

Session No. 28

Course Title: Social Dimensions of Disaster, 2nd edition

Session 28: Tourism and Disaster: Preparedness, Responses, and Impacts

1 hr.

Objectives:

- 28.1 Identify, categorize, and illustrate primary threats to tourists
- 28.2 Describe the social factors that constrain the extent of disaster planning by managers of tourist businesses
- 28.3 Identify and illustrate five key disaster responses by tourist business customers
- 28.4 Describe five major differences in the perceptions of policy preferences held by tourists versus those of tourist business managers
- 28.5 Identify five major recommendations regarding business preparedness offered by tourists who have been victimized by disaster
- 28.6 Describe two tactics for rebuilding the image of a destination after a disaster.

Scope:

This session introduces students to behavioral research on tourist behavior prior to and following disasters. Extent of disaster preparedness, typical tourist responses, and the social factors that constrain both are summarized. Differences in hazard perceptions of tourists versus those of tourist business managers are illustrated as are selected strategies for rebuilding the image of a destination after a disaster.

Readings:

Student Reading:

Drabek, Thomas E. 2000. "Disaster Evacuations: Tourist-business Managers Rarely Act as Customers Expect." *Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly* 41:48-57.

Professor Readings:

Drabek, Thomas E. 1995. "Disaster Planning and Response by Tourist Business Executives." *Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly* 36:86-96.

Drabek, Thomas E. 1999. "Disaster Evacuation Response by Tourists and Other Types of Transients." *International Journal of Public Administration* 22:655-677.

Ahmed, Zafar U. 1991. "Marketing Your Community: Correcting a Negative Image." *Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly* 31:24-27.

Background References:

Drabek, Thomas E. and Chuck Y. Gee. 2000. *Emergency Management Principles and Application for Tourism, Hospitality, and Travel Management Industries*. Emmitsburg, Maryland: Emergency Management Institute, Federal Emergency Management Agency. (<http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/completeCourses.asp>).

Ruchelman, Leonard. 1988. "The MGM Grand Hotel Fire." Pp. 101-114 in *Crisis Management: A Case Book* edited by Michael T. Charles and John Choon K. Kim. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, publisher.

Drabek, Thomas E. 1994. *Disaster Evacuation and the Tourist Industry*. Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado.

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Dahlhamer, James M. and Melvin J. D'Souza. 1997. "Determinants of Business-Disaster Preparedness in Two U.S. Metropolitan Areas." *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 15:265-281.

Pottorff, Susan M. and David M. Neal. 1994. "Marketing Implications for Post-Disaster Tourism Destinations." *Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing* 3:115-122.

General Requirements:

Overheads (28-1 through 28-9 appended).

Student Handouts (28-1 and 28-2).

See individual requirements for each objective.

Objective 28.1 Identify, categorize, and illustrate primary threats to tourists.

Requirements:

Use Overheads 28-1 and 28-2.

Start this session with student exercise and proceed with lecture material specified below.

Remarks:

I. Introduction.

A. **Exercise.**

1. **Remind** students of exercise procedures.
2. **Divide** class into four groups and assign roles.
 - a. Chair.
 - b. Reporter.
 - c. Timer.
3. **Announce** time limit: 5 minutes.

B. **Display** Overhead 28-1; “Workshop Tasks.”

1. Group 1 – What are four types of disasters that threaten tourists and business travelers?
2. Group 2 – What are five key disaster responses that have been documented among tourist populations?
3. Group 3 – What are four key differences in the perceptions of policy preferences held by tourists versus those held by tourist business managers.
4. Group 4 – What are five major recommendations regarding business preparedness that have been offered by tourists and business travelers impacted by disaster?

