

AMERICAN CIVIL DEFENSE 1945 - 1984
THE EVOLUTION OF PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

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ABSTRACT

This monograph examines the modern civil defense system from its inception to the present. The evolution of policies and programs is examined on the basis of five determinants: international crisis and change; quality of civil defense leadership and planning; congressional support and appropriations; presidential interest and support; and defense policy. This review is presented in terms of presidential administrations between 1945 and 1984. The Truman years were characterized by disagreement over what branch and level of government should be responsible for civil defense. The program also suffered from poor leadership during this period. Leadership problems also persisted in the Eisenhower years, coupled with the necessity for frequent policy change arising out of accelerated growth and greater understanding of nuclear weapon technology. A defense policy and corresponding programs of "Massive Retaliation" left little funding for civil defense programs. Although civil defense experienced a shaky start in the Kennedy administration, it soon began to enjoy its greatest growth and support thus far. For example, a nationwide system of fallout shelters was created during this period. The first part of the Johnson administration was marked by defense policy confusion, chiefly centered on the viability of Anti-Ballistic Missiles. As the confusion wore on, the concept of mutually-assured destruction grew, and civil defense appropriations shrank. Despite President Nixon's expressed interest in civil defense, budget requests reached an all time low during his administration. The "dual-use" policy, combining attack planning with disaster planning, was officially implemented during this time. Federal money was distributed to state and local agencies. Crisis Relocation (or evacuation) Planning characterized the Ford administration, with conflicts developing over federal funding of dual-use programs. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) became a part of the new Federal Emergency Management Agency under the Carter administration. President Reagan's civil defense budget request was attacked as "warfighting strategy", even though the use of civil defense funds for peacetime disasters was explicitly authorized for the first time. The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) was a response to those criticisms. This monograph concludes that the U.S. cannot expect to achieve a significant level of attack preparedness at current budget levels; but that the IEMS multi-hazard emergency management approach may be endorsed by the Congressional committees concerned.

PREFACE

Many emergency managers -- especially those new to the emergency management profession -- may not be aware of the dynamics that have affected the evolution of civil defense policies and programs. This monograph explores that evolution from a national defense, and civil defense, policy perspective. Those emergency managers who are not new to the profession may find this monograph particularly informative in that it explains the reasons behind some of the sudden, and often confusing, policy shifts that have occurred during the past 40 years.

This monograph provides an opportunity for all emergency management personnel to understand the conflicts surrounding civil defense at the federal level, and the interrelationship of technology, defense policy, and civil defense policy. It is a summary of a doctoral dissertation on the history of post World War II civil defense in the U.S. written in 1980 and updated in 1984 by Dr. William K. Chipman, Chief, Civil Defense Division, Office of Civil Preparedness, National Preparedness Programs, of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Recent movies on network and cable television have sparked significant public interest in the subject of civil defense. Similarly, reports in the news media regarding massive civil defense efforts by the Soviet Union have created interest in this Country's state of readiness.

Not only does this monograph tell us where we are, but it also explains how we got here.

INTRODUCTION

A combination of events in recent years has brought to the fore the issue of civil defense. Not since the civil defense debate of the early 1960's has this issue been the object of so much concern, speculation, and controversy. There has been, and continues to be, much talk of massive soviet efforts in civil defense that are so extensive as to undermine deterrence and indicate that the Soviets are, in conjunction with the continuation of a build-up in conventional and nuclear forces, seeking a war-fighting and perhaps war-winning capability.

In the United States, this development has prompted some to advocate that the U.S. follow suit and parallel the Soviet efforts. The Central Intelligence Agency has estimated that this would cost the U.S. roughly \$3 billion a year.¹ (The U.S. currently spends about \$170 million per year on civil defense.) Some have urged that the U.S. at least get serious about civil defense and augment current efforts (virtually non-existent) to the point that U.S. civil defense capabilities will be of some value, either in a nuclear confrontation or crisis or in a nuclear attack. U.S. programs involving average annual expenditures of \$1.00 to \$1.60 per capita are most often noted. On the other hand, there are those whose views range from skepticism to disbelief concerning the claims made in the U.S. and the Soviet Union relating to Soviet civil defense. Some argue that civil defense, whether in the U.S. or the Soviet Union, can never be so effective as to outpace the offensive or undermine deterrence.

