biggest domestic issue we face--unless steps are taken in the very near future to relieve the rising anxiety by a clear and authoritative definition of issues and programs."[123] The reason for this growing concern, he wrote, was plain enough:

> For years, internationalists have been yearning for some means of making questions of foreign policy less abstract and remote and bringing these questions home to every household in the land. Now, at last, there is such an issue. Civil Defense has become the focus for all anxieties over foreign policy.

"Obviously a shelter program of some sort is necessary," he continued. But, because of the problems noted above, it had become "urgent to establish at an early point a framework within which people can see the shelter problem in relation to other national needs and goals and can understand both the possibilities and the limitations of civil defense."

The remainder of the memorandum was devoted to a summarization of the development of the family fallout shelter concept and of the problems with and arguments against it. (Noted, among others, were problems of equity, motivation, psychological effects, and effects abroad.) Schlesinger concluded that "these considerations do not necessarily constitute an argument against a shelter program." They did, however, in his opinion, constitute "an argument against a high-keyed, do-it-yourself, family shelter program," and "<u>for</u> a low-keyed, public, community shelter program." Thus:

> Most important of all, in my judgement--and the indispensable prelude to the announcement of a program or the release of a pamphlet--is a nationwide television speech by the President defining the civil defense problem, warning the nation that absolute protection against nuclear war is impossible; pointing out that a shelter program is only one, and not the most important, means of working for peace and security; emphasizing that our basic posture and purpose must be affirmative if we

> are to meet our responsibilities; saying that the pursuit even of relative protection against nuclear war cannot be undertaken at the expense of more essential goals of policy; assuring the nation that within these limits we will have as democratic and effective a shelter program as humanly possible; affirming that any shelter program must meet the needs of all the people; declaring that community shelters will be central in that program and that family shelter can be an important supplement; and outlining the precise steps to be taken in the next months to bring that program into operation.[124]

Hyannis Port

On 22 November 1961 President Kennedy met at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts with "all of his advisers in the White House and in the Defense Department concerned with defense matters, including those responsible for civil defense."[125] Among these were Secretary of Defense McNamara, Carl Kaysen and Arthur Schlesinger of the White House Staff, Scientific Advisor Jerome Wiesner, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Steuart L. Pittman, who had been appointed the Director of the new Office of Civil Defense by Kennedy on August 30th.[126] During the course of the meeting Schlesinger went over the points made in his memorandum and there was a discussion of the civil defense booklet. On these matters there was quick and complete agreement--the family shelter concept would not be emphasized in the future and the Defense Department would tone down and rewrite its pamphlet, placing copies in post offices where they could be picked up rather than mailing one to every household.[127]

On the subject of the degree of emphasis to be placed on civil defense in the future and the scope of the civil defense program, there was not consensus. Pittman has recounted that prior to the meeting, agreement had been reached between the Secretary of Defense and "the White House staff member directly responsible for this subject /Kaysen/ ...for a recommended 700-million-dollar beginning, as the first bite of

a 3.5 billion-dollar program to complete a nationwide shelter system in five years." Not everyone present was in agreement with this proposal however. Pittman notes that "it became apparent in the meeting that those on whom the President relied most heavily for advise on defense matters and political matters had little inclination to go beyond surveying and stocking existing shelter." He cites only Wiesner, though, who "gave the unqualified opinion that the five-year plan to meet the nation's fallout shelter requirements was a questionable investment because fallout shelters would be obsolete after five years."[128]

Though Kennedy found this argument unpersuasive, Pittman notes that "the prospect of implementing a major civil defense program was clearly unappetizing to the President and his senior advisers." Apparently on this point, this latter group included McNamara, who Pittman indicates "hardly supported" his own recommendation. Despite this, "when the moment for decision came, the President simply said that "if the Secretary of Defense felt it was feasible to carry out the recommended...program, he could do no less in discharging his responsibilities," and decided that the 700 million figure was "a minimum follow-through on his May speech."[129] On this point Sorenson notes: "Having created this laboring mountain, he was reluctant to bring forth a mouse; but he was even more unwilling to let the mountain overshadow his overall policy."[130]

Thereafter the visibility of the program was toned down and its nature reverted back to that implied in the May speech--a prudent measure designed to mitigate the destructiveness of a nuclear attack which, however unlikely, remained a possibility to guard against. As Kennedy remarked to Sorenson--"I don't want the survivors, if there are any...to

say we never warned them or never did anything to save at least some of their families while there was still time."[131]

The New Civil Defense Program

A few days after Hyannis Port, President Kennedy gave the first public indication of the new direction of civil defense. At a November 29th press conference he let it be known that in the future "the emphasis will be on community shelters." While the information on what the homeowner could do to protect his family would still be made available, "the central responsibility, it seems to me, is for us to provide community shelters."[132] This would be "the most effective use of our resources" and would "provide the best security for our people."[133]

During the next several months Administration officials would elaborate on the details of the redirected civil defense effort. This began on December 14th when the Defense Department issued a press release on "the next phase of the President's Civil Defense program," noting Kennedy's decision to emphasize community shelters, and indicating that this would be accomplished "by offering incentive payments to cover a part of the cost of providing fallout shelter in schools, hospitals and public welfare institutions."[134]

Exactly what this entailed was made clearer in January when the new program was presented to the Congress for authorization and appropriations. Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee in hearings on the military posture, Secretary of Defense McNamara noted that "because most of our working population must be provided protection both at work and at home, it is estimated that complete protection for our entire population of 180 million people would require about 220 million shelter spaces today, rising with population increases at the rate of

about 3 million a year."[135] The President's civil defense program would seek to provide all these shelter spaces. According to McNamara, the Federal portion of this program would consist of three parts:

1. The Federal shelter survey--the identification, marking, and provisioning of shelter spaces in existing buildings;

2. The Federal shelter incentive program--the creation...of additional space by means of new construction and alteration or modification of existing structures; and

3. The stimulation of private individual, business, and community shelter construction by example /i.e. Federal buildings/ and technical assistance.[136]

In that the incentive portion was the only significantly new aspect of this program, it deserved closer attention. As explained by McNamara, and OCD Director Pittman before various Congressional Committees, what this program sought to accomplish was the encouragement of shelter incorporation in new construction through the use of Federal funds to offset the cost of the shelter for the builder. The program would be restricted to non-profit institutions engaged in health, education, and welfare activities, for construction or modification of public fallout shelters holding fifty people or more. If such institutions would either modify existing structures in this manner, or provide shelter in new construction (primarily by providing basements that met fallout shelter specifications), then the OCD would pay up to $25 per shelter space created, or $2.50 per square foot of actual cost, whichever was less. It was estimated that "the average incremental cost of such shelter will amount to approximately $40 per individual space of 10 square feet or $4 per square foot."[137] Thus most construction or modification efforts would require that the institution providing the shelter absorb some of the cost. This could be very little or a great deal, depending on the cost of the shelter spaces created. On the other hand,

if modifications or new construction could be accomplished for $25 or less, there would be no charge to the cooperating institution and the Government would pay the entire shelter portion of the bill.[138] Civil defense would benefit, due to the added shelter to the national system, and the institutions would benefit through the addition of protective classrooms, cafeterias, gymnasiums, storage rooms, etc., to their buildings at little or no extra cost.

It was estimated that the total cost of the shelter incentive program over the next four years would run about $3.3 billion with the Federal Government financing approximately $1.8 billion.[139] It was expected that this outlay would provide 100 million shelter spaces to the shelter system by FY 1967. In that it was also anticipated that the shelter survey would locate 70 million shelter spaces by then and that approximately 3.5 million spaces would have been added through the incorporation of shelters in new Federal construction, and that 60 million spaces would be added to the total by private citizens, organizations, and industry, it was thought that by FY 1967 a total of 235.5 million shelter spaces could be provided--enough to meet the requirements of a comprehensive nationwide fallout shelter system.[140] The cost for all of this was estimated in the five to six billion dollar range, of which the Federal share would be about three billion.[141]

There was some doubt, though, that the shelter incentive portion of the civil defense program could be implemented adequately without explicit authorizing legislation. Thus on 8 February 1962, McNamara transmitted to Congress the draft of a bill seeking such authorization.[142] Pittman elaborated on the need for the authorizing legislation at a later date when he noted that "we do not believe we can achieve our

objective under a law which requires the funds to be allocated to States in accordance with target areas as well as population."[143] In other words, he wanted the authority to provide shelter any place it was found economically feasible to do so.[144] To be able to do this, though, the program would have to be approved and the President's $700 million civil defense request appropriated.

The FY 1963 Appropriation

Appearing before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on 13 March 1962, OCD Director Steuart Pittman was faced with two dire developments. First, as of this date absolutely no action had been taken on the shelter incentive program legislation which had been submitted almost five weeks earlier, and for which $460 million was being sought in the FY 1963 budget. The Appropriations Committee could not approve any money for this program until Carl Vinson's Armed Services Committee (to which the bill had been referred) voted the bill out and unless the House voted favorably. But first, Vinson would have to hold hearings on the measure, and these had not yet been scheduled.

Secondly, the subcommittee before which Pittman was appearing was not the Department of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (which had approved the OCD budget the year before), but the Independent Offices Subcommittee, chaired by Albert Thomas. In a surprise move, Clarence Cannon (Dem., Mo.), the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, had returned the civil defense budget back to Thomas' jurisdiction earlier in the year, despite the fact that civil defense was now a responsibility of, and a part of, the Department of Defense, and not that of an Independent Office. It must be assumed that Cannon's decision was based on a conclusion that Thomas' subcommittee was more familiar

with the civil defense program than Mahon's subcommittee and would thus treat the OCD requests more rigorously, though there was speculation at the time that the move could be better explained in terms of Cannon's anti-civil defense bias.[145] It is also entirely possible that Cannon's action was an attempt to molify the influential Thomas, who deeply resented the initial transfer to the Department of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.[146] In any event it is notable that the Administration did not protest the move back to Thomas.

With these developments as a backdrop, Pittman presented the Thomas subcommittee with an OCD FY 1963 appropriation request of $695 million. (See Table IV-3.) As can be seen, the largest portion by far was the shelter incentive program, which, because of the lack of explicit authorization, was not considered during these hearings. The next largest share, at $56 million, was for the continuation of the shelter survey, marking, and stocking program initiated the previous fiscal year. It had been hoped then that 40 to 50 million spaces could be found. By the time of these hearings the latter figure was thought to be the more accurate one.[147] Pittman noted that this program was "moving rapidly," and would probably be concluded by the end of the year, at which time the scope of the program could be cut back to a level sufficient to keep up with new construction.[148]

From the course of the hearings it became clear that nothing that had happened in the year intervening since civil defense had been transferred from his jurisdiction had changed Thomas' opinions on civil defense matters. Indeed, Thomas indicated his concern (or lack of it) over civil defense early in the hearings when he indicated that Khrushchev would no more use nuclear weapons against the United States than

TABLE IV-3

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1963 OCD APPROPRIATION REQUEST

	1962 Estimate	1963 Estimate
1) Operation and Maintenance:		
Warning and detection	$ 26,868,112	$ 46,160,000
Emergency operations	22,522,109	33,485,000
Financial assistance to States	21,185,799	32,000,000
Management	12,235,712	14,600,000
Total	$ 82,811,732	$126,245,000
2) Shelter, Research & Development, & Const.		
Shelter incentives	$ 0	$460,000,000
Shelter in existing federal buildings	17,500,000	35,000,000
Shelter survey, marking, stocking	140,055,470	56,000,000
Research and development	15,484,834	17,755,000
Total	$173,040,304	$568,755,000
Grand Total	$255,852,036	$695,000,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1963, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1962, p. 84.

Hitler used his chemical and bacteriological weapons during World War II. According to Thomas, "Neither side could have won, so neither side attempted to use them. Are we not on that same level right now with Mr. Khrushchev?....Who is going to be foolish enough to drop the first one? Who is going to win? Can either side win by it? What is the purpose?"[149]

Rather than counter the weak points in this parallel, Pittman, instead, responded by restating the fact that "the Administration is convinced that the threat is sufficiently real, and the opportunity to meet it is sufficiently real, that we should at least take this much of a step to protect the population."[150] Representative Harold Ostertag (Rep., N.Y.), later noted in relation to this line of argument that "of course,

we must recognize that there is a calculated risk involved in present-day cold war tensions, but isn't it reasonable to say that by virtue of our terrific capability, our retaliatory strength and power, that it is and has been accepted and regarded as a real deterrent to an attack and that our strength has increased rather than decreased and that the chance of an attack on the United States has been considerably diminished over the months?" To this Pittman agreed, while also noting that Soviet strength was similarly increasing and that in any event the real "danger is in miscalculation and accident and misjudgment, /and/ limited wars getting out of hand."[151]

Thomas, however, was seemingly unconvinced. He noted, in relation to his subcommittee, that "we have talked with the people in England, France, Germany, Turkey, and there is not the slightest bit of interest in a shelter plan any place in Europe."[152] Similarly, Ostertag argued that contrary to reports that the Soviets were engaged in an intensive civil defense program, in his opinion (which he neither qualified nor substantiated) "they have actually done very little."[153] The implied point in both these arguments was that if these countries were unconcerned with civil defense, then why should the United States be an exception.

As if to bolster this perception, Chairman Thomas took an unusual step for a House Appropriations subcommittee in those days. After Pittman and other civil defense officials presented their justifications for the present civil defense program and budget, Thomas received several nongovernment witnesses before the subcommittee who then gave testimony opposing the civil defense program and appropriation request.[154] Among these were representatives of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear

Policy, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the General Brotherhood Board of the Church of the Brethren, the Methodist Board of Christian Concerns, the Peace Research Institute, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.[155] The subcommittee was told that civil defense would not work, that it would work too well and lead to war, that it would encourage a garrison state mentality, would lead to defeatism, would be too expensive (to the tune of $250 to $300 billion),[156] would accelerate the arms race, etc. From his statements, Thomas appeared receptive to these arguments, notwithstanding the contradictory nature of several. Moreover, it is reported that upon the close of these hearings, Thomas stated that he had now heard from the spokesmen for academic and scientific groups and that "every one of them was against the program."[157]

It should come as no surprise, then, to learn that when the House Appropriations Committee voted out its OCD appropriation recommendation on July 27th, it had been significantly reduced. Out of the $695 million requested, $75 million was approved.[158] In its report the Committee stated that this would allow the OCD "to continue the established programs of civil defense at the same general level as in 1962," even though the OCD had been appropriated over $256 million in that fiscal year.[159] Evidently, the Committee was choosing to ignore the $207 million OCD supplemental appropriation and was referring to the level at which the OCDM would have operated on its regular appropriation of $86.5 million had the reorganization of civil defense not taken place!

In justifying its reduction the report stated that "the Committee believes that before the Nation embarks on an extensive fallout shelter construction program involving billions of dollars, more study and

research should be applied to the vast and complex problems involved."[160] Paradoxically, however, the Committee then went on to note that only $10 million for R&D had been approved (out of a requested $17.8 million--a cut of more than forty percent.) In another area, the entire $35 million request for the modification and construction of fallout shelters in existing Federal buildings was cut--one of the three basic legs of the new Kennedy civil defense program. On the floor of the House, Subcommittee member Ostertag justified this cut by arguing that "there seems to be no valid reason to have a very limited number of people protected as against the general population."[161] He completely ignored the supporting argument that it was important to provide a Federal example if it was to be expected that State and local areas include fallout shelter protection in their new construction, or even support civil defense in general.[162]

On July 30th the Independent Offices Appropriations Bill containing the OCD appropriation recommendation of $75 million came up before the whole House for discussion. With the exception of Chet Holifield and a handful of others, no serious exception to the civil defense section of the bill was made and no ammendments offered to reinstate the civil defense funds and programs which had been cut. Holifield, however, argued that "a body blow to the President's civil defense program" had been dealt: "It sends the program reeling in confusion. Careful plans are shattered, orderly programs disrupted, hard work done for nought... Do you suppose that this wholesale fund slash, this meat-ax cut, is a saving? Do you suppose that you can tell your constituents you are saving money by depriving them of protection in case of a real emergency?" Holifield's answer was a forceful "NO." Noting that this year's grant

amounted to but 25 percent of the previous years' grant, Holifield concluded that this was "poor business."[163] Judging by the nature of the vote on this bill the following day (368-12) Holifields efforts were short of the mark.

Kennedy's Reaction

The severity of the House reduction in Kennedy's new civil defense program prompted the President to write the chairmen of the Congressional Committees with responsibilities in the civil defense area, expressing his concern:

> I wish again to state my view that, in these times, the Federal Government has an inescapable responsibility to take practical and sensible measures to minimize loss of life in the event of nuclear attack, to continue the essential functions of the Government, and to provide a base for our survival and recovery as a nation. These matters are an integral part of a balanced defense program for the security of our Nation.

Kennedy expressly rejected the House Appropriations Committee argument that more research should be undertaken before further forward movement in the civil defense program be allowed. He noted that "the Secretary of Defense and my other senior advisers on this subject had intensively reviewed what is known and what is not known about the possible effects of nuclear war" and had concluded that "for the foreseeable future, under a wide range of attack assumptions, large numbers of lives could be saved by adequate fallout shelter space." This "conclusion was clear," he asserted. Therefore, "postponement of practical measures to shield our people from fallout radiation cannot be justified by the inevitable imponderables and the continuing need for greater research."[164]

While Kennedy did not want to see civil defense become publicly salient again, neither was he prepared to see it wither away.

Senate Hearings

On August 6th, a few days after Kennedy's appeal, Pittman appeared before the Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee and sought restoration of the entire request denied by the House (with the exception of the incentive shelter funds still awaiting committee action in the Armed Services Committees.) In his opening statement Pittman asserted that "civil defense has had its opportunity to move forward in fiscal year 1962. It cannot slide back in fiscal year 1963 without damage from which it will take time to recover."[165] By this time, he noted, the existing shelter survey had identified shelter space for nearly 60 million people--a figure above their original estimates--and the survey was continuing.[166] Of these, 37 million had either already been stocked with survival supplies or were awaiting stocks that were in the pipeline. In addition, another 60 million spaces had been identified in the 40 to 100 PF range, and while these were not scheduled for marking and stocking, it was hoped that many could rather easily be modified to meet the 100 PF standard set by the OCD. Notably, however, the House bill would necessitate having to halt this, thus far, very successful program. Pittman argued there was no rational justification for forcing a cutback, much less a halt, in this program.[167]

On August 27th, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out to the Senate its FY 1963 Independent Offices Appropriations Bill containing an OCD appropriation recommendation of $185 million--more than twice the House amount.[168] (See Table IV-4.) As can be seen in Table IV-4, the major difference between the two bills was in the "Shelter, Research and Development, and Construction Program," for which the House had allowed only $10 million (and this restricted solely to the R&D

subprogram.) The Senate, on the other hand, allowed $93.8 million for the program, without earmarking the subprogram funds (thus allowing the OCD to continue the shelter survey, marking and stocking program, the R&D program, and the Federal buildings program, as they saw fit within the limits of the appropriation.)[169]

On August 31st, this bill survived an attempt by Senator Young to cut the civil defense funds back to the House level, when the bill came up for discussion.[170] The two bills then went to conference where agreement was reached on a compromise in the Operations and Maintenance Program granting the OCD $75 million. No agreement, however, could be reached on the Shelter Program. According to Senator Allott, who headed the Senate conferees, "the House was quite adamant in its position" opposing any increase over the $10 million they had seen fit to appropriate for this program.[171] Thus the two conference committees went back to the House and Senate to seek support for their positions and instructions concerning the second conference round.

In the Senate, discussion of this deadlock took place on September 19th. In leading off the discussion, Senator Allott argued that "sometime, somewhere, we in the Congress of the United States must decide what to do about civil defense....At some time we must 'fish or cut bait' on this issue." As far as Allott was concerned, "this is the place to do it."

> We heard a lot said in the conference committee, making fun of dog biscuits and storing water...but it is not possible to put people in fallout shelters and expect them to live without food and water for a period of 10 days, 2 weeks, or 3 weeks....
>
> We are not talking about the difference between $10 million and $93 million. What we are trying to decide, and what we must decide, is whether we are going to kick it out and forget it.

In Allott's opinion, "in the present situation in the world, I for one cannot see abandoning my responsibility." Neither, he argued, could the other Senators: "We must face this question....this is the reason we must send the item back in disagreement." Allott was willing to bend, however, for he noted that "the absolute minimum with which the agency can begin to do the job is $56 million."[172]

Senator Humphrey spoke up in support of Allott and stated that he also was of the opinion that the Senate "should put up a fight on this subject and finish it once and for all." Senator Symington agreed and pointed out that "if we go through with this almost washing out of the civil defense program, it would be the last time we would get any real interest on the part of the States and the municipalities."[173]

Despite all the tough talk about fighting the House on this issue and of an "absolute minimum" of $56 million for this program, when the second conference report was published on September 25th, it became apparent that the Senate conferees had changed their minds. A $36 million compromise had been accepted--$20 million short of the "absolute minimum."[174] Both the House and the Senate agreed to this compromise and subsequently the FY 1963 Independent Offices Appropriaions Bill was passed containing $111 million for the OCD.[175]

On top of this blow to the OCD program, it had become obvious by this time that hearings would not be held on the shelter incentive program during 1962. Concerned with this development, President Kennedy, in his August 3rd letter to various Congressional chairmen, urged that such hearings be held early enough to enable a supplemental request for enough fiscal year 1963 funds to keep pace with those communities and eligible institutions with plans for creating new fallout shelter

TABLE IV-4

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1963 OCD APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1962[a] Grant	Request[b] to BOB	Approved[a] by BOB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1963[c] Grant
Operations	$ 83,000	---	$126,245	$ 65,000	$ 91,200	$ 75,000
Shelters*	173,000	---	568,755	**10,000	93,800	36,000
Total	$256,000+	$754,400	$694,000	$ 75,000	$185,000	$128,000@

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1963, Senate Report 1923, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 26.

[b]U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Program Paper (Volume 5), "Financial Digest (1951-1978)," 1979.

[c]Congressional Record, Vol. 108, Part 15, 19 September 1963, p. 19913.

*Includes shelter survey, marking, stocking, R&D, Federal buildings shelter, and incentive program.

**For R&D only.

+$49.6 million was transferred to the OCD from the FY 1962 OCDM appropriation.

@On 17 May 1963 the OCD received in supplemental funds $15 million for food stock procurement, out of a $61.9 million request which, if granted, would have completed the provisioning of shelter spaces located up to that time. The OCD thus received a total of $128 million in FY 1963 funds.

spaces.[176] On August 20th, however, Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee, wrote Kennedy back and stated: "I do not believe that the country is at this time ready for the shelter incentive program."[177] Vinson gave no indication of when he would schedule hearings on this subject. He had successfully delayed holding hearings on the incentive program authorization all through the summer, however. Given the fact that the House had recently supported significant cuts in the civil defense program, it did not appear that Vinson would be pressured into holding hearings before he wanted to.

Postscript to the FY 1963 Appropriation

There are several reasons which help explain the cutback in the civil defense program which resulted from the FY 1963 appropriation and the failure to authorize the incentive program. First, the crisis atmosphere which had spurred action in 1961 had passed. The "shelter mania," likewise quickly passed. Sales of shelters and shelter supplies began dropping precipitously in November and December 1961.[178] By early 1962 the level of civil defense involvement and concern on the part of the general population had just about receded to a pre-Berlin Crisis level. Secondly, it would appear that in terms of the Congress, the Berlin Crisis had little legacy value in relation to civil defense. Like the general public, the views of many Congressmen had reverted back to pre-crisis conceptions by early 1962. Indeed, many in the Congress still maintained a philosophy of civil defense quite at odds with that of Kennedy. In the words of Representative Joe L. Evins of Thomas' subcommittee, spoken during the 30 July 1962 debate on the civil defense appropriations bill in the House, and referring to the various committees of Congress with responsibilities in the civil defense area: "I believe

it is the feeling of the committees that the States and municipalities--and certainly the individuals have a responsibility in providing protection from fallout--and that a shelter program is not, strictly speaking, a national problem exclusively."[179]

This was but one of the many problems faced by civil defense officials then and now. Another perennial problem that was notable during the House FY 1963 Appropriations hearings was the lack of adequate knowledge of civil defense issues on the part of committee members; knowledge that was readily available and had been available for a number of years. For example, on the subject of keeping food safe from contamination and on decontaminating food that had not been protected, OCD Director Pittman noted that "any cover or partition of a wall would be sufficient to keep the fallout particles out." It was also noted that "radiation itself does not contaminate. If fallout particles get into the food they would have to be cleaned out." If fallout particles could be removed then the food would be safe to eat. This led subcommittee member Sidney R. Yates (Dem., Ill.) to inquire: "Why do we then need elaborate shelters?" Yates was obviously unaware of the effects of radiation and the distinction to be made between its effects on animate objects on one hand and inanimate objects on the other. Mr. Yates was similarly uneducated on fallout protective measures: "Suppose a person has an ordinary home with a basement: does he need any elaborate precautions?"[180]

Chairman Albert Thomas, likewise, was ignorent of some basic facts. He also assumed that people could be protected in a manner similar to food and suggested that civil defense problems could be solved by utilizing gas masks and overalls: "We had to have gas masks in World

War II. Why can you not come up with that now? If that will take it out of the air and you have a little plastic overall covering that will protect you against dust, why does this not solve our problem?"[181] This example of Thomas' ignorence of the distinction to be made between the danger of penetrating radiation on the one hand and contaminated particles on the other, is unfortunately illuminating. In that these people were shaping civil defense programs through their granting of funds, and had been doing so for a number of years, it was their responsibility to be better acquainted with the subject than they were. For this, Thomas and his subcommittee must be faulted.[182]

Finally, President Kennedy was no longer as committed to civil defense as he had been in 1961. This was in evidence during the Hyannis Port meeting. There are indications that his commitment to civil defense continued to deteriorate after Hyannis Port. In the press, at the time, it was noted that despite the problems the OCD was having with Congressional cooperation and appropriations, "President Kennedy had not publicly urged approval of the program in recent months and had made no plans to do so."[183] While this was consistent with Kennedy's Hyannis Port decision to maintain a low civil defense profile there are other indications that Kennedy's, only intermittently broken, silence on civil defense went deeper than the low profile explanation. For example, Steuart Pittman has written, in reference to Kennedy's Hyannis Port decision to promote new shelter construction, that "the President probably doubted his own decision by 1962."[184]

For these reasons, by September 1962, the prospects for civil defense seemed much dimmer than they had just twelve months earlier. In that same month, however, one of those developments which occur from

time to time in international relations, began to simmer. Before the next month was over a full-blown crisis developed which once again brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war. There can be little doubt that at this point there were many Congressmen who must have doubted the wisdom of their recent slashing of civil defense funds.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

On 22 October 1962, after a hectic week of conference in Washington, President Kennedy appeared on television and announced that "within the past week" serial reconnaissance had established "unmistakable evidence" that a "series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation" on the island of Cuba. Their purpose could be "none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere." These were Soviet built sites. In addition, the Soviets had delivered medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and jet bombers to Cuba, despite past assurances. These actions, the President continued, constituted a "deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo that cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe." Kennedy then announced "a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba" and warned the Soviets that it "shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." Khrushchev was urged to withdraw these threatening forces post haste. In the meantime, Kennedy stated, "I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities."[185]

During the following week tensions mounted as an anxious nation watched on and pondered the likelihood of nuclear war as the crisis unfolded. One wonders how many Congressmen remembered the words of Chet Holifield, uttered on July 30th during the heat of the debate on the civil defense appropriation, when he warned that "if a new Berlin crisis develops into a serious situation before the end of the year we will be sorry that we acted hastily to slash funds."[186]

Finally, on October 28th, Khrushchev consented to withdrawing the missiles and bombers the Soviet Union had placed in Cuba, and to the dismantling of the missile bases. Shortly thereafter the "quarantine" was lifted and the crisis passed. However, in its wake was left the reality that nuclear war was indeed conceivable. In similar fashion during the crisis, civil defense became more conceivable.

In writing of the Cuban Missile Crisis a few years later, Steuart Pittman noted that "the public exhibited a sudden concern about civil defense, widely reported by local civil defense to take the form of one question: where does my family go for protection if there is an attack?"[187] It has been estimated that millions answered this question for themselves during the crisis by leaving their homes in the cities for "vacations" in less target worthy locales. Similarly, during the heat of the crisis the Washington Post published a list of a thousand locations in the Washington vicinity where people could find fallout protection; none of which had been marked or stocked--not enough money.[188] As a result of the crisis, Orville L. Freeman, the Secretary of Agriculture, had 8,400 pounds of processed cheddar cheese and a stockpile of wafers stored in the basement of the Agriculture Department.[189] And, the Very Reverend Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Dean of the Washington

Cathedral, had a large area of the cathedral basement flooded "to provide potable water in an emergency."[190]

Other examples could be given of the seriousness with which the situation was viewed and the lengths taken to improve one's chances of survival had the crisis devolved into nuclear war. Suffice it to say, however, that the Cuban Missile Crisis brought about a sharpened awareness of the increased need for civil defense improvements. Within the Government there were several physical manifestations of this "sharpened awareness" both during and after the crisis, though the record is not completely clear as to the conclusions that should be drawn from the actions that were taken.

On the sub-Federal government level the record is fairly clear--there was a flurry of activity on the part of local civil defense organizations, primarily in attempting to mark and stock shelter spaces that had been previously located by the shelter survey. On the Federal level the civil defense response to the crisis was more low-keyed and cautious. During the crisis OCD Director Pittman was directed to draw up two sets of contingency plans for civil defense activity should hostilities erupt: the first dealt with recommendations for measures to be taken "in the vicinity of targets close to Cuba under attack with conventional weapons," and the second dealt with steps to be taken "in response to a possible nuclear attack within MRBM range" of Cuba.[191] In a memorandum accompanying these plans Pittman indicated that in his opinion the immediate implementation of either plan was "not desirable" and, instead, "strongly" proposed a third course of action: "to announce an acceleration of the current civil defense program."[192]

According to Pittman, these feelings were expressed to Kennedy

personally when Pittman was "called into the marathon crisis meeting" to inform the President of possible civil defense options should the worst come to pass. When asked specifically about the feasibility of evacuating the Miami area, Pittman advised against, citing among other reasons, that "we did not have any significant evacuation plans" for that area. He reiterated the point made in his memorandum that "we would do better to accelerate nationwide shelter preparations."[193] Kennedy, however, was unwilling to approve this recommendation--at least during the crisis--apparently out of a motivation to keep from giving the appearance of escalating the crisis any further. The public panic and overreaction which attended Kennedy's Berlin Crisis civil defense statements was still remembered, and Kennedy did not want to lose control of this situation. According to Pittman, the President went so far as to issue "a stop order on any Federal steps even to 'alert' or activate state and local civil defense, much less the public."[194] When reflecting back on this episode after leaving the OCD, Pittman reached the conclusion that "this reveals how precarious and unreliable crash civil defense is likely to be."[195] The corollary, of course, to this conclusion, was that the only effective civil defense was one that was based on a system in being (such as fallout shelters) and not paper plans.

Apparently President Kennedy was reinforced in this same conclusion as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for shortly afterwards he approved Pittman's recommendations made during the crisis, and ordered a speedup in the marking and stocking of shelters. Moreover, the minimum acceptable fallout radiation protection factor was changed from PF 100 to PF 40. This enabled a rapid increase in the size of the nationwide fallout shelter system. While the lowering of the standard was criticized

by some, the OCD estimated that 90 percent of shelters with a 40 PF would provide effective shielding in case of attack. The low cost involved in adding this shelter to the inventory, the fact that the inventory would be expanded significantly, and the fact that most such shelter was better distributed throughout the country than the higher PF 100 shelter, expecially "in the South and in less densely populated urbanized areas," justified this change in the opinions of those at the OCD.[196] Kennedy concurred. His actions during and after the Cuban Missile Crisis thus reinforce the conclusion that Kennedy was still concerned with civil defense, though not as strongly as in 1961, and not to the extent that he was willing to risk a public panic in order to facilitate civil defense goals.

The 1963 House Armed Services Committee Hearings

In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis President Kennedy once again appealed to Chairman Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee to hold hearings on the shelter incentive program.[197] Kennedy was backed up by Secretary of Defense McNamara, who told Vinson's committee on February 2nd that:

> In the light of the critical reception accorded this program by the Congress last year, we have again thoroughly examined its concepts, requirements, costs and phasing. Our conclusion is that fallout shelters for the population are absolutely essential to enable us to face the consequences of a nuclear war which might be forced upon us.[198]

A few days later Vinson "grudgingly" agreed and hearings were scheduled to begin on May 28th.[199] Though no one expected it at the time, these would evolve into the most thorough examination of civil defense ever undertaken by a committee of Congress.

On May 28th these hearings commenced before a skeptical, if not

hostile, subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee under the Chairmanship of F. Edward Hébert (Dem., La.).[200] For civil defense advocates the hearings began on an inauspicious note, for the first action of the committee was to hear subcommittee Counsel, Phillip Kelleher, deliver an overall negative staff report on civil defense, putting forth the nature and parameters of the current civil defense controversy. Mr. Kelleher began by stating:

> To place the matter in its broadest perspective I suggest that the question which the Congress will ultimately be called upon to answer is whether the prosecution of the currently planned fallout shelter program, or any extension or expansion of it, would work a cruel and dangerous deception on the American people, or would it, on the other hand, constitute the salvation of this country both for itself and as the leader of the free world.[201]

The nature of the remainder of Mr. Kelleher's presentation tended to support the former conclusion: "It should be stated, at the outset, that for the most part the matters raised and the arguments presented are against the fallout shelter program."[202] Mr. Kelleher justified this somewhat unusual approach by arguing that since the committee had a positive legislative proposal before it, it was only fair to balance this with the negative opposite side of the coin.[203] He then proceeded to summarize as many arguments against fallout shelters and civil defense in general as time and space would allow. It was, in his words, "a dismal and even horrifying picture of what nuclear war can mean." Kelleher spoke of enormous areas of blast destruction, gigantic fire storms, "insuperable" problems, "useless" shelters, and unknown "psychological effects." On another level he spoke of the "very broad language of the administration bill," and of the "irreversible" and "irretraceable step" passage of the bill would signify. Upon the close of this presentation, Chairman Hébert congratulated Kelleher "for one of the finest,

if not the finest, presentations on any given subject that has ever been heard."[204]

After this presentation the OCD officials surely had their work cut out for them, for the initial stages of the hearings proceeded much in the same vein as the Kelleher Memorandum. Witness after witness rose to speak in opposition to the shelter legislation specifically, and civil defense generally. However, as the hearings continued throughout the summer of 1963 it began to appear that for every witness speaking out against the program, two or three would appear in support.[205] Indeed, as the record of the testimony began to accumulate, a gradual shift could be detected on the part of some committee members from opposition to support of the civil defense legislation.

Two basic and related reasons appear in explanation of this shift. First, much of the testimony offered by critics of the civil defense program was notably fatuous in nature. For example, the committee was told that "the atmosphere of fear of an inevitable attack that accompanies civilian defense efforts corrupts the minds and hearts of young and old alike."[206] The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom was opposed to the program because "it threatens our moral and spiritual values as well as our democratic heritage."[207] Dr. Lester Grinspoon, a Senior Research Psychiatrist at the Massachusetts Mental Health Center, and an Instructor in Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School, told the committee that a shelter program would create dangerous anxieties in children:

> Some of the central issues with which children struggle inwardly are their fears of separation from their parents, physical injury, and death. A shelter and shelter drills may make a child believe that his worst fears are coming true...But more serious may be the long-term effects on the character development of children who are confronted with the kind of anxiety

> that school centered shelters and school drills may lead to.[208]

In comparison to such testimony, and thus the second reason for the shift of some committee members, was the calm, objective, and business like testimony of the OCD officials who appeared before the committee, especially that of the OCD Director, Steuart Pittman, who capably countered, point by point, the more germane of the criticisms leveled against the civil defense program. For Pittman, the basic issue was simple:

> It is whether to face a crisis with a well-conceived plan to contain the psychological and physical damage of a nuclear crisis or a nuclear attack, or whether to look the other way until the last possible moment.[209]

Hébert's HASC subcommittee agreed and on July 12th voted to support the OCD shelter program.[210] Hébert and his subcommittee, however, also agreed with the conclusion of the Kelleher Memorandum to the effect that the shelter incentive program, as presented in H.R. 3516, was "too broad" in scope and legislative authority. They thus had the OCD prepare a new draft bill "in order to nail down some generalities." On July 17th, the subcommittee met to go over the new draft. However, some subcommittee members became upset when the nuts and bolts operations of the program, as written into the bill, were laid out. For example, a proposal to build six more underground OCD regional control centers was immediately thrown out (presumably to be considered the next year when the committee planned to take an in-depth look at other aspects of civil defense besides the shelter program.) Some were also upset by an OCD plan to average out community fallout shelter plans, thereby allowing Federal contributions for specific projects greater than $2.50 a square foot (up to $4) as long as the average for the community was $2.50.