C. **Start** discussion.

D. **Stop** discussion.

E. **Explain** that the report from Groups 2, 3 and 4 will be presented later in the Session.

- II. Examples of tourist vulnerability.
 - A. Group 1 report: 2 minutes.
 - B. **Supplement** Group 1 report with examples like the following.
 - C. **Display** Overhead 28-2; “Disaster Events and Tourist Populations.”
 - D. **Transportation** disasters.
 - 1. **Airplane crashes**, e.g., Swissair (September, 1998; crashed after take off from John F. Kennedy in New York City; 229 killed) (*Newsweek*, September 14, 1998, pp. 22-26).
 - 2. **Shipwrecks**, e.g., George Prince and Frosts (October 1976; ferry boat and Norwegian tanker collided in Mississippi River, Luling, Louisiana; 77 killed) (Hoffman 1993, pp. 571-574).
 - E. **Lodging fires**.
 - 1. **MGM Grand Hotel fire**.
 - a. Las Vegas, Nevada.
 - b. November 21, 1980.
 - c. 85 killed, approximately 600 injured.
 - d. \$30-50 million in damage to hotel.
 - e. Ruchelman 1988, pp. 108-109.
 - F. **Climatological disasters**.
 - 1. **Hurricanes**, e.g., Bob (1991), Andrew (1992), Iniki (1992) (Drabek 2000, p. 49 and p. 51).
 - 2. **Wildfires**.
 - a. Mesa Verde National Park, Long Mesa Fire, July 2002; Lightning strike ignition source, forced evacuation of approximately 2,000 visitors and employees (National Park Service, 2003, p. 1).
 - b. Missionary Ridge Fire, June 9, 2002; near Durango, Colorado; 10,085 acres burned including 57 homes and cabins (*The Durango Herald* 2002, p. 2).

c. Yellowstone National Park.

- 1) 1988; 38 percent of the park's 2.2 million acres plus 400,000 acres near the park; approximate cost for fire fighting effort was \$112 million (Maclean 2003, pp. 194-195).
- 2) 2003 (August); lightning caused largest fire since 1988; in excess of 16,000 acres burned resulting in closure of east entrance to park; fire fighting costs exceeded \$1.7 million (Moen 2003, p. 10A).

G. **Geophysical disasters.**

1. **Earthquakes**, e.g., Big Bear Lake, California, (1992) and Northridge, California, (1994) (Drabek 2000, p. 49).
2. **Avalanches**, e.g., Anchorage, Alaska (January, 2000) (Drabek 2003c, p. 25).

H. **Terrorist attacks.**

1. **Bali, Indonesia**; October 12, 2002; bomb in disco; 180 killed, mostly tourists (Perlez 2002, p. 3).
2. **Jakarta, Indonesia**; August 5, 2003; bomb in Marriott Hotel; 13 killed and 149 injured (Gutkin 2003, p. 24A).

Supplemental Considerations:

Depending on the quality of the student report, this section may be **very brief**. Some professors may wish to **remind** students of the types of hazards and disasters that comprised Session No. 4; "Overview of Disasters and Hazards in the U.S.A. Today." Others may wish to **expand** the discussion of tourist vulnerability through discussion of the **lack of familiarity** with both place and type of event, e.g., honeymooning couple from Kansas knew little about hurricanes and less about the Hawaiian island of Kauai. Also, the **types of places** that attract many tourists are **high risk locations**. For elaboration on these and related issues, see Murphy and Bayley 1989. For discussion and examples of tourists traveling internationally, including the process and format of advisories issued by the U.S. State Department, see Drabek and Gee 2000, Session 4 "The Nature and Types of Political Threats" (pp. 63-72) and Session 28 "The International Dimension: Issues Relating to Foreign Tourists" (pp. 441-453).

Objective 28.2 Describe the social factors that constrain the extent of disaster planning by managers of tourist businesses.

Requirements:

Use Student Handout 28-1.

Use Overhead 24-3.

Remarks:

- I. A study of disaster planning.
 - A. **Refer** students to Drabek (2000) summary, i.e., assigned student reading, p. 51.
 - B. **Distribute** Student Handout 28-1; “Drabek Study of Disaster Planning in Tourist Businesses.”
 - C. **Review briefly** the study sample, i.e., locations and events.
 1. **Phase I** (local government initiatives to stimulate preparedness).
 - a. Pinellas County, Florida.
 - b. Sevier County, Tennessee.
 - c. City of Galveston, Texas.
 2. **Phase II** (communities impacted by flooding or Hurricane Bob).
 - a. Whatcom County, Florida.
 - b. Snohomish County, Washington.
 - c. Carteret County, North Carolina.
 - d. Dare County, North Carolina.
 - e. York County, Maine.
 - f. Cape Cod/Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts.
- C. **Explain:** Drabek (1995) created **multivariate regression models** to identify the key **social factors** that **constrained** the extent of disaster planning within the 185 tourist businesses.