Running through this debate, on virtually all sides of all the issues, is a phenomenon that in at least one respect parallels the earlier 1960's debate on civil defense -- massive ignorance of civil defense capabilities, purposes, programs, policies, proposals, and possibilities.²

Several observations are in order based on a doctoral study of the evolution of civil defense policies and programs in the United States for the period 1945 to 1974 and recent experience.³ First, contrary to an often-repeated refrain, civil defense can work. Indeed, every government study of civil defense published during the years covered by this study has indicated that civil defense measures can make a difference of tens of millions of lives saved in a nuclear attack. How, then, does one reconcile this with the fact that as of 1984 -- 35 years after the Federal Civil Defense Administration was formed -- the U.S. has only a rudimentary civil defense system? The major problems of civil defense are not, and have not been, technical problems, but rather social and political ones. That is, technical capabilities have not necessarily determined the evolution of civil defense policies and programs in the United States in the post-World War II era. Rather, there have been five major non-technical determinants of U.S. civil defense policy:

- International crisis and change
- Quality of civil defense leadership and planning
- Congressional support and appropriations
- Presidential interest and support
- Defense policy.

This monograph analyzes the role of the aforementioned determinants in shaping U.S. civil defense policy from 1945 through 1984.

THE TRUMAN YEARS

Prior to 1949 -- despite the findings and recommendations of such studies as the Strategic Bombing Survey Report, the Bull Board Report, and the Hopley Report,⁴ as well as the calls by State and local government for a Federally-led civil defense effort -- President Truman declined to promote a permanent Federal-level civil defense organization or program. Instead, he concluded that civil defense was basically a State and local responsibility, with the Federal role to emphasize planning for future crisis-implemented contingencies. The military were of the same mind. At the time, defense policy revolved around containment of the Soviet Union, while defense budgets were constrained in an effort to balance the budget and provide economic aid to Europe. Thus, military leaders were unresponsive to suggestions that civil defense become a responsibility of the military establishment for fear that it would eat into already meager defense budgets. Moreover, it was not perceived that the United States would face the prospect of atomic attack in the near future. Indeed, the Finletter Commission Report to the President of January 1948 predicted that the Soviets would not be able to produce an atomic bomb by earlier than 1953.

However, the Soviets exploded their first atomic device in August 1949. The following June, North Korea invaded the South. Then, in November, the People's Republic of China intervened in force, pushing U.N. forces back all along the front. In Washington, concern grew that Korea was a diversion to tie U.S. forces down as a prelude to attacks in Europe. There was even speculation that Soviet attacks against the U.S., itself, were a possibility. It was in this crisis atmosphere that President Truman established the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) in December 1949. Congress quickly followed suit and passed both the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (giving the FCDA statutory authority) and the Defense Production Act (setting guidelines for industrial dispersal).

As enacted, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 gave the FCDA authority to draw up plans and to provide the States and their political subdivisions with guidance, coordination and assistance, training, and matching grants on a fifty-fifty basis for the procurement of supplies and equipment. The FCDA was further instructed to provide for the sheltering and evacuation of the population where appropriate. For these purposes, the FCDA in its first Congressional appropriation request sought \$403 million as the initial installment of a civil defense program that would eventually involve total expenditure of some \$3 billion. The heart of the program would be the establishment of a nationwide shelter system. Towards this end, \$250 million was requested to begin the implementation of a three-stage shelter program which would (1) locate existing shelter, (2) upgrade potential shelter, and (3) construct new shelter in deficit areas in the Nation's "critical target cities" as designated by the FCDA and the Department of Defense. Of the \$403 million, however, the Congress approved only \$31.75 million.

There were several reasons for this drastic cut in the FCDA's initial appropriation request. First, by March 1951 when the FCDA presented its appropriation request to the Congress, the crisis atmosphere in Washington had waned as the war in Korea began to stabilize and as Soviet military action in Europe failed to materialize. Secondly, the Congressional appropriations committees (par-

ticularly key members such as Clarence Cannon and Albert Thomas of the House) disagreed with the philosophy of the new Civil Defense Administration and to some extent with the basic law. Noting that the basic law proclaimed that civil defense was primarily a State and local responsibility, these committees argued that the FCDA should not preoccupy itself with the procurement of "expensive things" such as shelters and stockpiles of food, medical supplies, and engineering equipment. Rather, the FCDA was told that its responsibility lay primarily in the areas of training, planning, and guidance.

Finally, there was some Congressional concern regarding the quality of FCDA leadership and planning. Millard Caldwell, the Director of the Agency, was an ex-Governor with no civil defense background who displayed a combative attitude in Congressional hearings. Both he and other FCDA officials at times had difficulty in adequately answering committee questions concerning civil defense policies and programs. For years, civil defense would suffer because of the Director's statement that it would take \$300 billion to provide a comprehensive civil defense system in the United States. He then compounded this mistake by his inability to define this system in terms of the number of lives that would be saved through such an expenditure. Despite the fact that the \$300 billion figure was only an initial "top of the head" estimate and the FCDA had no intention of seeking a nationwide deep-blast shelter construction program for every man, woman, and child (as was envisioned under the \$300 billion program), the impression was conveyed that an enormous program was envisioned; and that if the FCDA's plans were approved, such an enormous expenditure of funds might ultimately be involved, even though there was no conviction as to expected results. In Congressional debates over civil defense, this comprehensive "ultimate" conception of a civil defense system was transformed into the "merely adequate." It was argued that the expenditure of even a few paltry millions for civil defense would be foolish given the "fact" that it would take \$300 billion (an impossible sum) to provide a merely adequate system.