In view of these problems, the hearing was adjourned until the following day when the full subcommittee could be informed of these difficulties. Meeting then, on the 18th, yet another problem emerged involving OCD plans to make retroactive payments (to 1 January 1963) to eligible institutions for fallout shelter space that had been provided in anticipation of the bill's passage. A decision was therefore made to rewrite the bill section by section within the subcommittee.[212]

One month later this task was completed, and on August 2nd the full House Armed Services Committee met for the presentation of the Hébert subcommittee's new bill (H.R. 8200). Speaking for the subcommittee, Chairman Hébert referred to the public portion of the hearings and noted:

> The weight of the evidence was clearly and overwhelmingly on the side of approving the program. I think I speak for all the members of the subcommittee when I say that the auguments against the program were, in very great part, of a frail and temuous nature when compared with the arguments for it.[213]

Hébert then noted how his and his subcommittee's initial opposition to the civil defense program "melted as the hearings progressed and then again hardened into an attitude of firm belief in the wisdom of the program." According to Hébert:

> It is an experience that is unique in my service in Congress and necessarily requires one important, and I will say almost inevitable, conclusion--and that is, that if the full committee had sat through the 108 witnesses, it, too, would have undergone the same experience as that of the subcommittee. I offer this as my most persuasive, single argument for favorable consideration of this legislation by the full committee.[214]

Despite the obstructionist efforts of one of the subcommittee members whose position of opposition to the program remained unchanged,[215] when Chairman Carl Vinson indicated that he too had changed his mind and now supported the legislation, there was no doubt that it would pass the

committee vote (which it did 32 to 4, with 1 abstention).[216] For the supporters of civil defense a major battle was won with the vote of the House Armed Services Committee. But, the war was not over--the whole House would have to vote on H.R. 8200 in less than a months time.

Realizing this, as well as the, by now, skeptical civil defense predisposition of the House, the HASC, in its report on the civil defense hearings and legislation, argued that:

> The bill, H.R. 8200, bears little resemblance to the bill submitted by the executive branch. Only the central theme has been maintained. Where there was broad and general language leaving vast areas for administrative decision, there is now precise language delineating exactly what can be done under the bill. The committee has preempted the whole area. There is no room for the issuance of Executive orders nor is there room for the interposition of administrative interpretation. Every door has been closed, every crack has been sealed.[217]

Not content to let the Committee's report speak for itself, Chairman Hébert of the subcommittee took it upon himself to write every member of the House urging their support for H.R. 8200 and noting, among other things, that originally he and the other subcommittee members had opposed the legislation but changed their minds on the strength of the evidence presented.[218]

Thus the stage was set for a marathon debate on civil defense that took place on the Floor of the House on 17 September 1963. Leading off the debate Hébert spoke on behalf of the legislation and confirmed the contents of the letter and indicated that Chairman Vinson of the full committee likewise had changed his position on civil defense. In a remarkable show of candor Hébert told the House that not only had he and Vinson been opposed to the civil defense program before the hearings, but that the only reason the hearings had been held in the first place was because "we felt we would be polite about this and have a hearing

and let everybody have their say. Then we would bury the bill."[219]

After Hébert's presentation numerous Congressmen rose urging support for the legislation for various reasons in what seemed to be a carefully orchestrated campaign for House approval.[220] And, from the nature of the debate that followed it did not appear that the tide was in favor of the opposition. In bringing this debate to a close, Carl Vinson summed up the position of the Armed Services Committee for those present:

> The committee feels, and I am in complete personal agreement, that, while unlikely, nuclear war is a possibility over the next 5, 10, or 20 years--and that its consequences are far too grave to be discounted. It is equally clear that if there should be a nuclear attack, it would almost certainly be accompanied by widespread, deadly fallout radiation. A most reasonable program of civil defense can provide shielding which will protect and save those who would otherwise be killed. How many would be saved, and who--no one can say with certainly. But based on very conservative assumptions, some 25 to 65 million lives would be saved by providing reasonable protection against fallout radiation.

Vinson noted that his House Armed Services Committee would from then on keep an eye on the civil defense program and would hold yearly authorization hearings. There should be no fear, he continued, that the program would get out of hand. For all these reasons, he urged adoption of H.R. 8200.[221]

Shortly thereafter the House complied, and, on a voice vote, passed the long fought for civil defense legislation. Another major battle had been won by civil defense proponents; some thought the major battle. But, before this measure could become law the Senate would also have to vote approval. Even then, there would still be a very hazardous bridge to cross before the Thomas House Appropriations subcommittee. Momentum, however, seemed to be with civil defense. The House was now on record formally sanctioning the completion of the shelter system.

The FY 1964 Appropriation

Throughout the Spring and Summer of 1963 the Congressional appropriations hearings on the FY 1964 OCD budget request had been postponed in view of the nature of the hearings being conducted by the House Armed Services Committee. Following the favorable vote of the HASC on August 2nd, the House Appropriations Committee scheduled hearings on the OCD appropriation. On 11 September 1963--five days before the House vote on H.R. 8200--the Thomas Independent Offices Subcommittee met to receive the testimony of the OCD on its FY 1964 request for $346.9 million. (See Table IV-5.) Appearing then before Thomas' subcommittee, and later before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, OCD Director Steuart Pittman made, in this author's opinion, his strongest case yet before Appropriations committees for approval of his program. Before Thomas' subcommittee, Pittman began by noting that several important developments had taken place in the year that had lapsed since his last appearance before the subcommittee. According to Pittman:

> The most important fact is the crystallization of a judgement, a consensus you might say, among the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top scientists, and the military strategists in the Pentagon. This judgement is that a weak part of our military posture is our defense against nuclear attack--I would personally say the weakest link in the whole system of defense. The best new opportunity to minimize nuclear damage at the lowest possible cost is by means of a nationwide fallout shelter system.[222]

He then went on to cite statements made by McNamara, General Wheeler of the JCS, and others in support of civil defense fallout shelters.

The second development was the decision of the House Armed Services Committee, recently made, to support H.R. 8200 on the incentive and Federal buildings programs. Pittman summarized the hearings, the nature of the testimony of the witnesses, and the conclusions of the

TABLE IV-5

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1964 OCD APPROPRIATION REQUEST

	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963 [1]	Fiscal year 1964 [2]
Warning and detection	$31,585,885	$14,124,000	$8,500,000
Warning and alert	(6,834,433)	(4,124,000)	(5,000,000)
Radiological fallout detection and monitoring	(23,822,094)	(8,300,000)	(1,700,000)
Warehousing and maintenance	(929,358)	(1,700,000)	(1,800,000)
Emergency operations	11,500,805	17,524,000	25,000,000
Communications and control	(1,962,523)	(1,528,000)	(2,000,000)
Damage assessment	(1,150,307)	(1,500,000)	(2,500,000)
Training and education	(2,805,048)	(10,100,000)	(16,400,000)
Public information	(3,959,847)	(4,096,000)	(3,600,000)
Industrial participation	(66,306)	(300,000)	(400,000)
Red Cross advisory services	(92,000)	(100,000)	(100,000)
Survival services	(1,464,274)	(0)	(0)
Financial assistance to States	18,849,530	27,500,000	33,000,000
Survival supplies, equipment, and training	(6,192,693)	(7,000,000)	(5,000,000)
Emergency operating centers	(2,956,754)	(7,000,000)	(10,000,000)
Personnel and administrative expenses	(9,700,083)	(13,500,000)	(18,000,000)
Management	12,432,252	13,600,000	15,700,000
Total operation and maintenance	74,368,472	72,848,000	82,200,000
Shelters	156,634,512	44,300,131	242,700,000
Shelter survey and marking	(58,414,271)	(9,300,000)	(7,800,000)
Shelter in Federal buildings	(17,482,035)	(2,300,131)	(20,000,000)
Shelter development	(0)	(0)	(175,000,000)
Shelter stocking	(80,738,206)	(32,700,000)	(46,900,000)
Research and development	19,046,395	11,000,000	15,000,000
Shelter	(8,183,732)	(4,300,000)	(5,250,000)
Support systems	(4,128,160)	(2,590,000)	(4,000,000)
Postattack	(1,699,772)	(1,840,000)	(3,250,000)
Systems evaluation	(4,607,283)	(1,970,000)	(2,500,000)
Prototype shelters	(427,448)	(0)	(0)
Total research and development, shelter and construction	175,680,907	55,300,131	264,700,000
Grand total	250,049,379	128,148,131	346,900,000

[1] Includes $15,000,000 approved in fiscal year 1963 supplemental appropriation, Public Law 88-25, May 17, 1963.

[2] Includes $46,900,000 included in budget amendment transmitted by the President on June 6, 1963 (H. Doc. 120).

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 955.

Hébert subcommittee for Thomas, and noted that:

> I believe this subcommittee is entitled to conclude, both from the logic and weight of the testimony and from the experience of the witnesses: (1) that the speculations about morality, psychology, and philosophy are certainly no reason not to take measures to protect our people; (2) that there are intangible factors which strongly support a shelter program, quite apart from its estimated lifesaving potential--most important that it makes war less likely-- and (3) that the critical issue is whether a fallout shelter system will save a substantial number of Americans under nuclear attack.[223]

Exactly how many lives saved would depend on a number of factors, but the range would most likely be from 25 to 65 million. This figure, Pittman indicated, derived from a series of Defense Department calculations which considered a wide range of hypothetical nuclear attacks covering both cities and military targets and considering present as well as potential future Soviet capabilities.[224] These studies concluded, Pittman continued before the Senate Appropriations subcommittee, that "millions of lives would be saved by a full fallout shelter system," and that as attack levels increased, so would the lifesaving potential of shelters (because more lives would be jeopardized by fallout as attack levels increased).[225] As a matter of fact, he noted, "the proportion of the population surviving solely because of fallout shelters becomes critical to the national recovery potential as attacks become heavier." In other words, civil defense measures could potentially spell the difference between survival or destruction of the Nation following a nuclear war.[226]

Despite this testimony and the recent HASC hearings, when the House Appropriations Committee reported out its civil defense appropriation recommendation on October 7th, only $87.8 million was provided out of the $346.9 million request. Of this amount, $70 million was for the continuation of "established" (i.e. pre-Kennedy) programs such as matching funds, training, and management. Of the $264.7 million that had been requested for the shelter program, the Committee recommended $7.8 million for continuation of the shelter survey and marking subprogram, and $10 million for R&D. No funds for the stocking of survival supplies was approved ($46.9 million had been requested) "because $11,000,000 has heretofore been appropriated for such shelter provisions and we should

wait and see how those stocks fare before putting more money into the program." In addition, the report noted that "the Committee has denied the $175,000,000 proposal for contributions to develop shelters in facilities of non-profit institutions and $20,000,000 for fallout shelters in Federal buildings."[227]

In relation to this last cut, it has been reported that Thomas, in commenting on the action of his subcommittee in comparison with Hébert's subcommittee, stated that "we haven't changed our minds. We're not building any fallout shelters, period."[228] This conviction was also expressed when Representative Oliver P. Bolton asked Thomas on the Floor of the House whether the shelter items had been cut because H.R. 8200 had yet to be approved by the Senate, or because of opposition to shelter construction in general. Thomas replied that the latter factor was the deciding one.[229]

In a similarly telling statement, Clarence Cannon, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, who had risen to speak in support of his Committee's action, claimed at one point in reference to fallout shelters:

> They will never be needed because there will never be another world war. With modern weapons, an international war amounts to international suicide. Most of the people would die and all cities would disintegrate within 3 days after hostilities started.
>
> In the meantime, the nations of the world have entered into treaties to discontinue air testing of nuclear reagents. /The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, initialed on 25 July 1963/.... For these reasons, the Committee has cut $259.1 million from the budget for fallout shelters.[230]

On October 17th, Steuart Pittman appeared before the Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee and sought to (1) appeal the House action on his civil defense program, and (2) seek the aid of the subcommittee members in expediting the consideration of H.R. 8200 in the

Senate (still pending before the Senate Armed Services Committee).[231] On November 13, the Senate Appropriations Committee forwarded to the Senate its conclusions after having heard Pittman's testimony. In its report the Committee recommended restoration of $638,000 in the operations and maintenance program, $4.5 million in the matching grants program, and $46.9 million in the shelter stocking program. (See Table IV-6.) The Committee also endorsed the OCD's Federal buildings shelter proposals and recommended that the House provision denying the use of funds for this program be deleted.[232]

After acceptance of this report by the Senate, the two bills went to conference where a compromise was worked out on the items in disagreement. Of these, two are noteworthy: First, the House relented and agreed to allow $41.25 million for the shelter survey, marking and stocking subprogram. However, the Conference Report also stated that "the conferees are agreed that no further funds are to be provided for shelter survey and stocking." For civil defense advocates this was a high price indeed to have paid to get an increase in FY 1964 shelter funds. The shelter survey was the only leg of the President's three-legged civil defense program currently in operation. Without this there would not be much left. The second area of note involved the Senate's agreement to recede from its language approving the provision of shelter in Federal buildings, and acceptance of the House prohibition against using funds for such purposes. For the OCD this meant that even if the Senate approved H.R. 8200 during FY 1964, the OCD would not be able to channel any funds into the program unless, of course, the prohibition could be overturned.[233] The forward momentum of civil defense was again placed in jeopardy.

Thus, the year 1963 ended for the OCD on a troubling note. The OCD had received an appropriation of $111.6 million for FY 1964--far below their request and $16.4 million less than had been appropriated in FY 1963.[234] More troubling, however, would be the impact of the two noted conference provisions. If these were allowed to stand in FY 1965, civil defense would drift back into a state of operational limbo, funded only at a level that would allow the organization to maintain itself.

TABLE IV-6

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1964 OCD APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1963[a] Grant	Request[b] to BOB	Approved[a] by Bob	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1964[c] Grant
Operations	$ 75,000	---	$ 82,200	$70,000	$ 70,638	$ 70,319
Shelters*	53,000	---	264,700	17,800	64,700	41,569
Total	$128,000	$689,400	$346,900	$87,800	$135,338	$111,569

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Report, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1964, Senate Report 641, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 November 1963, p. 20.

[b]U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Program Paper (Volume 5), "Financial Digest (1951-1978)," 1979.

[c]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1964, House Report 1004, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 December 1963, p. 12.

*Includes shelter survey, marking, stocking, R&D, Federal Buildings shelter, and incentive program.

Postscript

What President Kennedy would have thought of the FY 1964 appropriation development can only be speculated, for the Conference Report was released on 10 December 1963, eighteen days after the President had been assassinated in Dallas, Texas. What is clear is that President Kennedy came into office and began a program of civil defense that offered the prospect of saving millions of lives from death due to radioactive fallout in the event of nuclear attack.

It is also clear that Kennedy had been disturbed by the "shelter mania" that hit the nation after his July Berlin Crisis speech. He decided shortly afterwards that a responsible civil defense program would have to be a low-keyed program, and one based on Federal funds rather than private efforts. Though Kennedy declined to speak to the Nation on civil defense matters after the July speech, he, nevertheless, maintained a commitment to seek to mitigate the effects of nuclear destruction on the population. The size of the OCD budget requests he approved, as well as his August 1962 letter to Congressional leaders, and his actions following the Cuban Missile Crisis bear this out.

President Kennedy left a civil defense program that was beginning to reach effective levels of operational readiness. At the time of his death in November 1963 the shelter survey he initiated had located 110 million shelter spaces--more than twice the amount anticipated. Of these, 70 million were immediately usable and had been approved by building owners for shelter use in time of emergency, and 14 million of these spaces had been stocked.[235]

But, as the Conference Report on the FY 1964 OCD appropriation indicates, Kennedy's program would be working under two important

handicaps, unless the Congressional provisos against the continuation of the shelter survey and stocking program, and against the provision of shelter in Federal buildings, could be removed. These items would have to be dealt with during the term of Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson. These would not be the only items of controversy in the civil defense area during the Johnson years. The lifting of the appropriations roadblock to funding Federal shelters would be virtually meaningless unless the Senate Armed Services Committee passed H.R. 8200 on the incentive program. This issue would have to be dealt with. Another issue, which actually began to simmer during the Kennedy years, would have to be faced under Johnson--the connection between civil defense and the ABM.

In one sense, the making or the breaking of Kennedy's civil defense program would be left up to his successor and those who served under him, and to their ability to persuade key Congressional leaders to support the program. For this story we turn next to a look at civil defense during "The Johnson Years."

NOTES

1 From Kennedy's Inaugural Address. Reported in the New York Times, 21 January 1961.

2 See Kahan, p. 74

3 For example, William C. Foster became the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Jerome Wiesner was appointed Science Adviser. See Barnet, p. 181.

4 Klass, p. 58.

5 Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, (NY: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 613. Kennedy did, though, as a Congressman in 1949, warn President Truman, following the Soviet atomic explosion, that the United States was laying itself open to an "atomic Pearl Harbor" by its continued indifference to civil defense. See the New York Times, 10 October 1949, p. 9, col. 1; noted by Thomas James Kerr, The Civil Defense Shelter Program: A Case Study of the Politics of National Security Policy-Making, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1970, p. 51.

6 Douglas Cater, "The Politics of Civil Defense," The Reporter, Vol. XXV, 14 September 1961, p. 33. See also, Kerr, p. 247.

7 Quoted in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1962 (Part 2), 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 626.

8 HCGO, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, p. 49.

9 The New York Times, 8 March 1961, p. 12, col. 3. Noted by Kerr, p. 247.

10 The New York Times, 14 April 1961, p. 12, col. 4. Noted by Kerr, pp. 247-248.

11 Cater, p. 33. Ellis told the National Association of County Officials meeting in Chicago in mid-August 1961 that the private provision of fallout shelters was "the Christian thing to do..."

12 HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for FY 1962, p. 614.

13 Sorenson, p. 613.

14 Noted by Cater, p. 33.

15 Congressional Record, Vol. 107, Part 5, 24 April 1961, p. 6557.

16 Ibid., Part 6, 4 May 1961, pp. 7420-7421.

17 See, for example, the Congressional Record on the following dates and pages: 31 January 1961, p. 1512; 16 February 1961, p. 2193; 22 February 1961, p. 2561; 28 February 1961, p. 2785; 8 March 1961, p. 3455; 8 May 1961, p. 7477; and 18 May 1961, p. 8320.

18 Sorenson, p. 613.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., pp. 613-614.

21 Stewart Alsop, "Kennedy's Grand Strategy," The Saturday Evening Post, 31 March 1962, p. 12.

22 From Appendix 1A--"Excerpt From The President's Address To The Congress, May 25, 1961, on 'Urgent National Needs'," in HCGO, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, p. 375.

23 New York Times, 24 May 1961, p. 18. Noted in Kerr, p. 249.

24 Cater, p. 34; see also Schlesinger, p. 614.

25 Sorenson, p. 614.

26 HCGO, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, pp. 379-381.

27 Sorenson, p. 614.

28 Congressional Record, Vol. 107, Part 7, 29 May 1961, p. 9203.

29 Ibid., 6 June 1961; and, Part 8, 14 June 1961, p. 10319. It is stressed that the reader bear in mind the nature of the positions taken by Young, Hosmer, and Kennedy; for while these positions by no means reflect the full spectrum of viewpoints taken on civil defense today, they do reflect three prevalent positions: (1) that civil defense will not work, (2) that civil defense will work and can in fact play a significant role in deterrence and even the strategic balance, and (3) that prudent levels of civil defense will work but that deterrent and strategic implications should be downplayed or denied because, as Kennedy obviously concluded, these might well be viewed as provocative by the other side.

30 An exception to this was an article appearing in The Nation (10 June 1961, Vo. 192, No. 23), by Carl Dreher on "Hazards of Civil Defense." While Dreher did not specifically seek to rebut the Kennedy position he did argue that "anyone who believes that democracy could survive a nuclear holocaust must believe in fairies." He further contended that "The CHIEF, though concealed function of OCDM is to front as the public-persuasion agency for the preemptive war interests. The fact that this is neither the avowed aim of the organization nor the

conscious intention of most of its staff, is of little interest." (pp. 492 and 494.)

31 Ulam, p. 321.

32 Quoted by Klass, p. 60.

33 Ibid.

34 Kennedy quotes in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days--John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 379.

35 In Ibid., pp. 381-382, and 384.

36 Klass, p. 61.

37 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 399.

38 Klass, p. 61.

39 See Erich Fromm's treatment of the speech in Herman Kahn, Erich Fromm, and Michael Maccoby, "A Debate On The Question Of Civil Defense," Commentary, January 1962, p. 11.

40 See Appendix 1B--"Excerpt From The President's Televised Address To The American People, July 25, 1961," in HCGO, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, p. 377.

41 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 392.

42 Quoted by Klass, pp. 61-62. Khrushchev was probably fabricating, however. The USSR has never tested a weapon of this size.

43 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 394. Over 3 million East Germans had gone over to the West by the time the wall went up--over 30 thousand in July alone. See also, Ulam, p. 322.

44 Klass, p. 62.

45 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 395.

46 Klass, p. 62.

47 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 396. The anxiety was justified. There is no telling what might have happened had the East Germans or Soviets interfered with the movement of the U.S. forces through East German territory to Berlin. The same movement could have been accomplished by air with less visability and less provocation, but it would not have indicated the same degree of resolve and will.

48 Klass, p. 62.

49 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 397.

50 Ibid., p. 398.

51 Klass, pp. 64-65, and 70-71. On the latter explosion, one analyst, Tom Stonier (Nuclear Disaster, Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1964), contends that "the addition of a urnaium 238 jacket could easily have doubled the yield of that detonation, but the uranium apparently was omitted to avoid the large amounts of fallout that would have been produced by its fission." (p.21)

52 Klass, pp. 64-65.

53 Kahan, p. 109. In effect, the Soviet bluff had been called, in that the Soviets had for several years been claiming a missile force strength that the U.S. satellite reconaissance data now indicated was false. The U.S. subsequently revised its previous June estimate of approximately 60 Soviet operational ICBMs down to 14. (It is interesting to note that in December 1959 it had been estimated that the Soviets would have 400 ICBMs by this time. See Klass, p. 107.) Klass also notes that the U.S., at this time, had approximately 42 Atlas ICBMs in operational readiness, 80 Polaris missiles, and 600 bombers of the B-52 class (end even more B-47s).

54 Klass, pp. 65 and 68.

55 Ibid., p. 68, and Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 400.

56 Sorenson, p. 615.

57 Asher Brynes and Garrett Underhill, "Civil Defense Muddle," The New Republic, Vol. 146, No. 3, Issue 2463, 15 January 1962, p. 8.

58 Noted by Arthur I. Waskow and Stanley Newman, in America In Hiding--The Shelter Mania, (N.Y.: Ballantine, 1962), pp. 11-12. The respondents surveyed were referring to information read in all media dealing with government as well as non-government information on shelter needs.

59 Reported in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations, National Fallout Shelter Program, House Report 1754, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 31 May 1962, p. 46. Hereafter referred to as HCGO, National Fallout Shelter Program.

60 "Hazards of Selling Survival Products," Business Week, 24 February 1962, p. 62.

61 "Civil Defense--The Sheltered Life," Time, Vol. LXXVII, pp. 23-24.

62 HCGO, Report on New Civil Defense Program, p. iv.

63 Noted by Dean Brelis in Run, Dig or Stay? A Search For An Answer To The Shelter Question, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 54-55.

64 Los Angelis Times, 5 August 1961 and San Francisco Chronicle,

23 September 1961 reports noted by Roger Hagan, in "When The Holocaust Comes," The Nation, 4 November 1961, p. 341.

65 According to the Nutley group:

> The current world situation compels a frank appraisal of Civilian Defense as an instrument for saving lives and as a means of maintaining strong civilian morale upon which to build positive national action. Both objectives are imperative to survival of our way of life in the face of the demonstrated and continuing Communist aggression which today continues to advance through both military and subversive channels....
>
> Where does the United States of America stand in this situation? It stands where you the individual citizen, stands-- and 'stand' each citizen must. Now is the time for commitment, there can be no further delay...There can be no equivocation. Either you belong now--committed to your nation's defense--or you do not belong, and stand 'uncommitted.' Today no commitment in this matter is an open invitation to party-line Communist penetration.

(Quoted in Waskow, America In Hiding, pp. 12-13.)

66 Noted by Rev. L. C. McHugh, in "Ethics at the Shelter Doorway," America, Vol. 105, No. 27, 30 September 1961, pp. 824-825.

67 Noted by Waskow, America In Hiding, p. 89.

68 Sorenson, p. 615.

69 Grant Flint, "Flight From Doomsday," The Nation, 20 January 1962, p. 53.

70 The New York Times and the Washington Post, for example, ran more letters to the editor on civil defense in September and October 1961 than on any other issue. And, according to the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, in 1959 there were 21 civil defense related entries. In 1960 there were 16. In 1961 these jumped to 114 and there were 70 more during the first four months of 1962 alone. See Waskow, America In Hiding, p. 39.

71 Fearing that this might be so, the anthropoligist, Margaret Mead, suggested at an AAAS symposium in Denver that an international program be developed through which certain recently married couples would be provided their honeymoon underground in a blast-proof shelter--the theory being that at any given point in time, a reasonable breeding population would be protected from annihilation in the event of nuclear attack. Quoted by P. Herbert Leiderman, M.D., and Jack H. Mendelson, M.D., in "Some Psychiatric and Social Aspects of the Defense Shelter Program," a report indluded in HCAS, Hearings, Civil Defense Fallout Shelter Program, Part 11, Vol. 2, p. 4854.

72 For Young statements on CD following Kennedy's July 25 speech see:

CR, 107-10, 27 July 1961, p. 13654.

CR, 107-11, 7 August 1961, p. 14820
CR, 107-11, 9 August 1961, p. 15219
CR, 107-12, 22 August 1961, p. 16657
CR, 107-13, 25 August 1961, p. 17041

See, also, Stephen M. Young, "Civil Defense--Billion-Dollar Boondoggle," Reader's Digest, June 1961, pp. 104-106, (condensed from The Progressive).

73 Edward Teller, "The Feasibility of Arms Control and the Principle of Openness," in D. G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, (N.Y.: George Braziller, 1961), p. 123.

74 "How You Can Survive Fallout," Life, 15 September 1961. See, also, the Congressional Record, Vol. 107, Part 15, 19 September 1961, pp. 20332-20335 for reprint of the article and the President's message, as well as commentary.

75 Copy of supplement included in HCAS, Hearings, Civil Defense--Fallout Shelter Program, Part II, Vol. 1, pp. 4226-4227. Posited was a one-day war in all four cases.

76 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 747-748.

77 Sorenson, p. 615. In Washington, for example, four thousand students demonstrated against nuclear testing and civil defense at one point. On this, see Waskow, America In Hiding, p. 105.

78 Waskow, America In Hiding, p. 16.

79 H.R. 5677. Noted in HCGO, Report on New Civil Defense Program, p. 46.

80 Congressional Record, Vol. 107, Part 13, 29 August 1961.

81 The purpose would be to provide educational examples in order to encourage families to provide their own fallout shelters. Other bills and resolutions called for the establishment of food depots, for the creation of a joint select committee on civil defense, etc. See Ibid., Part 11, 3 August 1961, p. 14590.

82 HCA, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1962, Part 2, Hearings, p. 615. In addition, $6 million for the President's disaster relief fund was sought.

83 Ibid., p. 626.

84 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1962, House Report 449, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 June 1961, p. 3. The increases over the previous year's appropriation were in the Federal Contributions Program (the Committee finally reconciling itself to fully funding the personnel and administrative matching funds section thereof); the Emergency Supplies and Equipment Program (enabling the purchase of 500 additional portable

emergency hospitals); and, the Facilities Construction Program (for initiating the construction of a second hardened underground regional control center).

85 In the meantime he wanted funds for 500 more hospitals than the House had allowed, and the eliminated "funds requested for sampling surveys of the shelter potential of existing structures and shelter design grants"--a program which contemplated at least one example survey in a major city of each State, "thereby providing a trained nucleus of personnel with the knowledge and skills to conduct further surveys at State expense." (See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1962, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, pp. 2 and 9.)
Similar pilot surveys had already been initiated in twenty States. Ellis also sought support from the Committee for the restoration of $9.7 million requested by the GSA for the installation of shelters in existing Federal buildings--another pilot program cut by the House. On this see Ibid., p. 8. (See, also, HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1962, p. 626; and, the Congressional Record, Vol. 107, Part 7, 7 June 1961, p. 9678, concerning amendment by Representative Baldwin to have these funds restored. It was defeated.)

86 SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1962, p. 29.

87 Accounted for by a substantial increase in the Emergency Supplies and Equipment Program. See, U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1962, Senate Report 620, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 July 1961, pp. 3 and 30.

88 Waskow, America In Hiding, p. 14.

89 See Stanley L. Newman, "Civil Defense and The Congress: Quite Reversal," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1962, pp. 33-34.

90 Congressional Record, Vol. 107, Part 11, 10 August 1961, p. 15326.

91 Ibid. (In the Senate the hearing on civil defense had been just as brief. See, for example, the justification of the President's request in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, (26 July 1961), pp. 1636-1641.)

92 Ibid., pp. 15327-15328.

93 Ibid., p. 15328.

94 Ibid., p. 15329.

95 Ibid., p. 15330.

96 Ibid., pp. 15328-15329.

97 Ibid., p. 15330.

98 Ibid., p. 15332.

99 In addition, another $13 million was given to the Public Health Service for the stockpiling of supples. See, CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 315.

100 Congressional Record, Vol. 107, Part 16, 26 September 1961. Federal civil defense had actually been appropriated about $620 million (or about 25% of the amounts requested) over this period, but not all that had been appropriated had been spent. About $44 million, for example, lapsed back to the Tresury as unexpended funds. See HCGO, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, p. 396.

101 Reference is made to HCGO, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961.

102 HCGO, Report on the National Fallout Shelter Program, p. 5. As McNamara's "Special Assistant," Yarmolinsky (Harvard, Yale Law) had the title of Deputy Secretary of Defense.

103 Stanley Newman, p. 34.

104 Quoted in Ibid. Thus the resolution introduced by Ryan to establish a Joint Committee on Civil Defense, mentioned earlier.

105 It was thought that 100 such personnel would be used full time to train and supervise "approximately 1000 supervisory personnel of architect-engineer firms. They in turn would be responsible for providing the requisite training for the shelter survey field engineers who would probably number approximately 10,000." See HCGO, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, pp. 7 and 113.

106 The ultimate cost to produce the extra 25 million spaces was thought to be in the neighborhood of 1.5 billion dollars. Towards this end $10 million had been alloted in the current budget to install forced draft ventilation systems in existing (primarily Federal) buildings in order to increase their occupancy capacity. It was hoped that the basic survey could be completed by December 1962. See HCGO, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, pp. 7 and 85.

107 Ibid., pp. 8 and 14. It was anticipated that the survival food would have a useful life of at least five years. The water supply was based on the consumption of one quart per person per day.

108 Only buildings with a capacity for a minimum of fifty shelterees would be marked and stocked, though a record would be kept of lesser capacity buildings affording a PF of 100 or more. The $58.8 million alloted to this program in FY 1962 would be sufficient to stock 30 million of the 50 million anticipated spaces. Funding for the remaining supplies would be sought in FY 1963 at an anticipated cost of $2 per space, or $40 million in additional supply funds. McNamara further indicated that only shelter spaces available and accessible to the public would be stocked. See HCGO, Report, New Civil Defense Program, p. 50.

109 McNamara was quick to point out, however, that locating,

marking, and stocking shelter spaces would not guarantee a requisite number of survivors. For example, out of the fifty million spaces it was thought would be found, marked, and stocked in the next few months, it was estimated that only 10-15 million of these would actually "save" their occupants in the event of a thermonuclear war, for the remainder would probably succomb to the combined effects of blast, heat, fire, and initial radiation. See HCGO, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, p. 7.

110 Ibid., p. 20. On the subject of home fallout shelters, Representative William Minshall (Rep., Ohio) noted later in the hearings that a Department of Defense study made the year before had come to a similar conclusion as the result of an analysis of the effect of an all out Soviet attack on the United States, including countervalue targets. Without adequate civil defense protection, it had been estimated that 100 million fatalities would likely result. According to Minshall, "the same computers that clicked out this ghastly information reported that more than half these Americans would survive if vigorous civil defense measures are taken--chief among them construction of home fallout shelters." Ibid., p. 46.

111 Ibid., p. 106. Upon hearing of this testimony on August 3rd, Congressman Holifield stated: "If the Secretary of Defense maintains this attitude in the face of the reams of testimony and the scientific evidence which has been presented to our committee, then I say that the Secretary of Defense is absurd." (In Ibid.)

112 See, for example, the Congressional Record (Vol. 107, Part 11, 1 August 1961, p. 14202) in which one such local CD official is quoted as stating that "President Kennedy is asking all Cuyahoga County families to provide themselves with fallout shelters."

113 Noted by John Kay Adams, "The Reluctant Moles," The Nation, 4 November 1961, p. 347.

114 Noted by Brynes and Underhill, p. 24.

115 Reprinted in the Congressional Record, Vol. 107, Part 15, 19 September 1961, p. 20332.

116 Harold W. Chase and Allen H. Lerman (eds.), Kennedy and the Press: The News Conferences, (N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965), p. 118.

117 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 748.

118 Newman, p. 36.

119 Noted in Ibid.

120 Jerome B. Wiesner, "Memorandum For The President--Subject: Article on Civil Defense, September 15, 1961 Issue of Life Magazine," 27 September 1961.

121 See testimony of Doty in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International

Organizations and Security Agreements, Hearings, Non-Proliferation Issues, 94th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., March 1975 through November 1976, pp. 92-93.

122 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 748.

123 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Memorandum For The President--Reflections on Civil Defense," 22 November 1961, p. 1. (Obtained from Carrolton Press, Inc.)

124 Ibid., pp. 1-10.

125 Steuart Pittman, "Government and Civil Defense," in Wigner, Who Speaks For Civil Defense, p. 67.

126 Pittman had been a Washington lawyer before being given his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense position. He was a close friend of Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick, a New York lawyer who had been Under Secretary of the Air Force under Thomas Finletter a decade earlier. (The Pittman-Gilpatrick friendship link is noted by Kerr, p. 257.)

127 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 749.

128 Pittman, pp. 67-68.

129 Ibid.

130 Sorenson, p. 616.

131 Ibid.

132 This booklet--"Fallout Protection: What To Know and What To Do About Nuclear Attack"--was finally made available on December 31st.

133 Chase and Lerman, pp. 144-145.

134 HCGO, Civil Defense--1962, Hearings, p. 696.

135 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9551, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 3291. Hereafter cited as HASC, Military Posture Hearings, 1962.

136 Ibid., pp. 3291-3292. (See, also, McNamara's 14 February 1962 testimony in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Subcommittee, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations For 1963, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1962.)