D. **Display** Overhead 28-3; “Six Factors that Constrain Disaster Planning.”

E. **Review** and illustrate each social factor as required (adapted from Drabek 1995, p. 20).

1. **Intra organizational factors** (e.g., requirements of the corporate office or specific governmental mandates given the firm mission like a cruise ship line or sea animal park).
2. **Local emergency manager** (e.g., provided planning assistance or guidance).
3. **Firm size** (number of full-time employees; larger firms planned more).
4. **Risk perception** (higher level of risk perception by manager of firm regarding the probability of a future event that would trigger evacuation within the next decade).
5. **Managerial professionalism** (general manager has membership in professional organization).
6. **Disaster sub-culture** (community had evidence of various norms indicating the presence of a disaster sub-culture).
7. The six variable regression model accounted for 55% of the variance.

F. **Explain:** Drabek (1995, p. 20) also documented some other social factors that constrained the extent of disaster planning although these were less significant than the above six.

1. **Disaster events** (recent actual evacuations).
2. **Full-time security officers.**
3. **Community factors** (e.g., island location).
4. **Disaster committees** (e.g., planning assistance received from industrial safety committees or organizations).

II. How much planning had occurred?

A. **Explain:** Drabek (1995) identified nine criteria, e.g., written disaster plan, revision annually, regular staff training, etc.

B. **Explain:** all firms were coded on each of the criteria with a “yes” or “no”; 184 of 185 firms were coded.

C. **Results:**

1. **Extensive disaster planning**, i.e., “yes” answers to 9, 8, or 7 of the criteria; 25 firms (13%).
2. **Moderate disaster planning**, i.e., “yes” answers to 6, 5, 4, or 3 of the criteria; 50 firms (27%).
3. **Minimal planning**, i.e., “yes” answers to 2, 1, or none of the criteria; 109 firms (59%).

D. **Conclusion:** the tourism industry represents a catastrophic vulnerability.

Supplemental Considerations:

The message of this section is that the **extent of disaster planning** within tourist businesses has been **documented** and found to be **spotty at best**. Some professors may wish to **expand** this section by comparing the results from the Drabek study to **broader surveys** of business firms for points of contrast. For example, **Dahlhamer and D’Souza** (1997) obtained questionnaire returns from 737 businesses (40% return rate) in Shelby County, Tennessee (Memphis area) and 1,079 businesses (50% return rate) in Polk County, Iowa (Des Moines area). **Some, but not most**, reported completion of such disaster **preparedness activities** as these: obtain first aid kit or extra medical supplies: 60% Shelby County (SC); 49% Polk County (PC); purchase earthquake/flood insurance: 51% (SC); 8% (PC); develop an emergency plan: 22% (SC); 29% (PC); conduct drills or exercises: 9% (SC); 3% (PC). Other professors may wish to **expand** this section through a **class exercise** wherein alternative research designs and measurement strategies would be considered. For example, how is “response readiness” for a tourist business **best assessed**? What type of multicommunity studies should be conducted to assess tourist business preparedness for future **terrorist** attacks?

Objective 28.3 Identify and illustrate five key disaster responses by tourist business customers.

Requirements:

Use Overhead 28-4.

Use Student Handout 28-2.

Remarks:

- I. Customer responses during disaster.
 - A. **Group 2 report:** 2 minutes.
 - B. **Distribute** Student Handout 28-2; “Drabek Transient Study Events and Communities.”
 1. **Explain:** Drabek (1996) included for comparison purposes four types of transients.
 - a. Tourists = 520.
 - b. Business travelers = 83.
 - c. Migrant workers = 34.
 - d. Homeless persons = 45.
 2. **Explain:** Drabek (1996) data base included 827 interviews.
 - a. Transients = 682.
 - b. Lodging executives = 69.
 - c. Community officials = 76.
 3. **Ask students:** “Why did Drabek include the four types of transients?”
(**Answer:** different response patterns could thereby be documented as could areas of similarity).
 - C. **Supplement** Group 2 report, as required through such points as these (adapted from Drabek 2000, pp. 51-52).
 - D. **Display** Overhead 28-4; “Tourist Responses During Disaster.”
 1. **Warning messages** were processed by social groups.
 2. **Warning messages** were **less frequently** received through media sources; **more frequently** received by lodging-firm employees and other customers.
 3. **Warning messages** were perceived as being imprecise (40%).
 4. **Confirmation** was sought from a source different than that which provided the initial warning.

5. **Prior to departure**, over one-half (52%) contacted a relative or friend to let them know of their anticipated departure.
6. **Larger proportions** of tourists (compared to residential evacuations) went to public shelters (23%), returned home (20%), or went to another private firm (18%), **rather** than going to a friend or relative's home.
7. **Dissatisfaction** with shelters reflected such concerns as: location (hard to find); inadequate facilities (too few toilets); crowding; and additional issues (see Drabek 2000, p. 52).