The impression made by FCDA officials before the Appropriations Committees concerning the shelter program that was actually proposed was little better. Prior to, and during, the appropriations process in its first year of existence, the FCDA exhibited some confusion over the scope and nature of its shelter program. At various times, FCDA officials spoke of the construction of huge underground community shelters, of subsidies for family shelter construction, of subsidies for private and public dual-use shelter construction, and of surveys for the identification of existing shelters to be followed by a shelter modification program. It was for this final concept that \$250 million was sought in the FY 1951 budget request. Curious as to how the FCDA had arrived at such a nice round figure, the House Appropriations Committee was told by an FCDA official that a massive job was ahead and that this sum had been decided on as a good first start. In other words, this was an arbitrary decision. But, FCDA witnesses could not say exactly what the \$250 million would purchase or how many lives might be saved because of this expenditure. The program was not approved.

While such confusion and lack of precision by a new agency about a new program may be understandable, the FCDA's insistence on presenting the same \$250 million figure for the following two years is not. Thus, for the remaining two years, of the Truman Administration, the FY 1951 civil defense appropriation process was repeated. FCDA sought budgets in the hundreds of millions each year, and each

year the Appropriations Committees cut the civil defense appropriation to a small fraction of the original request. Despite this, the FCDA intransigently stuck to its original estimates. Appropriations Committee reports of the time referred to nebulous FCDA planning, to lack of coordination with other Government agencies, to conceptual problems within the FCDA, and to unrealistic organizational structuring. This was unfortunate in that lasting impressions of probity and reputability were made during these initial agency-committee meetings.

If the performance of Federal civil defense officials was not exemplary during the Truman Administration, neither was the performance of the Congress after the passage of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. A few congressmen, such as Estes Kefauver and Brien McMahon, sought to resolve the differences between the FCDA and the Appropriations Committees. They were incredulous that the Appropriations Committees should cut the civil defense requests so drastically and sought to amend these bills on the floor, but with little or no success. Loose planning and loose justification language worked to the detriment of the FCDA during these floor debates. Concerned with balanced budgets, economy, and eliminating waste, and preoccupied with current appropriation requests, the Committees failed to take a long-term view of the need for civil defense for some future era or crisis. Some, such as Representatives Cannon and Thomas in the House, held conceptions of civil defense that differed radically from the intent of the basic legislation. They believed that the FCDA was trying to undertake tasks that were more properly the responsibility of the citizen, the local community, and the State.

For his part, President Truman supported the programs sponsored by the FCDA -- after the Korean War provided the wherewithal to develop an operational Federal organization. He approved civil defense requests totaling more than one-and-a-half billion dollars over three years, and scolded the Congress when it refused to appropriate more than a small fraction of this amount. He did not, however, make an issue of the Congressional cuts or move beyond his statements of criticism as some thought he should -- resulting in the charge that he gave the program only lip service. There were, for Truman, other and higher priority concerns than civil defense.

THE EISENHOWER YEARS

Early during his Administration, President Eisenhower indicated that he agreed with the philosophy of the Appropriations Committees in relation to the sharing of civil defense responsibilities. Civil defense responsibilities belonged preponderantly to State and local governments, with the job of the Federal Government being defined in terms of guidance, technical information, and support of a medical and engineering materials stockpile program. Proposals to establish a nationwide shelter system were quickly shelved. Eisenhower also chose a new Civil Defense Director (ex-Governor Val Peterson) whose views were similar to his own.

A new civil defense policy soon emerged as a result of the explosion of a Soviet hydrogen weapon in 1953 and the partial release of information soon thereafter, on the effects of the 1952 U.S. hydrogen explosion. The blast and thermal

effects of these weapons were so enormously destructive that FCDA Director Peterson decided that the cities would be doomed in a nuclear attack; therefore, the only alternative was to replace the sidetracked shelter concept with an evacuation policy.

Hardly had this policy been publicized, however, when the March 1954 BRAVO hydrogen bomb explosion brought to the fore the lethal hazard of long-range radioactive fallout. Prior to the testing of ground-level hydrogen weapons, the fallout threat had been thought of as a concern only in the immediate vicinity of an explosion -- and, even then, not a deadly concern. Given the knowledge that lethal radioactive fallout could cover thousands of square miles, sheltering regained theoretical importance. It would be foolhardy, it was argued to seek to play cat and mouse with unseen and deadly fallout radiation. Nevertheless, throughout 1954 and 1955, the Eisenhower Administration stayed with evacuation as its basic civil defense policy. Programs for shelter were restricted to planning a search for the best possible shelter during a severe crisis or evacuation. (One such plan, for example, envisioned the digging of trenches along the Nation's highways during an evacuation so that when the warning of impending attack was given, shelter could be found in the trenches, which would then be covered with tarpaper to keep the fallout out.)