137 Ibid., p. 3292.

138 For example, it was estimated at the time that modifications in eligible buildings having substantial basements would average about $1.75 per square foot or $17.50 per shelter space. In all such cases the Federal Government, through the OCD, would pay for the actual cost

of modification. In many (if not most) cases, modification would consist of adding ventilation equipment to provide air and to vent heat.

139 Ibid.

140 The OCD estimated that 12 million shelter spaces a year would be added to the fallout shelter system as a result of the example set by the government and by government encouragement. These shelters would have received no Federal funds and "would include all that industry does in its buildings, all of the institutions that are not eligible under the incentive program, all community shelter construction that does not qualify under our incentives." It was thought that home shelters would be only a marginal factor in this total. See Pittman testimony in HCGO, Civil Defense--1962, Hearings, p. 69.

141 See testimony of Pittman in Ibid., p. 17.

142 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 317. See, also, the Congressional Record, 19 February 1962, p. 2169. (The draft legislation was introduced by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, respectively, as H.R. 10262 and S. 2857.)

143 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1963 (Part 3), 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 38. Hereafter referred to as HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1963. (Matching funds for shelter construction were authorized by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, but these had to be on a 50-50 basis. Also, Federal contributions for shelters were to be determined by apportionment among the States in the ratio in which the urban population in critical target areas in each State bore to the total urban population of all critical target areas throughout the Nation. Dual-purpose shelters which would have revenue producing potential could not be the subject of Federal contributions.)

144 Another reason for not building the incentive program into the existing legislation was that it would require the States to participate on a 50-50 basis. In many cases this would require that the States contribute money to institutions which they were not authorized by their own laws to put money into (such as private schools and even some public schools). Moreover, the OCD did not want to be restricted to 50-50 contributions whether it was in conjunction with the States or other institutions. As noted earlier, the OCD, in some cases, was proposing to accept responsibility for the entire bill for the added shelter costs if the costs fell below $25 per space.

145 See, for example, Daniel S. Greenburg, "Fallout Shelters," Science, Vol. 136, 4 May 1962, p. 377.

146 This point was made by Steuart Pittman during an interview with the author, July 1979.

147 According to Pittman, "This operation has been, and continues to be a management problem of major proportions. First, it was necessary

to establish facilities to train large numbers of architects and engineers through intensive 2-week courses in the complex geometry and physics of interaction between radiation and building materials and building shapes. The technology for this job was in the hands of a few dozens of people in the country when we started. We have now given training in two military schools and eight universities to approximately 2000 professionals, of which about 1800 have passed this course. These men have returned to their architectural and engineering firms to spread the technology to others....

The result of the operation I have just described is to identify space believed to have a protection factor of 20 or better. The architects and engineers, equipped with the computations on potential shelter space and the permission of the building owners, then make a thorough examination of the premises, marking such space as appears to meet our standards and developing cost estimates of minor improvements to increase capacity and bring substandard space up to the 100 protection factor which we have prescribed." From HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1963, pp. 20-21.

148 It was estimated that approximately 4 million additional fallout shelter spaces could be added each year after FY 1963 due to new construction. At "$4 a space developed for our fiscal 1962 estimates," Pittman told the subcommittee, "there will be a requirement for $16 million for continuation of the survey, marking and stocking for fiscal year 1963." See Ibid., pp. 20 and 22.

149 Ibid., p. 8.

150 Ibid. Obviously, if the Administration had not been convinced that the threat was sufficiently real, Pittman would not have been sitting before Thomas' subcommittee requesting nearly $700 million.

On the Hitler/chemical-bacteriological weapons argument, it might have been pointed out that the parallel to nuclear weapons was weak in that there were few, if any, tactical situations in which the effects of these weapons (as opposed to other more conventional German weapons) presented a strong case for their use when weighed against the potential hazards of their use for the Germans--i.e. wind shifts could make the use of these weapons more hazardous for the Germans in the field than for the Allies. Had this not been the case Hitler may well have used chemical and bacteriological warfare--he was not noted for his restraint in achieving goals.

Conceivably Pittman was endeavoring to avoid arguing with Thomas.

151 Ibid., p. 54.

152 Ibid., p. 53.

153 Ibid. Both Thomas and Ostertag were factually incorrect. In Europe, for example, Switzerland and some of the Scandinavian countrys have had very elaborate shelter systems for many years. In terms of the Soviet Union, information that was available then, and that has been substantiated since then, indicates that the Soviets have been active in civil defense (and shelters) throughout the post-war period.

154 The more usual procedure (at least at the time) was to have interested parties submit their written views for inclusion in the record of hearings. Anne Cahn notes in Congress, Military Affairs and A Bit of Information, (Beverly Hill, Cal.: Sage American Politics Series, Vol. 2, No. 17, 1974, pp. 26-27) that it was not until the 1968-1969 period that it became more common to find nongovernment witnesses testifying before Appropriations subcommittees.

155 See HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1963, pp. 918-974, for relevant testimony. It has been asserted (Newman, p. 36) that Thomas solicited these anti-civil defense presentations; however, a reading of the record of the hearings does not reveal whether the presentations were volunteered or solicited.

156 From the testimony of Dr. John E. Ullmann, Professor and Chairman, Department of Management, Marketing, and Business Statistics, Hofstra College, in Ibid., p. 942. Dr. Ullmann contended that fallout shelters would spark demands for really effective shelters against blast and fire as well as fallout. Taking into account the cost of land and the requirements for these "effective" shelters, Ullmann derived the sums quoted.

157 Newman, p. 37. If Thomas did indeed make this statement as reported, it is not true that all the academic and scientific witnesses before the subcommittee were opposed to the CD program. See, for example, the views of a group of Chicago university professors in HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1963, pp. 953-955.

158 See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1963, House Report 2050, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 27 July 1962, p. 3. In that the $460 million shelter incentive program request was still unauthorized the reduction should perhaps be considered as deriving from a $235 million request. The reduction to $75 million was, nevertheless, significant.

159 Ibid. (The OCD had received in FY 1962 a regular appropriation of $207.6 million plus $49.6 million transferred to the OCD when the OCDM was reorganized into the OEP, for a total of $256.2 million.)

160 Ibid., p. 4.

161 Congressional Record, Vol. 108, Part 11, 30 July 1962, p. 14968.

162 This program had thus far had a checkered past. In previous years, the Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee had opposed requests for shelter in Federal buildings, partly on the grounds that shelter construction and building modification was not expressly authorized. Thus in the regular OCDM FY 1962 appropriation the funds for this program were cut. However, language in the FY 1962 OCD supplemental appropriation supported a $17.5 million appropriation for this program. Both bills were signed on the same day, but the Independent Offices Appropriation Act was numbered 141, whereas the Department of Defense Appropriation Act was numbered 144. The OCD interpreted the fact

that the DoD Appropriation Act was signed into law after the Independent Offices Bill as transcending the prohibition against using Federal money for this program contained in the latter bill. Thus the program was initiated with this $17.5 million appropriation. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1963, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp. 177 and 180. Hereafter referred to as SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1963. See also, HGO, New Civil Defense Program, Report, p. 46.

In the FY 1963 House Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, not only were funds for this expressly disallowed, but the language doing so was written in such a way as to attempt to cut off the further use of funds appropriated in the previous fiscal year for this program--not all of which had as of yet been obligated. See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings, Civil Defense--Fallout Shelter Program, (Part II, Vol.2), 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 5332. Hereafter referred to as HCAS, Civil Defense--Fallout Shelter Program Hearings (Part II, Vol. 2).

163 Congressional Record, (108-11), 30 July 1962, p. 14979.

164 Kennedy's letter, dated 3 August 1962, was sent to the chairmen of the Armed Services Committees, the Appropriations Committees, and the Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittees, and is presented in the Congressional Record, Vol. 108, Part 14, p. 19443.

165 See SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1963, pp. 125 and 127.

166 Ibid., p. 128. As noted by Representative Price in the Congressional Record (108-11, 30 July 1962, p. 14988), these were also better shelter spaces than had originally been estimated: "Of the 55 million spaces located in buildings, 9 million are located in buildings or parts of them which have protection factors of 100 to 150; 15 million in areas with 150 to 250 protection factors; 15 million in areas with 250 to 500 protection factors; 6 million in areas with 500 to 1000 protection factors; and 10 million in areas with over 1000 protection factors. Another 5 million or more are being designated in underground caves, tunnels, and special structures with much more than 1000 protection factors."

167 Ibid., pp. 128-129.

168 See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1963, Senate Report 1923, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 4.

169 In the Operation and Maintenance Program the major Senate disagreement with the OCD was in a subprogram request for 750 additional mobile hospitals. In that 2000 of these were already on hand it was decided to forego this addition. See the Congressional Record, Vol. 108, Part 14, 31 August 1962, p. 18344.

170 The vote was 68 to 14. See Ibid., p. 18345.

171 Ibid., Part 15, 19 September 1962, p. 19915.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.

174 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1963, House Report 2466, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 25 September 1962, p. 3. Completely dropped was $20 million for construction of shelters in Federal buildings. (Congressional Record, Vol. 108, Part 15, 25 September 1962, p. 20566.)

175 In related action, the Public Health Service was authorized $7 million, out of a $41 million request, to stock more medical supplies. See CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 318.

176 Congressional Record, Vol. 108, Part 14, p. 19443.

177 CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 317. According to John Modell in The Politics of Safety, Vinson had been a long time opponent of civil defense (p.11). Modell does not elaborate on or substantiate this statement, however.

178 See Business Week, 24 February 1962, p. 62. See also, BAS, "Shelter Interest Wanes," June 1962, p. 47.

179 Congressional Record, (108-11), 30 July 1962, p. 14979.

180 HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1963, p. 58.

181 Ibid., p. 59. See pp. 58-64 for additional examples of the inadequate knowledge of some subcommittee members--some of whom (like Thomas) had been dealing with civil defense for a number of years.

182 On this point, the view has been expressed during interviews with ACDA officials that the "OCD should be faulted for not properly informing them /the committees/." It should be noted, however, that the justification statements which accompained civil defense appropriation requests each year were quite detailed and informative. Generally, this was true of oral testimony as well. Yet each year many of the same questions which had been answered during previous hearings, were asked again and again by the same individuals. The lack of information retention on these subjects was remarkable.

183 From New York Times report included in the Congressional Record, Vol. 108, Part 8, 18 June 1962, p. 10760.

184 Steuart Pittman, "Government and Civil Defense," in Wigner, Who Speaks for Civil Defense, pp. 65-66. Pittman also writes that it was at about this time that "hearings" were initiated before the President's Science Advisors Committee which would go on for one and a half years and "from which data were drawn to challenge the program before the President." (p. 69.)

185 The Kennedy address can be found, among other places, in Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Days--A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, (N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 163-171. For another summary see CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 317.

186 Congressional Record, (108-11), 30 July 1962, p. 14980.

187 Pittman, "Government and Civil Defense," in Wigner, Who Speaks for Civil Defense?, p. 69.

188 Noted in record of U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations For 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess, 1963, p. 1463. Hereafter referred to as SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964.

189 Noted in HCAS, Civil Defense--Fallout Shelter Program Hearings (Part II, Vol. 1), p. 4434. The cheese was diverted from the Food for Peace program, Freeman indicated.

190 Ibid., p. 3702.

191 Gordon Chase, "Memorandum For Mr. Bundy, Subject: Memorandum Regarding Civil Defense From Assistant Secretary Pittman," dated 26 Oct. 1962, (Washington, D.C.: The Declassified Documents Reference System, Carrollton Press, Inc., 1976), 2 pages. Elsewhere Pittman has stated that these plans were drawn up as a result of OCD initiative. See Pittman, "Government and Civil Defense," in Wigner, p. 70.

192 Chase, p. 1.

193 From interview with Pittman, included in, Roger J. Sullivan, Jeffrey M. Ranney, Richard S. Sall, The Potential Effect of Crisis Relocation on Crisis Stability (Report # 361), (Arlington, Va.: System Planning Corp., June 1978), p. D-52. Hereafter referred to as Sullivan, et. al., Crisis Relocation Study.

194 Pittman, "Government and Civil Defense," in Wigner, p. 70. This statement has been supported elsewhere to the effect that during the crisis the OCD was "directed to stay 'mum,' and did so in exemplary fashion." See Chipman, Nonmilitary Defense..., p. 39. Sorenson, however, has stated that the Southeastern region States were "alerted," nonetheless. Sorenson, p. 708.

195 Pittman, "Government and Civil Defense," in Wigner, p. 70.

196 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964 (part 3), 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 1014. Hereafter referred to as HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964.

197 Kerr, p. 273.

198 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Military Posture and H.R. 2440, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 495. See also, McNamara's comments on CD in U.S., Congress, House, Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964 (Part 1), 88th Cong., 1st Sess., (6 February) 1963, pp. 186-192, 438, 450, and 510. McNamara gave a similar presentation in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., (24 April) 1963, pp. 91-95.

199 Quotation is from Kerr, p. 273.

200 On this point see statements made in the Congressional Record, 17 September 1963, p. 17239.

201 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, Hearings, Civil Defense--Fallout Shelter Program (in 3 parts), Part 1, Vol. 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 3029.

202 Ibid., p. 3033.

203 Ibid., p. 3048. Several weeks later, however, and after repeated misquotes of the Kelleher Memorandum, both in and out of the hearing room, committee member Otis Pike (Dem., N.Y.) complained about the wisdom of opening the hearings with a deliberately slanted presentation which was, all too often, proving to lead to distortions. (See Pike statement on 11 June 1963 in Ibid., p. 4170.)

As an example of the distortions to which Pike referred, on 6 June 1963, Senator Young, in praising the Kelleher Memorandum during an anti-CD speech on the Floor of the Senate, stated that the conclusion of the staff report was that "the currently planned fallout shelter program, or any extension of it, would work a cruel and dangerous deception on the American people." (Congressional Record, 6 June 1963, p. 10347.) Senator Young conveniently neglected to mention that the foregoing was only the first part of a two part supposition.

For other Senator Young comments see "Garlic Around the Neck as Effective to Cure Diphtheria as Civil Defense Fallout Shelters to Save Lives," in the Congressional Record, 27 June 1962, p. 11862.

204 The Preceding quotes derive from HCAS, Hearings, Civil Defense --Fallout Shelter Program (Part 1, Vol. 1), pp. 3033-3049.

205 108 witnesses appeared in all.

206 From testimony of Herman Will, Jr., Division of Peace and World Order, General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Methodist Church, in Ibid., Part 2, Vol. 1, p. 4550.

207 Ibid., p. 4155.

208 Ibid. See Grinspoon testimony, pp. 3685-3697.

209 Ibid., Part 1, p. 3061.

210 Ibid., Part 2, Vol. 2, p. 5319.

211 Ibid., p. 5380.

212 Ibid., pp. 5392 and 5395.

213 Ibid., Part 3, p. 5602.

214 Ibid., p. 5603.

215 In the discussion that followed Representative Frank Becker (Rep., N.Y.) came out in opposition to the program and tried to mislead the Committee at several points on aspects of the proposed program and legislation. For example, at one point he claimed that "the projected estimate of this program before the committee...is that it will run between $5 and $9 billion." Mr. Kelleher, however, quickly corrected this mis-statement of fact and indicated that the total cost to the Federal government over a five-year span would be $2.1 billion with "a follow on of something in the order of $100 million a year for operational maintenance." (See Ibid., p. 5617.) Becker was later criticized by the Chairman of the full Committee, Carl Vinson, for his obstructionism. (p. 5668)

216 Ibid., pp. 5649 and 5694.

217 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Providing for Fallout Protection in Federal Structures and Non Profit Institutions, House Report 715, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 27 August 1963, p. 4.

218 Noted by Representative Bolling in the Congressional Record, 17 September 1963, p. 17239.

219 Ibid., p. 17246.

220 A few also rose in opposition, such as Representative Ed Foreman (Rep., Tx.) who claimed that the American people were against the program (though he could cite no evidence to support this supposition) and argued that they should not be taxed against their wishes to save their lives:

> Automobile manufacturers and seat-belt manufacturers have proven beyond a doubt that, with the use of seat belts, lives are saved in automobile accidents. Millions of Americans as a result of this have put seat belts in their automobiles. Does that justify that the Government should step in and say, 'Here is a proven way lives can be saved, so we are going to initiate a new Federal-aid program for seat belts.'

(Ibid., p. 17256.) One should note, however, that the loss of life on the Nation's highways does not jeopardize the continuance of the Nation whereas an all-out nuclear war might. A goal of civil defense proponents is to be able to mitigate the destructiveness of even an all-out war enough to provide for the continuation of the Nation.

221 Ibid., p. 17264

222 HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964, p. 929.

223 Ibid., p. 932.

224 Ibid. Before the Senate subcommittee, Pittman elaborated:

> The Department of Defense has conducted studies of over 20 attack patterns over the last 2 years. These studies were made for many purposes: analysis of military strategy, evaluation of new weapons systems development and civil emergency planning. The targeting was done principally by the staff of the Joint Chiefs of the Defense Atomic Support Agency. The attacks covered the different combinations of military, urban-industrial and population targets with various mixes of airbursts and groundbursts and sizes of weapons. Other variables included such matters as how the war starts, enemy abort rates, attrition from U.S. military action, duration of attack, weapons accuracy, and upper wind direction and velocicy. In evaluating shelter potential, allowances were made for failure of some people to get into available shelters and for poor use of shelters by part of those who do get in.

See, SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964, p. 1429.

225 SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964, p. 1429. Pittman also noted that the distribution of lives saved as a result of shelters would be fairly evenly split between about half in urban areas (cities of over 50,000 people) and half in small towns and urban areas.

226 Ibid. Pittman noted that, especially in the heavier attack levels, it could be taken as a general assumption that 75% of the U.S. land area would be covered by fallout.

227 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Report Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1964, House Report 824, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 October 1963, p. 4.

228 New York Times, 8 October 1963. Noted by Kerr, p. 276.

229 Congressional Record, Vol. 109, Part 14, 10 October 1963, p. 19266. Representative Bolton was clearly upset by the action of the Appropriations Committee. He was also upset with the President and with McNamara, and quoted an unnamed Pentagon official who felt that the action taken by the Committee "represents a stab in the back by both the White House and the Defense Secretary." Bolton explained:

> He realized, as I do, that while this is a congressional action, absolutely no administration leadership has been in evidence in this regard. You will recall the anguished screams that were expressed by the administration earlier this year when the

supplemental appropriations to the accelerated public works program were eliminated by the same Appropriations Subcommittee responsible for the measure before us today. By the telegrams, letters, and various pressures that were in evidence then, one might have thought the country was facing Armageddon. Needless to say, nearly all of the appropriations were restored on the floor. Gentlemen, we know that there are ways and means available to any administration to foreclose against the possibility of a 100 percent appropriations cut in an important program. When such a cut takes place without a whisper of White House discontent, we all know pretty much what the real story is.

230 Noted by Pittman in SAC, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964, p. 1404.

231 See Ibid., pp. 1391-1490.

232 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Report, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1964, Senate Report 641, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 November 1963, pp. 4-5.

233 See, U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1964, House Report 1004, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 December 1963, p. 12.

234 In a related development, HEW received $27.5 million (out of a $41.4 million request) for stocking medical supplies. See CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 324.

235 SAC, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964, p. 1455. Considerably more shelter supplies had been bought at this time but the movement of the supplies into the shelters was going slowly due, primarily, to inaction and even "indifferance at local areas." See William M. Brown, et. al., Nonmilitary Defense Policies; A Context, Reappraisal, and Commentary, (N.Y.: Hudson Institute, 1964) Chapter 1, p. 5.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE JOHNSON YEARS

Civil defense during the Kennedy years had undergone a metamorphosis. From a system which was nothing but a series of paper plans, the beginnings of a nationwide system of fallout shelters had been created and civil defense was upgraded organizationally with its placement in the Department of Defense. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the key factor in this metamorphosis was the Presidential involvement of John F. Kennedy. The Presidential commitment was vital to civil defense progress; as Kennedy's commitment to civil defense decreased in the wake of the "shelter mania" of 1961, so did Congressional appropriations and support. Nevertheless, President Kennedy gave a spark of life to civil defense, and though his commitment weakened, the spark was never lost. Thus, the key question for civil defense proponents as Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency was whether he would continue his predecessor's commitment to civil defense. The answer to this question, at first, seemed to be a tentative yes, for Johnson vowed to continue with Kennedy's policies and advisers. Much of the responsibility for civil defense, then, would rest with Secretary of Defense McNamara, under whose Office civil defense was organized. As the President's advisor and spokesman on defense matters--including civil defense--McNamara's statements and actions in the civil defense field would be most important.

As 1964 began, it appeared that McNamara's commitment to civil defense had increased. Appearing in January and February before the

Armed Services Committees and the Department of Defense Appropriations Subcommittees of the Congress, McNamara opened a new campaign for Congressional support. From the statements made by McNamara before these committees, it appeared that the Defense Department did not consider civil defense to be merely prudent insurance, as Kennedy had stated in 1961, but rather "an integral and essential part of our overall defense posture." Indeed, McNamara noted at one point, in reference to the nation's strategic offensive and defenseive forces, that...

> ...a well planned and executed nationwide civil defense program centered around fallout shelters could contribute much more, dollar for dollar, to the saving of lives in the event of a nuclear attack upon the United States than any further increases in either of those two programs.[1]

For these reasons McNamara informed the Congress that he had authorized the Office of Civil Defense to seek $358 million in FY 1965 funds--$11.1 million over the previous year's request and almost $250 million more than the previous appropriation. Of this amount, $175 million was earmarked for the shelter incentive (or dual purpose) program which had yet to be authorized by the Senate.[2] (See Table V-1 for breakdown of programs and funding levels.) This sum, McNamara stated, was "the minimum amount required to maintain the momentum of the shelter program as a whole and to initiate the new dual-purpose shelter development program in all 50 States."[3] For this to transpire, however, the Senate would have to approve H.R. 8200

The SASC and H.R. 8200

Following the passage of H.R. 8200 in the House of Representatives in September of 1963, Senator Henry Jackson (Dem., Wa.) at last scheduled hearings on the proposed civil defense legislation before his Senate Armed Services Subcommittee. Beginning in December of 1963 and

continuing into early 1964, the case for the fallout shelter incentive program (and for civil defense) was, in Steuart Pittman's words, presented even "more concisely and more effectively" than before the Hébert committee.[4] As the first witness before the committee Pittman warned:

> If there is no consensus among leadership, no closing of ranks of people to whom the public mainly looks for guidance on defense matters, then public confidence in this or any other civil defense program will drop out of sight. If later events show this to be gross negligence, the blame is on those responsible for American lives and cannot be laid at the door of public apathy, as is so often done by those who fail to lead.[5]

Pittman added that, in large measure, the future direction of civil defense was in the hands of the subcommittee and the Senate. It was up to them to weigh the factors of nuclear war probability and civil defense expenditures against the OCD estimate that if nuclear war did come civil defense efforts could double or treble the surviving population.[6] In closing, Pittman gave the subcommittee his personal conclusion:

> ...our only possible excuse for inaction is a conviction that nuclear war is impossible or would be the end of the United States. If we really mean this, we cannot escape the danger that this attitude will be believed abroad and our deterrent force adjudged a bluff.[7]

On this point, both General Earle G. Wheeler (Chief of Staff of the Army) and General Curtis E. Le May (Chief of Staff of the Air Force) agreed.[8]

As had been the case before the Hébert committee, a number of spokesmen appeared in opposition to the legislation (primarily representing religious and peace groups).[9] Nevertheless, according to Pittman, a majority of the subcommittee appeared supportive. Upon the close of the hearings, however, Senator Jackson indicated that he would

defer action on the legislation (on the grounds that Secretary McNamara had associated civil defense and ABM decisions) "unless he had a clear signal from the President that the Administration wanted the program."

According to Pittman's account of this development, Senator Jackson was concerned that the Administration was not behind the program. He therefore did not want "to go out in front" on this issue unless the Administration affirmed its support of H.R. 8200. Pittman "promised that this would happen before the scheduled markup session of his Subcommittee," in early March. In Pittman's words:

> I asked Secretary McNamara to send a short memorandum to the President urging him to sign an attached note to Senator Jackson. The memorandum went to the White House, but I was unable to determine what had happened to it for several crucial days. At the Subcommittee meeting at which Senator Jackson intended to defer the matter, I was allowed 15 minutes to report on the President's position. My telephone calls to Mac Bundy the night before and outside the hearing room established that there was doubt about whether Secretary McNamara really meant what he had asked the President to do. In response to my last call from outside the hearing room, Bundy said he would talk to McNamara and call back. There was no call. I appeared empty-handed and Senator Jackson deferred action as he said he would. On returning to my office, I was given the explanation that the President appreciated the effort but that there was not enough time to resolve the matter.

In an effort to mitigate the effect on OCD morale that revelation of the President's lack of support for civil defense would create, Pittman drafted the following statement which Jackson agreed to sign and present as the public explanation of his subcommittee's action:

> This decision was based on several factors not necessarily related to the substance of the bill. Principally among them is the fact that ballistic missile defense and the shelter program have been closely related and it is believed that a decision as to both should be similarly related. Likewise, all programs involving the expenditure of Federal funds must be closely reviewed in the light of the current program of economy.

Given the nature of the civil defense-ABM connection, this statement

led some observers to (correctly) assume that this explanation was but a smokescreen (but for the incorrect reasons).

It was true that for several months the Department of Defense and the OCD had drawn attention to, as a supporting civil defense argument, the complementary relationship between civil defense and ABMs. On February 6th, 1963, for example, McNamara told the House Department of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that "the effectiveness of an active ballistic missile defense system in saving lives depends in large part upon the availability of adequate fallout shelters for the population."[13] The reason for this was the ease with which an ABM system could be circumvented simply by exploding large ground-level bursts up-wind of cities and beyond the range of ABMs. The resulting fallout would kill large percentages of urban populations downwind unless fallout shelters were provided. Thus McNamara told the subcommittee that "it would be foolhardy to spend funds of this magnitude /3 billion for the Nike-Zeus/ without accompanying it with a civil defense program." He went on to note that "I personally will never recommend an anti-ICBM program unless a fallout program does accompany it."[14] In fact, in both the FY 1964 and FY 1965 appropriation justification reports, McNamara stated that "the very austere civil defense program recommended by the President should be given priority over <u>any</u> major additions to the active defenses."[15]

Two days after the Jackson Subcommittee action McNamara made the Defense Department view on this subject absolutely clear:

> A fallout shelter program can stand alone and be justified independently of an anti-ballistic missile system, and we believe should be given priority over such a system. But an anti-ballistic system cannot stand alone without a fallout shelter program.[16]

The CD-ABM connection was thus not a persuasive reason for postponing action on fallout shelters or H.R. 8200. Jackson's explanation on his subcommittee's action was thus viewed by some as an attempt to pressure McNamara into ABM development and deployment at an early date by tying the civil defense shelter system (which McNamara seemed to favor at an early date) to the ABM decision (which he was not as convinced of).[17]

Adding to the jolt presented by the Jackson Subcommittee action and to the confusion occasioned by the subcommittee's explanation were two other developments in March that were of significant impact upon civil defense. Several days following the March 2nd Jackson Subcommittee vote, Steuart Pittman resigned to return to his Washington law practice.[18] He was replaced by a career official, William P. Durkee, who had been the Director of Federal Assistance for the OCD. A few weeks later, on March 31st, the OCD was reassigned from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Office of the Secretary of the Army.[19] The Defense Department insisted that this move was not a downgrading of civil defense nor a demonstration of lessened significance, but its caveat generally fell on skeptical ears.[20]

Civil defense was thrown into a state of shock by these developments. The (behind the scenes) Johnson decision and the Jackson Subcommittee vote effectively killed the shelter incentive concept and thus forced civil defense to begin looking for other policy options. In one action several years of OCD preparation and planning were scuttled. March 2nd, 1964 marked a major turning point for civil defense in the United States. Compounding the impact of these developments was their timing, coming as they did on the eve of the OCD's appearance before the appropriation committees of Congress in April, May, and June.

The FY 1965 Appropriation

Appearing initially before the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee on April 24th, and the parallel Senate subcommittee on May 11th, the new OCD Director, William Durkee, presented his $358 million appropriation request for FY 1965--a request that had been drawn up prior to the March 2nd SASC subcommittee action, and thus included requests for funds that could not be appropriated. (See Table V-1.) For support during his first appearance before these committees as OCD Director, Durkee was accompanied by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance, and Secretary of the Army, Stephen Ailes, both of whom assured the committee members of the vital nature of civil defense as "an indispensable element of our national security."[21] Vance told the committees that civil defense was "essential for five basic reasons:

> It will save many millions of lives in the event of nuclear attack;
>
> It will demonstrate our national will to stand fast, recover from nuclear attack, and look to the future with optimistic determination.
>
> It will give us more flexibility in making future decisions as to weapons systems and strategy.
>
> It will, as Mr. McNamara has said, "contribute much more, dollar for dollar, to the saving of lives" than further increases in either our strategic retaliatory or continental air and missile defense forces.
>
> It will, in accomplishing all of the foregoing, strengthen our deterrent posture.

For these reasons, he observed, the Congress should "move forward with the program we are supporting today."[22]

To the Congressmen on these committees, however, this program must have appeared as one in a state of flux. While the overall sum of $358 million was the same figure that McNamara had presented to the

TABLE V-1

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1965 OCD APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Operation and maintenance appropriation summary (direct obligations)

Budget program/project	Actual, fiscal year 1963	Estimate, fiscal year 1964	Estimate fiscal year 1965
I. Warning and detection	$14.104.597	$3,321.000	$10.300.000
A. Warning and alert	4.065.546	1,500.000	2.400.000
B. Radiological fallout detection and monitoring	8.885.860	255.000	5.400.000
C. Warehousing and maintenance	1.150.171	1,566.000	2.500.000
II. Emergency operations	17.257.379	21,920.000	31.400.000
A. Emergency broadcast system	1.504.711	1,979.000	5.579.000
B. Damage assessment	1.559.580	2.300.000	3.800.000
Training education	(9.821.062)	(13.741.000)	(17.900.000)
C. Individual training	1.342.253	1.300.000	1.900.000
D. Emergency operations training	3.217.201	4.991.000	8.300.000
E. Requirements, status and evaluation	481.534	750.000	1.000.000
F. Public education	4.780.014	6.700.000	6.700.000
G. Public information	3.976.849	3.500.000	3.600.000
H. Industrial participation	294.937	300.000	400.000
I. Other emergency operations	100.000	100.000	121.000
III. Financial assistance to States	27.463.700	31.000.000	35.700.000
A. Survival supplies, equipment and training	7.462.965	7,000.000	7.000.000
B. Emergency operating centers	7.060.489	9,000.000	10.000.000
C. Personnel and administrative expenses	12.940.246	15.000.000	18.700.000
IV. Management	13.579.805	14.070.512	15.000.000
A. Personal services and benefits	10.515.277	11.554.000	12.400.000
B. Travel	770.085	800.000	800.000
C. Administrative and housekeeping expense	2.294.443	1.716,512	1.800.000
Total	72.435.481	70,311.512	92.400.000

Shelter, construction and research and development appropriation summary (direct obligations)

Budget program or project	Actual, fiscal year 1963	Estimate, fiscal year 1964	Estimate, fiscal year 1965
I. Shelters	$20,106,634	$41,853,366	$240,690,000
A. Shelter survey and marking	3,966,957	13,133,043	9,200,000
B. Shelter stocking	26,139,677	28,720,323	100,990,000
C. Identification of existing fallout protection in smaller structures	0	0	7,200,000
D. Designing shelter systems	0	0	10,000,000
E. Shelter development	0	0	93,200,000
F. Shelter in Federal buildings	0	0	20,000,000
II. Research and development	6,778,564	14,221,136	15,000,000
A. Shelter research	2,322,184	4,809,636	5,250,000
B. Support systems research	1,357,004	3,992,500	3,900,000
C. Postattack research	1,192,264	2,670,500	2,700,000
D. Systems evaluation	1,373,103	2,748,500	3,150,000
E. Prototype shelters	4,309	0	0
Total obligations	36,885,498	55,074,502	255,690,000
Unobligated balance carried forward	+16,114,502	+1,290,000	+11,200,000
Unobligated balance brought forward	0	−16,114,502	−1,290,000
Total budget plan	53,000,000	41,250,000	265,600,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1965, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, pp. 1525 and 1575.

House and Senate Armed Services Committee prior to March 2nd, several program levels within the budget had been amended after Jackson's action by shifting some $72 million out of the non-authorized programs into other program areas. In addition, several new programs were presented in this budget and several old programs discontinued.[23]

Nevertheless, throughout the hearings Vance and the OCD officials sought to give the impression that not much had really changed since the last year. The SASC subcommittee action did not mean the shelter program would be abandoned, they argued, only that the shelter incentive portion would be deferred temporarily: "There has been no change in the administration's position that legislative authority should be enacted promptly to permit incorporation of fallout shelters in existing and new facilities of non-profit institutions."[24] The move to the Office of the Secretary of the Army was not a reduction in status for the OCD, they further argued, and the new programs were only logical follow-throughs to existing programs. The shelter survey, marking, and stocking program would continue as before, only now to be complemented by a program to identify existing fallout protection in smaller structures,[25] and by a local shelter assignment program.[26] Even though HR 8200 had not been authorized, the OCD hoped to continue developing and improving the use of already existing shelter space through the addition of portable packaged ventilation kits which could be stocked in shelters. The use of these would not require further Congressional authorization in that no structural changes would have to be made for their effective utilization.[27] And, even though the provision of shelter in Federal structures through structural modification and new construction had not been authorized, nevertheless, the heads of all

Federal departments and agencies would be instructed to design shelter features into all new Federal construction anyway. If this could be done at no extra cost, the shelter would be incorporated into the construction. If additional expenditures were required, then specific authorization for each case would be sought from the appropriate authorizing committee of the Congress.[28] It was hoped that at least a few of these would be approved. Through the use of all these devices it was hoped that enough shelter spaces could be found to bring the nationwide total up to 121 million by the end of FY 1965.[29]

On May 18th the House Appropriations Committee reported out its Independent Offices Appropriations Bill for 1965 and these plans were all but dashed. Out of the $358 million request, $89.2 million was approved. (See Table V-2.) Neither shelter stocking nor any of the new programs had been funded. Only enough to allow the continuation of "the present level of funding for established programs" had been allowed. In addition, the OCD personnel authorization level was cut from 1062 to 1000. The only justification that the Committee offered for its slashing of OCD funds was that "The entire fallout shelter program is under study and review by the Department of Defense at the present time and the Committee recommends no additional funds for stocking shelter supplies or new programs proposed in the budget."[30] This was in fact a rather dissembling explanation. The civil defense program, as well as other DoD programs, was in a constant state of "study and review" by program management and evaluation echelons within the Department. Moreover, DoD officials had testified before the committee in support of the OCD appropriation request, program, and new proposals. Either the Committee doubted the veracity of the DoD testimony or disagreed with it.

On the floor of the House, Representative Hébert indicated that he was "astonished" at this action and explanation. He further noted that after reading the Committee report he had sought clarification from DoD on their civil defense position and had been "assured that the position of the Department is exactly as Deputy Secretary Vance stated it" before the Thomas subcommittee.[31] Thomas (as well as the other subcommittee members) declined to comment further on the civil defense cuts.

Due to the severity of the House cuts the OCD went back to the Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee a second time in order to appeal the House action.[32] On July 30th, the Senate Appropriations Committee went part of the way towards granting the OCD appeal when it recommended $154.2 million for the OCD--$80.5 million less than the authorized portion of the OCD request, but $65 million more than the House recommendation.[33] On August 2nd, the Conference Report on these two bills was released, giving OCD $105.2 million for FY 1965.[34] This was $6.37 million less than had been appropriated the year before and was the third straight year of appropriation decline. (See Table V-2.)