II. Additional customer responses during disaster.

A. **Explain:** Drabek has published additional conclusions in related publications.

B. **Example: conflict resolution.**

1. Most tourists were traveling with at least one other person, hence, 92% reported there was **discussion about what to do** (Drabek 1999, p. 661).
2. Topics **discussed** and/or disagreed about included: (see Drabek 1996, p. 84).
 - a. **Where to go** (73%).
 - b. **When to go** (73%).
 - c. **Safety of current location** (46%).
 - d. **Concern about potential traffic congestion** (18%).
 - e. **Severity of threat** (16%).

C. **Example: departure profiles.**

1. **Major reasons for leaving** (Drabek 1996, p. 94).
 - a. Advice from lodging firm management/employee (34%).
 - b. Advice received through media (28%).
 - c. Personal observation of threat, e.g., looked at waves (11%).
 - d. Advice from local government (direct) (8%).

- e. Personal evaluation of specific threat information, e.g., storm forecast (6%).
2. **Personal property:** 50% **left personal property** at the lodging firm when they departed (Drabek 1996, p. 94). Many managers, lacked procedures for returning such property to customers after disaster impact.

Supplemental Considerations:

Some professors may wish to **expand** this section by adding discussion of the **theoretical framework** used by Drabek (2000, p. 50) that guided his data collection, analysis, and interpretation. The “**stress-strain**” **perspective**, posits that tourists are **decision makers** reflecting the areas of ignorance and **misinformation** about risk documented by those working within the frameworks of “**bounded rationality**” and “**emergent norm theory**.” Hence, from this vantage point, people are viewed as decision makers—there is choice—but the **range of options perceived** as being available are constrained by invisible webs of social experience (so-called ‘webs of constraint’).” (Drabek 2000, p. 50). **Integration** of this approach into basic sociological theory would **enhance student understanding** of how this course reflects key **sociological concepts** and orientations.

Objective 28.4 Describe five major differences in the perceptions of policy preferences held by tourists versus those of tourist business managers.

Requirements:

Use Overhead 28-5.

Remarks:

- I. Perception gaps in policy preferences.
 - A. Group 3 report: 2 minutes.
 - B. **Supplement**, as required with examples like these (adapted from Drabek 2000; pp. 52-55).
 - C. **Display** Overhead 28-5; “Gaps In Policy Preferences: Customers vs. Managers.”
 - D. **Refer students** to Exhibit 2 (p. 52) and review such findings as these.
 1. **Commitment to disaster evacuation planning.**
 - a. Customers – 27% disagree.

b. Managers – 63% disagree.

2. Local government training.

a. Customers – 7% disagree.

b. Managers – 22% disagree.

3. Business association interest.

a. Customers – 3% disagree.

b. Managers – 18% disagree.

4. Media-awareness campaign.

a. Customers – 9% disagree.

b. Managers – 2% disagree.

II. Perception gaps in policy options.

A. **Display** Overhead 28-6; “Gaps in Policy Options: Customers vs. Managers.”

B. **Refer students** to Exhibit 2 (p. 54) and review the findings.

1. Require written disaster-evacuation plans.

a. Customers – 4% disagree.

b. Managers – 16% disagree.

2. Provisions for special populations.

a. Customers – 3% disagree.

b. Managers – 31% disagree.

c. **Note:** questionnaire item for managers was “behaviorally” worded, i.e., “our planning had provisions to insure . . .”

3. Annual exercises.

a. Customers – 8% disagree.

b. Managers – 29% disagree.

4. **Promote vertical evacuation.**

a. Customers – 27% disagree.

b. Managers – 34% disagree.

c. **Note:** out of all items listed in the questionnaire, this was the item on which there was the **greatest consensus** between customers and managers.

Supplemental Considerations:

The **key message** of this section is that customers have priorities and policy preferences that **differ significantly** from those of tourist business managers. These perceptual differences are **critical** for **emergency managers** to understand as they **promote** enhanced **commitment** to disaster preparedness within the tourism industry. Some professors may wish to **expand** this section through extended discussion of additional **policy options** and elaborate on differences in the priorities reflected by alternative **stakeholders**. Additionally, the **implementation barriers** and **disaster planning processes** used within the tourist industry could be discussed (see Drabek and Gee 2000, especially sessions 11, 16, & 17; “Behavioral Studies of Tourist Manager Disaster Planning Activities”; “Customer Responses and Expectations During Disaster”; and “Employee Responses and Concerns During Disaster”).