Such planning, and the refusal of the Administration to pour Federal funds into a fallout shelter system, created considerable difficulties for FCDA Director Val Peterson before two Congressional committees which had taken an interest in civil defense. These were Senator Estes Kefauver's Armed Services Subcommittee and Representative Chet Holifield's Military Operations Subcommittee. Both committees undertook lengthy investigations of civil defense during Eisenhower's first term.

Both the Kefauver and Holifield investigations heightened interest in civil defense and precipitated Administration initiative. Holifield was particularly determined to see the creation of a nationwide shelter system and had little regard for the Administration's evacuation policy. Peterson had little option but to support the Administration's position before Holifield's committee, nevertheless, his handling of the shelter/evacuation controversy was not exemplary. The same can be said of his relationship with the Congressional Appropriations Committees, which remained strained despite Peterson's attempts to improve relations.

The Congressional Appropriations Committees (particularly the House Committee) continued to cut civil defense requests by significant percentages. Although the level of appropriations for civil defense during Eisenhower's first term was an improvement over the Truman era level (appropriations rose from an average of \$50 million to an average of almost \$65 million -- a 28 percent improvement), the House Appropriations Committee continued to adhere to a concept of civil defense that differed from that held by the FCDA. Thus, before the House Appropriations Committee, Peterson was criticized for trying to do too much, and before Holifield's Committee he was criticized for not trying to do more and for not doing better with the limited resources at his disposal.

During Eisenhower's second term, the pace of civil defense evolution quickened. Chet Holifield introduced legislation (H.R. 2125) which called for (1) the reorganization of civil defense into a Cabinet-level Executive Department; (2) the

establishment of civil defense as a primarily Federal, rather than primarily State, local, and citizen responsibility; and (3) the creation of a nationwide shelter system. Similarly, the FCDA performed an about-face and submitted a proposal recommending a change of policy incorporating the development of a shelter system, with an estimated price tag of \$32 billion.

Reacting to these developments, Eisenhower did two things. First, the Administration submitted its own amendments to the basic legislation (the most important of which called for a new era of "joint" Federal and State/local responsibility). In that these amendments were not as far-reaching as Holifield's bill and were Presidentially supported, they received a wider range of Congressional support and were subsequently enacted.

The second Presidential initiative was to appoint, in April 1957, a committee to study the FCDA shelter proposal. This was the Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee which came to be referred to as "the Gaither Committee." The panel soon widened the scope of its investigation to include national security policy in general, and it is for its work and recommendations in this broader area that the panel gained national attention. In its report and presentation before the President and the National Security Council, the panel presented a rather alarming estimate of adverse U.S.-Soviet military trends. After providing an analysis of the low state of active and passive U.S. defenses, the panel made a series of recommendations calling for improvements in the SAC force; a speed-up of work on IRBM's, ICBM's, and the Polaris IRBM system; the hardening of ICBM sites; the improvement of tactical warning systems; the provision of an ABM system and an increase in conventional force size and capability. While the panel accorded the highest priority to these military measures, it also noted that these would be "insufficient" unless they were "coupled with measures to reduce the extreme vulnerability of our people and our cities."⁵ The committee, therefore, proposed programs for both active and passive defense. In terms of passive defense, the committee recommended:

A nationwide fallout shelter program to protect the civil population. This seems the only feasible protection for millions of people who will be increasingly exposed to the hazards of radiation. The Panel has been unable to identify any other type of defense likely to save more lives for the same money in the event of a nuclear attack.⁶

The panel, therefore, recommended the expenditure of \$25 billion for a civil defense fallout shelter system over a multi-year period. This, it was argued, would "save nearly half the casualties" should nuclear war break out.

President Eisenhower, however, did not agree with many of the Gaither recommendations, including the proposed fallout shelter program. The proposals flew in the face of his economic and foreign policies. Balanced budgets and economy in government were cherished goals throughout Eisenhower's tenure in office. In addition, he was trying to create an atmosphere of peace by easing Cold War tensions. A significant (or massive) step-up in defense (or civil defense) might jeopardize this budding environment. These views were buttressed by close advisors, such as John Foster Dulles, who opposed a shelter program for a variety of reasons. Moreover, Eisenhower must have been aware of the problems a multi-billion dollar shelter program would face in Congress.

Even though Eisenhower was adamant in refusing to sponsor a Federally-funded nationwide fallout shelter program, the calls for Federal leadership in the civil defense field hardly diminished. In addition to the pressure created by the Holifield Committee and the Gaither Report was the pressure created when the Soviet Union fired the world's first successful ICBM in August 1957, followed in October by the first successful launching of an earth-orbiting satellite -- the 184 pound Sputnik-1. In typical Washington fashion, the Administration reacted by reorganization. In a move publicized as promoting progress in the civil defense field, the FCDA and the Office of Defense Mobilization were reorganized into the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Another ex-Governor Leo Hoegh of Iowa, assumed leadership of the new organization.