The year 1964 had not been a particularly good year for civil defense. The shelter incentive program had been deferred indefinitely, an able administrator had been lost, civil defense had been moved down from the Office of the Secretary of Defense within the Pentagon to the Office of the Secretary of the Army, and a "modest" civil defense appropriation request had been cut significantly by the Congress. On the brighter side, the appropriation that was approved was, despite the cuts, large enough to continue forward movement towards the goal of providing a comprehensive nationwide fallout shelter system--albeit at a

TABLE V-2

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1965 OCD APPROPRIATION PROCESS
(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1964[a] Grant	Request[b] to BoB	Approved[a] by BoB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1965[c] Grant
Operations	$70,319	---	$ 92,400	$70,000	$ 85,000	$ 75,000
Shelters*	41,250	---	265,600	19,200	69,200	30,200
Total	$111,569	$559,000	$358,000	$89,200	$154,200	$105,200

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1965, Senate Report 1269, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 30 July 1964, p. 24.

[b]U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Program Paper (Volume 5), "Financial Digest (1951-1978)," 1979.

[c]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1965, House Report 1781, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 August 1964, pp. 12-13.

*Includes shelter survey, marking, stocking, R&D, Federal Buildings shelter, and incentive program.

slower pace than was desired. In addition, it appeared that the Secretary of Defense had decided to give civil defense a major role to play in a far-reaching future program of damage limitation, designed to save the lives of millions of Americans in a future nuclear attack.

The FY 1966 Appropriation

As 1965 began, a concerted attempt was made to put civil defense back on schedule and to acquire the Congressional support necessary for this. For example, President Johnson in his January 18th "Special Message to Congress on National Defense," urged the Congress to support his FY 1966 civil defense budget. Johnson repeated the Pentagon's stated

position that:

> It is already clear that without fallout shelter protection for our citizens, all defense weapons lose much of their effectiveness in saving lives. This also appears to be the least expensive way of saving millions of lives, and the one which has clear value even without other systems.[35]

Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February, Secretary of Defense McNamara went even further in promoting the importance of civil defense than he had the year before when he termed it "vital" and "essential" to the defense effort. In presenting his posture statement to the SASC this year Civil Defense was ranked, for the first time, along with the Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces as one of the three major programs of the general nuclear war forces. As McNamara elaborated for the Committee, the strategic objective of these general nuclear war forces was two-fold:

1. To deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining a clear and convincing capability to inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker, even were the attacker to strike first;

2. In the event such a war should nevertheless occur, to limit damage to our population and industrial capacities.[36]

The first of these was to be called "Assured Destruction" and the second "Damage Limitation," the cornerstone of which, it was explained, was civil defense.[37] Both were important, but far more attention had been paid to the Assured Destruction forces than to the Damage Limitation Forces (also called Continental Defense Forces). The result was that the Nation's Strategic Offensive forces were unparalleled in the world, while the Damage Limitation forces were dangerously lacking. In response to this situation McNamara proposed a comprehensive five-year $25 billion Damage Limitation package which could, by FY 1970, save over 70 million lives in a full-scale attack if implemented. According to

McNamara:

> The most important element of that $25 billion program would be a $5 billion expenditure for fallout shelters /$3 billion Federal share; would reduce fatalities by about 30 million./ Until that is done one should not expend any additional money for anti-ballistic missile defense or anti-bomber defense. After the $5 billion is spent on fallout defense, the next most important expenditure would be for an antiballistic missile protection system which would require anywhere from $15 to $20 billion /would reduce fatalities by another 40 million./ After that, if additional expenditures were to be made, the next most important item to be procured would be additional surface-to-air missiles for defense against incoming Soviet bombers, and only after those three systems had been procured would it be desirable to procure additional intercontinental ballistic missiles or additional manned bombers or additional manned interceptors.[38]

Because of its cornerstone damage limitation role, McNamara indicated the civil defense fallout shelter system was one of the "six major issues involved in our FY 1967-1970 general nuclear war programs."[39] However, in light of the deferral of H.R. 8200, and a current reappraisal of the estimated shelter deficit at the end of FY 1970,[40] and a reevaluation of the best means to attack that deficit, McNamara told the Committee that the proposed civil defense program for the coming fiscal year was, in essence, predetermined to be a continuation of the current year program. McNamara further noted, though, that while the authorization for incentive funds could be safely deferred in FY 1966, it would have to be addressed before too long because it would not be long before a decision would have to be made on the ABM and a new interceptor--programs which he ranked under a nationwide civil defense fallout shelter system.[41]

In related testimony before the House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, Secretary of the Army Ailes noted that at the end of five years there would still be a shelter deficit of 40-70 million suitably located shelter spaces in the planned 240 million-space

nationwide fallout shelter system even if the OCD received everything it asked for at the current appropriation request level. This deficit would have to be made up he argued:

> While it is believed that a portion of this deficit will be met by no-cost/low-cost design techniques, there are certain areas of the country where construction rates and practices are such that substantial deficits will remain. It is anticipated that higher cost shelter solutions still will be required, ranging from low-cost dual-purpose shelters in new construction to, possibly, relatively high-cost single-purpose fallout shelters. It is not now evident exactly where and what method will be best suited to meet shelter deficits. However, community shelter planning now underway will furnish more precise information on the location of deficits.[42]

On March 30th, 1965, William Durkee presented an FY 1966 OCD budget request of $193.9 million before Albert Thomas' House Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations. (See Table V-3.) As presented, the OCD shelter program centered on five basic components: (1) the continuation of the survey, marking and stocking program, with the survey portion thereof basically restricted to new construction;[43] (2) the survey of small structures and home basements; (3) the provision of architectural and engineering advice and assistance to stimulate the development of dual-purpose low-cost fallout shelter in new construction or major structural modification projects through the application of various design techniques (called slanting); (4) the development of plans to identify more precisely the residual shelter requirements and to insure the efficient use of currently available shelter by matching individuals with specific shelter spaces; and, (5) an attempt to acquire the portable ventilation equipment refused during the previous appropriation process.[44] Durkee noted that by this time 127 million shelter spaces had been located, 79 million of these had been licensed and marked, and 31.2 million of these had been stocked. If the funds being sought were

TABLE V-3

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1966 OCD APPROPRIATION REQUEST

[In thousands of dollars]

Budget program and project	Appropriations, fiscal year 1965	Estimate, fiscal year 1966			
		President's budget	Tentative proposed distribution of House allowance	Difference—restoration requested of Senate	Total requested of Senate
Warning and detection	$8,300	$8,000	$5,150	$2,850	$8,000
Warning systems	2,400	1,300	1,300	0	1,300
Detection and monitoring systems	1,550	3,420	570	2,850	3,420
Warehousing and maintenance	2,350	3,280	3,280	0	3,280
Emergency operations	27,250	26,100	24,440	1,660	26,100
Broadcast station protection program	3,735	2,000	2,000	0	2,000
Damage assessment	3,800	1,400	1,400	0	1,400
Training and education	15,235	15,397	14,397	1,000	15,397
Emergency operations systems development	1,000	3,000	3,000	0	3,000
Public information	3,244	4,000	3,340	660	4,000
Other emergency operations	236	303	303	0	303
Financial assistance to States	28,950	30,500	19,250	11,250	30,500
Survival supplies, equipment, and training	5,600	6,000	5,000	1,000	6,000
Emergency operating centers	5,350	6,000	5,000	1,000	6,000
Personnel and administrative expenses	16,000	18,500	[1] 9,250	[1] 9,250	18,500
Management	14,485	14,600	[1] 10,150	[1] 4,450	14,600
Total operation and maintenance appropriation	74,985	79,200	[1] 53,990	[1] 20,210	79,200
Shelters	20,200	99,700	20,200	79,500	99,700
Shelter survey and marking	9,200	13,300	6,900	6,400	13,300
Small structures survey	2,500	23,000	3,000	20,000	23,000
Improvement of shelters	2,750	29,200	500	28,700	29,200
Shelter development	5,750	3,000	2,000	1,000	3,000
Federal regional emergency operating centers	0	7,800	7,800	0	7,800
Shelter stocking	0	23,400	0	23,400	23,400
Research and development	10,000	15,000	10,000	5,000	15,000
Total research, shelter survey, and marking	30,200	[2] 114,700	30,200	84,500	114,700
Grand total	105,185	193,900	89,190	104,710	193,900

[1] In the report of the House Committee on Appropriations, the only 2 specific reductions made were (1) $9,250,000 in personnel and administrative expenses (from $18,500,000 to $9,250,000), and (2) $4,450,000 in management (from $14,600,000 to $10,150,000). Restoration is requested for the full amount of the reduction ($20,210,000).

[2] Included in President's budget as "Shelter, construction and research and development" appropriation.

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 36.

granted, Durkee estimated that 217 million shelter spaces could be located by 1970--not all of which would be suitable for licensing and marking, however.[45]

Chairman Thomas was particularly obnoxious this year and delivered a string of quips and barbs attempting to ridicule the civil defense program and its employees. For example, at one point he alleged that most of the local area civil defense officers had it so easy that "they must wear out a lot of crossword puzzles." According to Thomas, the OCD could cut their personnel strength by half--from 1000 to 500--and still be able to do the same job. If Thomas could have his way he would be perfectly willing to prove this point.[46]

The ominous tone of this hearing was borne out on May 6th when the House Appropriations Committee reported a civil defense appropriation recommendation of $89,190,000 including only enough management funds to support "about 700" positions. Of additional note, the Committee, in reporting out its $9,250,000 recommendation for the matching of State and local personnel and administrative expenses, observed that as "States and local governments develop civil defense programs as integral parts of their organizations the requests for matching funds should decline."[47] The more likely consequence, however, of a future Congressional attempt to cut back on these funds, would be a decrease in the personnel levels in State and local civil defense organizations.

On May 12th Durkee appeared before the Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee to appeal the $104.7 million House cut of his program and personnel level. He noted the support given to the program by McNamara, as well as the House Armed Services Committee, which, in a recent report, had written that:

> If this country is to have an adequate defense against ballistic missiles, vigorous programs must be pursued for both civil defense and the NIKE-X system. Therefore, the funds requested in this year's budget for both of these items receive the full support of the committee and it is the desire of the committee that none of the funds recommended for reduction in this budget should be applied toward either of these programs.[48]

Durkee then reiterated that if the OCD could run its program at the budget request level, approximately 220 million shelter spaces could be provided by 1970 without any shelter construction subsidy. This would represent four-fifths of the nation's requirement.[49]

On June 30th, the Senate Appropriations Committee released its civil defense report, recommending $123,370,000 for the OCD in FY 1966--$35,180,000 more than the House recommendation. This included a recommendation that the OCD personnel level be retained at 900 rather than 700, as advocated by the House, and that a House provision excluding stocking from the authorization for expenditures be removed. This would enable the OCD to continue the stocking program using stocks purchased with previously appropriated funds.[50] (No additional stocking funds had been approved by either committee.)

On August 4th, the Conference Report on these two bills was published. A compromise appropriation of $106,780,000 was granted to the OCD for FY 1966. (See Table V-4.) This included a compromise of the OCD personnel level, authorizing 800 positions--a reduction of 200 from the FY 1965 level. The House also agreed to allow the OCD to continue the stocking of shelters with paid-for supplies.[51] At $1.58 million over the previous appropriation the FY 1966 grant thus seemed to have ended for a year the steady decline of the OCD funding level over the last few years. In a sense, though, this was illusory in that the $106.78 million grant included a one-shot appropriation of $7.8 million

to construct and equip six Federal OCD regional operating centers. Subtracting this sum indicates a decrease in the regular OCD appropriation level.

TABLE V-4

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1966 OCD APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1965[a] Grant	Request[b] to BoB	Approved[a] by BoB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1966[c] Grant
Operations	$ 75,000	---	$ 79,200	$58,990	$ 69,170	$ 64,080
Shelters*	30,200	---	114,700	30,200	55,200	42,700
Total	$105,200	$371,850	$193,900	$89,190	$124,370	$106,780

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1966, Senate Report 384, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 June 1965, p. 24.

[b]U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Program Paper (Volume 5), "Financial Digest (1951-1978)," 1979.

[c]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1966, House Report 727, 89th Cong, 1st Sess., 4 August 1965, pp. 8-9.

*Includes shelter survey, marking, stocking, R&D, Federal buildings shelter, and incentive program.

The FY 1967 Appropriation--The Quiet Reversal?

The prospect that the trend of decreasing OCD budget appropriations would be reversed in FY 1967 was hardly enhanced when on 14 February 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara presented a $134.4 million OCD appropriation request to the Congress--$59.5 million less than was sought the previous year. Potentially more important for civil defense, however,

were the ramifications of the following statement made by McNamara in presenting this request:

> Considering the great uncertainties regarding the other elements of the damage limitation program, I do not believe that we should undertake, at this time, any major change in our present civil defense effort. Therefore, with but one exception /to be dealt with later/, the program I am recommending this year is essentially the same as the one approved by the Congress for fiscal year 1966.[52]

This was in interesting statement for McNamara to have made for he was linking civil defense to the ABM, a weapons system he had lost enthusiasm for. It was McNamara who, for several years by this time, had argued that the civil defense fallout shelter program could stand independently, on its own merits, despite the direction of decision on the ABM. Did this indicate a loss of commitment to civil defense on McNamara's part? Several Congressmen thought this a possibility and questioned McNamara as to why he was failing to request more funds for civil defense since, apparently, he genuinely believed in the utility of a fallout shelter system. Upon being pressed on this issue by Congressman Lipscomb, McNamara stated:

> We have made stremuous efforts in the past to obtain larger appropriations and have been unsuccessful. I think it is wise, instead of wasting our time continuing to press for something we cannot accomplish, to spend our resources on other more fruitful areas of activity, and that is why we are submitting a budget again higher than the Congress approved last year by some 25 percent, but still lower than we requested in the past....I do not believe we can get more than we are asking for. I am not sure we can accomplish that.[53]

It would appear, then, that McNamara still believed in the efficacy of civil defense and a fallout shelter system, only he had become disheartened of the possibility of acquiring Congressional approval of incentive fund legislation and higher appropriation levels. This perception is borne out by McNamara's answer to Chairman George H. Mahon's

question as to why McNamara was refusing to ask for funds to operationalize and deploy the NIKE-X ABM system:

> First, I would emphasize that moving ahead with the NIKE-X by itself is of relatively little value. If you wished to increase our defense posture in relation to a Soviet nuclear attack, the first and by far the most important action to take, and certainly the cheapest action to take, would be to support a full fallout shelter program for the Nation. The Congress, and in a very real sense I think the people, have turned down such a program on a number of occasions. We have recommended it in at least 3 of the past 5 years. In every year it was turned down.[54]

Thus for the second year in a row McNamara's Office had refused to approve OCD requests to seek a comprehensive incentive program authorization. Only the year before, McNamara had explained this decision primarily in relation to the reevaluation of the estimates of the shelter deficit five years down the road and the ability of several new programs to diminish that deficit. Now McNamara appeared willing to shape the civil defense program according to Congressional appropriation levels rather than by what he thought to be right.[55]

On the other hand, it is conceivable that McNamara's strong statements of support for the civil defense program, coupled with the fact that he was approving smaller and smaller amounts for civil defense and had begun to link civil defense to the ABM, might suggest the possibility that McNamara was engaged in a political gambit to delay ABM funding. McNamara was concerned with the feasibility of the ABM given developmental problems, and with its costs and role in strategic policy. There were, however, strong pressures for the ABM. Since McNamara's strongest statements of support for civil defense and his linkage of CD to the ABM came after the Johnson/Jackson deferral of H.R. 8200, it is conceivable that his latest push for civil defense was a ruse to delay the

ABM and, at the same time, counter the pressures for ABM deployment. Knowing that the Congress was not about to pass the needed civil defense legislation (especially since he was no longer proposing such legislation) he could successfully make a nationwide fallout shelter system the prerequisite for an ABM system he did not want to see deployed, and safely extol the virtues of civil defense.

Regardless of Secretary McNamara's motivations the end result was steadily decreasing civil defense appropriation requests. With this as a backdrop, OCD Director Durkee, on 24 March 1966, presented his FY 1967 appropriation request of $134.4 million to the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee, chaired this year by Joe L. Evins (Dem., Tn.)--Albert Thomas died in 1966.[56] Durkee was able to report that the previous year had been one of progress for the OCD.[57] Many lives could now be saved in the event of nuclear war. The OCD Director informed the Subcommittee that studies within the Defense Department calculated that even in an all-out attack against both cities and military targets, at current Soviet force levels, 115 million Americans would nevertheless survive. At least 15 million of these would owe their lives to the fallout shelter system in being.[58] The lifesaving potential of this system would, of course, be much higher in attacks restricted primarily or solely to military targets. And, these figures would improve in the future if OCD budget requests were favorably considered.

In terms of the present $134.4 million request (see Table V-5), Durkee explained that it was basically a continuation of the current FY 1966 program with one addition. This involved the initiation of an "experimental" small-scale fallout shelter incentive construction program (for which $10 million was being requested) similar, in some

TABLE V-5

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, FISCAL YEAR 1967 BUDGET ESTIMATE

[In thousands of dollars]

Budget program/project	Appropriations, fiscal year 1966	Estimate, fiscal year 1967			
		President's budget	Tentative proposed distribution of House allowance	Difference-restoration requested of Senate	Total requested of Senate
Warning and detection	[1] $5,862	$7,448	$5,898	$1,550	$7,448
Warning systems	375	700	700	----------	700
Detection and monitoring systems	832	1,548	798	750	1,548
Warehousing and maintenance	4,854	5,200	4,400	800	5,200
Emergency operations	[1] 22,818	25,952	22,502	3,450	25,952
Emergency operations systems development	2,155	2,190	2,190	----------	2,190
Training and education	13,418	15,454	13,400	2,054	15,454
Emergency information	3,466	4,000	3,498	502	4,000
Broadcast station protection program	1,075	1,394	500	894	1,394
Damage assessment	474	1,500	1,500	----------	1,500
Other emergency operations activities	1,220	1,414	1,414	----------	1,414
Financial assistance to States	23,000	30,500	25,500	5,000	30,500
Personnel and administrative expenses	16,000	18,500	18,500	----------	18,500
Survival supplies, equipment, and training	3,500	6,000	3,500	2,500	6,000
Emergency operating centers	3,500	6,000	3,500	2,500	6,000
Management	12,386	13,200	13,200	----------	13,200
Total O. & M. appropriation	64,066	77,100	67,100	10,000	77,100
Shelters	32,700	47,300	25,000	22,300	47,300
Survey	13,000	10,500	10,500	----------	10,500
Marking	700	700	700	----------	700
Home basement survey	750	6,300	2,000	4,300	6,300
Small structures survey	3,350	5,900	5,900	----------	5,900
Community shelter planning	0	4,000	2,000	2,000	4,000
Design development	2,950	3,080	3,080	----------	3,080
Experimental shelter program	0	10,000	0	10,000	10,000
Packaged ventilation kits	500	6,000	0	6,000	6,000
Shelter stocking	1,050	820	820	----------	820
Federal regional emergency operating centers	7,800	0	----------	----------	----------
Research and development	10,000	10,000	10,000	0	10,000
Total research, shelter, survey and marking	42,700	57,300	35,000	22,300	57,300
Grand total	106,766	134,400	102,100	32,300	134,400

[1] Does not add due to rounding.

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1967 (Part I), 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, p. 135.

respects to the one that had been proposed in H.R. 8200. Before the House Armed Services Committee a few weeks earlier, Secretary of Defense McNamara explained that this was...

> ...a modest experimental program designed to stimulate the use of construction techniques in new public non-Federal or privately owned buildings which would at little or no extra cost, provide dual use fallout shelter space. We propose to do this by subsidizing with Federal funds the

> extra costs, but not to exceed 1 percent of the total construction costs. This program could provide two valuable options. First, if we should later decide on a major damage limiting effort, the experience gained in this experimental program would allow us to eliminate most of the shelter deficit by expanding the program nationwide. Second, even if we decide against a major damage limiting effort, the techniques used in the experimental program could be employed selectively in areas where the shelter survey program cannot locate the shelter spaces required /by reducing window areas and by using partitions, stairwells, retaining walls, and high density materials to reduce radiation/... This latter option would be compatible with a lighter damage limiting effort such as in...connection with the possible emergence of a Chinese Communist strategic nuclear threat.[59]

Durkee told the subcommittee that all the OCD really wanted to do was to find out if it would be administratively possible to carry out such a program on a larger scale if the need arose. This prompted Representative Jonas of North Carolina to ask why not then experiment with $1 million instead of ten. Durkee had no better answer than that $10 million was but a fraction of a percent of the $25 billion worth of construction that went on each year that would qualify for the program.[60] More probably, what the OCD was trying to do was to find some way of institutionalizing a program that would decrease the shelter deficit. An innocuous $10 million request presented as "experimental" might provide for the acceptance of a program that could later be expanded.[61]

On May 6th, the House Appropriations Committee reported out its recommendations on the OCD appropriation request. In an action the writer attributes to the fact that the Appropriations subcommittee dealing with civil defense was under new chairmanship, $102.1 million was recommended for the OCD--a significant jump over any recommendation ever made by the subcommittee for civil defense. The language of the Committee's report is also of note in that the Committee went out of its way to praise civil defense. The report noted that "the Nation continues

to be concerned with civil defense," and that "in recent years the entire concept of civil defense has changed vastly. The program now seems on sounder footing and the present Director is providing able leadership." After summarizing many of the accomplishments of the OCD in recent years the report concluded that "it is apparent that the program has come a long way and the base exists on which to continue to build in the future." A desire to continue enabling this progress was voiced.[62]

On the negative side, the Committee did not approve the "experimental" construction program.[63] And, even though the House action was considerably above the usual House recommendation for civil defense, it was still $32.3 million lower than the budget submitted by the OCD, a fact noted by Durkee in appealing the House cut before the Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee on May 9th. As a result of the cuts, Durkee argued, the Community Shelter Planning Program would have to be halved, the home basement survey would be reduced by two-thirds, ventilation kit procurement would be cut drastically (or out altogether), and State and local matching funds would be cut by about one-half.[64] (See Table V-6.)

The Senate, this year, did not support the OCD in its appeal of the House cuts, however, and instead voted to concur with the House recommendation.[65] The OCD appropriation was thus $102.2 million--approximately $4.7 million less than the previous appropriation.[66]

The year 1966 thus was a benchmark year for civil defense in several respects. With the passing of Thomas the House seemed more supportive of civil defense--though a decrease from the previous appropriation was still approved because the Senate failed to serve its usual

appellate function. More important, however, was the apparent decrease in support from McNamara which, if not reversed, could be fatal for CD.

TABLE V-6

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1967 OCD APPROPRIATION PROCESS

Item	Appropriations, 1966 (adjusted) [1]	Budget estimates, 1967 (as amended)	House bill	Senate bill	Conference action
Operation and maintenance:					
Appropriation	64,080,000	78,100,000	66,100,000	66,100,000	66,100,000
By transfer		(1,000,000)	(1,000,000)	(1,000,000)	(1,000,000)
Research, shelter survey and marking	42,700,000	57,300,000	35,000,000	35,000,000	35,000,000
Total, civil defense, Department of Defense	106,780,000	133,400,000	101,100,000	101,100,000	101,100,000

SOURCE: Congressional Record, (112-15), 24 August 1966, p. 20496.

The FY 1968 Appropriation

As the OCD was formulating its FY 1968 budget request for the approval of the Defense Department and the Executive during the latter months of 1966, a group of private citizens sought to influence this process by expressing to President Johnson their concern "that the United States is not doing what it should to reduce our vulnerability to nuclear attack."[67] In a letter to Johnson, dated 23 November 1966, this group of scientists, businessmen, retired officers and former Government officials, noted that their purpose was not "to attract critical attention to an inherently difficult job; it is to ask that the stimulation of your personal attention be extended to a subject which appears to be largely eclipsed by other national priorities," only one of which was the Vietnam War.[68] After summarizing the lifesaving potential of a fallout shelter system the letter went on to make several recommendations centering around the importance of eliminating "present doubts in Congress about the determination of the Executive Branch with regard to

civil defense and emergency planning programs," and of ways to stimulate a "serious search for long-term, low-cost opportunities to reduce vulnerability to nuclear war."

While it would seem that this letter had a negligible effect upon the formulation of the FY 1968 OCD budget, it is noted because it amply highlights the concern that was being generated in pro civil defense circles over the on-going evolution of the civil defense program. This evolution, it was feared, was heading civil defense in the wrong direction. It was becoming increasingly apparent that the Administration was losing interest in the civil defense program--one indication of which was the progressive scaling down of program objectives. As this process unfolded, and as the areas suitable for fruitful shelter survey efforts diminished, civil defense policy was being nudged increasingly toward a paper planning program centered around crisis-implemented civil defense efforts.[69] Already the OCD was beginning to speak in terms of "experimental" and "shelf" programs which could, if needed, be called upon. If the OCD budgets continued to decrease, and thus if the ability to procure systems-in-being continued to decrease, the OCD would be irrevocably pushed in this direction. On this, the writers of the above letter warned that "the current inclination to rely on stepped up preparations when the threat materializes is a dangerous illusion," for "in an accelerating nuclear crisis, it might well be too provocative or too alarming to call for readily available measures to save lives from fallout radiation and other emergency preparations." Nevertheless, these trends would continue, as evidenced by the FY 1968 OCD budget request and appropriation.

Appearing in January before the Senate Armed Services Committee,

Secretary of Defense McNamara noted that the FY 1968 OCD budget request that he had authorized amounted to $111 million--$33.4 million less than the previous year's request and the third consecutive decreasing budget request. This, he further noted, was "essentially the same in context and objectives as that approved for the current year."[70] Missing from the appropriation request, however, was any mention of the "experimental" shelter incentive construction program that had appeared in the previous appropriation request. Missing, also, were the statements of support from McNamara that had been typical in previous years. Nowhere did McNamara this year refer to civil defense as "crucial" or "vital" to the defense effort. As a matter of fact in early March, McNamara, in discussing with another committee the shortcomings of the NIKE-X ABM system (in the R&D stage at the time), agreed with a statement by Representative Minshall to the effect that "neither the Soviet Union or the United States would survive as a nation in an all-out nuclear attack."[71] Previously, the Defense Department had argued that civil defense was the hedge in an attempt to insure that such a development could never become a possibility should deterrence fail.

Following the less than enthusiastic presentation of the OCD budget by McNamara before various Congressional Committees in January and February, the OCD appeared on March 15th before the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee to support and defend its FY 1968 request for funds. (See Table V-7.) In a written statement presented for the record, Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor noted that while this request was basically a continuation of the current program and funding level, so were all other budgets throughout the Defense Department "not directly related to Southeast Asia." His Department, he

TABLE V-7

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1968 OCD APPROPRIATION REQUEST

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE APPROPRIATION SUMMARY

Direct obligations

Budget program/project	Actual, fiscal year 1966	Estimate, fiscal year 1967	Estimate, fiscal year 1968
Warning and detection	$5,473,037	$5,413,000	$9,217,000
Warning systems	647,674	830,000	900,000
Detection and monitoring systems	1,092,761	678,000	2,317,000
Warehousing and maintenance	3,732,602	3,905,000	6,000,000
Emergency operations	21,058,624	22,037,000	20,656,000
Emergency operations systems development	1,601,756	1,316,000	1,225,000
Training and education	13,232,964	13,335,000	13,231,000
Emergency information	2,276,898	2,334,000	3,269,000
Broadcast station protection program	1,316,540	1,000,000	972,000
Damage assessment	1,384,426	1,415,000	1,500,000
Other emergency operations activities	1,246,040	1,617,000	459,000
Financial assistance to States	23,365,011	27,000,000	30,000,000
Personnel and administrative expenses	15,413,669	18,500,000	20,000,000
Survival supplies, equipment, and training	4,002,835	3,500,000	5,000,000
Emergency operating centers	4,448,516	5,000,000	5,000,000
Management	11,994,222	12,648,780	13,227,000
Personal services and benefits	10,457,485	10,847,000	11,107,000
Travel	487,590	590,000	590,000
Administrative and housekeeping expenses	1,049,147	1,211,780	1,530,000
Total	62,390,894	67,098,780	73,100,000

Fiscal year 1968 budget estimate—Research, shelter survey, and marking

	Actual, fiscal year 1966	Estimate, fiscal year 1967	Estimate, fiscal year 1968
Shelters	$32,700,000	$25,000,000	$27,909,000
Shelter survey and marking	15,400,000	14,500,000	14,500,000
Home fallout protection survey	2,998,000	4,550,000	4,450,000
Community shelter planning	2,442,000	2,000,000	3,500,000
Design development	3,201,000	3,130,000	1,630,000
Ventilation kits	500,000	0	0
Shelter stocking	359,000	820,000	3,820,000
Trapped water equipment	0	0	0
Federal regional emergency operating centers	7,300,000	0	0
Research and development	10,900,000	10,000,000	10,000,000
Shelter research	2,319,000	2,880,000	2,700,000
Support systems research	2,157,000	2,137,000	2,145,000
Postattack research	1,982,000	2,128,000	2,220,000
Systems evaluation	2,457,000	2,203,000	2,300,000
Management and support	535,000	602,000	635,000
Total appropriation	42,700,000	35,000,000	37,900,000
Unobligated balance for use in subsequent years	37,279,645	11,982,000	4,791,000
Recoveries	5,113,949	0	0
Available prior year unobligated balance	21,012,304	37,279,645	11,983,000
Total obligations	31,546,608	60,296,645	45,092,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, pp. 470 and 520.

intimated, would continue to support OCD appropriation levels of $100 to $150 million per year" as part of the projected five-year plan for this program.[72]

According to the testimony of the new Acting Director of the OCD, Joseph Romm, this budget, and the above mentioned funding level, represented a minimum program level and he therefore urged that complete support be given his request.[73] At this level, though progress would be slow, it would continue, as in the current fiscal year.[74]

On May 12th, the House Appropriations Committee published its reccommendation for an FY 1968 OCD appropriation of $86.1 million, a sum, the report noted, that would enable "the same level of appropriation as in the current fiscal year."[75] However, in "the current fiscal year" the OCD had received a $102.1 million appropriation. Only with a long stretch of the imagination can these two sums be considered on the same level. Such was the gist of Romm's arguments as he appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations on July 19th to appeal the House $24.9 million cut (22%) from his request. Noting that the bulk of the cut (64%) fell upon the shelter program area, Romm argued that unless the cuts were restored the home fallout protection survey, the design and development subprogram, as well as the shelter stocking program would have to be cut back drastically. At a time when the OCD was nearly half the way towards completion of its overall planned program for fallout protection, it was not a good time for further cutbacks, he added.[76]

On August 29th, however, the Senate Appropriations Committee in its report of the OCD appropriation request, recommended only a $5 million increase over the House version.[77] At $91.1 million this

recommendation was still a significant cutback from the previous year's $102.1 million appropriation. This recommendation survived an attempt by Senator Young, on September 19th, to have an additional $20 million cut from the budget.[78] It did not survive, though, the Conference Report on the two House and Senate versions. When this report was published on October 20th, the OCD budget had been cut back to the $86.1 million House version.[79] Untypically, no compromise on funding was made.

TABLE V-8

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1968 OCD APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1967[a] Grant	Request[b] to BoB	Approved[a] by BoB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1968[c] Grant
Operations	$ 66,100	---	$ 73,100	$66,100	$66,100	$66,100
Shelters*	35,000	---	37,900	20,000	25,000	20,000
Total	$101,100	$163,400	$111,000	$86,100	$91,100	$86,100

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriation Bill, 1968, Senate Report 548, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 August 1967, p. 27.

[b]U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Program Paper (Volume 5), "Financial Digest (1951-1978)," 1979.

[c]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1968, House Report 803, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 October 1967, p. 46.

*Includes shelter survey, R&D, and marking.

There are several factors which help explain this appropriation--the lowest since 1960. First, Secretary of Defense McNamara and

President Johnson had given the impression through their statements (or absense of supporting statements) that high-level interest in the program was waning. Second, the level of expenditures for the Vietnam War was rising and was becoming more and more significant. This was of importance to Congressioanl budget cutters, especially since 1967 was a year of budget consciousness in Congress generally. Low priority programs throughout the government were slashed. Third, some Congressmen associated the expenditure of $5 billion for the Sentinel ABM system (announced by McNamara in September) with civil defense and looked at this as sort of a substitute for higher civil defense appropriations.[80] Though this line of reasoning was illogical it was repeated by no less than the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Warren Magnuson, in defending his Committee's OCD appropriation cuts:

> In view of the fact that we are now going to be asked to spend $5 billion for an antimissile system, which in a sense is part of civil defense, it seems to me that this is a reasonable amount for the protection of civilians...[81]

On the contrary, if $5 billion was going to be spent on an ABM system, the best way to protect that investment would be to spend a few hundred million more for a more complete nationwide fallout shelter system so that the ABM system could not easily be circumvented. This was the position of Steuart Pittman who rhetorically asked if the Administration believed that its light anti-Chinese ABM system was so effective that fallout protection would not be needed. Or, if some fallout protection was needed, did the Administration really believe that the present fallout shelter system was so capable that no expansion was needed to prepare against a light attack? It was more likely, he thought, that the Administration had decided to throw all its eggs in the basket of deterrence through offensive strength.[82]

The FY 1969 Appropriation

In his Military Posture hearings before the Armed Services Committees of Congress in January and February 1968, Secretary of Defense McNamara, who would soon retire, again dropped from his testimony the strong and positive statements on the role of civil defense in national defense plans, which had been part of his presentations in earlier years. Likewise, in his spoken presentation in May before the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, McNamara did not dwell upon civil defense. However, two paragraphs in his written report to the Committee were illuminating in regards to the strength of Executive commitment to the civil defense program:

> The Civil Defense program is a necessary and prudent complement to our active strategic defensive forces. It will provide a degree of protection to our population which is essential in event of attack. However, in view of the necessity to place continued emphasis on the effort in Vietnam, our Civil Defense request--along with those for other activities not oriented towards Southeast Asia--has been curtailed for FY 1969. We are requesting $77.3 million, which represents a reduction of more than 30% from the FY 1968 request and 10% from our 1968 appropriation.
>
> This reduced level of funding is the minimum essential to sustain progress toward our basic civil defense objectives. There will necessarily be some deferral and rephasing of major program activities pending the end of the Vietnam conflict.[83]

This was the lowest civil defense request sinse FY 1960 when civil defense was basically composed of paper planning efforts by an independent agency outside the Defense Department. While there is no doubt that the Vietnam War was expensive,[84] not everyone in the Defense Department agreed with McNamara that this was reason to cut the civil defense budget. For example, in April, General Earle G. Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee and informed them that:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended the funding of the current civil defense program at an annual rate of $150-200 million, pending a decision to expand the program, leading to sufficient fallout shelter for the total population. They have not recommended detailed measures, but generally support the various program elements, including shelter identification, marking, and stocking, the Community Shelter Plans, increasing the shelter potential of new buildings, civil defense training, public information, coordination, control, and improved warning. The total civil defense program for FY 1969 is about half the lower level recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[85]

It would appear, then, that considerable latitude exists to speculate that the decision to cut the FY 1969 OCD budget request was an arbitrary decision rather than one based on the military necessity of the Vietnam War. Support for this position can be garnered from the testimony of the Acting OCD Director, Joseph Romm, before the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee holding hearings on the FY 1969 OCD budget request. Romm testified that the Secretary of the Army (Resor) had originally approved an OCD budget request of $159.7 million. When this was cut to $76.8 million by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget, Resor requested a restoration which would have brought the total up to $122 million, but his request was denied by McNamara.[86] Obviously the Army was bearing a major burden of the expense of the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, the Secretary of the Army, just as obviously, felt that this fact did not call for a reduction in the civil defense program. To the contrary, both his original recommendation and his appeal were for sums higher than the previous year's OCD request.