Objective 28.5 Identify five major recommendations regarding business preparedness offered by tourists who have been victimized by disaster.

Requirements:

Use Overhead 28-7.

Remarks:

- I. Customer recommendations for improving disaster preparedness.
 - A. Group 4 report: 2 minutes.
 - B. **Display** Overhead 28-7; “Customer Recommendations for Policy Changes.”
 - C. **Supplement** Group 4 report as required through such illustrations as these (adapted from Drabek 2000, p. 55).
 1. **Evacuation plan** – 61%.

2. **Warning procedures** – 57%.
3. **Information flow** – 56%.
4. **Threat information** – 56%.
5. **Employee training** – 49%.
6. **Sheltering** – 39%.
7. **Route information** – 36%.
8. **Re-entry** – 23%.
9. **Transportation** – 21%.
10. **Personal property** – 18%.

II. Customer recommendations for improving disaster response effectiveness.

A. **Display** Overhead 28-8; “Customer Recommendations for Improving Response.”

B. **Review** examples like the following (based on Drabek 2000, pp. 56-57).

1. **Communication.**

- a. Periodic updates.
- b. Be visible and available.

2. **Proactive warnings.**

- a. Don't deny threat.
- b. Warn early, not late.

3. **Distribute hazard brochure.**

- a. Shelter locations.
- b. Maps and route information.
- c. Evacuation procedures.

4. **Train staff.**

- a. Exercise disaster plan.
- b. Role in warning and evacuation.

5. **Emergency supplies.**

- a. First aid/medical supplies.
- b. Food, water, etc.
- c. Flash lights, candles.
- d. Radio.

Supplemental Considerations:

Beyond the report from Group 4, some professors may wish to have students **explore** the ideas in this section through **extended discussion**. Students could be asked such questions as these: 1) “Based on the Drabek (2000) findings regarding **customer recommendations**, what three are most important and why?” 2) “If you were an emergency manager and were conducting a workshop for hotel executives, what six **customer oriented recommendations** would you emphasize?” and 3) “If customer satisfaction is a managerial requirement, what **level of commitment** would you make to insure an effective disaster response?”

Objective 28.6 Describe two tactics for rebuilding the image of a destination after a disaster.

Requirements:

Use Overhead 28-9.

Remarks:

- I. Tactics for rebuilding the destination image.
 - A. **Display** Overhead 28-9; “Tactics for Rebuilding the Destination Image.”
 - 1. **Customer behavior** may reflect negative images, e.g., large scale cancellations.
 - 2. **Emergency officials** may unknowingly contribute to negative images.

B. **Example:** Missionary Ridge Fire near Durango, Colorado (La Plata County) in July, 2002. “There’s a lot of businesses that are upset about those headlines. Case in point: Butch Knowlton pointing up the hill, headline ‘It could be hell on earth’ (*Herald*, July 9) does not help the tourism factor.” Bobby Lieb, executive director, La Plata Economic Development Action Partnership.” *The Durango Herald*, 2002, p. 84. **Note:** Butch Knowlton is Director of Emergency Preparedness, La Plata County.

II. Rebuilding the destination image.

A. Potential customer images.

1. **Hurricane** devastation portrayed in media, hotel cancellations follow.
2. **Wildfire** images in media, both short and long-term decline in tourism, followed by economic loss.
 - a. **Example:** 2003 Yellowstone National Park fire; lodge is not threatened by fire, but guests depart and those expected cancel reservations. “The family-owned mountain lodge, open since 1924, has seen business drop by at least 75 percent since the East fire forced closure of the park’s east entrance about 4 miles to the west.” (*The Denver Post*, August 20, 2003, p. 1B).
 - b. **Example:** 2002 Missionary Ridge fire near Durango, Colorado.
 - 1) Fire was followed by severe rain storms which “. . . washed fire debris into the Florida Valley, tearing out guard rails along Florida Road (County Road 240), ripping down trees and sending cars, gates, concrete barriers and even people into ditches and streams.” *The Durango Herald*, 2002, p. 79.
 - 2) Local business owners responded (Example quotations from *The Durango Herald* 2002, p. 95).
 - a) “Vallecito business people pooled money to advertise.”
 - b) “They fought what they called negative media images of scorched forests, incinerated homes and mudslides.”

c) “Tourism promoters in both Vallecito and Durango did what they could to keep tourists from being frightened away.”