The reorganization, however, had little real impact upon civil defense even though a "National Plan" was promulgated shortly thereafter calling for the States and local political jurisdictions to create a shelter system with the Federal Government providing advice and guidance. It is hardly surprising that the Congress, noting a lack of strong Presidential interest in civil defense during the Eisenhower years, significantly cut each successive civil defense budget presented to it. These cuts elicited little response from the military. Defense policy during the Eisenhower Administration was governed by the theory of "Massive Retaliation." In the military, the offense reigned supreme. Voices calling for more emphasis on active defense had to shout to be heard in this context. Passive defense was given no serious consideration. Many in the military perceived civil defense as a manifestation of a "Marginot Line" mentality.

THE KENNEDY YEARS

Under President Kennedy, the leadership of civil defense would improve vastly, but not before another political appointment resulted in a man -- Frank B. Ellis -- who would call for a "revival for survival" and who would seek to visit the Pope in order to publicize civil defense and persuade him to incorporate fallout shelters in church-owned buildings. This mission was aborted, but another blow had been dealt to the reputation of civil defense. Nor was the reputation of civil defense enhanced with the ambiguities in a July 1961 speech by Kennedy relating to what the individual citizen could or should do, combined with the Berlin Crisis atmosphere, to produce what was seen from Washington as a fallout shelter "scare."

To the credit of the Administration, civil defense planning was quickly righted and placed on firmer ground when it was made known that civil defense was not to be based primarily on individual initiative and backyard family shelters, but rather on the development of a Federally-based nationwide fallout shelter system. The reputation of civil defense was enhanced by the selection of a man of high caliber, Stewart Pittman, to head the new Office of Civil Defense created within the Pentagon -- a move which indicated the seriousness with which the Administration viewed civil defense.

The reasoning behind President Kennedy's reorientation of civil defense was succinctly stated by him during a "Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs," on May 25, 1961:

One major element of the national security program which this Nation has never squarely faced up to is civil defense. This problem arises not from present trends, but from past inaction. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety of programs, but we have never adopted a consistent policy. Public considerations have been largely characterized by apathy, indifference, and skepticism; while, at the same time, many of the civil defense plans proposed have been so far-reaching or unrealistic that they have not gained essential support.

This administration has been looking very hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guarantee against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack.

We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is so strong and so invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response. If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute.

But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, or an accidental war which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. The nature of modern warfare heightens these possibilities. It is on this basis that civil defense can readily be justified -- as insurance for the civilian population in the event of such a miscalculation. It is insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.

In order to implement his new civil defense policy, President Kennedy submitted to the Congress a supplemental request for \$207.6 million -- a sum approximately twice that of the civil defense requests presented during the Eisenhower Administration. And, for the first time in the post-World War II era, the Congress approved the entire amount. With these funds, the new Office of Civil Defense (OCD) instituted a survey of all existing fallout shelter space in the country. Appropriate spaces would then be marked and stocked with food, water, and other survival supplies.

The following year, Kennedy authorized a civil defense request for \$695 million to continue the shelter survey, marking, and stockpiling program and to implement two new programs which would decrease the deficit of existing shelter:

- (1) a shelter incentive program involving the payment of Federal funds (under specific conditions) to non-profit institutions engaged in health, education and welfare activities, for construction or modification of public

fallout shelters for 50 or more people; (2) a Federal-buildings shelter program involving the stimulation of individual, business, and community shelter construction through the example of shelter incorporation in Federal buildings.

Because there was some doubt that these two new programs could be adequately implemented without explicit authorizing legislation, the Administration felt compelled to transmit to the Congress the draft of a bill seeking such authorization. In both the House and the Senate, however, hearings on this legislation were delayed, with the result that no appropriations could be made for these programs. Moreover, the Appropriations Committees cut the funds for approved programs to roughly half of the previous year's appropriation.

Several factors help explain the FY 1963 appropriations cutback and the failure of Congress to authorize the incentive and Federal-buildings programs. The Berlin Crisis atmosphere, which had spurred the passage of the \$207.6 million supplemental appropriation the year before, had passed. By early 1962, the level of civil defense involvement and concern on the part of the general population had just about receded to the pre-crisis level and, in Congress, the Berlin Crisis similarly had little legacy value in terms of civil defense.