In his testimony before the House Appropriations subcommittee, OCD Director Romm sought to make the best out of a deteriorating situation. He noted that the programs "deferred" by the fiscal cutback included the shelter supply program, completion of the regional emergency operating

centers program, and the moderization of emergency water supply equipment program. The Community Shelter Program would continue at a decreased level, as would the heart of the present OCD program--the shelter survey program. However, the shelter survey would be cut back by 50 percent, meaning that half the new construction containing fallout shelter space would be missed.[87] Despite the cutbacks in these and all other OCD subprograms, Romm testified that progress could still be made, though not at the FY 1968 rate, which had also been described as a minimum program.[88]

On May 3rd the House Appropriations Committee released its recommendation on the FY 1969 OCD budget request. The report noted that "Civil Defense Director Joseph Romm is a talented administrator and has been able to effectuate efficiency and economy in administering the vast civil defense programs." Romm's ability to continue "to effectuate efficiency and economy" would be sorely tested during the coming year, however, for the Committee then recommended a budget of only $58,540,000 --a cut of $17,860,000 from the authorized 76.8 million request.[89] No reasons were given for the proposed reductions. Notably, the only major program area not recommended for reduction by the Committee was the matching grants program for State and local area supplies and equipment--a program directly effecting funds flowing into local constituencies. On the floor of the House, Chet Holifield protested this 23 percent cut in the OCD request (54 percent in the shelter section). Holifield warned that:

> If these cuts are allowed to stand, the civil defense appropriation for fiscal year 1969 will be far less than the minimum required to continue the program at the lowest possible sustaining rate....the Federal, State, and local civil defense organizations will be seriously weakened, and our people will suffer.[90]

Despite Holifield's attempts to restore at least a portion of the cut funds, the House passed the Appropriations Committee's recommendations. The civil defense bill then went to the Senate where $5.6 million was restored.[91] A Conference compromise, however, reduced this to $60,540,000--the lowest appropriation since FY 1960.[92]

TABLE V-9

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1969 OCD APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1968[a] Grant	Request[b] to BoB	Approved[a] by BoB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1969[c] Grant
Operations	$66,100	----	$55,200	$48,040	$48,640	$48,040
Shelters*	20,000	----	21,600	10,000	15,000	12,500
Total	$86,100	$159,700	$76,800	$58,040	$63,640	$60,540

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriation Bill, 1969, Senate Report 1375, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 9 July 1968, p. 27.

[b]U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Program Paper (Volume 5), "Financial Digest (1951-1978)," 1979.

[c]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1969, House Report 1904, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 18 September 1968, p. 7.

*Includes shelter survey, R&D, and marking.

Postscript

In a book published in 1968, Steuart Pittman, the Director of the Office of Civil Defense during the Kennedy Administration, after noting the evolution of civil defense policy and the steady diminution of

authorizations and funding levels during the Johnson years, wondered "have we reverted back to the armband days of civil defense."[93] The possibility was real. From an authorization of $358 million during Johnson's first year, the authorized request dropped by more than $280 million to but $77.3 million in his last year. Of these requested funds, the amounts appropriated by the Congress dropped from $105.2 million to $60.5 million. The trends were most unpromising.

The intermingling of several factors help explain this development. Major responsibility, though, must be shared by the Congress and the Executive. It appeared that both President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara supported a viable and active civil defense program in early 1964, yet Johnson's failure to supply Senator Jackson with the needed endorsement of H.R. 8200 and McNamara's cuts of the civil defense budget afterwards suggest the contrary. Exhaustive hearings in the House in 1963 had persuaded that skeptical branch of the Congress that civil defense was viable and needed. Support was given to continuing and concluding a comprehensive nationwide fallout shelter system. Senator Jackson's tabling of H.R. 8200 due to lack of Administration support summarily prevented the passage of H.R. 8200--the vehicle for bringing this goal to fruition.

Faced with doubts about the viability of other elements in the damage limitation package, the all-consuming nature of the Vietnam War, resource constraints, the Congressional mood of economy, and perhaps weary of providing a sounding board for outspoken peace and religious groups who perceived civil defense as a step toward nuclear war and away from the road to peace, Johnson and McNamara withheld the support that was essential if civil defense was to progress and complete the

nationwide fallout shelter system. Sensing this, Congressional support also weakened. On this point Steuart Pittman has written:

> The critical long-term task of improving our chances of survival in the nuclear age may be too important to be decided exclusively in the closed chambers of a government so pinned down by today that the problems of tomorrow must be set aside and assigned "the lowest possible sustaining rate."
>
> It would not be difficult for the President and the Secretary of Defense to clear up the doubt and schedule completion of a program to meet the full fallout shelter requirement with supporting systems ... I am convinced that the obstacle is neither Congress nor the public but unwillingness of the Executive Branch to assert through words and actions a firm position that timely completion of the fallout protection program is necessary and quite independent of more expensive and complex decisions involving damage-limiting weapons systems.[94]

For this, Pittman charged that Johnson had been "less than responsible in failing to establish and to maintain a long term civil defense policy and to provide the necessary federal leadership to carry it out."[95] As an indication of the strength of Johnson's commitment to civil defense one might further note that in Johnson's book, The Vantage Point, published after his departure from office, civil defense was not even mentioned.[96]

It is a tribute to the strength of the program implemented during the Kennedy Administration that progress continued to accrue to the nationwide fallout shelter system despite decreasing levels of high Executive interest, commitment, and support and the attendent drop in Congressional appropriations. By the end of the Johnson years, however, the program had reached such a low state that the further continuation of progress was becoming more and more questionable. Would the newly elected President--Richard Nixon--reverse this trend or would he allow it, through inaction, to continue? For this we turn next to a consideration of civil defense during the Nixon years.

NOTES

1 See prepared statement of McNamara included in U.S., Congress, House, Committe on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9637, HASC Paper No. 36, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964 (27 January), pp. 7085-7086. See also, U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations For 1965, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964 (19 February), pp. 261-267.

2 Ibid., pp. 7087 and 7091. It was expected that the $175 million, if granted, would produce 10.7 million shelter spaces at $17 per space. Another $175 million would then be sought the next fiscal year in expectation that a further 7.5 million spaces could be created at $23 per space.

3 Ibid., p. 7087.

4 Steuart L. Pittman, "Civil Defense and Congressional Acceptance," Mimeograph dated 23 February 1978, p. 8.

5 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services (Jackson Subcommittee), Hearings, Civil Defense Fallout Shelter Program, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., December 1963, p. 9.

6 Ibid., pp. 9, 25, and 230.

7 Ibid., p. 230.

8 Ibid., see pages 51 and 56 in particular. General Wheeler testified as the JCS spokesman. General LeMays written remarks were included in the record of the hearings.

9 Represented, for example, were the General Brotherhood Board, Church of the Brethren; the Friends Committee on National Legislation; the Division of Peace and World Order, General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Methodist Church; the National Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, Inc.; and, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

10 Pittman, "Civil Defense and Congressional Acceptance," p. 8.

11 Ibid., pp. 8-9. The vote of the subcommittee was 4 to 1 to defer. Besides Jackson, the three members of the subcommittee voting to table H.R. 8200 were J. Gleen Beall, Robert C. Byrd, and Stephen Young. Senator Strom Thurmond voted in support of the bill, and Senator Barry Goldwater was absent. See New York Times, 3 March 1964, p. 22, Col. 6. Noted in Kerr, p. 276.

12 U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Information Bulletin No. 105, 12 March 1964, p. 2. The information that Pittman drafted this statement comes from author interview with Pittman the summer of 1979.

13 HAC, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, p. 214.

14 Ibid., p. 439.

15 Ibid., p. 214. Emphasis added.

16 OCD, Information Bulletin No. 105, 12 March 1964, p. 1.

17 There was also speculation that Jackson's action was the result of his "dissatisfaction with the Pentagon's award of the TFX experimental airplane contract to General Dynamics of Fort Worth rather than Boeing of Seattle." See Leon Weaver, The Civil Defense Debate (Michigan State University, Social Science Research Bureau, 1967), p. 4.

18 Pittman later told Chet Holifield that when he accepted the OCD position it was with the understanding that he would return to his law practice after two years. At the time of his resignation he had been in office 2 years and 6 months. See the Congressional Record, 26 March 1964, p. 6406.

19 U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, 1964 Annual Report, (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 2. The author has been informed by one source that McNamara had wanted to make this move for some time but that Pittman had adamantly resisted. Not wanting to make waves, McNamara decided to wait until Pittman's departure to make this move. (The source was a government official at the time who was in a position to reliably possess such information.)

20 Before the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cryus Vance stated:

> I have been distressed to read statements in the press to the effect that this move constituted a downgrading of civil defense. I want to state categorically that this is not so. Rather, this action constituted recognition of the progress already made and a belief that the programs, now essentially operational, should be located in that office already having principal responsibility for coordinating military support of civil authority. (p. 1495)

21 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1965 (Part 1), 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964 (May 11), p. 690. (See also, U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations

for 1965, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964 (April 20), in which almost identical testimony was given.)

22 Ibid., pp. 690-691.

23 Besides dropping the planned shelter incentive program and Federal buildings shelter modification and construction programs, the OCD also dropped the NEAR program (for National Emergency Alarm Repeater system). This program, which was described in 1962 as "basic to the new Department of Defense Civil Defense Program," (HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1963, p. 89), involved the development of a small home receiver which could be plugged into any electrical outlet in the home. Through the use of "signal generators" which would be installed at power stations throughout the country, a signal could be passed through existing powerlines activating the home receiver which would then give off an audible warning.

Approximately $8 million of the estimated $500 million program had been spent during the last 6 years to bring this system to operational readiness. (Much of this latter figure would have been borne by private citizens through the purchase of the home receiver at $10 to $15 each.)

Durkee told the committees that the system was ready for operational deployment but that "technological developments and the discontinuence of Conelrad indicate there are other warning systems possible that might be cheaper or more effective. Among these alternative systems was a radio device which would increase the volume of a radio when activated, and a similar device which would turn the radio on automatically when activated. See, HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1963, pp. 89, 92, 94, 96; HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964, pp. 960-961, 963; and, HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1965, pp. 1504, 1507.

24 Vance in SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1965, p. 691. This statement, however, is contradicted by Pittman's account of the H.R. 8200 deferral.

25 Ibid., p. 733. The identification of existing fallout protection in smaller structures was a two part program: (1) the single family home basement fallout protection survey, and (2) a survey of small structures other than single family homes. The OCD, using Bureau of the Census data, noted that approximately 25 million homes contained basements. Each of these families would be sent a packet of material instructing them on how to gauge the fallout protection capability of their basements. After receiving this information the OCD would inform these families how they could improve their particular basements to afford a higher PF.

The survey of small structures other than single family homes is self-explanatory. The OCD estimated that 73,400 such structures could be surveyed in FY 1965 with the requested funds. These smaller than 50 capacity structures would not be marked or stocked, but noted for possible emergency use. (See pp. 736-737.)

26 This new program is largely self-explanatory. In local communities citizens would be assigned to the best available shelter using the shelter survey and smaller building and family home survey data. See Ibid., p. 737.

27 This kit consisted of a fixed bicycle-type apparatus which could be powered by electricity or pedaled to move air through a bag to and from the outside. It was estimated that the purchase of 200,000 of these (at a cost of $250 each, or $50 million total), would allow the addition of 20-31 million more shelter spaces (at approximately $2.50 each.) See Ibid., pp. 735-736. See also, HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1965, p. 1583.

28 See the Congressional Record, 28 April 1964, p. 9411.

29 HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1965, p. 1496.

30 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Report, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1965, House Report 1413, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 18 May 1964, p. 4.

31 Congressional Record (110-9), 21 May 1964, p. 11621.

32 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1965, (Part 2), 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964 (June 17).

33 This recommendation included $30 million for shelter stocks, $5 million for the home basement and small structure survey, and $10 million for the shelter assignment program. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1965, Senate Report 1269, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 30 July 1964, p. 4.

34 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1965, House Report 1781, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 Aug 1964, pp. 12-13. None of this amount, however, could go for shelter supplies. See CQS, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 330.

35 U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Civil Defense 1965, (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, April 1965), p. 5.

36 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965 (February 24), pp. 42-43.

37 The other components of the Damage Limitation package included the NIKE-X ABM, a new interceptor aircraft, and improvements in the command and control network.

38 SCAS and SCA, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1966, p. 222. McNamara also noted that "there is no range of expendi-

tures which would reduce fatalities to a level much below 80 million unless the enemy delayed his attack on our cities long enough for our missle forces to play a major Damage Limitation role." Moreover, expenditures above this level could be offset by cheaper expenditures for offensive systems by the Soviets. Ibid., pp. 54-55.

39 Ibid., p. 56. The other five were (1) a new manned bomber, (2) increase in Minuteman II forces, (3) anti-bomber defense program, (4) a new manned interceptor, and (5) the NIKE-X ABM.

40 Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes, noted before the House Subcommittee on DoD Appropriations that in 1962 the estimate of the shelter deficit at the end of five years without H.R. 8200 type authorization had been 105 million spaces. The 1963 estimate brought this down to 95 million. The current 1965 estimate was that there would be a 40-70 million space deficit at the end of five years. Several reasons accounted for the estimate reductions--more shelter spaces had been found than anticipated, protection levels had been lowered, ventilation improvements would allow for more spaces, and the current survey of small structures and homes would result in space dividends. See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1966 (Part 3), 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965 (March 3), p. 511.

41 SCAS and SCA, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1966, p. 231. This explains why the Army was turned down by DoD in a request for $140 million for fallout shelter construction and authorization shortly after OCD's transfer to Army jurisdiction. On this, see U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., February and March 1965, p. 499.

42 HCA, Hearings, DoD Appropriations for 1966, p. 511.

43 In relation to the stocking program, the OCD was no longer proposing to provide food, water, or sanitation supplies in buildings which contained their own indigenous supplies of any of these items.

44 HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1966, pp. 604-686. In FY 1965 the portable ventilation kits had not been funded, in part, because the cost, at $250 each, was thought to be excessive. Research funds had been approved, however, and as a result of this effort modifications were made which reduced the cost per kit to $180. On this, see U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965 (May 12), p. 51.

45 Ibid., p. 607. (See, also, OCD, Civil Defense 1965, p. 14)

46 Ibid., p. 620. As noted earlier, Thomas had engineered a cut of 200 positions from the OCD the year before (from 1200 to 1000).

47 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1966, House Report 320, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 May 1965, p. 4.

48 SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1966, pp. 22-23. The HASC Report referred to was House Report 271, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.

49 Ibid., p. 23.

50 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1966, Senate Report 384, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 June 1965, pp. 4-5.

51 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1966, House Report 727, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 Aug. 1965, pp. 8-9.

52 U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Congressional Testimony on Civil Defense--Excerpts, (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 2.

53 Ibid., p. 10.

54 Ibid., p. 4. As if there were any doubt of the lack of Congressional interest in CD at this point, Congressman Flood interrupted to observe: "Make no mistake about it, there is no interest in Congress or any main street of the United States in any such a program as of now." (In Ibid.)

55 Before the House DoD Appropriations Subcommittee, McNamara testified that his Office had cut from the OCD budget request "a proposal for the initiation of a full-scale shelter construction subsidy program, at a saving of $58.6 million...." See Ibid., p. 2.

56 The original OCD budget request had been for $192.7 million, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense cut that to $144.1 million by dropping to $10 million the experimental shelter construction program and cutting by as much as 43% the procurement of packaged ventilation kits and the survey of smaller structures. The deployment of a recently developed radio-warning system was completely eliminated. This was on 5 December 1965. On OCD appeal the experimental shelter program was restored through reprograming of funds within the authorized budget, rather than through an increase in the budget total. This necessitated further reductions in the shelter survey program, community shelter assignment program, and the ventilation kit procurement program. Secretary of the Army budget scrutiny resulted in yet another reduction of about $10 million in smaller structure survey program and R&D. Thus the $134.4 million final request authorization. See Ibid., p. 16.

57 During FY 1966 the OCD located 14 million additional shelter spaces, bringing the total to about 150 million; 11,000 shelter facilities were licensed, bringing the total up to 89 million shelter spaces; 7,500 facilities were marked, bringing this total up to 85 million

spaces; and the continuation of the shelter stocking program brought the capacity up to 41.3 million persons who could be sustained for up to 14 days. In addition, the Community Shelter Program (assignment and deficit analysis) was extended to cover 28 large local planning areas in 21 States. See, Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, 1966 Annual Report, (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 2.

58 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1967 (Part I), 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966 (March 23-24), p. 1618.

59 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 13456, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966 (March 8), pp. 7358-7359. In connection with the last sentence quoted, the first Chinese thermonuclear bomb was exploded in May of 1966. (See Bliss, p. 271.)

60 HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1967, p. 1625.

61 In addition to the $10 million for the experimental shelter program, the remainder of the $27.6 million that the FY 1967 request represented over the FY 1966 appropriation was accounted for in the following programs: (1) $5.6 million more than had been appropriated in FY 1966 for the continuation of the home basement survey. (2) $5.5 million more for the packaged ventilation kits. This sum would provide a sufficient number of kits to make habitable another 2.8 million shelter spaces at a cost of a little more than $2 per space. 2400 kits had been procured in FY 1966. It was estimated that 51 million shelter spaces could eventually be added because of these kits--22 million in shelter deficit areas. (See HASC, Military Posture Hearings, FY 1967, p. 7359.) (3) $7.5 million more was requested for matching P&A funds to the State and local areas, primarily due to increased requirements demanded of State and local CD officials by the new CD programs. HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1967, p. 1625.

62 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1967, House Report 1477, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 5 May 1966, p. 16.

63 When this bill came up for vote on the floor of the House on May 10th, Chet Holifield stated that while he would have liked to have seen the experimental program funded, he, nevertheless, was supportive of and encouraged by the Committee's action which was, in his words, "marked by a constructive congressional policy and support for civil defense," and "established a clearer purpose for civil defense appropriations to be made by Congress than in any recent years." See, Congressional Record, Vol. 112, Part 8, 10 May 1966, pp. 10240-10241.

64 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1967 (Part I), 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966 (May 9), p. 87.

65 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 1967, Senate Report 1433, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 4 Aug.1966, p. 18.

66 This was passed over an attempt by Senator Young, on 10 August 1966, to cut the budget by 15% across the board. Congressional Record, Vol. 12, Part 14, 10 August 1966, pp. 18900-18901.

67 See "Letter To The President," dated 23 November 1966, in Wigner, Who Speaks For Civil Defense, pp. 114-119.

68 Among the letter's signatories was Stephen Ailes--former Secretary of the Army, Charles J. Hitch--former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Herman Kahn--Chairman of the Hudson Institute, Willard Libby--former AEC Commissioner, Steuart Pittman--former OCD Director (and organizer of this effort), Lewis Strauss--former AEC Chairman, Edward Teller, Eugene Wigner, and Adam Yarmolinsky--former Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense McNamara.

69 As evidence that preparation for this was going on see the study conducted for and presented to the OCD in April 1967 by Frederick C. Rockett, on Crisis Civil Defense and Deterrence (Croton-on-Hudson: The Hudson Institute, 14 April 1967).

70 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1968 (Part I), 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967 (January 15), p. 69.

71 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967 (March 6), p. 91. The contention that the U.S. would not survive as a nation in an all-out attack designed to achieve this purpose, would be contested by a number of individuals and groups. Chet Holifield, for example, had used this argument for a number of years to bolster his efforts to promote a blast as well as fallout shelter system. With the expenditure of approximately $20 billion, he argued, a Soviet attack designed to destroy the U.S. as a Nation could not achieve its purpose. See also the statements in support of a blast shelter system and what such a system could accomplish in Civil Defense--Little Harbor Report (Washington; National Academy of Sciences, 1969). This study, which was conducted in early 1967, was a review and update of an earlier Project Harbor study session the summer of 1963. On this, see, Civil Defense--Project Harbor Summary Report, (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1964); "Civil Defense: Notes on Project Harbor," by Howard Margolis, in BAS, February 1966; "Civil Defense: Wigner on Project Harbor," by Eugene Wigner, in BAS, February 1966. These studies and reports, interesting as they are, have had only a marginal impact, at best, on the evolution of civil defense policy in the U.S. Consider the difficulties that shelter systems based on fallout protection alone have had. Unfortunately, time and space does not allow for a detailed examination of these and other blast shelter studies and proposals.

72 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Appropriation for 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967 (March 15), p. 433.

73 Ibid., p. 434. Like his predecessor, William Durkee (who had resigned his post 1 January 1967 to accept the position of Vice President, Europe, of Free Europe, Inc., with responsibility for Radio Free Europe), Romm was a career official. He had previously been the Assistant Director of the Policy and Programs Division of the OCD.

74 During FY 1967, 10.6 million additional fallout shelter spaces were added to the national inventory increasing the total to more than 160.2 million spaces; 7,436 additional facilities were licensed, bringing the total aggregate of licensed spaces to 99 million; 5,600 facilities were marked, bringing the total of marked spaces to 92 million; and, the continuation of the distribution of previously procured shelter stocks brought this total up to enough to accommodate 78.4 million persons for 8 days or 47.1 million for 14 days. In addition, the home basement fallout protection survey was extended into Minnesota, Maine, Utah, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, West Virginia, and Colorado. This resulted in the identification of 335,000 PF 40, or higher, spaces and 8.2 million PF 20-40 spaces. From U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, 1967 Annual Report, (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1-2.

75 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices and Department of HUD Appropriations Bill, 1968, House Report 259, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 May 1967, p. 12.

76 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967 (19 July), pp. 631-632, 647, 661.

77 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1968, Senate Report 548, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 August 1967, p. 27.

78 Young charged that "this outfit has become the catch-all, or cesspool, for Army officers and civilians who spend time concocting propaganda and sending messages to other unneeded officials likewise feeding at the public trough." See the Congressional Record, Vol. 113, Part 19, 18 September 1967, pp. 25866 and 25869.

As ridiculous as these charges may sound, with a vote of 32 to 55, Young received more support this year than in previous attempts to cut OCD budgets. Ibid., 19 September 1967, p. 25956.

79 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1968, House Report 803, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 October 1967, p. 46.

80 The decision was announced as "a limited ballistic missile defense system" oriented toward a Chinese Communist nuclear threat

(improbable as that was). This decision to deploy a "light" BMD system was apparently made despite McNamara's objections. The Sentinel system was never fully deployed, however. See Kahan, p. 103.

81 Congressional Record, (113-19), 19 September 1967, p. 25955. This perception was hardly arrested by McNamara's statement that "with the planned defense against the (Chinese People's Republic), no shelter construction program is necessary." Quoted in U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Status of the Civil Defense, (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, April 1968), p. 9.

82 Pittman, "Government and Civil Defense," in Wigner, p. 50.

83 U.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1969, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 9 May 1968, p. 543.

84 In September of 1967 it was noted in the Congressional Record, (Vol. 113, Part 19, 18 September 1967, p. 25866) that $80 million a day was being spent on the war.

85 The SASC Subcommittee was holding hearings on "The Status of U.S. Strategic Power." Noted in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Continuing Certain Civil Defense Authorities, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 16 May 1968, p. 53.

86 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations for 1969 (Part 2), 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1968 (March 6) p. 553.

87 Ibid., pp. 539, 543, and 549.

88 During FY 1968 the OCD survey located 16.3 million additional fallout shelter spaces in 13,559 facilities, increasing the national inventory to more than 176.5 million spaces--not all of which were suitably located, however. An additional 9,257 facilities were licensed, bringing the total number of such spaces up to 108.9 million; 6,438 facilities were marked, bringing marked spaces up to 100.1 million; and survival supplies--paid for in previous years--were distributed to 8,033 facilities, bringing the total up to a capacity to maintain 88.1 million persons for 8 days, or 52.7 million for 14 days. In addition, 37 Community Shelter Planning contracts were executed, bringing this total up to 194, thereby providing for the development of emergency shelter plan use for 49.8 million persons. Finally, Home Fallout Protection Surveys in 26 States, 2 New York Counties, and the District of Columbia, resulted in the identification of 1.8 million shelter spaces with a PF of 40 or higher, and almost 28 million spaces with a PF 20-39. For other achievements see U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, 1968 Annual Report, (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 2.

89 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1969, House Report 1348, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3 May 1968, p. 15.

90 Congressional Record, (114-10), 8 May 1968, p. 12243.

91 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1969, Senate Report 1375, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 9 July 1968.

92 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conferences Report, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1969, House Report 1904, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 18 September 1968, p. 7.

93 Pittman, "Government and Civil Defense," in Wigner (Ed.), p. 50.

94 Pittman, "Afterward," to Ibid., pp. 113, and 71-72.

95 Pittman, "Government and Civil Defense," in Ibid., p. 57.

96 Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point--Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969, (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971).

CHAPTER SIX

THE NIXON YEARS

President Richard Nixon came to office in 1969 and was immediately confronted with the same pressing problems that had confronted, and overwhelmed his predecessor. The main problem was the Vietnam War. Nixon, however, did not plan on letting the Vietnam War mire his Administration down, and planned to be active in other areas. One of President Nixon's first actions was in the damage-limiting field. On March 14th, after less than three months in Office, Nixon announced his decision to deploy a modified ABM system (Safeguard) which would defend a nucleus of the U.S. land-based strategic missile system against a Soviet first strike, thus ensuring or "safeguarding" the retaliatory capacity of the United States.[1] On the same day Nixon ordered a study of the Nation's civil defense shelter system "to see what we can do there to minimize American casualties" should deterrence fail.[2]

A further indication of Presidential support of civil defense during Nixon's first year in Office came in late October when he signed Executive Order 11490. This included a specific provision encouraging all Federal agencies engaged in building construction to plan, design, and construct such buildings to protect the public against the hazards of nuclear war. In cases where Federal financial assistance would be given, the responsible agencies were encouraged "to use standards for planning design and construction which will maximimize protection for the public."[3] According to the OCD Annual Report of 1970 this Executive

Order represented a "significant step forward" for the OCD, for this was the first time that Federal agencies engaged in building construction had been requested (though not ordered) to encourage the incorporation of shelter in Government financially assisted grant and loan construction projects.[4]

Nixon's Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, also seemed convinced of the need of a viable civil defense system:

> My responsibilities as Secretary of Defense require me to evaluate problems related to the possibility of nuclear war and its probable effects upon the nation. As Secretary of Defense, I am convinced that the Civil Defense system is a vital part of our overall strategic posture and essential to the protection of the people...[5]

Civil defense, it seemed, had once again become a "vital" and "essential" element of the U.S. defense system. One of the reasons for this can perhaps be extrapolated from the testimony of Laird before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 22nd, 1969, when he contended that the Soviet Union was "going for a first-strike capability. There is no question about it."[6]

This impression of a renewal of interest in civil defense was muddied by the FY 1970 budget request of the Office of Civil Defense. Appearing on February 26th before the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee, Joseph Romm, the acting Director of the OCD, presented a $75.3 million request--$2 million less that the previous year's request.[7] (See Table VI-1.) This fact by itself, however, can not be taken as a true indication of the new Administration's interest in civil defense. This budget had been prepared during the final months of the Johnson Administration and while it is true that it could have been modified by the new Administration, it is understandable that it was not, given the fact that Nixon had been in Office only a few weeks

at this time and intended to study the shelter system and policy.

The FY 1970 OCD budget was notable in two respects. First, it was the lowest civil defense budget request in ten years. The other notable aspect of this request is that the Nixon Administration had allowed the inclusion of a request for incentive shelter funds--though at a very modest level. This new program centered on a proposal to grant up to $15 per space for fallout shelters provided in new construction. Romm estimated that if allowed the average subsidy would run about seven dollars a space, or about four to five thousand dollars per building, and that the funds would only be used in areas where the shelter deficit and need was the greatest. He warned that:

> The credibility and significant progress in the shelter program may be lost if State and local governments, and the general public, do not see added effort from the Federal Government to provide fallout protection for people living in areas where such protection is not now available for all.[8]

For this the OCD was requesting $2.5 million as compared to the $250 million sought for the program proposed in H.R. 8200 during the Kennedy Administration and the $10 million sought for the "experimental" program under Johnson. When the House Appropriations Committee reported out its OCD budget recommendation of $64.2 million a few weeks later, however, funds for this type program were once again disapproved.

On July 9th, officials of the OCD appeared before the Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee to appeal this and other cuts in their budget. By this time Joseph Romm had been replaced by John N. Davis who had previously served two terms as the Republican Governor of North Dakota.[9] Noting this, the Chairman of the Subcommittee, John O. Pastore, asked Davis "why one with your background would want to do this job."[10] During the hearing that followed, Pastore seemed

TABLE VI-1

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1970 OCD APPROPRIATION REQUEST

(In Thousands of Dollars)

Budget Program/Project	Appropriations FY 1969	Estimate FY 1970: President's budget	House action	Tentative proposed distribution of House allowance	Restoration requested of Senate	Total requested of Senate
WARNING AND DETECTION	$ 3,200	$ 3,875		$ 3,875		$ 3,875
Radiological Defense	2,700	3,430		3,430		3,430
Warning Systems	500	445		445		445
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS	9,736	9,736		7,736	$ 2,000	9,736
Training & Education	6,086	6,186		4,186	2,000	6,186
Emergency Information	1,373	1,385		1,385		1,385
Damage Assessment	90	90		90		90
Emergency Operations Systems Development	395	399		399		399
National Civil Defense Computer Facility	1,045	1,013		1,013		1,013
Emergency Water Supply Equipment	428	428	$47,700	428		428
Advisory Services	139	139		139		139
Broadcast Station Protection Program	180	96		96		96
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO STATES	22,900	23,900		22,900	1,000	23,900
Personnel & Administrative Expenses	19,100	19,700	(19,100)**	19,100	600	19,700
Emergency Operating Centers	2,300	2,500		2,500		2,500
Survival Supplies, Equipment & Training	1,500	1,700		1,300	400	1,700
MANAGEMENT	12,579	13,189		13,189		13,189
TOTAL O & M APPROPRIATION	$48,415*	$50,700		$47,700	$ 3,000	$50,700
SHELTERS	7,300	19,600		11,500	8,100	19,600
Shelter Survey & Marking	3,550	6,050		5,000	1,050	6,050
Shelter Design & Analysis Services	2,000	2,800		2,800		2,800
Experimental Shelter Program	0	2,500		0	2,500	2,500
Shelter Stocking	0	4,250	$16,500	2,034	2,216	4,250
Community Shelter Planning	1,950	4,000		1,666	2,334	4,000
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	5,000	5,000		5,000		5,000
TOTAL RESEARCH, SHELTER SURVEY AND MARKING	12,500	24,600		16,500	8,100	24,600
GRAND TOTAL	$60,915*	$75,300	$64,200	$64,200	$11,100	$75,300

*Excludes $124,700 transferred to General Services Administration and includes $500,000 transferred from the Civil Defense Procurement Fund.

**Allowance indicated within the "Operation & Maintenance" account.

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices and HUD, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations, 1970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 562.

sympathetic to and supportive of the civil defense program to the point of criticizing the Secretary of the Army for not appearing in person to support the OCD budget request.[11] He indicated that the Senate would do what it could to restore some of the House cuts, but that only limited success in this should be expected: "For us to take this amount that they have cut and put it back in its entirety would be considered by the House...a rebuke to their action. Naturally...we have got to do something about some restoration."[12]

Shortly thereafter the Senate voted favorably on its Appropriation Committee's recommendation of $72.5 million for the OCD--$8.3 million more than the House figure. A later Conference compromise on these two figures resulted in an OCD budget approval of $69.25 million--up $7.71 million from the previous year, but still significantly lower than the appropriations levels of the Kennedy Administration. (See Table VI-2.)

In that the $69.25 million finally approved for the OCD was $4.05 million less than the $75.3 million request--presented as "the minimum sustaining rate"--the OCD would have to continue during FY 1970 with its cutbacks in program levels.[13] Thus the picture of accomplishment for the OCD in FY 1970 would (as in FY 1969) be a cloudy one. While it is true that some progress had been made during FY 1969 on the fallout shelter program (see Table VI-3) the OCD, nevertheless, was not able to keep up with the pace of new construction. According to the OCD FY 1969 Annual Report, by the end of FY 1969 the OCD was approximately one year behind schedule on its survey of new buildings. In other areas it had been unable (1) to match $2 million in State and local funds which had been earmarked for emergency operating centers, (2) to match a further $1.3 million of State and local money earmarked for emergency

TABLE VI-2

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1970 OCD APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1969[a] Grant	Request[b] to BoB	Approved[a] by BoB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1970[a] Grant
Operations	$48,040	$ ---	$50,700	$47,700	$50,700	$49,200
Shelters*	22,500	---	24,600	16,500	21,800	20,050
Total	$60,540	$85,656	$75,300	$64,200	$72,500	$69,250

SOURCES: [a]Congressional Record, 18 November 1969, p. 34595.

[b]U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Program Paper (Volume 5), "Financial Digest (1951-1978)," 1979.

*Includes shelter survey, R&D, and marking.

TABLE VI-3

SUMMARY OF PROGRESS IN PUBLIC FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM, FY 1969

Program action	Number of facilities (in thousands)				Number of spaces (in millions)			
	End of fiscal year 1968, total	End of fiscal year 1969, total	During fiscal year 1969		End of fiscal year 1968, total	End of fiscal year 1969, total	During fiscal year 1969	
			Gain	Percent gain			Gain*	Percent gain
Located	189.1	195.8	6.7	4	176.5	188.2	11.6	7
Licensed	109.7	117.2	7.5	7	108.9	119.7	10.8	10
Marked	107.5	109.0	1.5	1	101.1	105.1	4.0	4
Stocked	91.1	98.4	7.3	8	52.7	58.5	5.8	11
Rated capacity of facilities stocked	-------	-------	------	------	88.1	96.6	8.5	10

*Totals may not add due to rounding.

SOURCE: U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Annual Report--Fiscal Year 1969, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 20.

communications and warning equipment, (3) to approve the entrance of 105 local jurisdictions into the matching funds program due to lack of funds, (4) to deploy a newly developed Radio Warning Decision Information Distribution System (DIDS),[14] and (5) had to either cutback or defer many research projects.[15] In addition, some of the food survival stocks which had been stocked early in the Kennedy Administration were beginning to reach the end of their estimated life expectancy. No new funds for food stocks had been approved since then and the prospect of obtaining funds to replace outdated food stocks was remote indeed. In his Annual Report, Davis thus warned:

> The current civil defense capability should not be permitted to deteriorate. Much work has been done, a great deal more remains to be done, but the ultimate goal of providing protection for everyone cannot be achieved without adequate funds to eliminate the backlogs and reinstate the program to effective performance levels consistent with new technological advancements and the national population growth rate.[16]

The recent cuts in the FY 1970 budget, though, meant that deterioration would continue. The Home Fallout Shelter Survey would have to be ended, for example, and the Adult Education Program all but eliminated.[17] This also meant that the backlog of buildings to be surveyed for shelter would continue to increase.

The FY 1971 Appropriation

For the OCD, 1970 did not begin on an optimistic note. Despite the supportive tone of his statements the year before, Secretary of Defense Laird, in his written statement before the House Armed Services Committee in February, indicated that "no major changes are proposed in the Civil Defense Program."[18] The ostensible reason for this was that the civil defense program was still the subject of the review by the

Office of Emergency Preparedness--a study that had been on-going for nearly an entire year. Some room for change later in the year was left open, however, for as Laird indicated, the review was scheduled for completion in March.

A few weeks later OCD Director John Davis appeared before the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee and submitted an FY 1971 OCD budget request of $73.8 million[19]--the lowest request since FY 1959 and the sixth consecutive year of appropriation request decline.[20] Davis was only able to report that limited progress was being made in the current fiscal year. Some additions were being made to the shelter inventory, but even so the backlog of buildings to survey was continuing to increase.[21] This situation was not helped by the fact that the Home Fallout Protection Survey had been mothballed during FY 1970 and most of the remainder of the survival shelter food stocks had been distributed.[22] Moreover, the appropriation cutbacks of the last few years had necessitated a continual string of personnel cutbacks--to the point that the OCD had reached an alltime low of 719 during FY 1970.[23]

In light of the minimum nature of the FY 1971 request it could not be anticipated that the deterioration of the civil defense program could be reversed during the coming fiscal year. The shelter survey of new construction would continue, though only on the basis of an in-house project using the Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command rather than contracting with outside engineering firms. The Community Shelter Planning Program would continue in sixty-five large planning areas, though the supporting home basement survey would continue to be deferred.