3) Despite these and other tactics, hotel and motel sales tax collections fell by 23 percent between July, 2002 and July, 2003. “Last year hotels and restaurants took a huge hit from the Missionary Ridge Fire. Although customers are returning, business from group tours has been down this summer . . .” *The Durango Herald*, August 27, 2003, p. 1B.

B. Business manager priority.

1. **Refer students** to the last questionnaire item in Exhibit 1 of the Drabek (2000) study (assigned Student Reading, p. 53).
2. **Read item:** “A major priority for local government following any disaster should be a media-awareness campaign to ensure that prospective tourists know the community has recovered and businesses are open.”

a. **Drabek survey** (2000, p. 53).

1) Customers – 80% agreed.

2) Managers – 93% agreed.

b. Most disaster **impacts are localized** in scope; sharp contrast to media projected images.

c. **Reservation holders** can be contacted by e-mail or telephone and be given encouragement and accurate information.

d. **Known market areas** can be provided with advertisements in both print and electronic media to correct negative images.

III. Three proven tactics.

A. Establish toll-free telephone lines.

1. **Example:** forty days after Hurricane Iniki, updates on Kauai were made available via toll-free fax and phone lines (Durocher 1994, p. 69).
2. **Objectives** of toll-free information lines include (adapted from WTO/WMO 1998, p. 65).

- a. To respond to the public's questions about the disaster.
- b. To reduce the spread of rumors about the disaster.
- c. As a means of promoting tourism despite the disaster.
- d. To track advertising response.
- e. To provide an avenue for the public to express their concern for the disaster victims.

B. Press trips and familiarization tours.

- 1. Travel writers, journalists, travel agents, and tour operators play a vital role (Ahmed 1991, p. 26).
- 2. Travel professionals are more likely to promote a destination if they have **accurate information**.
- 3. Following a disaster, local officials and/or local business associations should organize press tours and familiarization trips for the travel trade so they can **see for themselves** the impact of the disaster, the recovery efforts and the redevelopment process.
- 4. Press and familiarization trips can help **correct misconceptions and misinformation** about the disaster.
- 5. **Example:** following the 1985 earthquake in Mexico, on-site tours were organized for travel writers, travel agents, tour wholesalers, and members of the various North American travel associations, e.g., Mexico City and Acapulco.

C. Media promotions.

- 1. **Example:** Hurricane Andrew (1992) (adapted from Pottorff and Neal 1994, p. 119).
 - a. Although the Florida Keys experienced minimal damage, the hotel occupancy in the southernmost Keys dropped drastically to five percent in the week after Andrew.
 - b. To correct inaccuracies in news reports, a promotional blitz was launched, i.e., "Paradise Wasn't Lost."

2. **Example:** Hurricane Hugo (1989) (adapted from Pottorff and Neal 1994, p. 119).
 - a. Officials and business leaders in the city of Myrtle Beach decided to fund an advertising and promotion campaign, \$1.5 million.
 - b. The campaign was entitled: “Our Smiles Are Back. Bring Yours.”
 - c. The campaign included extensive video news releases and feature-photo releases to television stations and newspapers throughout the United States and Canada.

Supplemental Considerations:

The key **message** of this section is to **enhance** student understanding of the **economic impacts** of disaster on the tourism industry and conversely on local communities. Also, emergency managers and other local officials may **inadvertently contribute** to negative **public images** of the post-disaster environment. Such contributions may **stimulate conflict** with sectors of the business community and erode the credibility of the emergency management program. The **clash of priorities** and perspectives will be examined more in depth during two upcoming sessions through an in-class simulation exercise focused on **mitigation**. Since, the wildfire hazard will serve as the focal point, the professor may wish to use this section as a way to “set the stage,” i.e., Session Nos. 34 and 35, “Disaster Mitigation Exercise” and “Exercise Analysis”. Some professors may wish to point out additional complexities such as these: 1) seasonal tourism businesses are more economically vulnerable to disasters that occur during or immediately prior to the tourist season at that location (e.g., Hurricane Hugo occurred near the end of the tourist season); 2) the economic costs of recovering from a disaster may leave chambers of commerce, businesses, and local governments without the financial resources to pay for post-disaster promotion; and 3) media organizations are less interested in promotional stories after disasters, especially when new events occur.

Course Developer References:

- I. Ahmed, Zafar U. 1991. “Marketing Your Community: Correcting a Negative Image.” *Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly* 31:24-27.
- II. Dahlhamer, James M. and Melvin J. D’Souza. 1997. “Determinants of Business-Disaster Preparedness in Two U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 15:265-281.
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