Some in Congress still argued that civil defense was primarily a State, local community, and citizen responsibility. Others, like Albert Thomas, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee responsible for approving civil defense appropriations, did not think that most civil defense programs would work or were worthwhile. For example, he did not think that cities the size of the Nation's capital or larger could be evacuated in less than two weeks' time. Neither did he think that sheltering was a worthwhile concept. Thomas frequently related a conversation he had with the Mayor of Hamburg after World War II in which the Mayor had stated that as a result of his experiences during the bombings of Hamburg, he had concluded that the best place to be when the bombs fell was outdoors rather than in shelters. Thomas further agreed with the Mayor's assertion that the stockpiling of medical and survival supplies was a waste of money in that the U.S. already had an adequate and distributed stockpile system -- corner drugstores -- which, as Thomas put it, were "everywhere."

A final reason that the OCD's FY 1963 appropriation request and legislative proposals were treated in the manner they were is that President Kennedy was no longer as committed to civil defense as he had been in 1961. Kennedy had been disturbed by the nature of the "national debate on civil defense" which had followed his July 1961 speech on the Berlin Crisis. Civil defense officials have noted that his commitment to civil defense began to deteriorate as the controversy heightened. After the crisis ended, he made a decision to maintain a low civil defense profile in the future, while quietly pursuing the enhancement of the system. On the Hill, however, Kennedy's cooling support was duly noted; and, in all likelihood, contributed to congressional budgetary cuts and legislative inactivity on civil defense.

For these reasons, the prospects for civil defense seemed much dimmer by September 1962 than they had just 12 months earlier. In that same month, however, one of those developments which occur from time to time in inter-

national relations began to simmer. Before October was over, a full-blown crisis had developed which brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war. At this point, some Congressmen openly doubted the wisdom of the recent slashing of civil defense funds.

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was an eye-opener in many respects. All over the country, people were asking their civil defense directors (if they had them) what they could do, where they could go, and why wasn't more being done? On the Federal level, shortly following the crisis, Kennedy ordered a speed-up in the marking and stockpiling of shelters, and the requirements for shelter qualifications were relaxed, allowing a rapid increase in the size of the fallout shelter system. In the Congress, Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee, who had up to this time refused to sanction hearings on the OCD's proposed shelter incentive program, withdrew his objections and scheduled hearings on the legislation. These began in May 1963 and, although no one expected it at this time, evolved into the most thorough examination of civil defense ever undertaken by a committee on Congress.⁷

Even though the Cuban Missile Crisis was only a few months in the past, and had provided the spark which allowed these hearings to take place, the great majority of the Congressmen comprising the subcommittee was skeptical of, if not opposed to, the legislation. The Chairman of the subcommittee (F. Edward Hebert, Dem., LA.) seemed to delight in calling witness after witness to testify in opposition to the legislation, in particular, and civil defense, in general. Over the next few months, however, one by one the subcommittee members were turned-off by the fatuous nature of much of the testimony that was offered by the peace and religious groups comprising the bulk of those opposing the legislation. Such testimony was in stark contrast to the cool, objective, reasoned testimony of the OCD officials who appeared before the committee, especially that of OCD Director, Stewart Pittman, who capably countered, point by point, the more germane of the criticisms leveled against the civil defense program. For Pittman, the basic issue was simple enough:

It was whether to face a crisis with a well-conceived plan to contain the psychological and physical damage of a nuclear crisis or a nuclear attack, or whether to turn the other way until the last possible moment?

Not only did Hebert's House Appropriations Subcommittee agree and vote to support the OCD shelter program, but Chairman Hebert personally lobbied with other Congressmen for support. The efforts of Hebert and the subcommittee were successful. In September 1963, the House passed the long fought for civil defense legislation (H.R. 8200).⁸ A major battle had been won by civil defense proponents; some thought the major battle. But, before this measure could become law, the Senate (perennially more supportive of civil defense than the House) would also have to approve. Even then, there would still be a very hazardous bridge to cross in the form of the Thomas House Appropriations Subcommittee. Momentum, however, seemed to be with civil defense. The House was now on record formally sanctioning the completion of the shelter system.

In October and November, though, another major setback occurred. In October, the Thomas House Appropriations Subcommittee slashed OCD's FY 1964 appropriation request of \$346.9 million to \$87.8 million. Thomas stated that, unlike the

Hebert subcommittee, "We haven't changed our minds. We're not building any fallout shelters, period." Moreover, the Thomas committee attached two provisions to their bill preventing the OCD from using any of the approved funds for the continuation of the shelter survey and stocking program or for the provision of fallout shelters in Federal buildings. Any chance that the Senate might restore the funds to initiate the new programs was then dashed when Senator Henry Jackson's Senate Armed Services Subcommittee failed to hold hearings on the proposed legislation.

How President Kennedy might have reacted to these developments can only be surmised, since the final Conference Report on the FY 1964 appropriation was not released until December 10, 1963 -- 18 days after the President's assassination in Dallas, Texas. What is clear, however, is that President Kennedy came into office and began a program of civil defense that offered the prospect of saving millions from death due to radioactive fallout in the event of nuclear attack.