In an effort to break out of this downward spiral Davis once again proposed an experimental shelter incentive subsidy program. This year, however, the proposal was for just a $1.5 million program in which the maximum Federal contribution could be no more than $10 for each added shelter space. [24] In another new program area Davis sought $2 million for the prototype deployment of a new warning and communication system called the Decision Information Distribution System (DIDS). An OCD official informed the subcommittee that tests and studies of the present warning system indicated that the system "appears to get the warning message alert to about 75 percent of the U.S. population in about 30-minutes time." With the DIDS system and the Sentinal ABM radar network (once operational) warning of attack could be automatically triggered to reach about 96 percent of the population in only 30-seconds time, at least theoretically. Moreover, specific areas could be alerted that their locales would be coming under direct attack and provide an estimation of the time remaining before missile impact. The system would have the ability to activate outdoor siren systems automatically and could be expanded to automatically turn on home television and radio receivers which had been fitted with inexpensive (about $10) adapters. The OCD estimated that the decrease in warning time from 30-minutes to 30-seconds, could, in the event of an attack, translate into the saving of 10 to 20 million lives that would otherwise be lost.[25]

Davis further noted that some thought had been given by the Administration to the prospect of giving the OCD greater leeway and responsibility in the natural disaster field.[26] Davis was in favor of this. Civil Defense had been involved in this field almost from its inception, along with various other Governmental agencies. Now that the fallout

shelter program was deteriorating, Davis was being forced by funding limitations to seek other avenues for his agency to pursue.

On May 7th, the House Appropriations Committee recommended a FY 1971 appropriation of $72 million for the OCD--a cut of only $1.8 million ($1.5 million of which was accounted for by the ill-fated shelter incentive subsidy program).[27] This recommendation passed the House on the 12th. On May 21st, Davis appeared before Pastore's Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee and appealed $1 million of the $1.8 million cut.[28] On June 24th the Senate Appropriations Committee supported the OCD appeal by recommending the entire $73 million Senate request.[29] The Conference "compromise" on the two bills, however, dropped the appropriation back to $72.1 million--just $.1 million over the original House recommendation.[30] (See Tables VI-4 and VI-5) This "compromise" passed both sides of the Congress shortly thereafter without Administration comment.

Following this appropriation, Davis, during the remainder of FY 1971, began to move the OCD further and further away from sheltering as the primary emphasis of his agency and closer to local disaster preparedness as the central focus of the OCD. In his Annual Report for FY 1971 Davis attempted to explain this shift:

> Early in his Administration, President Nixon said, "The time has come to assess and reform all of our institutions of government at the Federal, State, and local level. It is time for a new Federalism, in which, after 190 years of power flowing from the people and local and State governments to Washington, D.C., it will begin to flow from Washington back to the people of the United States.
>
> In keeping with the President's thoughts, a reassessment of the U.S. Civil Defense Program was undertaken. During fiscal year 1971, this resulted in a major shift in emphasis. The shift was from a program almost totally oriented to shelters, toward one which stresses greater emergency operations capability at the local level of government--with shelters being part of that capability.[31]

TABLE VI-4

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1971 OCD APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Budget Program/Project	Appropriations FY 1970	Estimate FY 1971 (In Thousands of Dollars) President's Budget	House Action	Tentative Proposed Distribution of House Allowance	Reallocation Requested of Senate	Total Requested of Senate
WARNING AND DETECTION	$ 3,004	$ 3,775		3,275	500	3,775
Radiological Defense	2,880	3,375		2,875	500	3,375
Warning Systems	120	400		400		400
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS	9,905	10,625		10,025	500	10,525
Training & Education	6,460	6,825		6,225	500	6,725
Emergency Information	1,408	1,700		1,700		1,700
Emergency Operations Systems Development	299	400		400		400
National Civil Defense Computer Facility	1,013	1,070		1,070		1,070
Maintenance of Data Base	90	90		90		90
Emergency Water Supply Equipment	390	390	$50,000	390		390
Red Cross Advisory Services	150	150		150		150
Broadcast Station Protection	95	0		0		0
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO STATES	23,200	21,800		22,800		22,800
Personnel & Administrative Expenses	19,400	20,400	(21,400)**	21,400		21,400
Emergency Operating Centers	1,900	0		0		0
Survival Supplies, Equipment & Training	1,900	1,400		1,400		1,400
MANAGEMENT	13,778	13,900		13,200		13,900
TOTAL O & M APPROPRIATION	$49,883*	$50,100		$50,000	$1,000	$51,000
SHELTERS	$16,050	$16,000		$14,300		$14,300
Shelter Survey & Marking	6,788	6,100		6,100		6,100
Shelter Design & Analysis Services	2,416	2,000		2,000		2,000
Shelter Stocking	1,336	1,000		1,000		1,000
Community Shelter Planning	3,710	3,400		3,200		3,200
Experimental Fallout Shelter Program	0	1,500		0		0
Decision Information Distribution System	0	2,000		2,000		2,000
Federal Regional Emergency Operating Centers	1,800	0	$22,000	0		0
EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTERS	0	4,200		4,200		4,200
State & Local Emergency Operating Centers	0	3,200		3,200		3,200
State & Local Supporting Systems Equipment	0	1,000		1,000		1,000
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	4,000	3,500		3,500		3,500
TOTAL RESEARCH, SHELTER SURVEY AND MARKING	$20,050	$23,700		$22,000		$22,000
GRAND TOTAL	$69,933*	$73,800	$72,000	$72,000	$1,000	$73,000

*Excludes $166,735 transferred to General Services Administration and includes $850,000 for civilian pay raise (supplemental request).
**Allowance indicated within the "Operation & Maintenance" account.

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1971, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1970, p. 1024.

TABLE VI-5

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1971 OCD APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1970[a] Grant	Request[b] to BoB	Approved[a] by BoB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1971[c] Grant
Operations	$49,200	$ ---	$50,100	$50,000	$51,000	$50,100
Shelters*	20,050	---	23,700	22,000	22,000	22,000
Total	$69,250	$76,346	$73,800	$72,000	$73,000	$72,100

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1971, Senate Report 949, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 24 June 1970, p. 30

[b]U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Program Paper (Volume 5), "Financial Digest (1951-1978)," 1979.

[c]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1971, House Report 1345, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 28 July 1970, p. 8.

*Includes shelter survey, R&D, and marking.

As Davis elaborated at another point, "the development of local capabilities for effective action in emergencies is essential to civil preparedness, both in peacetime or in event of attack."[32] Another OCD publication noted that "local directors prefer planning /for/ natural disasters rather than nuclear disaster, and...they also think their community prefers this emphasis. This may result from the fact that disaster planning is more manageable, less comprehensive, and also less threatening."[33] This same publication also stated that for the OCD there were desirable side-effects to such an approach:

> Experience in coordinating community resources for other than nuclear disaster hazards not only provides an increased base for such coordination but probably generates what might be called "reciprocal obligations." This means that the local director has helped others carry out their emergency roles and, therefore, can usually call for increased voluntary cooperation from recipients of his help in nuclear preparedness social action programs.[34]

In order to facilitate this mutual back-scratching and to push its newly highlighted local emergency preparedness mission, the OCD, in late October of 1970 initiated a news exchange publication (Response) in which local civil defense directors were encouraged to send in their experiences with local emergencies.[35] It was apparently the hope of the OCD that the publication of successful reactions to local emergencies would encourage the growth in number and size of local emergency management teams. Perhaps larger OCD budgets including larger State and local matching funds would follow.

The FY 1972 Appropriation

As the FY 1972 Congressional budget review process got under way in early 1971, there was little hope that the OCD would be able to break out of the appropriations rut it had fallen into. For the third consecutive year Department of Defense spokesmen indicated that no major changes in civil defense programs or funding levels would be sought, pending completion of the on-going review of the OCD and its policies.[36] The long-awaited study of civil defense by the OEP that was referred to here had been completed by the OEP and forwarded to the National Security Council in June, 1970. But since that time no action had been taken on the study, now known as NSSM 57 (for National Security Study Memorandum No. 57). The Administration was marking time on civil defense.

Before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, OCD Director Davis attributed the decline of OCD budget levels "to Southeast Asia

requirements."[37] This, however, was but a smokescreen. A more realistic explanation would have attributed the low-state of civil defense funding to a failure of the Administration to stand behind the civil defense program. To state this before a Congressional committee, however, would have been more damaging to personnel morale, and perhaps Congressional appropriations, than to blame the deterioration of civil defense preparedness on the fiscal restraints imposed by the war in Vietnam.[38] Davis was not completely wedded to the Southeast Asia explanation of civil defense stagnation, however, for at another point he sought to elaborate on his explanation for the low priority given to civil defense in the past and at present by noting:

> We have been under the influence of the heavy preponderance of power that we had, this in itself lent a feeling of security to the American people, the Congress and, I think, the Administration...that is why there ought to be a restructuring of thinking and judgement given at high levels toward how much we need to do today in light of the current obvious threat.[39]

For whatever the reason, civil defense was no longer moving forward --a point Davis candidly admitted. He noted that by the end of the current 1971 fiscal year there would be a backlog of 187,000 buildings to be surveyed as part of the shelter survey program. Education and training programs for architects and engineers on methods of low-cost dual-purpose shelter design were being either deferred or cut back drastically. Radiological monitoring and detection instruments (which had been stocked throughout the country over the years) were deteriorating for lack of maintenance and recalibration.[40] Warehoused food stocks were all but depleated and the stocks in the shelters had reached the end of their expected shelf-life in many cases. Because of this, the OCD, through the Agency for International Development (AID), had recently begun a program of overseas disaster relief using these

outdated food stocks (one million pounds of survival rations went to East Pakistan in November of 1970 alone).[41]

Unfortunately, the $78.3 million FY 1972 OCD budget request then before this House Appropriations Subcommittee would not be able to reverse this process. (See Table VI-6) As part of the new evolving orientation toward State and local emergency preparedness, the $6.2 million increase this request represented over the previous appropriation was accounted for by nominal increases in funds earmarked for State and local emergency operating centers (EOCs), State and local matching funds, and State and local training and education. More funds for the shelter program had been sought by the OCD through DOD/OMB channels, but these had not been approved.[42]

The reaction of the subcommittee members to Davis' presentation was interesting in that the House Appropriations Committee had recently reorganized and civil defense and disaster preparedness responsibility had been transferred to a new Subcommittee for Treasury, Post Office, and General Government Appropriations under the chairmanship of Tom Steed (Dem., Okla.). None of these subcommittee members had been on the old Independent Offices Subcommittee and were thus new to the civil defense field. The hearing on the OCD budget request therefore proceeded more along the lines of a review and overview of civil defense and disaster preparedness programs and policies, than along the lines of an item by item justification of the budget request itself. Representative Donald W. Riegle (Rep., Mich.) indicated he was shocked at the state of civil defense preparedness in the United States (particularly in light of reports he had seen on the Soviet civil defense effort):

> When I read in your presentation...that our warehouse stocks have been virtually exhausted and the supplies in shelters

> have exceeded their expected shelf life, I interpret that as meaning that if we should suddenly have to use our civil defense facilities we would find they really don't exist...I am surprised that the President, the National Security Council, or any official, is willing to let that condition exist.[43]

Riegle wanted to know how much money it would take to do the job right. Davis was somewhat at a loss to answer the question in that several alternative civil defense postures were under review by the Administration as part of the OEP study (NSSM 57): "I don't know whether I can appear to prejudge the ultimate decision..."[44] Upon being pressed by Riegle for more information, however, Davis agreed to submit for the record figures on an upgraded civil defense program. He later reneged on this promise, though, and submitted instead the following which fell short of Riegle's request:

> The experts themselves, in contributing to the study now before the National Security Council, were divided as to what constitutes a "best" civil defense program and posture. Some felt that $0.5 billion a year ought to be invested after a period of intensive research and development. There are complicated arguments as to whether the President, in a crisis, would order evacuation, with the consequent destabilizing effect this might have on international crisis management. Experts know how to design and build blast-resistant shelters for our target populations, but there are arguments that to do so would be very costly, might appear provocative to the potential enemy and possibly affect the course of the SALT negotiations. Counter arguments say that the Russians substantial investment in blast shelter systems and known planning for evacuation of large cities have neither provoked the United States, taken a significant share of the Russian defense budget, nor affected the SALT talks.
>
> All of this means that a decision on the nature of the U.S. civil defense program and budget levels must be taken at the highest level of our Government, involving, as it must, political and strategic considerations well beyond the cognizance of any one agency or department.[45]

While Davis' response did not answer Riegle's question, it did indicate some of the avenues along which consideration of alternative civil defense programs was being pursued, as well as some of the problems

involved in these considerations. It also indicated that the direction of civil defense policy was an area that for the most part, if not entirely, was out of Davis' hands.

In any event, the House committee was sufficiently concerned over the deterioration of the civil defense program to take an unprecedented action on a regular civil defense appropriation--the $78.3 million budget request was approved in its entirety. A few weeks later, after similar testimony in the Senate,[46] the Senate Appropriations Committee concurred with the House and approved the entire OCD request.[47] At $78.303 million this represented approximately a $5.8 million increase over the previous year. For the third consecutive year Congressional appropriations for civil defense had increased, while Executive-approved authorizations had followed almost the exact opposite trend.

The Birth of the DCPA

Following the FY 1972 appropriation the OCD continued to push civil defense preparedness against nuclear attack further into the background and State and local disaster preparedness to the forefront. This evolution was symbolized by the May 5th, 1972 disestablishment of the Office of Civil Defense and the transferral of its functions to a new Defense agency significantly named the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA). Though it was stated that "the new agency will provide preparedness assistance planning in all areas of civil defense and natural disasters...," there would come to be little doubt that the latter focus was ascendent over the former.[48] The fact that the new agency was named the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency rather than the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency should not be viewed as an insignificant detail. Nor was the new name, at first, universally accepted. For example, for two years

TABLE VI-6

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1972 OCD APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Appropriation/Budget Program	Page No.	Actual FY 1970	Estimate FY 1971	Estimate FY 1972
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE				
Warning and Detection	5	$ 2,963,216	$ 2,775,000	$ 4,000,000
Emergency Operations	15	9,872,494	10,625,000	11,200,000
Financial Assistance to States	43	23,242,417	22,900,000	24,400,000
Management	48	14,168,453	14,923,290	15,503,000
Total		$50,246,580*	$51,223,290***	$55,103,000
RESEARCH, SHELTER SURVEY & MARKING				
Shelters	54	$16,030,000	$14,300,000	$13,000,000
Emergency Operating Centers	73	(2,436,621)**	4,200,000	6,700,000
Research & Development	78	4,020,000	3,500,000	3,500,000
Total Appropriation		$20,050,000	$22,000,000	$23,200,000
Unobligated balance for use in subsequent years		5,399,793	3,740,000	1,080,000
Available prior year unobligated balance		4,654,237	5,399,793	3,740,000
Total Obligations		$19,304,444	$23,659,793	$25,860,000
GRAND TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS		$70,296,580*	$73,223,290***	$78,303,000
GRAND TOTAL OBLIGATIONS		$69,551,024	$74,883,083	$80,963,000

*Excludes $166,735 appropriation transfer to GSA.
**Funded under Operation and Maintenance
***Includes $1,200,000 related to proposed supplemental appropriation, of which $800,000 is for December 27, 1969 pay increase (PL 91-231) and $400,000 is for January 1971 pay increase (PL 91-656). Excludes $76,710 appropriation transfer to CSC (PL 91-648).

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Post Office, and General Government Appropriations For 1972 (Part 4), 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, p. 336.

following the name change the Appropriations Committees of Congress insisted on referring to the agency as the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency.

In essence, the transmutation of the OCD into the DCPA was the result of a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM 184). In turn, this decision was the consequence of the OEP study "NSSM 57" begun in 1969. After having spent three years studying and reviewing civil defense, the Administration evidently felt compelled to take some action in this area. Though NSSM 57 remains a classified document, it is no secret that a range of alternative civil defense programs were considered by this study, most of which would have entailed far higher appropriation levels than the Administration had thus far approved. These were not accepted. Instead, NSDM 184 directed that "there be increased emphasis on dual-use plans, procedures and preparedness within the limitations of existing authority /and appropriation levels as it would soon be made clear/ including appropriate related improvements in crisis management."[49]

The method for implementing NSDM 184 was suggested by another Executive study-paper which was written by the Fitzhugh blue ribbon panel on the defense establishment. Forwarded in early 1971, this report recommended that the OCD be reorganized as a separate agency at the Secretary's level within the Department of Defense.[50] This is precisely what happened. As implemented through NSDM 184, this meant a general belt-tightening for the new agency and the focus on "dual-use policy," or, in other words, on activities which facilitated both nuclear attack preparedness and natural disaster preparedness at the local level.

One of the first actions of the new agency was to decide that Federal level shelter marking and stocking did not fit into the dual-use focus. These activities thus became "crisis-implemented" programs, i.e. their actual accomplishment would be deferred until periods of increased tension.[51] The Shelter Survey Program, which had at one time been the very essence of civil defense, survived, but at a reduced level and importance with the DCPA advocating the creation of "State Engineer Support Groups," or in-house State organizations, to conduct the survey in place of the Federal Engineering Survey support which had been provided since 1962.

Along with these changes the DCPA noted in its 1972 Annual Report that one of the "major elements of the new program" would be the "development of guidance for local governments based on risk analysis, to include evacuation planning guidance for high risk areas."[52] Having been abandoned a decade earlier, evacuation planning would begin making a come-back under the Nixon Administration. Federal level "civil defense" officials were quick to point out that they were looking at the evacuation concept "in a quite different context" than had been the case earlier: "Namely that of a partial dispersal of people from cities during a period of intense international crisis which could well precede a nuclear attack upon the United States."[53]

It is understandable that the DCPA would want to divorce itself from the discredited evacuation policy of the early years of atomic-age civil defense. However, evacuation planning conducted under the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations was not tactically oriented totally. Allowances had been made for the possibility that strategic warning of potential attack would enable the evacuation of population centers prior

to the initiation of the attack.[54] This is not to say that in conceptual terms "strategic warning" evacuation and "crisis implemented" evacuation are one and the same, yet the distance between the two is largely determined by the undefined meaning attributed to "intense international crisis." This gets to the point which began to be heard during the remainder of the Nixon Administration as crisis relocation planning went forward. In the words of one local official:

> The Pentagon planners assume a period of "intense crisis" before an attack as a rationale for what is now being called "crisis relocation planning." How intense is "intense," and who would order the relocation of millions of people from our 250 urban centers? Would the Korean War, the Berlin Blockade, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cambodian invasion, the Tonkin Bay incident or the Sino-Indian War be considered intense crises?[55]

The point being made here was that some crises were more intense than others. Moreover, it was always possible that a crisis could become significantly intensified in a relatively short period of time. Thus, time and the ability of the human mind to predict the likely course of volatile events might not allow for the activation, much less the implementation, of crisis relocation planning. What the above quoted official was interested in was in being able to tell the local citizens where they could find shelter in case the bottom were to ever suddenly fall out.

The GAO Report

Intriguingly, the transformation of the OCD into the DCPA, with the attendant focus on local preparedness and dual-use, crisis implementation, and crisis relocation, came fast on the heals of the release of a General Accounting Office study of civil defense activities and status that recommended that more attention be paid to improving the fallout

shelter system and scarcely mentioned disaster planning or dual-use policy. After having studied the accomplishments of civil defense over the past ten years and the nature of nuclear destruction, the report concluded that even though huge increases in nuclear weapon strength and numbers had accrued over this ten year period this had not made survival hopeless: "Even though a full-scale nuclear attack would cause many casualties, effective protection against some of the effects of nuclear attack is available."[56] In this regard the report noted that "The Office of Civil Defense has developed a substantial life-saving capability," namely, the ability to "save from 18 to 30 million lives which would otherwise be lost in the event of a nuclear attack."[57] However, the fallout shelter system, which accounted for this life-saving capability, was not complete:

> Our review indicates that the Nation lacks, and under current programs will continue to lack, a sufficient number of properly dispersed, adequately equipped, fallout shelters in homes, schools, and other buildings and facilities to accommodate the population in the event of nuclear attack.[58]

However, the report noted paradoxically that "although appropriations for military defense as a whole have increased over recent years, appropriations for civil defense have decreased."[59] In an effort to clarify this development the GAO report noted the statements of support that had been made by the Executive and the Department of Defense throughout this period of appropriation decline and concluded that, nevertheless, "in practice civil defense does not seem to be regarded as a primary element of national defense."[60] The GAO report therefore recommended that the Secretary of Defense should:

> 1) provide additional justification to the Congress, concerning the part which civil defense plays in the U.S. overall national security posture and

2) give consideration to whether higher priority should be given to marking and stocking good shelter spaces already identified, in view of the relatively low per capita cost of protection which these shelters provide.[61]

Turning to the Office of Civil Defense, the GAO made two recommendations geared to the improvement of the fallout shelter system. In recognition of the fact that the OCD was operating under severe budgetary restraints and could not complete the fallout shelter system using current planning assumptions (unless the Executive and Congress decided to support the system), the GAO recommended that these planning assumptions be changed. First, the report recommended that the OCD establish a risk-area priority system. In that funds were not available to survey, license, mark, and stock on a nationwide basis, the report stressed that priority should be given to the development of protection in those areas most likely at risk from fallout after a nuclear attack. In the past it had basically been the position of the OCD that fallout was a nationwide hazard, given the unpredictable and changing nature of wind flows, especially seasonally. On the other hand, and in effect what the GAO was arguing, there were predominant wind patterns west to east, and a community forty miles downwind of an ICBM site was obviously at more risk than a community forty miles upwind. Preferences should be paid to the former rather than treating both as equals, at least until such time that funding could support nationwide development of protection.[62]

Secondly, the GAO report urged that the protection factor of 40 for marking and stocking shelter spaces should be lowered to take advantage of the best available shelter in deficit shelter areas regardless of the PF of that shelter. The report noted an OCD study which estimated that in a large hypothetical attack on military and urban targets in the United States, that "of those surviving the direct effects of the

attack, 46 percent would survive the fallout hazard without shelters and 97 percent would survive in PF 40 shelters....93 percent would survive in PF 20 shelters and 90 percent would survive in PF 15 shelters."[63] Obviously, the saving of lives even at a PF of only 15 was still very significant.

While it is true that the OCD, as part of the nationwide survey, had been noting the existence of lower than PF 40 shelter spaces and had even encouraged their inclusion in the Home Basement Survey and the Community Planning Program, these spaces were neither licensed, marked, or stocked. This the GAO found "inconsistent."[64]

Finally, in order to facilitate Congressional consideration of the current civil defense program and its future direction, the report included a statistical description of alternative civil defense programs and funding scenarios. In that the OEP had also considered alternative programs as part of its NSSM 57 study the GAO noted that it had sought to obtain information from the OEP on its study, but was unsuccessful.[65] Nevertheless, since both the OEP and the GAO relied on the OCD at several points for statistical information, it is hypothesized here that the correlation between the classified NSSM 57 study and the unclassified GAO study is most probably significant in the area of alternative programs. (See Table VI-7)

While the table demonstrates the high costs involved in a single-purpose fallout or blast shelter construction program (in terms of dollars and in terms of cost effectiveness), it also demonstrates the advantages of a continued fallout shelter survey, an incentive subsidy program, and the stocking of ventilation equipment--fifteen million

TABLE VI-7

1971 GAO STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

	% of Population Provided with Fallout Protection	(In Millions) Number of Deaths	Number of Survivors	Lives Saved	Estimated Cost	Cost For Each Life Saved
1) No Shelter	---	104	122	---	----	---
2) Shelters located as of 1 Jan. 1969	40	78	148	26	$639	$25
3) Surveys of existing shelter continued to 1975	54	74	152	30	995	33
4) #3 plus packaged ventilation equipment	68	63	163	41	1,059	26
5) #4 plus subsidy program	86	55	171	49	2,166	44
6) #5 plus construction of fallout shelter in deficit areas	100	49	177	55	4,686	85
7) #5 plus subsidy for blast shelters in 100 largest cities	86	48	178	56	5,684	102

These statistics are based on a large-scale 1975 attack including both military and urban targets. The program costs would be distributed over a multiple year span (generally programmed at 5 to 7 years).

SOURCE: U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congress: Activities and Status of Civil Defense in the United States, (Washington, D.C.: GAO, Comptroller General, 26 October 1971), p. 32.

additional lives saved over the then current capability at a cost of an additional $400 million.

The Administration, as we know, did not accept any of the augmented civil defense proposals contained in the GAO report or in NSSM 57, and instead decided to reorganize civil defense into the DCPA and focus on dual-use local preparedness. Several factors account for this decision. An ex-OEP official has stated that the OCD did not have the best reputation within the Administration for its staff work and was having problems getting quality work out of its contract research recipients.[66] But most probably the deciding factor involved the SALT I Treaty which was signed by President Nixon in Moscow just twenty-one days following the OCD/DCPA transfer.

The major accomplishment of this treaty was in limiting ABM deployment in both the United States and the Soviet Union.[67] Several participants in the negotiations that led to the signing of this Treaty have since stated that a major assumption behind the agreement was that both sides were thereby implicitly accepting the doctrine of mutual assured destruction which said, in effect, that each side could absorb a first strike by the other and still have sufficient forces left to visit unacceptable damage upon the other.[68] By agreeing to limit ABM deployment it was perceived that each side was agreeing that no steps would be taken to interfere with the other side's capability to inflict unacceptable damage after receiving a first strike, for with effective ABMs the determination of unacceptable damage became a dangerously cloudy issue. In other words, safety lay in vulnerability.

Highly effective levels of civil defense could create the same instability that ABMs created. While "highly effective" levels of civil

defense were not being proposed by the OCD, even marginally or moderately effective civil defense programs must have seemed incongruous to the Administration in relation to the SALT environment of cooperation and the theory of hostage populations.

The FY 1973 Appropriation

On May 5th 1972--the day the OCD officially became the DCPA--John Davis appeared before Representative Tom Steed's House Appropriations Subcommittee holding hearings on the DCPA FY 1973 budget request of $88,835,000. (See Table VI-8.) Davis noted at the beginning that during the past year the OCD/DCPA had reviewed and realigned its program. The major thrust of this realignment involved:

> 1) the enhancement of State and local capability to manage both attack and other disasters
>
> 2) a reorientation of the program to consider the most likely hazards, and
>
> 3) a shifting of ongoing programs, when feasible, to crisis implemented systems in order to reduce peacetime costs and obsolescence.[69]

In light of this new orientation the FY 1973 request sought $10.5 million more than had been requested in FY 1972.[70] Most of the increase, then, was in the areas of matching funds for State and local emergency preparedness personnel, equipment, and emergency operating centers. Less emphasis was placed on warning and detection--no funds were requested for the DIDS network, for example[71]--and on the shelter program.

On June 19th, the House Appropriations Committee reported out an FY 1973 DCPA budget recommendation of $83.5 million--$5.3 million less than the request. Notably, the entire $5.3 million cut was in the shelter program.[72] After nearly identical hearings in the Senate, the Senate Appropriations Committee concurred with the House and recommended

TABLE VI-8

SUMMARY OF FY 1973 DCPA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Appropriation/Budget Program	Page No.	Actual FY 1971	Estimate FY 1972	Estimate FY 1973
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE				
Warning and Detection.....	5	$3,206,131	$4,217,000	$4,750,000
Emergency Operations.....	15	10,528,106	11,211,000	12,800,000
Financial Assistance to States..	49	22,780,494	24,400,000	26,600,000
Management.....	53	14,261,609	15,275,000	16,185,000*
Total.....		50,776,340	55,103,000	60,335,000*
RESEARCH, SHELTER SURVEY & MARKING				
Shelters.....	59	14,020,137	13,000,000	15,000,000
Emergency Operating Centers.....	79	4,629,863	6,700,000	10,000,000
Research & Development.....	84	3,350,000	3,500,000	3,500,000
Total Appropriation.....		22,000,000	23,200,000	28,500,000
Unobligated balance for use in subsequent years.....		6,338,279	2,978,000	3,318,000
Available prior year unobligated balance.....		5,399,793	6,338,279	2,978,000
Total Obligations.....		21,061,514	26,560,279	28,160,000
GRAND TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS.....		72,776,340	78,303,000	88,835,000*
GRAND TOTAL OBLIGATIONS.....		$71,837,854	$81,663,279	$88,495,000*

*Includes $735,000 for pay increase (P.L. 92-210) submitted as a Budget Amendment, House Document 92-267 (Page 45).

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1973 (Part 4), 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1972, p. 283.

$83.5 million for the DCPA on June 22nd.[73] This sum was approved by both chambers a short time later, making this appropriation $5.2 million more than in the previous fiscal year.

With the FY 1973 appropriation the DCPA moved further into the local disaster preparedness field. A newly developed "On-Site Assistance Program," designed to facilitate this movement, was made the DCPA's top priority program. With this program the DCPA began to lend staff

members and resources in equipment to aid communities in planning against, or in actually coping with, peacetime disasters. According to the DCPA, "on-site assistance is basically a people-oriented program, emphasizing planning, organizing, training, and exercising; and requiring some shift in approach and attitude from the more hardware-oriented programs of the 1960s."[74]

The program did have its dividends. For example, during the floods of 1972 which resulted from Hurricane Agnes, the DCPA lent fifty staff specialists from its headquarters and regional offices in support of the State and local efforts, in addition to providing electrical generating and water pumping equipment for the hardest hit areas. The suffering and the disorganization that followed in the wake of the hurricane and the flooding was therefore lessened through the efforts of the DCPA.[75]

In relation to this focus, the DCPA, in July 1972, published a handbook for local governments on disaster planning,[76] dealing primarily with local natural and man-made disasters, and also developed a handbook on "Crisis Relocation" for the local planner.[77] Some work was also accomplished in the shelter field, though much of this was the result of State and local efforts rather than the result of direct Federal activity.[78]

The FY 1974 Appropriation

On May 21st, 1973, Acting Director Georgiana H. Sheldon (who was taking over for Davis while he recovered from an operation), appeared before Representative Tom Steed's House Appropriations Subcommittee holding hearings on the DCPA budget request for FY 1974.[79] From the $88.5 million request that was submitted and the nature of the

TABLE VI-9

SUMMARY OF FY 1974 DCPA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Appropriation/Budget Program	Page No.	Actual FY 1972	Estimate FY 1973	Estimate FY 1974
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE				
Warning and Detection	5	$ 4,504,330	$ 4,494,000	$ 4,371,000
Emergency Operations	15	10,772,015	13,233,000	14,718,000
Financial Assistance to States	51	24,326,045	26,600,000	28,900,000
Management	56	15,073,784	16,008,000	16,111,000
Total		$54,676,174	$60,335,000	$64,100,000
RESEARCH, SHELTER SURVEY & MARKING				
Shelters	63	$13,000,000	$11,700,000	$11,400,000
Emergency Operating Centers	76	6,700,000	8,000,000	10,000,000
Research & Development	81	3,500,000	3,500,000	3,000,000
Total Appropriation		$23,200,000	$23,200,000	$24,400,000
Unobligated balance transferred from other accounts		+197,283		
Unobligated balance for use in subsequent years		-3,610,232	-1,110,000	-1,110,000
Available prior year balance		+6,338,279	+3,610,232	+1,110,000
Total Obligations		$26,125,330	$25,700,232	$24,400,000
GRAND TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS		$77,876,174	$83,535,000	$88,500,000
GRAND TOTAL OBLIGATIONS		$80,801,504	$86,035,232	$88,500,000

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1974 (Part 4), 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, p. 857.

statements made during the hearing it became obvious that, as in FY 1972 and FY 1973, the shelter program efforts of the DCPA would continue their downward spiral while funds geared toward State and local emergency preparedness would continue to rise. (Compare, for example, the funding trends in the "Financial Assistance to States" program and the "Shelters" program in Table VI-9.) This was a trend that the House Subcommittee was supportive of. For example, upon being informed by

DCPA officials that research into nuclear attack civil defense areas was being considerably curtailed[80] and that the emphasis in the shelter survey was being changed to an "all-effects type"--meaning "instead of surveying buildings for shelter from nuclear fallout, we are now surveying for natural disaster hazards as well, so we will have a dual function use for our shelters"--Chairman Steed complimented the DCPA and stated that:

> We are pleased to note the change in the last year or so, to become what we believe is a more useful function in serving the people of the country.[81]

Following the hearing, the House Appropriations Committee recommended a DCPA FY 1974 budget appropriation of $82 million--a cut of $6.5 million. Hearings in the Senate led to a similar appropriation recommendation.[82] The subsequent $82 million appropriation was thus $1.5 million off the previous grant.

Further cutbacks in the shelter program and personnel level (from 721 to 699) followed the FY 1974 appropriation.[83] In addition, due to lack of funding, the maintenance of "Packaged Disaster Hospitals" was ceased in FY 1974. Low maintenance funding levels had already contributed to deterioration of equipment and supplies making up these portable hospitals. Therefore, after the cut of maintenance funds in FY 1974 these stocks were given over to the States to maintain.[84]

Another indication of the deteriorating position of civil defense within the Administration came in July when President Nixon abolished the Office of Emergency Preparedness and transferred its functions to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the General Services Administration, and the Treasury Department. In the past the OEP had had the responsibility of advising the President on mobilization,

economic recovery, local disaster recovery, and civil defense planning matters and its Director had been a member of the National Security Council. With the breakup of the OEP that position was eliminated, meaning that direct access to the President and his top aides on civil defense and emergency preparedness programs was lost. In the words of one civil defense official, "without the White House level coordination and direction of the several emergency preparedness and assistance programs, cohesiveness, direction and interest diminished at every level."[85]

The FY 1975 Appropriation

In his FY 1975 Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress the new Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, stated:

> The shift in our strategic deterrence policy...does not diminish the need for a vigorous Civil Defense Program. A Soviet counter-force attack which deliberately avoids our cities--for example, a large scale attack on Minuteman--would still produce a large amount of nuclear fallout which could drift over our cities. It would be highly desirable, therefore, to continue our efforts to identify additional fallout shelter space for our population.[86]

The shift in U.S. strategic deterrence doctrine that Secretary Schlesinger referred to above centered on the concepts of flexible response and limited nuclear war:

> The main point of this change in strategic doctrine is to introduce flexibility and options for the national command authorities so they may deal with a set of events without being forced by prior planning to make a decision that would bring about a degree of devastation that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States nor our allies around the world would find palatable. By introducing options and flexibility we believe that we have improved deterrence.[87]

According to Schlesinger's formulation there were basically two changes which needed to be made in order to implement this new policy: (1) targeting doctrine would have to be modified to focus more heavily on providing the option of "selective" or "surgical" strikes against

military or economic targets, and (2) in order to facilitate this approach improvements in weapon accuracy would need to be made, enabling the use of lower yield weapons so as to reduce collateral damage.[88]

These changes could not guarantee that nuclear war would remain limited in the event of the breakdown of deterrence, Schlesinger argued, but the changes would at least increase the possibility that any exchange of nuclear weapons could be limited while at the same time adding to deterrence. Under present circumstances, he noted, the United States, "if it responded to a Soviet Union attack by making an all-out attack rather than attempting to keep nuclear war constrained, would be guaranteeing the destruction of American cities as well as the cities of the Soviet Union."[89] Therefore:

> Should there be a breakdown of deterrence, there will be very powerful incentives on both sides to restrain the destructiveness of the use of nuclear weapons, and to come as rapidly as possible to the termination of not only the war but also the causes of war that led to that hopefully small-scale use of weapons. Those are very powerful forces because they relate to the very survival of the societies that have placed themselves at risk under those hypothetical circumstances.

Continuing, Schlesinger noted that this was the underlying premise of the new strategic doctrine, "that even into a hypothetical wartime period we could continue to have the effectiveness of what we call intra-war deterrence; that for both sides there would be no purpose to be served to bring about the massive destructions of population."[90]

Not everyone was happy with this formulation of Schlesinger's views, for to them the concept of flexible response and limited nuclear war translated not into a strengthening of deterrence (as Schlesinger argued) but into a lowering of the nuclear threshold. In other words, by decreasing the destructiveness of nuclear war and thus the perception

that such a war would mean the total destruction of both, or all, belligerents, nuclear war became more "thinkable" and more of a possibility.

It is particularly in relation to this last concern that the foregoing discussion of flexible response and limited nuclear war is of interest to civil defense. Early on in the controversy over this "new" doctrine which began to build in 1974, the lifesaving capabilities of civil defense were brought into the equation by Secretary Schlesinger who noted that a counterforce scenario could be conceived wherein the number of civilian casualties would be in the "hundreds of thousands as opposed to tens and hundreds of millions."[91] Such a relatively low conception of the life-threatening nature of a potential Soviet limited attack was attributed by Schlesinger not only to the limited number of warheads and warhead size and to the nature of their targeting doctrine, but also to the effectiveness of civil defense (at least potentially).

To the opponents of Schlesinger's limited nuclear war doctrine this claim (that civil defense could mitigate to some significant degree the collateral casualty level which would result in the wake of a limited Soviet nuclear attack) only heightened their concern over the lowering of the nuclear threshold. Thus civil defense became embroiled in the controversy over limited nuclear war that would become particularly conspicuous in late 1974 and early 1975 (and has remained a matter of controversy since then).

For civil defense at the time, the prospect that limited nuclear war planning would go forward held out the promise that civil defense would be given renewed emphasis and that the deterioration of the nationwide fallout shelter system would be reversed. If damage limitation

under limited nuclear war planning were to be seriously pursued, much more work would have to be done in the areas of providing fallout protection for communities downwind of potential counterforce targets and to the development of stand-by evacuation plans for these communities.

There was another reason in early 1974 for those in civil defense to hold some hope that civil defense would be taken more seriously. For several years some concern had been expressed over the nature and extent of the Soviet civil defense effort. It was known, for example, that the Soviets were expending much more effort on their civil defense system than was the case in the United States. Large numbers of Soviet citizens were being "trained," some fallout shelter and some blast shelter protection was being provided, and much emphasis was apparently being given to the formulation of evacuation policies. By 1974 this concern was beginning to express itself in suggestions that the United States should do more than it was doing to match Soviet efforts. This was the gist, for example, of a letter written by a group of concerned citizens and sent to Secretary Schlesinger in late January 1974.[92] Noting the developments in Soviet civil defense this group argued that "essential equivalence" required the U.S. to match Soviet capabilities and advocated that enhanced importance and budget authorizations be given to the DCPA. Their study, for example, indicated that for roughly $200 million per year over the next five years, the DCPA could provide much of what it had advocated in the past, especially in terms of fallout protection.[93]

None of these developments, however, were reflected in the DCPA budget request as presented by Director Davis before the House Appropriations subcommittee holding hearings on the DCPA's FY 1975 appropriation. Appearing on May 29th, Davis submitted an $86.3 million budget

request that was $2.2 million less than the previous year's request and differed from that request only to the extent that (1) the DCPA wished to increase matching funds for State and local administration and personnel expenses, and (2) the DCPA needed an increase in maintenance funds to meet an increase in GSA rental payments.[94] (See Table VI-10.) As had been the case for the last several years the program that Davis outlined to the committee gave primary emphasis to helping local communities prepare for possible local emergencies, with the vehicle for this policy the On-Site Assistance Program.[95]

On June 20th, the House committee recommended an appropriation of $82 million--$4.3 million less than the request and the same amount as had been appropriated the year before.[96]

Meanwhile, Davis had appeared before Senator Montoya's Appropriations Subcommittee on May 28th to repeat the testimony he had given in the House. Montoya did not give the impression of being favorably disposed toward the civil defense program. He remarked at one point that he had served on the House Appropriations Committee during the days that Thomas had been in charge and that he thought Thomas had been right in "always whittling down the budget request for this program."[97] Later, when the topic under discussion was a conference held in San Antonio on "crisis relocation," Montoya quipped: "Why did you pick on San Antonio, because of their expertise with the Battle of the Alamo?"

Despite the tone of this hearing, when the DCPA appropriation recommendation was reported out on July 24th, the Senate Appropriations Committee agreed with its House counterpart on sticking with the previous year's appropriation of $82 million. It disagreed, however, with the proposed funding of programs within this budget level. Indicative of

TABLE VI-10

SUMMARY OF FY 1975 DCPA APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Appropriation/Budget Program	Page No.	Actual FY 1973	Estimate FY 1974	Estimate FY 1975
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE				
Warning and Detection		$ 4,113,180	$ 4,251,000	$ 4,021,000
Emergency Operations		13,348,474	10,971,000	10,332,000
Financial Assistance to States		26,179,478	28,342,000	30,260,000
Management		15,386,118	15,929,910	19,687,000
Total		$59,027,250	$59,993,910*	$64,300,000
RESEARCH, SHELTER SURVEY & MARKING				
Shelters		$11,081,000	$ 9,000,000	$ 9,000,000
Emergency Operating Centers		8,619,000	10,000,000	10,000,000
Research & Development		3,500,000	3,000,000	3,000,000
Total Appropriation		$23,200,000	$22,000,000	$22,000,000
Unobligated balance for use in subsequent years		-3,712,318	-1,117,000	-822,000
Available prior year balance		+3,610,232	+3,712,318	+1,117,000
Total Obligations		$23,097,914	$24,595,318	$22,295,000
GRAND TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS		$82,227,250	$81,993,910*	86,300,000
GRAND TOTAL OBLIGATIONS		$82,125,164	$84,589,228	$86,595,000

*Excludes $6,090 appropriation transfer to General Services Administration.

SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1975 (Part 4), 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1974, p. 1029.

the trends of the time the Senate committee cut the Shelter Program by $3.4 million and transferred this sum to the Operations Program where it would be used "to help and assist communities cope with natural disasters, such as tornadoes and floods," and for training and education at the local level.[99]

On August 6th, the Conference Report on the two versions of the DCPA budget recommendation was published, indicating that the House had

agreed to the Senate internal restructuring of the budget giving more emphasis to local emergency preparedness and commensurately less emphasis to civil defense against nuclear attack.[100] (See Table VI-11.)

TABLE VI-11

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FY 1975 DCPA APPROPRIATION PROCESS

(In Thousands)

Item	FY 1974[a] Grant	Request[b] to BoB	Approved[a] by BoB	House[a] Action	Senate[a] Action	FY 1975[c] Grant
Operations	$60,000	$ ----	$64,300	$60,000	$63,400	$63,400
Shelters*	22,000	----	22,000	22,000	18,600	18,600
Total	$82,000	$98,300	$82,000	$82,000	$82,000	$82,000

SOURCES: [a]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Bill, 1975, Senate Report 1028, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 24 July 1974, p. 63.

[b]U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Program Paper (Volume 5), "Financial Digest (1951-1978)," 1979.

[c]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Making Appropriations For The Treasury Department, U.S. Postal Service, Executive Office of the President, and Certain Independent Agencies, House Report 1262, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 6 August 1974, p. 14.

*Includes shelter survey, R&D, and marking.

Postscript

It was, of course, during August of 1974 (the month of the FY 1975 appropriation) that the Nixon Administration came to an end upon the resignation of Nixon while under fire for his involvement in the Watergate scandal. Civil defense had undergone significant change during Nixon's tenure at the White House. Soon after coming to Office, the

President ordered a shift in emphasis from civil defense preparedness against nuclear attack--a mission whose first line of defense was the preparation of a nationwide fallout shelter system--to a greater emphasis on local emergency preparedness involving, first of all, preparations to deal with natural and industrial disasters and secondly with preparations to meet nuclear attack. Ignored were studies which indicated that millions of additional lives could be added to the life-saving potential of the existing civil defense system with increased appropriations which, in Defense Department terms, were rather modest.

Thus, the main responsibility and work for civil defense devolved to the State and local organizations during the Nixon Administration. The Federal Government's role became much more that of a coordinating and planning agency with the DCPA conducting research, operating a warning system, providing training and publications, making grants of money and equipment available, and making suggestions and recommendations.

This was an orientation that the Congress generally approved. After the Presidential decision was made in May of 1972 to formalize the shift in civil defense emphasis to local emergency planning by disestablishing the Office of Civil Defense and transferring its responsibilities to the new Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, very little high level Executive interest in or support for this new agency was in evidence. In this vacuum the Congress placed its mark on the new program by encouraging the continued evolution of the program in the direction of local emergency preparedness through its appropriations and by refusing to approve even a very modest shelter incentive subsidy proposal, fearing, perhaps, that this would be but the "leading edge of

the wedge." Funds flowing into State and local areas (and constituencies) steadily increased during the Nixon years while funds for the shelter programs decreased. This reorientation of appropriations generally took place within a stabilized total budget level of approximately $80 million a year throughout the Nixon years. In fact, however, the stabilized level was illusory in that a rising rate of inflation during this period translated into a steady decline of program scope and capabilities within the DCPA. In terms of non-inflated dollars the appropriation authorizations of the Nixon Administration were very close to those of the Eisenhower Administration (which were very low indeed). In view of the fact that the Nixon era civil defense budgets included significantly more funds for natural disaster programs than was the case during the Eisenhower era it can justifiably be argued that civil defense preparedness against nuclear attack reached a very low point during the Nixon years.

To those working in civil defense it might well have seemed that civil defense had reverted full circle back to the days of paper planning and low priority. Civil defense had been relegated by the Congress to a relatively low and unchanging budget level. Within this budget level the effects of inflation were eating away at program capabilities. The nationwide fallout shelter system begun under Kennedy was deteriorating and the current emphasis on local disaster preparedness was unlikely to lead to a reversal of this trend. The shelter supply program had ended upon the depletion of all previously procurred stocks, various shelter survey programs were either deferred or maintained at only substantially reduced levels,[101] enhanced warning and communication systems could not be procured for the lack of funds,

and OCD/DCPA personnel ceilings were reduced year after year. And, finally, the Administration seemed unconcerned and unwilling to attempt to reverse these trends in an environment of SALT and mutual vulnerability.

Clearly, there was reason for pessimism, but, as the Introduction indicated, civil defense was far from dead or forgotten. Though concerns about the role of civil defense in limited nuclear war doctrine and concerns about Soviet civil defense had a negligible impact on civil defense planning during the Nixon years, controversies in these and other areas would soon erupt. The direction these controversies would cause civil defense planning to move was (and still is) unclear. What is clear--and continuing controversies related to civil defense guarantee this--is that civil defense cannot be ignored.

NOTES

1 See Spanier and Uslaner, pp. 127 & 129.

2 Congressional Record, (115-13), 24 June 1969, p. 17150.

3 Noted in U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, New Dimensions--Annual Report 1970, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 9.

4 Ibid.

5 Quoted in Ibid., p. 6.

6 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs, Hearings, Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 196.

7 See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations for 1970 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 787.
This was the fifth consecutive year of budget request decline. Notable, also, is the fact that the original OCD request to the OSD/BoB review was for $85,656,000 compared to the previous year's request of $159.7 million. This was the seventh consecutive year of original request decline.

8 Ibid., pp. 789 & 800.

9 Davis was appointed on 20 May 1969. He was born in Minneapolis, Minn. on 18 April 1913. Graduated from the University of North Dakota in 1935, having majored in business administration. Davis served as an Army officer in World War II. After the war he served in elected local and State positions before his terms as Governor of North Dakota from 1956 to 1960. Davis was the national commander of the American Legion from 1966 to 1967. See biographical sketch in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Post Office, and General Government Appropriations for 1972 (Part 4), 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, pp. 271-2.

10 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations, 1970 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 556.

11 Ibid., p. 557.

12 Ibid., p. 598.

13 HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations for 1970, p. 787.

14 To be dealt with later.

15 U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Annual Report--Fiscal Year 1969, (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 119-120.

16 Ibid. On the brighter side the OCD, during FY 1969, was able to complete the Home Fallout Protection Survey in 5 States and the District of Columbia, bringing the total up to 26 States, D.C., and 2 New York counties and identifying spaces for 30 million home occupants. In addition, 29 Community Shelter contracts were issued, bringing the total to 223 contracts entered into providing for the development of emergency use shelter plans in 292 counties with a combined population of nearly 62 million. See Ibid., pp. 1-2.

17 On the history and accomplishments of the Adult Education Program, see SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations, 1970, p. 569.

18 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on the Military Posture (Part 1), 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., February 1970, p. 6884.

19 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations for 1971 (Part 2), 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 25 February, p. 2.

20 The OCD's original budget submitted to the Dept. of Defense was for $96.8 million. DoD and BoB made overall percentage rather than specific program cuts to this figure. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations, 1971, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1970, p. 1070.

21 In FY 1970 the OCD added 6.6 million shelter spaces to the national inventory, bringing the total to 194.8 million. In addition, 8.1 million spaces were licensed, bringing this total to 127.8 million spaces; 2.4 million spaces were marked, bringing the total to 107.5 million (the low number of spaces marked in FY 1970 can be attributed to the fact that this responsibility had been given over to the local areas and met with very limited success); food supplies sufficient to sustain 5.3 million people for two weeks were distributed, bringing the total to enough to accommodate 63 million people for two weeks; and, 7,842 shelters were stocked with at least one radiation detection and monitoring kit, increasing the total to 11,404 shelters or 111.3 million spaces covered. See OCD, New Dimensions--Annual Report 1970, pp. 10-11.

22 On the depletion of the food stocks the OCD warned in its Annual Report for 1970 that "with the depletion of all stocks previously procured, there will be an interruption in shelter stocking activity; nevertheless, demand continues. Not only are there approximately

130.9 million spaces of located shelters not yet stocked, each year additional spaces are located through survey and community shelter planning activities. When funds for procurement become available, procurement, production and leadtimes mean further widening of the gap between shelter stocking goals and accomplishments." Ibid.

23 HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations, 1971, p. 11.

24 Ibid., pp. 2-4 & 127. (See, also, U.S., General Accounting Office, Report To Congress: Activities and Status of Civil Defense in the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 26 October 1971), p. 21.

25 The funds requested for FY 1971 would provide for the construction, installation, testing and placing in an operational status a prototype system for the central east coast. After evaluation the remainder of the system could be deployed over a three-year time span. Besides providing a warning function the system would permit both "voice and radio teletype messages to pass between national command authority at the national level, regional level, Governors' level and local level." The deployment cost of the entire system was estimated at $43.3 million with an annual maintenance cost $2.7 million thereafter. For derived data and further information see Ibid., pp. 30-57. See, also, SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations, 1971, p. 1081.

26 HCA, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations, 1971, p. 10.

27 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1971, House Report 1060, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 7 May 1970, p. 15.
In addition, $.2 million was cut from the Community Shelter program and $.1 million from Operation and Maintenance, forcing the deferral of procurement of needed radiation detection equipment. See SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations, 1971, pp. 1023 & 1027.

28 Davis did not appeal the shelter incentive subsidy program, but he did appeal some of the funds earmarked for the program so that they could be distributed to on-going programs that had Congressional support. See SCA, Hearings, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations, 1971, p. 1022.

29 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1971, Senate Report 949, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 24 June 1970, p. 14.

30 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Independent Offices and HUD Appropriations Bill, 1971, House Report 1345, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 28 July 1970, p. 8.

31 From U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Annual Report 1971--Changes and Challenges, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 1.

32 Ibid., p. v.

33 U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Civil Defense and the Public--An Overview of Public Attitude Studies, prepared by Ralph L. Garrett, (Washington, D.C.: OCD, Research Report No. 17, October 1971), p. 40 (Updated and reprinted December 1976.)

34 Ibid.

35 OCD, Annual Report, 1971, p. 13.

36 See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1972 (Part 1), 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, p. 104.

37 HCA, Hearings, Treasury, Post Office, and General Government Appropriations for 1972, p. 318.

38 A point made in conversations with Federal civil defense officials.

39 HCA, Hearings, Treasury, Post Office, and General Government Appropriations for 1972, p. 308.
Davis did not elaborate on the "obvious threat" which presumably was seen as the buildup in Soviet military forces.

40 See Ibid., pp. 318-319 & 326-327 for elaboration on deterioration in these and other programs. For example, 8.7 million shelter spaces were added to the nationwide inventory for a total of 203.5 million; licenses were signed for 3424 facilities with an aggregate capacity for about 4.5 million persons, bringing this total to 132.4 million; 7366 facilities were marked with an aggregate capacity for 6.9 million, bringing the total to 114.4 million spaces; stocks for 1.8 million persons were distributed, bringing the total to an amount sufficient to sustain 65.6 million persons for two weeks; and, 3706 shelters were furnished with at least one radiation detection and monitoring kit, bringing the cumulative aggregate total to 115.7 million spaces covered. See OCD, Annual Report, 1971, pp. 22-24.

41 The East Pakistan relief effort was for the survivors of a cyclone which struck in the Bay of Bengal in mid-November. Following this operation food stocks were also shipped to Chad, Guinea, Columbia, and the Republic of the Philippines. See Ibid., p. 25.

42 The OCD had forwarded a $97,703,000 request to the DoD/OMB budget reviewers. The resultant 20% cut fell primarily in (1) the shelter survey program (from $9.5 to $5.1 million); (2) shelter stocks; (3) the DIDS warning program (from $3.9 to 1.3 million--thereby eliminating a 2nd transmitter station); (4) the shelter incentive subsidy

test program; and (5) training and education for architects and engineers. See Ibid.

43 Ibid., p. 304.

44 Ibid., p. 306.

45 Ibid., p. 307. In all liklihood Davis was probably prevented from being more direct or specific by higher authority.

46 See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1972, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971 (May 20), pp. 1135-1195.

47 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Bill, 1972, Senate Report 243, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 28 June 1971, p. 29.

48 U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Annual Statistical Report--Fiscal Year 1972, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), from inside cover.

49 Noted by Donald S. Marshall, Consultant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), in Civil Defense: A Strategic Assessment, Department of Defense unpublished study paper, June 1977, p. F1.

50 Reported by Davis in HCA, Hearings, Treasury, Post Office, and General Government Appropriations, 1972, p. 1172.

51 Noted in DCPA, Annual Statistical Report--Fiscal Year 1972, p. 20.

52 U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Annual Report 1972, Civil Preparedness--A New Dual Mission, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 2.

53 See, for example, the statements of Davis in HCA, Hearings, Treasury, Post Office, and General Government Appropriations For 1972, p. 372.

54 In this regard, and in relation to the fact that the DCPA was now turning to evacuation planning, it is interesting to note that the National Plan for Emergency Preparedness, published by the OEP in 1964, had this to say about "strategic warning" evacuation: "...it is unlikely that strategic warning (indications of a possible attack before it is launched) ever will be so definite as to warrant taking all protective measures for civil defense."

55 From letter of Mayor Lawrence D. Cohen (St. Paul, Minn.) to Senate Appropriations Committee, in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General

Government Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1975 (Part 2), 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1974, p. 1197.

56 U.S., General Accounting Office, Report to Congress: Activities and Status of Civil Defense in the United States, (Washington, D.C.: GAO, Comptroller General, 26 October 1971), p. 10.

57 Ibid., p. 1.

58 Ibid., p. 23.

59 Ibid., p. 1.

60 Ibid., p. 14. The GAO submitted a draft report of its study to the DoD for comment with this statement included. According to the GAO, the DoD disputed this conclusion while acknowledging the shift in budget emphasis in recent years. DoD argued that "the shift has not resulted from a reduction in civil defense priority or emphasis but rather has been caused by two main factors: (1) the need, since the mid-1960s, for tighter fiscal constraints on all DoD's non-Southeast Asia programs and (2) the tendency in the executive branch to limit budget requests for civil defense to progressively lower levels as a consequence of continued funding reductions /!/ during the 9-year period /1962-1970/." After considering this statement the GAO left their conclusion intact in the final report. Ibid., p. 14.

61 Ibid., p. 3.

62 Ibid., p. 2.

63 Ibid., p. 25.

64 Ibid., p. 26. It should be noted that the PF 40 standard was rather arbitrary anyway. The Federal minimum standard during the 1955-1957 period was PF 5000. This was subsequently lowered to PF 1000 in 1959 and PF 100 in 1960. The PF 40 standard was the result of a Presidential Advisory Committee report which stated, on 16 July 1962, that:

> ...a lower figure, say PF-50, would make a much larger number of spaces available without greatly decreasing the life-saving potential under many kinds of attack.

Since the shelter surveys were reported in the PF ranges of 20 to 39, and 40 to 69, etc., the PF 40 standard was chosen as the closest approximation to the PF 50 suggested by the Advisory Panel. Noted in Ibid., pp. 24-25.

65 G.A. Lincoln, the Director of the OEP, in a 17 February 1971 letter to the GAO stated that "it would not be appropriate...for me or members of my staff to comment on this study before it has been reviewed by the President." Noted in Ibid., p. 49.

66 Noted in interview in July 1979 with the writer.

67 Two ABM sites per country were allowed--one around the capital and one around an ICBM base, with a total aggregate of no more than 200 ABMs.

68 This point was made, for example, in January 1977, when Senator Proxmire asked General George Brown, Chairman of the JCS, to comment on a number of points made by Maj. Gen. George Keegan, Jr., the recently retired chief of Air Force Intelligence. One of General Keegan's charges was that "the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty in which the two superpowers agreed to hold each other's civilian populations hostage against nuclear attack....was based on the wholly erroneous assumption that the Soviets were not seriously engaged in a major, centrally directed civil defense effort." General Brown's response was:

> Civil defense has received little consideration during past U.S./Soviet arms control negotiations. For the United States, both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement /on strategic offensive forces/ were based primarily on a philosophy of mutual vulnerability to retaliatory attack. (Emphasis added.)

See the Congressional Record, 31 January 1977, p. 1781 (daily edition). My thanks to William Chipman for this notation.

69 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973 (Part 4), 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1972, p. 201.

70 However, as Davis noted, based upon the February 1972 Consumers Price Index the $88.8 million was worth only $66.7 million in 1964 dollars (the FY 1964 OCD appropriation had been $111.6 million). See Ibid.

71 Ibid., p. 351.

72 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Treasury, Post Office, and General Government Appropriations Bill, 1973, House Report 1150, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 19 June 1972, p. 40.

73 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Bill, 1973, Senate Report 919, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 22 June 1972, pp. 36-37.

74 DCPA, Annual Report 1972, p. 7.

75 See article by James R. Schlesinger (Secretary of Defense), "Civil Defense Programs--Roles and Missions," in Foresight, January-February 1975, p. 3.

76 U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Disaster Operations--A Handbook For Local Governments, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1972).

77 Noted in U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Annual Report FY 1973--Foresight, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 10.

78 According to the DCPS's 1972 Annual Report (pp. 15-22), (1) 9.1 million shelter spaces were located in 6789 facilities, for a total of 217,171 facilities having aggregate space for 213 million people; (2) 1192 facilities were licensed with an aggregate of 2.9 million spaces, bringing the total to 129,149 facilities with 135.2 million spaces; (3) 663 facilities were marked, with an aggregate capacity for 2.1 million, bringing the total to 118.264 facilities and 116.4 million spaces; (4) 60,820 radiological defense instruments were distributed, bringing this total to 4.1 million.

79 See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974 (Part 4), 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, pp. 829-944.

80 Compare the FY 1974 R&D request of $3 million to the 1962 appropriation of $19 million.

81 HCA, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, 1974, p. 856.

82 See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1974 (Part 1), 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, pp. 945-995.

83 The personnel cutback should not be attributed to the Congressional appropriation, however, in that it was ordered by the DoD before the appropriation was made. See HCA, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, 1974, pp. 833-841.

84 On the brighter side, due in large measure to the work done at the State and local level, some accomplishments were recorded in the shelter program: (1) 4,105 facilities were added to the shelter inventory, bringing the total to 228,000 facilities with an aggregate of about 227 million fallout shelter spaces; (2) 171 facilities were licensed containing about 1 million spaces, bringing the total to 130,000 facilities with an aggregate of 139.1 million spaces. See U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Annual Report 1974: Mandate for Readiness, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 22-23.

85 George Rodericks, Director, District of Columbia Office of Emergency Preparedness. Quoted in U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, Hearings, Federal, State, and Local Emergency Preparedness, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1976, pp. 65-66.

86 Quoted in DCPA, Annual Report 1974, p. 1.

87 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1974 (April 4th), p. 152.

88 Ibid., pp. 169, 184-185.

89 Ibid., p. 161.

90 Ibid., p. 177.

91 Schlesinger quoted by Sidney Drell and Frank Von Hippel in "Limited Nuclear War," Scientific American, Vol. 235, No. 5, November 1976, p. 27.

92 The signatories were (1) Dr. Donald Brennan, Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute; (2) Steuart Pittman, ex-Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense) during 1961-1964; (3) Dr. Frederick Seitz, former President of the National Academy of Sciences and, at the time, President of Rockefeller University (4) Dr. Eugene Wigner of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and (5) Walmer E. Strope, Stanford Research Institute and Consultant on civil defense. The letter was dated 19 January 1974.

93 See "Minimum Requirements For An Adequate Civil Defense," reprinted in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Civil Defense Review, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1976, pp. 331-332.

94 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975 (Part 4), 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1974, p. 986.

95 Ibid., see especially p. 987.

96 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Bill, 1975, House Report 1132, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 20 June 1974, pp. 40-41.

97 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1975 (Part 2), 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1974, p. 1192.

98 Ibid., p. 1199.

99 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Bill, 1975, Senate Report 1028, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 24 July 1974, p. 55.

100 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report, Making Appropriations For The Treasury Department, U.S. Postal Service, Executive Office of the President, and Certain Independent Agencies, House Report 1262, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 6 August 1974, p. 14.

101 Only 3 million shelter spaces were added to the shelter inventory in FY 1975, for example, and this was the result of State and local initiative. See U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Annual Report, 1975: Taking Measure, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 28.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION: THE DETERMINANTS OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Having looked at the evolution of civil defense in the United States during the 1945 to 1974 period, several conclusions can be drawn. First, contrary to an often repeated refrain, civil defense can work. Indeed, every government study of civil defense published during the years covered by this study has indicated that civil defense measures can mean the difference in millions of lives saved in a nuclear attack. The following is just a partial listing of the government or government-sponsored studies and investigations noted which have been supportive of civil defense:

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Report, 1946
The Bull Board Report, 1947
The Hopley Report, 1948
The NSRB's Report on United States Civil Defense, 1950
HASC and SASC Hearings on H.R. 9798..., 1950
The Kefauver Hearings, 1951
Project East River, 1952
The Kefauver Hearings, 1955
The Kestnbaum Report, 1955
The Report of Project East River Review Committee, 1956
Holifield Hearings, 1956
Holifield Hearings, 1957
The Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory Reports, 1957
The Gaither Report, 1957
Holifield Hearings on The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man, 1957
Holifield Hearings, 1958
Holifield Hearings, 1959
Holifield Hearings, 1960
The Kaysen (White House) Report, 1961
Holifield Hearings, 1961
Holifield Hearings, 1962
Hébert HASC Hearings, 1963
The OEP Study (NSSM 57), 1969-1970
The GAO Study "Activities and Status of Civil Defense in the United States," 1971

How, then, does one reconcile this with the fact that as late as 1979 the U.S. had only a rudimentary civil defense system? To answer this question one must consider a second conclusion which follows naturally from the first: The problems of civil defense today and in the past are not and have not been technical problems but rather social and political ones. Technical capabilities have not necessarily determined the evolution of civil defense policies and programs in the thirty-year period covered by this study. There are five major non-technical determinants of U.S. civil defense policy:

- International crisis and change.
- Quality of civil defense leadership and planning.
- Congressional support and appropriations.
- Presidential interest and support.
- Defense policy.

International Crisis and Change

There can be no doubt that international crises have been important in the evolution of U.S. civil defense. Indeed, one commentator has written: "Measured by federal spending, passive defense in the United States for other than military facilities is primarily a function of periodic alarms..."[1] This assertion, however, is incorrect and is the result of the author's mistake in attributing fiscal year appropriations to real year events. For example, the author of the above statement attributed the rise in FY 1957 FCDA appropriations (from $68.7 to $93.6 million) to the launch of Sputnik in October of 1957. However, the FY 1957 appropriation was made in early 1956--more than a year before Sputnik. In point of fact, FCDA appropriations after Sputnik dropped to $39.3 million--the lowest full year appropriation before or since.

International crises have at times been determining factors in the development and evolution of civil defense. For example, prior to 1949, despite the findings and recommendations of such studies as the Strategic Bombing Survey Report, the Bull Board Report and the Hopley Report, as well as the calls for a Federally led civil defense effort by State and local groups across the country, President Truman declined to promote a permanent Federal-level civil defense organization or program. Instead, he concluded that civil defense was basically a State and local responsibility with the Federal role that of planning for future crisis implemented contingencies. The military was of the same mind. At the time it was not perceived that the U.S. would in the near future face the prospect of atomic attack. Indeed, the Finletter Commission Report to the President of January 1948 predicted that the Soviets would not be able to produce an atomic bomb any earlier than 1953.

Nevertheless, the Soviets exploded their first atomic device in August of 1949. The following June, North Korea invaded the South. Then in November, the People's Republic of China intervened in force, pushing U.N. forces back all along the front. In Washington concern grew that Korea was just a diversion to tie U.S. forces down as a prelude to Soviet attacks in Europe. It was in this crisis atmosphere that President Truman established the Federal Civil Defense Administration in December of 1949. Congress quickly followed suit and passed the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (giving the FCDA statutory authority) and the Defense Production Act (setting guidelines for industrial dispersal).

An international crisis was also of much importance in the funding of President Kennedy's nationwide fallout shelter program in mid-1961. President Kennedy had signaled in May of that year that changes

were going to be made in the civil defense field. In July these changes were discussed during Kennedy's Berlin Crisis speech to the nation. In this speech Kennedy disclosed that he would seek a $207.6 million emergency supplemental appropriation for the new Office of Civil Defense he was creating within the Defense Department. Meeting in a crisis atmosphere, the Congress within weeks passed this appropriation without a single-cut--the first time this had ever happened. From the floor debates in the Congress, however, it was clear that the primary reason Kennedy's request was acted on so quickly and favorably was the emergency nature of the request and the crisis. Following the passing of the crisis the next civil defense budget request was cut drastically.

Not all international crises have had a determining effect on civil defense, however. The best example of this is perhaps the most serious crisis the U.S. has experienced where the use of nuclear weapons became a real concern--the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Stung by the reactions to his Berlin Crisis civil defense initiatives earlier and wishing to insure the maintenance of control over events, President Kennedy expressly forebade any civil defense initiatives during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Moreover, in the appropriation process which followed the crisis by only a few months the civil defense budget was cut by Congress to a lower level than the previous year. (The budget went from $128 to $111.6 million.)

International crises which include the possibility of military confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR have a way of galvanizing attention to issues of defense, safety and security. Suddenly the "thinkability" of nuclear warfare takes on a seriousness which only a few weeks earlier would have been attributed to the rantings of a warmongering fanatic. The history of civil defense is replete with

statements by Congressmen who have flatly stated that nuclear warfare is simply not thinkable, not a possibility. Yet during the height of the Berlin Crisis the civil defense budget tripled and quite a few Congressmen found themselves in the same position as Representative Mahon who stated in relation to civil defense that like Paul on the road to Damasacus he had seen the light and had changed his mind.

Thus, in summarizing the above section on international crises and volatility as a determinant of U.S. civil defense policy it can be said that: (1) while international crises have not been the primary determinant of U.S. civil defense, some have had a major impact on civil defense; and (2) the volatile nature of international relations historically and currently has influenced, to a degree that cannot be quantified, the attitudes of Presidents and Congressmen as questions of support for civil defense have arisen.

Civil Defense Leadership and Planning

Another determinant of U.S. civil defense policies and programs that is difficult to measure or quantify is the quality of Federal-level civil defense cadre and planning. For the early years of the Federal Civil Defense Administration especially, problems with the quality of FCDA planning and leadership are important in explaining the low-level Congressional support given to civil defense at the time. (During the Truman Administration FCDA budget requests were cut by 92, 86, and 93 percent respectively. Reductions during the Eisenhower Administration were less extreme, but considering that the Eisenhower civil defense requests were typically one-fourth to one-sixth of the Truman requests the over 40 percent average Eisenhower-era reductions were nevertheless very significant.)

Under President Truman, the Director of the FCDA was an ex-Governor with no civil defense background who took a combattive attitude into Congressional appropriation hearings. Both he and other FCDA officials at times had difficulty adequately answering committee questions concerning civil defense policies and programs. For years civil defense would suffer because of the Director's statement that it would take $300 billion to provide an adequate civil defense system in the United States. He then compounded this mistake by his inability to define "adequate" in terms of an estimated "X" number of lives saved through such an expenditure. Despite the fact that the $300 billion figure was just a rough "off the top of the head" estimation and that the FCDA had no intention of seeking a nationwide deep-blast shelter construction program for every man, woman, and child, as was envisioned by the $300 billion program, the impression was given that an enormous program was envisioned; that ultimately, if the FCDA's plans were approved, over a period of years, such an enormous expenditure of funds might be approached even though there was no conviction of expected results.

The impression made by FCDA officials before the Appropriations Committees concerning the shelter program that was proposed was little better. Prior to and during the appropriations process during their first year of existence, the FCDA exhibited some confusion over the scope and nature of their shelter program. At various times FCDA officials spoke of the construction of huge underground community shelters, subsidies for family shelter construction, subsidies for private and public dual-use shelter construction, and surveys for the identification of existing shelters to be followed by a shelter modification program. It was for this final concept that $250 million was sought in the FY

1951 budget request. Curious as to how the FCDA had arrived at such a nice round figure the House Appropriations Committee was told by an FCDA official that a massive job was ahead and that this sum had been decided on as a good first start. In other words this was an arbitrary decision. As to exactly what the $250 million would purchase or how many lives might be saved because of this expenditure the FCDA official could not say. The program was not approved. While mistakes such as this may be understandable for an inaugural appropriation request, the repeated insistence on the part of the FCDA to present the same $250 million figure for the following two years is not. The impression made by the FCDA for three consecutive years was that the $250 million was a more or less arbitrary figure not firmly based on careful cost analysis and programming. Despite this, the FCDA intransigently stuck to their original figure.

Thus, Appropriation Committee reports of the time referred to nebulous FCDA planning, to lack of coordination with other Government agencies, to conceptual problems within the FCDA, and to unrealistic organizational structuring. This was unfortunate in that lasting impressions of probity and reputability are often made during these initial agency-committee meetings.[2]

Under President Eisenhower, the practice of filling the FCDA Director position with an ex-Governor was continued with both of Eisenhower's appointments. (The practice of political appointments to the civil defense leadership position has been the norm rather than the exception.) Eisenhower's first civil defense Director had an especially trouble ridden tenure, primarily because of questions concerning the quality of his leadership, planning, and relationship with Congress.

His handling of the shelter/evacuation controversy with the Holifield committees was not exemplary. Neither was the impression left the Kefauver Committee when told of the FCDA's contingency planning involving the trench-shelter program for evacuees.

Under President Kennedy the leadership of civil defense would improve vastly, but not before another political appointment resulted in a man who would call for a "Revival for Survival" and who would seek to visit the Pope in order to publicize civil defense and persuade the Pope to incorporate fallout shelters in church-owned buildings. Of course this mission was not permitted to get off the ground, but another blow was dealt to the reputation of civil defense. Nor was the reputation of civil defense enhanced when ambiguities in Kennedy's July 1961 speech relating to what the individual citizen could or should do combined with the Berlin Crisis atmosphere to produce a fallout shelter scare. To the credit of the Administration, civil defense planning was quickly righted and placed on firmer ground when it was made known that civil defense was not primarily based upon individual initiative and backyard family shelters but rather on the development of a federally based nationwide fallout shelter system. The reputation of civil defense was enhanced by the selection of Steuart Pittman to head the new Office of Civil Defense created within the Pentagon--a move which indicated the seriousness with which the Administration viewed civil defense.