It is also clear that Kennedy had been disturbed by the so-called "shelter mania" that hit the Nation after his July Berlin Crisis speech. He decided shortly thereafter that a responsible civil defense program would have to be a low-keyed program -- based on Federal funds, rather than private efforts. Although Kennedy declined to speak to the Nation on civil defense matters after the July speech, he remained committed to mitigating the effects of nuclear destruction on the population as shown by the size of the OCD budget requests he approved, as well as his actions following the Cuban Missile Crisis.

President Kennedy left a civil defense program that was beginning to reach effective levels of operational readiness. At the time of his death in November 1963, the shelter survey he initiated had located 110 million shelter spaces -- more than twice the number anticipated. Of these, 70 million were immediately usable and had been approved by building owners for shelter use in time of emergency, and 14 million of these spaces had been stocked. But, as the events of latter 1963 indicate, Kennedy's program would be working under severe handicaps, unless the Congressional roadblocks to the continuation of his program could be lifted. Moreover, the lifting of the appropriations roadblock to the funding of Federal shelters would be virtually meaningless unless the Senate Armed Services Committee passed H.R. 8200 authorizing the incentive program. These items would have to be dealt with during the term of Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Baines Johnson. The success or failure of Kennedy's civil defense program was not only left to Lyndon Johnson and those who served him, but to their ability to persuade key Congressional leaders to support the program.

THE JOHNSON YEARS

Civil defense during the Kennedy years had undergone a metamorphosis. From a system which was nothing but a series of paper plans, the beginnings of a nationwide system of fallout shelters had been created; and civil defense had been upgraded organizationally with its placement in the Department of Defense.

The key factor in this metamorphosis was the Presidential involvement of John F. Kennedy. This commitment was vital to civil defense progress. As Kennedy's

commitment to civil defense increased in the wake of the perceived "shelter mania" of 1961, so did Congressional appropriations and support. Nevertheless, President Kennedy gave a spark of life to civil defense; and although his commitment weakened, the spark was never extinguished.

Thus, as Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency, the key question for civil defense was whether he would continue his predecessor's commitment to civil defense. At first, the answer to this question was to be a tentative "yes," for Johnson vowed to continue with Kennedy's policies and advisors. Much of the responsibility for civil defense, then, would rest with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. As the President's advisor and spokesman on defense matters -- including civil defense -- McNamara's statements and actions in the civil defense field would be most important.

As 1964 began, it appeared that McNamara's commitment to civil defense had increased. In January and February, before the Armed Services Committees and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees of the Congress, McNamara appeared to open a new campaign for Congressional support for civil defense. From the statements made by McNamara before these committees, it appeared that the Defense Department no longer considered civil defense as merely prudent insurance, as Kennedy had stated in 1961, but rather as "an integral and essential part of our overall defense posture." Indeed, McNamara noted at one point, in reference to the Nation's strategic offensive and defensive forces, that ...

... a well planned and executed nationwide civil defense program centered around fallout shelters could contribute much more, dollar for dollar, to the saving of lives in the event of a nuclear attack upon the United States than any further increases in either of those two programs.⁹

As future events would indicate, however, not all was necessarily as it seemed. Following the passage of H.R. 8200 in the House of Representatives in September of 1963, Senator Henry Jackson at last scheduled hearings on the proposed civil defense legislation before his Senate Armed Services Subcommittee. Beginning in December of 1963 and continuing into early 1964, the case for the fallout shelter incentive program (and for civil defense) was, in Stewart Pittman's words, presented even "more concisely and more effectively" than before the Hebert committee.¹⁰ As had been the case before the Hebert committee, a number of spokesmen appeared in opposition to the legislation (primarily representing religious and peace groups). Nevertheless, according to Pittman, a majority of the subcommittee appeared supportive. Upon the close of the hearings, however, Senator Jackson indicated that he would defer action on the legislation "unless he had a clear sign from the President that the Administration wanted the program."

According to Pittman's account of this development, Senator Jackson was concerned that the Administration was not behind the program. He, therefore, did not want "to go out in front" on this issue unless the Administration affirmed its support of H.R. 8200. Pittman "promised that this would happen before the scheduled markup session of his Subcommittee" in early March. In Pittman's words:

I asked Secretary McNamara to send a short memorandum to the President urging him to sign an attached note to Senator Jackson. The memorandum went to the White House, but I was unable to determine what had happened to it for several crucial days. At the Subcommittee meeting at which Senator Jackson intended to defer the matter, I was allowed 15 minutes to report on the President's position. My telephone calls to Mac Bundy the night before and outside the hearing room established that there was doubt about whether Secretary McNamara really meant what he had asked the President to do. In response to my last call from outside the hearing room, Bundy said he would talk to McNamara and call back. There was no call. I appeared empty-handed and Senator Jackson deferred action as he said he would. On returning to my office, I was given the explanation that the President appreciated the effort, but that there was not enough time to resolve the matter.