In retrospect the Kennedy/Pittman era marks the high point in terms of both Federal-level civil defense leadership and planning in the history of U.S. civil defense. Since then the quality of civil defense leadership and planning has declined, thought not to the depths of the early civil defense years. It should be pointed out, however, that the

nature of civil defense leadership and planning is often not so much a reflection of decisions made within the Federal civil defense establishment but of decisions made elsewhere--typically in the Congress and the high-Executive. It need hardly be pointed out that it is in the White House that decisions are made on general civil defense policy and leadership. It is also in the Executive that the President's budget officers and, since 1961, the Office of the Secretary of Defense effect civil defense policies and programs through the budget review process. Similarly, the Congress (especially the Appropriations Committees and appropriate Subcommittees) effects programs and influences policies through their restrictions on civil defense budgets.

Congressional Support and Appropriations

Not surprisingly, Congress has had both a positive and negative impact upon the evolution of civil defense. It was Congressional pressure in the form of the Holifield hearings that helped force a reexamination of sheltering and a modification of civil defense policy during President Eisenhower's second term. As one commentator has put it: "It is probably no exaggeration to say that if it were not for the pressure of the Holifield subcommittee on the administration, the whole subject of civil defense would have lapsed into a patronage 'boondoggle'."[3] It was in large measure due to the efforts of Representative Chet Holifield throughout the 1950's and early 60's that civil defense was in a position to move forward when given the go-ahead by President Kennedy in 1961.

Similar Congressional oversight hearings continued throughout the Kennedy Administration and into the Johnson Administration, at which point they lapsed, not to be resumed again until the mid-1970s.

Whenever such oversight, authorization or investigative hearings have been held, the result has generally been a positive one, forcing as they do a reexamination of programs, policies, and personnel within the civil defense establishment and within the high-Executive as well as causing a focusing of attention on civil defense from sources outside of the government.

On the negative side, the lapses of Congressional interest in civil defense (as evidenced by the periods of non-appropriation civil defense oversight) correlate with periods of decline in civil defense effectiveness. More noticeable, however, is the impact of Congressional appropriations. While it is not uncommon for the Congress to hold Administration programs back through the refusal to appropriate program funds, the continual Congressional reluctance to fund civil defense programs over a long period of time is somewhat unusual. It is an understatement to say that civil defense budget requests have fared rather poorly before Congressional appropriations committees, especially in the House.

In order to illustrate this point it is instructive to briefly examine the "batting average" of government bureaus before Congressional appropriations committees in general. Several broad studies of the Congressional appropriation process have been conducted and provide data with which suggestive comparisons can be made. Two such studies in particular will be drawn upon here: Richard F. Fenno's study, The Power of the Purse--Appropriations Politics in Congress;[4] and, "The Price of Power: The Appropriations Process For Seventeen Foreign Affairs Agencies," by David H. Davis.[5] In the former study Dr. Fenno examines the budgetary history of thirty-six government bureaus over the fifteen

year period 1947-1962. He concludes that most of the bureaus received most of what they requested most of the time, with the House Appropriations Committee being the more stringent of the two Congressional appropriations committees. The Senate, Fenno observed, generally served an appellate function. Even in the House, however, he found that most bureaus received an appropriation within 5 percent of their requests.[6] Indeed, even the least successful of the thirty-six bureaus included in his analysis averaged nearly 80 percent of its requests.[7]

The Davis study produces comparable results. Davis analyzed the appropriation history of seventeen foreign affairs agencies and eight domestic agencies over the twelve-year period 1957-1968 and found the lowest rate of appropriation to be 81 percent while the average rate was roughly 92 percent.[8] In the military field Ronald Fox tells us that appropriation rates for defense agencies run even higher; to the extent that "Congressional reductions in defense funding proposals over the two decades 1950-1970 often amounted to less than 2%."[9] As can be seen in Table VII-1, however, civil defense received roughly only 40 percent of its appropriation requests during the twenty-five appropriation years covered in this study--half the percentage of the least successful track record in either the Fenno or Davis studies. Davis refers to this measure of Congressional support (i.e. the rate of appropriation request approval) as "Congressional esteem."[10] Judging from the 40 percent rate of approval of civil defense funds over the years one must conclude that civil defense suffers from low Congressional esteem, especially in the House.

Another measure of Congressional support used in both the Fenno and Davis studies is agency "growth," or the rate of appropriations

increase from one year to the next.[11] Agency "growth" is a useful analytical tool with which to supplement and balance the "esteem" index for it is conceivable that an agency's requests could be cut severely year after year and yet continue to grow if each year's appropriations were generally higher than the previous year's. In his study Fenno found that 3.8 percent of the time bureau appropriations were the same as the previous year, 27 percent of the time they were decreased from the previous year, and 69.2 percent of the time they were incrementally increased over the previous year's appropriation.[12] This was despite the fact that 73.6 of the time these budgets were cut.[13] The norm then is incremental agency growth from one year to the next.

Looking at civil defense we find that of the twenty-three appropriation decisions examined in this study which can be used for this analysis, appropriations were the same as the previous year 4.3 percent of the time (1 case), were decreased from the previous year 39.1 percent of the time (9 cases), and were increased over the previous year 56.5 percent of the time (13 cases).[14] This was despite the fact that civil defense appropriations were cut 92.3 percent of the time--almost 20 percent more often than were the agencies comprising Fenno's study group. Thus, according to Fenno's yardstick civil defense, too, has demonstrated growth, though to a lesser extent than was the norm of his study group.

Davis used a different statistical tool to measure the growth of his study group which better illustrates the magnitude of growth where it occurs. Davis establishes a base of 100 (the previous appropriation) for each appropriation decision and adds to or subtracts from it as appropriations go up or down in subsequent years. Thus,

> If an agency receives a 5 percent increase in appropriations from one year to the next, its growth is rated as 105. That is, it received its base (100) plus an increase of 5 percent (100 + 5=105). An agency which received only its base (the previous year's appropriation) would be rated as having a growth index of 100. An agency which was cut below its base from the previous year (for example, a 5 percent cut) would have an index of less than 100 (100-5=95).[15]

Applying this measure to the seventeen foreign affairs agencies comprising his study group, Davis found an average rate of growth of 17.5 percent (an index of 117.5) compared to a government-wide annual growth rate of 8 percent.[16] Applying this same measure to civil defense appropriations (See Table VII-1) we find a growth rate of 7.2 percent--much lower than Davis' study group, though only slightly lower than the government average in the 1957-1968 time frame. Again we find that growth has taken place in civil defense appropriations during the period covered by this study. However, even this measure still does not present an accurate picture of civil defense growth for it does not take into account the impact of inflation--a factor which began to be significant in the mid-1960s and continued to grow in significance during the 1970s. As can be seen in Table VII-1 and Chart VII-1, civil defense appropriations from FY 1963 to FY 1975 show a steady and almost uninterrupted decline to levels even lower than those experienced during the Truman and Eisenhower years when corrected for inflation. Applying Davis' rate of growth index to the standard (non-inflated) dollars found in column eight of Table VII-1 we arrive at an inflation-corrected rate of growth index for civil defense of 103.1. In other words the rate of growth of civil defense for the period 1950 to 1974 was 3.1 percent. Moreover, even this very modest (if not meager) growth is virtually entirely dependent on one year's appropriation--that of the emergency FY 1962 supplemental appropriation of $207.6 million. If the rate of

growth index is recalculated without this appropriation a rate of growth factor of 100.5 (.5%) is derived--an indication of almost nonexistent growth. Of consideration also is the fact that the growth that has occured in civil defense took place basically during the Kennedy Administration, not during recent years. Since then, a steady decline in Congressional appropriations (and the effects of inflation) have resulted in a corresponding steady decline in civil defense personnel strength and program performance levels, as demonstrated in Charts VII-2 through VII-6.

Using the Fenno study group as a base of comparison it must be concluded that the history of civil defense appropriation requests before the Congress has been atypical. In fact, the relationship between the bureaus Fenno studied and the Congressional appropriations committees was described by him to be one of interest-sympathy-leniency.[17] One student of Fenno has summarized this syndrome in the following manner:

> The subcommittee first becomes interested in the agency's activities. As the subcommittee comes to know the agency better and becomes more involved with the agency, it becomes more sympathetic to the desires of the agency. The agency is given free rein. Its appropriation estimates are seldom cut and may even be increased. Irregular agency behavior is excused. The subcommittee becomes an advocate for the requests of the agency.[18]

A more appropriate syndrome in the case of civil defense is one evidenced by Davis for certain of the foreign affairs agencies in his study group--the interest-criticism-hostility syndrome:

> In this case subcommittee interest evolves into criticism rather than sympathy. Greater involvement leads to the discovery of more errors to criticize. Eventually this syndrome culminates in open hostility between the subcommittee and the agency. The agency is criticized and attacked for all its faults and for the faults of others as well. The outcome of this syndrome is a large cut in the agency's budget estimate...[19]

The pertinent question is what accounts for this syndrome? In his study Davis generalizes that Congressional appropriations committees favor orderly, business-like agencies. Therefore, when presented with funding requests which seem to oscillate erratically from one year to the next, or when presented with seemingly arbitrary requests, Congressional cuts may well be erratic or arbitrary. In addition, when "the return on Congress'es investment is nebulous and its collection is in the distant future /while/ its costs are real and present," budgets may tend to suffer.[20] One can add to this that when, as has happened with civil defense, appropriation responsibilities are placed in the hands of a man who is unsympathetic to the agency, its programs, or its goals, (such as Albert Thomas with civil defense) then appropriations will decline and programs will suffer. It has been the case that a few men with strong opinions on civil defense in important positions in the Congress can rather easily carry subcommittee, committee, and even House or Senate votes on civil defense issues. Unfortunately for civil defense, from the very beginning civil defense appropriation requests have suffered because of conflict with Congressional "strongmen." In 1951 when the FCDA appeared before the House Appropriations Committee to present its very first appropriation request, Committee Chairman Clarence Cannon indicated his disagreement with the Administration's concept of civil defense--a concept which had been sanctioned by the Congress only weeks earlier. One of the most powerful men in Congress, Cannon stated that he thought that the actual work of civil defense should be restricted to planning, training, and guidance. Therefore he was in favor of scrapping the approved Congressional program.

When the FCDA appeared to present its FY 1952 appropriation request Cannon indicated his perception that civil defense was not worth the money, that "our only hope...is to altogether avoid war," and that if war did come civil defense would be but "a drop in the bucket." During the FY 1953 hearings the FCDA was told by Subcommittee Chairman Albert Thomas that their proposed programs for shelter development and survival stockpiles were unneeded. Using an analogy to the Hamburg bombing during World War II, Thomas stated that the best protection to be found during an atomic bomb attack would be found not in shelters but out in the streets and that rather than build up national survival stockpiles reliance should be placed upon the corner drugstore system, for such establishments were "everywhere."

Comparable sentiments could be found in the Senate where Senator Edward Thye told the FCDA that "the only time we will need Civilian Defense...is when the world situation is so unsettled that we are fearful of becoming involved in a shooting war which will bring war to us."

So low in esteem was civil defense during these early years that it was not until 1955 that civil defense appropriations were handled during the regular appropriation process by a regular appropriations subcommittee--up until then FCDA appropriations were treated in supplemental hearings by the General and Temporary Activities Subcommittee. While this situation was rectified in 1955, the expression of unfavorable, if not hostile, sentiments similar to those quoted above has continued to the present day and all too often finds voice in the appropriations committees.

Such antipathy to civil defense has not been restricted to appropriations committees. Carl Vinson, for example, the Chairman of the

Armed Services Committee, blocked for more than a year the initiation of hearings in the House on H.R. 8200 during the Kennedy Administration. Later, when he and Edward Hébert were convinced of the need for H.R. 8200 after lengthy hearings, however, they were instrumental in persuading the House to reverse its positions on a shelter incentive subsidy program. Even so, Albert Thomas pledged that he would never allow the funding of the program just passed by the House, and he had a position within the Appropriations Committee to put some force behind those words. Later in the Nixon Administration, the Congress twice refused to allow a shelter incentive program, thus forcing civil defense officials to reorient civil defense policy away from efforts to develop a comprehensive shelter system. The door had been closed to the completion of that system.

Over the years Congressional appropriations committees have repeatedly affected civil defense programs in a similar fashion. Appropriations committees have disagreed with the Executive's concept of civil defense operations and scope, and with specific programs and policies. At various times appropriations committees have disagreed with the role the Federal Government has played in civil defense, with the policies of evacuation, sheltering, stockpiling, and matching funds, and with specific programs such as the provision of fallout shelter protection in Federal buildings and construction, the provision of personnel and administrative matching funds to the States and local political subdivisions, or any of the proposed federally-subsidized fallout shelter incentive programs.

Often such opposition to civil defense policies and programs flies directly in the face of recommendations made by substantive Congressional

committees. Notably, every single examination of civil defense by a substantive committee during the years covered by this study has ended on a note of support for civil defense. In fact, most Congressional civil defense examinations have concluded by recommending the augmentation or expansion of the Nation's civil defense capability. The quintessential example of this, of course, was the 1964 Hébert House Armed Services Subcommittee hearings on H.R. 8200--a measure to which Hébert and his subcommittee were opposed before examining civil defense in depth. As we have seen, however, their initial opposition was transformed into support during the course of the hearings as they became more knowledgeable of the subject. Other committees have pointedly (and in the case of Holifield's, repeatedly) urged an increase in Congressional appropriation support for civil defense. All of this has more often than not, however, been for naught.

What then accounts for this phenomenon of substantive committee support for civil defense and appropriation committee lack of support? A major explanation of this phenomenon, as suggested during the study, is the gross ignorance of the subject demonstrated by appropriation subcommittee members repeatedly over the years--especially in the House where the brunt of questioning has generally taken place. This is not the norm found by Fenno in his path-breaking study. Fenno states that "a commonly expressed agency sentiment is that vetern subcommittee members 'know as much about our program and problems as we do'."[21] Yet the lack of knowledge and preparedness demonstrated by appropriation subcommittee members during civil defense hearings is not entirely atypical. Fox, in his study of defense appropriation requests, found substantial superficial committee performance in his study. He

specifically noted an evident lack of knowledge and preparedness. He also noted in explanation that interviews with Congressional staff members "revealed that the Congressmen and Senators serving on authorization and appropriations committees rarely read the material gathered by their staffs in preparation for the hearings."[22]

Part of this problem is that the committee members often do not have the time or do not take the time to acquire an in-depth knowledge of their subjects and rely instead on mere surface knowledge. Why then do Appropriations Committee-members not rely more on substantive committees for in-depth knowledge? Fenno notes that Appropriation Committee members like to think that they are taking a fresh and independent look at the agencies. Moreover, their concerns are somewhat different in that their role is to look for waste and inefficiency and to make cuts. Many maintain an "attitude of self-sufficiency." They have sat on the committee for numerous years and "think" they know their agencies and their agencies' programs.[23] Sometimes this turns out to be a misconception.

These differences between substantive committees and appropriations committees are exacerbated in the case of civil defense by the fact that over the years there has been a lack of consensus (government-wide) on the nature and scope of civil defense functions and responsibilities. Antagonistic Appropriations Committee members (such as Cannon and Thomas) have been able to take advantage of the controversy and lack of consensus to make substantial budget cuts. In that civil defense does not have a strong grass-roots clientele to protest these cuts when they are made, this process has been repeated many times.

Presidential Interest and Support

Though Congress has had considerable impact upon the evolution of U.S. civil defense both positively and negatively, so have political officials in the high-Executive--the President and his advisers in the White House, budget offices, Defense Department and elsewhere. This assertion is not manifestly self-evident however. For example, whereas the Executive (through the BoB and OSD/OMB) has cut civil defense requests by an average of 25 percent over the years covered by this study, the Congress has cut the resulting requests by an average of roughly 60 percent. (See Table VII-1.) It would seem then that Congress has had the greater impact, especially when considering that Congress has repeatedly refused to approve (fund) various Administration-approved civil defense programs.

The 35 percent difference in Executive and Congressional civil defense appropriation request approval averages, however, is not an accurate reflection of civil defense support. For example, President Truman, a supporter of civil defense, approved an average of 68.1 percent of the civil defense appropriation requests submitted during his Administration. President Eisenhower approved 71.7 percent. Thus it appears that Eisenhower's support for civil defense was comparable to Truman's, if not greater. This was not the case, however. Looking at the actual figures approved, Truman approved an average of $514 million per year for civil defense whereas Eisenhower approved only $104 million per year --20.2 percent of the Truman approval rate. Similarly, it would appear that President Nixon's approval rate of 87.2 percent would rival President Kennedy's approval rate of 87.7 percent. Yet Kennedy approved an

average of $472 million per year for civil defense while Nixon approved only $82 million--82.6 percent less.

The explanation for this, of course, is that civil defense requests drop significantly during the administrations of Presidents who are not notable civil defense supporters. The Executive-approved request therefore continues to correlate comparably to Presidentially supportive civil defense request approval rates. As is demonstrated in Chart VII-7, Presidential appropriation request approval levels are highly erratic, reflecting the strong support of Truman and Kennedy. Likewise, civil defense appropriation requests demonstrate an erratic rise and fall that correlates more highly with Executive approval than with Congressional approvals, which are comparatively less erratic. Thus one must conclude that it is more accurate to say that civil defense appropriation requests are more dependent upon Administration support than Congressional support.

This conclusion on the importance of Administration support is bolstered by an examination of the major decisions made concerning civil defense over the years. The decisions made by President Eisenhower in 1957 relating to civil defense are a case in point. A series of Congressional hearings bearing on civil defense in the House had by 1957 led to the drafting of legislation (H.R. 2125) mandating a reorganization of civil defense within the Executive Branch, a recognition of civil defense as primarily a Federal responsibility rather than a State and local responsibility, and the initiation of a nationwide fallout shelter system. These points were paralleled closely by the recommendations of the Presidentially-mandated Gaither Commission which in its 1957 report argued that not only was a fallout shelter program the most

effective way of saving lives in the event of attack but such a program would also bolster deterrence and indicate resolve. President Eisenhower, however, rejected both H.R. 2125 and the recommendations in the Gaither Report on civil defense. Instead, he sanctioned just enough change in civil defense so as to thwart Congressman Holifield's far-reaching initiatives. The President's civil defense legislation was passed rather easily in the Congress despite the fact that the alternative legislation originated in the Congress by one of its own and had been the subject of lengthy hearings and debate. There would be no nationwide fallout shelter system during the Eisenhower Administration.

The next major impact on civil defense was also a Presidential initiative and came in May of 1961 when President Kennedy in an address to the Congress indicated that major changes would be forthcoming in the civil defense field. The reasons for this were not adverse trends in international relations nor Congressional pressure, but rather the desire to correct the inactivity of the past. Judging his actions to be but the prudent response of a man with responsibilities for the well-being and defense of the citizens of the Nation, Kennedy stated that a nationwide fallout shelter program would be initiated, significant increases in funds would be sought, and responsibility for civil defense would be transferred to the Defense Department. The implementation of these changes, as we know, followed Kennedy's July speech to the Nation on the Berlin Crisis; the point, however, is that the basic decisions were made before the crisis in a non-crisis atmosphere.

After the President's initiatives, the Congress followed through and supported his appropriation request. This Congressional support was maintained even after the passing of the crisis (though not as fully as

the Administration would have desired) and was maintained for several years afterwards in the form of appropriations twice the size of pre-Kennedy civil defense appropriations. This support declined only after it became apparent that the support of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was declining.

After President Johnson refused to sanction H.R. 8200 in 1964, in a watershed civil defense development rivaled only by Kennedy's initiatives of 1961, Congressional support for civil defense (measured in terms of appropriations) continued to decline. This process culminated in President Nixon's 1972 decision to invest civil defense with a dual-use policy which in actuality became a policy of peacetime disaster preparedness at the expense of civil defense preparedness. In a development closely paralleling Eisenhower's 1957 decision, again we find a President making decisions on civil defense contrary to the findings of Government studies which noted the life-saving potential of augmented civil defense programs--particularly fallout shelters. The sequal of Nixon's 1972 decisions has been declining civil defense appropriations (in non-inflated dollars) and declining civil defense capabilities--a process which has gone largely unchecked to the present day.

The conclusion that the most weighty determining factor in the evolution of civil defense in the U.S. has been high-Executive support (or lack of it) is one supported by interviews with Federal civil defense officials. This is an understandable perception. Federal civil defense officials are in much more frequent contact with Executive officials than with the Congress. Approval for proposed policies and programs must first come from the Executive Branch. Even after approval, further battles must be fought with other segments of the Executive (the BoB or

OSD/OMB) in order to present funding requests to the Congress. With high Executive support civil defense programs may be funded; without such support, however, there is virtually no chance of program funding at progressive levels. Such was a lesson of the Holifield/Eisenhower difference in opinion. As one commentator has written:

> Presidents, for whatever reason, can easily pre-empt congressional initiatives. They are able to do so because, on the political side, no other actor in American politics commands the attention, prestige, and popular good will the Chief Executive enjoys.[24]

On the other hand, as was the case with Kennedy, when a President's support for civil defense is more than lip-service he stands a good chance of getting his programs through.

Defense Policy

The relative importance of defense policy as a consideration in determining the evolution of civil defense is difficult to measure. Defense or strategic considerations are quite naturally of importance when decisions concerning civil defense are made within the Congress and the Executive. More often than not, however, these considerations are unvoiced and unmeasurable. Even when it is obvious that defense policy, per se, is a weighty consideration, it is difficult to separate this consideration from others in order to measure its comparative weight. By definition Civil Defense is a defense policy--it undertakes to save lives that would otherwise be lost in a nuclear attack. Just how integral civil defense has been to defense policy, however, has been subject to change.

During the Truman Administration there can be no doubt that defense "considerations" played a role in Congressional decision-making.

At several points expression was given to the thought that the threat of atomic attack upon the United States was either non-existent or too remote to justify the approval of funds or programs that would move civil defense out of the realm of paper planning and into the realm of operational readiness. Civil defense, quite simply, was not considered to be a significant component of national defense policy or even a component at all. Thus, the reluctance of the military to accept responsibility for civil defense or to give much more than lip-service in support. Manifestations of such appraisals have continued to the present day.

During the Eisenhower Administration defense "policy" as a factor of impact upon civil defense was more in evidence. As has been noted, Eisenhower was opposed to the expansion of the civil defense system and rejected H.R. 2125 which would have mandated the development of a nationwide fallout shelter system. The Budget Bureau and the Treasury advised against the program for reasons of economy. The Defense Department thought it might lead to a "Maginot Line mentality," or result in lower appropriations for their programs. The State Department worried about the psychological impact on our allies. The advice that Eisenhower specifically quoted, however, was the advice of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles pertaining to the policy of the United States of relinace on massive retaliation. Dulles argued that it would be difficult to sustain both an offensive and defensive posture at the same time. His advice, then, was to rely on the strategic policy of offensive massive retaliation. Eisenhower agreed. On the other hand, it is also known that Eisenhower at times thought of civil defense in rather gloomy terms not altogether related to defense policy. He was furthermore quite

serious about keeping government expenditures down--to a minimum. It is therefore impossible to rank with confidence the factors that ultimately influenced Eisenhower's civil defense decisions.

No definitive statement can be made as to why President Kennedy made his civil defense decision announced in May of 1961 either, other than to note that he did not perceive nuclear war to be impossible and that it was therefore prudent to establish some existing civil defense protection as part of his responsibility to safeguard the well-being of the citizenry. On the other hand, after this decision was made and civil defense was moved into the Defense Department, civil defense began to be referred to as a significant, even "indispensable," component of the Nation's damage-limiting capability. As such it was conceived of as contributing to deterrence. This emphasis on building up the Nation's damage-limiting capability, however, was only a relatively short-lived phenomenon. As enthusiasm for damage-limitation waned so did Executive support for civil defense.

This development played its course during the Johnson Administration. After the Administration decision was made to deemphasize ABM development and deployment, civil defense was much less often referred to in damage-limiting and deterrence terms. Gone were the references in McNamara's posture statements to civil defense as a "vital" and "essential" component of defense policy. By this time McNamara had adopted the mutal vulnerability theory and mutual assured destruction doctrine. Civil defense "seemed" not to fit in with these policies, especially in an age of multiplying weapon numbers and capabilities. A truly effective civil defense system, like a truly effective ABM system, would, by saving a significant number of lives, cast into question

assured destruction. Without assured destruction the "strategic balance," whatever that is, would become unstable. The probability of nuclear war would theoretically rise. The problem with this logic is that unlike the ABM, civil defense could not prevent the massive destruction of the physical resources of the Nation--if effective. Moreover, the civil defense proposals of the time did not contemplate the "massive" saving of lives--60, 70, 80 percent or more of the population. Moderate programs were proposed which if implemented could only hope to mitigate the destructiveness of nuclear war, not make it ineffective.

During the Nixon Administration, civil defense continued to suffer from its seemingly disjointed attachment to defense policy. The arrival of the SALT era served to intensify this perception. The decision of President Nixon in 1972 to change the scope of civil defense policy, coming as it did only two weeks prior to the signing of the SALT I agreement forces one to the consideration of strategic issues as a factor in Nixon's decision. A notable aspect of SALT I was the agreement to severly restrict active defense systems. Moreover, it is known that the U.S. negotiators were working under the assumption that the successful completion of this treaty would signify a recognition by all parties of the theories of mutual assured destruction and mutual vulnerability--theories about which much controversy is centered today. In light of this it is indeed a possibility that Nixon's decision on civil defense policy was colored by the atmosphere of detente and cooperation and acceptance of mutual vulnerability.

The Determinants of Civil Defense

From the preceeding discussion of civil defense determinants one must conclude that Congressional and high-Executive factors have been predominant in the evolution of civil defense policies and programs, with factors of international crisis, civil defense leadership and planning, and defense policy of significant impact during Congressional and Executive decision-making on civil defense. Occasionally these other factors have even been determining in specific civil defense developments. It is the conclusion of the author, however, that by looking at the major civil defense developments over the years, one must conclude that high-Executive (particularly Presidential) interest (or lack of it) has been the primary determinant of civil defense policies and programs. This was the case in 1957 when President Eisenhower refused to initiate a fallout shelter system; it was the case in May of 1961 when President Kennedy decided to initiate a fallout shelter system; it was the case in 1964 when President Johnson refused to support the fallout shelter incentive program, and it was the case in 1972 when President Nixon likewise refused to support an augmented civil defense effort and instead sanctioned an orientation which focused on peacetime disaster preparedness at the expense of civil defense preparedness.

Again, this is not to say that other factors are not important in determining civil defense policies and programs. They are. This study has shown that several factors have had significant impact upon the evolution of civil defense. Thus it is the conclusion of the author that progress in the civil defense field will be made and sustained only through the combination of several factors. It is true that progress may be prompted as the result of a crisis, but for obvious reasons this

would not be the preferred course. In addition, progress made as the result of a crisis tends to be of short-term duration. As the crisis atmosphere wanes, so does civil defense support and progress. For these reasons a combination of other factors is preferable. This combination has not existed since the 1961-1963 period when significant progress was made in civil defense protection levels. At that time there was a military interest in damage limitation. There was broad agreement within the civil defense community on a preferred civil defense policy as well as programs to implement the policy. A modest and prudent long-term effort was envisioned and supported by detailed plans. Presidential and Congressional support of these plans existed. As long as there was Presidential and Congressional support, progress was sustained.

For progress to be made and sustained once again, then, it would take a combination of adequate planning, modest programming, and military, Presidential and key Congressional support. Without these, progress in civil defense will be all but impossible to attain.

TABLE VII-1

APPROPRIATION HISTORY OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Fiscal Year	Submitted to BOB (OSD/OMB)	Percent Approved by BOB	Submitted to Congress	(In Thousands) House Action	Senate Action	Conference Action	Appropriation in 1977 Dollars	Percent of BOB Request	Percent of Con. Request	Rate of Growth
Truman										
1951[a]	$ 730,215	55.2	$ 403,000	$ 186,750	$ 84,000	$ 31,750	$ 99,400	4.3	7.9	-----
1952	588,389	91.2	537,000	65,255	97,000	77,021	227,800	12.8	14.1	-----
1953	1,032,700	58.3	601,555	37,500	85,000	44,250	129,800	4.2	7.2	57.5
avg.	783,768	68.1	513,852	96,502	88,666	51,007		7.1	9.7	
Eisenhower										
1954	288,478	53.1	153,200	37,770	61,000	49,275	142,000	16.1	37.2	111.4
1955	138,845	63.7	88,511	45,325	57,850	50,186	139,800	34.6	56.0	101.8
1956	93,938	83.2	78,170	58,000	71,300	70,900	188,600	73.1	91.1	141.3
1957	134,809	93.1	125,483	86,100	123,200	95,760	243,200	69.4	75.9	135.1
1958	144,786	91.4	132,380	39,300	39,300	41,561	101,000	27.1	30.2	43.4
1959	112,997	67.7	76,473	38,250	42,915	45,285	106,300	34.0	51.4	109.0
1960	259,039	39.2	101,670	43,735	59,735	52,885	121,900	18.0	62.2	116.8
1961	93,863	82.4	77,313	51,900	68,850	61,088	138,600	65.0	79.0	115.5
avg.	158,344	71.7	104,156	50,097		58,368		42.2	60.4	109.3
Kennedy										
1962[b]	104,535	100.0	104,535	79,167	95,500	[c] 86,600	[d]	82.7	82.7	
1962S	-	-	207,600	207,600	207,600	207,600	580,200	100.0	100.0	321.7
1963	754,400	100.3	756,900	75,000	215,000	128,000	285,200	17.0	17.0	49.7
1964	689,400	50.3	346,900	87,800	135,338	111,569	241,000	16.2	31.1	87.2
avg.	585,312	87.7	471,978	179,125	218,813	177,923		54.0	57.7	152.9
Johnson										
1965	559,000	64.0	358,000	89,200	154,200	105,200	219,600	18.8	29.4	94.3
1966	371,850	52.1	193,900	89,190	124,370	106,780	216,200	28.7	55.1	101.5

TABLE VII-1---Continued

Fiscal Year	Submitted to BOB (OSD/OMB)	Percent Approved by BOB	Submitted to Congress	House Action	Senate Action	Conference Action	Appropriation in 1977 Dollars	Percent of BOB Request	Percent of Con. Request	Rate of Growth
				(In Thousands)						
				Johnson---Continued						
1967	$ 192,029	69.5	$ 133,400	$ 101,000	$ 101,100	$ 101,100	$ 201,800	52.6	75.7	94.7
1968	163,400	67.9	111,000	86,100	91,100	86,100	164,900	52.7	77.5	83.2
1969	159,700	48.1	76,800	58,040	63,640	60,540	111,100	37.9	78.8	70.3
avg.	259,796	60.3	189,980	84,726	106,882	91,944		38.1	63.3	88.8
				Nixon						
1970	85,656	89.0	76,608	65,508	73,808	70,558	117,600	82.4	92.1	116.5
1971	76,346	98.9	75,496	73,546	73,546	73,546	110,400	96.3	97.4	104.3
1972	96,700	81.0	78,303	78,303	78,303	78,303	112,000	81.0	100.0	106.5
1973	99,992	88.8	88,835	83,535	83,535	83,535	112,100	83.5	94.0	106.7
1974	113,537	77.9	88,500	87,500	70,000	82,000	101,700	72.2	92.7	98.2
1975	98,300	87.8	86,300	82,000	82,000	82,000	91,700	83.2	95.0	100.0
avg.	95,088	87.2	82,264	78,399	76,865	78,318	-	83.1	95.0	105.4
Grand Total	$7,390,000	----	$5,200,000	$2,030,000		$2,100,000	-	----	----	-----
Grand Avg.	284,000	75.0	200,000	78,200		80,800	-	28.4	40.1	107.2

SOURCES: "OCDM Appropriation History (1951 Through 1961)," (Appendix 9A) In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Civil Defense--1961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 397, for material pertaining to FY 1951 through 1961 in columns 1, 3, and 7. Other data supplied by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and by the author. The 1977 dollar figures were provided in a mimeograph information sheet compiled by Walmer E. Strope, courtesy of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

[a]FY 1951-1961 statistics include figures for the ODM, OCDM and FCDA, except for the House and Senate Action columns which are FCDA and OCDM only.

[b]It is believed that the OCDM request to the BOB in FY 1962 was $104,535,000 but this figure could not be verified.

[c]Of this amount approximately $50 million was transferred to the OCD upon its creation in the Department of Defense. The remainder went to the OEP upon the disbandment of the OCDM in July 1962.

[d]Based upon the total OCD appropriation of $257.6 million

CHART VII-1



SOURCE: Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Public Attitudes Toward Civil Defense, (Wash., D.C.: DCPA, 1976), p. 3.

CHART VII-2

Federal Civil Defense
Personnel Strength
(At end of Fiscal Year)



SOURCE: W.K. Chipman, United States Civil Defense Programs and Activities--Current Status, DCPA staff study, 28 Oct.1976, p. A-2-20. (Charts VII-3 through VII-6, same source.)

CHART VII-3

PROCUREMENT OF SHELTER STOCKS & RADEF EQUIPMENT



CHART VII-4

SHELTER SPACES IDENTIFIED



NOTE: SPACES IDENTIFIED SINCE 1973 DO NOT INCLUDE ALL SPACE IN RURAL AREAS LOCATED BY THE HOST AREA SURVEY (E.G., BUILDING WHOSE FALLOUT PROTECTION COULD BE IMPROVED BY CRISIS ACTION). HOWEVER, THERE IS A CURRENT BACKLOG OF ABOUT 1300 WORKYEARS ($29 MILLION) OF SURVEY EFFORT (ABOUT 8 YEARS' EXPENDITURE AT THE FY 1977 LEVEL)



CHART VII-5

DCPA Public Training Programs

CIVIL DEFENSE
RESEARCH, SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT, SHELTER DEVELOPMENT

(CHART VII-6)



CHART VII-7

CIVIL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS (in millions)

Top Line = CD Request to BOB, DOD/OMB
Middle Line = President's Budget
Bottom Line = Congress's Appropriation



NOTES

1 William H. Kincade, "Repeating History: The Civil Defense Debate Renewed," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 3, Winter 1978, p. 103.

2 See Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (second edition), (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974).

3 Lewis Anthony Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy," in New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, edited by Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963), p. 309.

4 Richard F. Fenno, The Power of the Purse--Appropriations Politics in Congress, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

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6 Fenno, pp. 353-354.

7 Ibid., p. 367.

8 Davis, p. 358.

9 Ronald J. Fox, Arming America--How the U.S. Buys Weapons, (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1974), p. 126.

10 Davis, p. 356.

11 See Davis, pp. 357-359.

12 Fenno, p. 353.

13 Of the remainder, 18.8% were granted in-tact and 8% were increased. See Fenno, p. 353. For civil defense 0% of the budgets were increased, 7.7% were granted intact and 92.3% were cut.

14 The FY 1951 appropriation was not included in that it was a partial year appropriation, and the FY 1962 regular and supplemental appropriations were treated as one decision.

15 Davis, p. 357.

16 Ibid., pp. 365-366.

17 Fenno, p. 322.

18 Davis, p. 356.

19 Ibid., pp. 356-357.

20 Ibid., pp. 362-369.

21 Fenno, p. 280.

22 Fox, p. 124.

23 Fenno, especially p. 115.

24 John R. Johannes, Policy Innovation In Congress, (Morristown, N.J.: General Learing Press, 1972), p. 15.

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*For purposes of clarity the Congressional items will be listed first by committee and then chronologically. Due to the large number of Appropriations Committee hearings and reports used in this study, only abbreviated references will be made here. Listed will be item titles in appropriate groupings for hearings only. For specific references to appropriation hearings and reports, consult the Note sections in the body of the dissertation.

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