In an effort to mitigate the effect on OCD morale that revelation of the President's lack of support for civil defense would create, Pittman drafted the following statement which Jackson agreed to sign and present as the public explanation for his subcommittee's action:

This decision was based on several factors not necessarily related to the substance of the bill. Principally among them is the fact that ballistic missile defense and the shelter program have been closely related and it is believed that a decision as to both should be similarly related. Likewise, all programs involving the expenditure of Federal funds must be closely reviewed in the light of the current program of economy.

Given the nature of the civil defense-ABM connection, this statement led some observers to assume (correctly) that this explanation was but a smokescreen (but for the incorrect reasons).

It was true that for several months the Department of Defense and OCD had drawn attention to the complementary relationship between civil defense and ABM's. On February 6, 1963, for example, McNamara told the House Department of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that "the effectiveness of an active ballistic missile defense system in saving lives depends in large part upon the availability of adequate fallout shelters for the population."¹¹ The reason for this was the ease with which an ABM system could be circumvented simply by exploding large ground-level bursts upwind of cities and beyond the range of ABM's. The resulting fallout would kill large percentages of urban populations downwind unless fallout shelters were provided. Thus, McNamara told the subcommittee that "it would be foolhardy to spend funds of this magnitude (\$3 billion for the Nike-Zeus) without accompanying it with a civil defense program." He went on to note that "I personally will never recommend an anti-ICBM program unless a fallout program does accompany it."¹² In fact, in the justifications for both the FY 1964 and FY 1965 appropriations, McNamara stated that "the very austere civil defense program recommended by the President should be given priority over

any major additions to the active defenses."¹³ The CD-ABM connection was, thus, not a persuasive reason for postponing action on fallout shelters or H.R. 8200.

Adding to the concern created by the Jackson Subcommittee action and to the confusion occasioned by the subcommittee's explanation were two other developments in March that had significant impact upon civil defense. Several days following the March 2 Jackson Subcommittee vote, Stewart Pittman resigned to return to his Washington law practice. He was replaced by a career official, William P. Durkee. A few weeks later on March 31, the OCD was reassigned from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Office of the Secretary of the Army. The Defense Department insisted that this move was not a down-grading of civil defense nor a demonstration of lessened significance, but this protestation fell on skeptical ears.

Civil defense was thrown into a state of shock by these developments. The (behind the scenes) Jackson decision and the Jackson Subcommittee vote effectively killed the shelter incentive concept and, thus, forced civil defense to begin looking for other policy options. March 2, 1964, marked a major turning point for civil defense in the United States, scuttling several years of OCD preparation and planning. Compounding the impact of these developments was their timing, coming as they did on the eve of the OCD's appearance before the appropriations committees of Congress in April, May, and June.

Not surprisingly, the \$358 million OCD request was cut. Thus, 1964 was not a good year for civil defense. The shelter incentive program had been deferred indefinitely, an able administrator had been lost, civil defense had been moved down from the Office of the Secretary of Defense within the Pentagon to the Office of the Secretary of the Army, and a "modest" civil defense appropriation request has been cut significantly by the Congress.

Despite statements made by McNamara following these developments to the effect that civil defense was the most important element of the Department's damage limitation package and would have to precede any other elements of the package (ABM's, manned interceptors), civil defense programs began a long slide downhill in 1964. Contrasted with strong statements of support for civil defense on the part of McNamara were weak actions of support. Smaller and smaller amounts for civil defense were approved by McNamara's office for OCD submission to Congress. Similarly, fewer and fewer new programs were approved. Moreover, McNamara would begin to link the future of civil defense to the ABM, despite his earlier statements that decisions could be made on civil defense independent of decisions on the ABM, but not vice versa. This paradox suggests the possibility that McNamara was engaged in a political gambit to delay ABM funding.

McNamara was concerned with the feasibility of the ABM (given developmental problems) and with its costs and role in strategic policy. There were, however, strong pressures for the ABM. Since McNamara's strongest statements of support for civil defense and his linkage of CD to the ABM case after the Johnson/Jackson deferral of H.R. 8200, it is conceivable that his latest push for civil defense was a ruse to delay the ABM and, at the same time, counter the pressures for ABM deployment. Knowing that the Congress was not about to pass the needed civil defense legislation (especially since he was no longer proposing such

legislation), McNamara could successfully make a nationwide fallout shelter system the prerequisite for an ABM system he did not want to see deployed, and safely extol the virtues of civil defense.

Whatever Secretary McNamara's motivations, the end result was steadily decreasing civil defense appropriation requests. And, as requests and appropriations declined, so did program objectives. As this process unfolded, and the areas suitable for fruitful shelter survey efforts diminished, civil defense policy was nudged increasingly toward a paper planning program centered around crisis-implemented civil defense efforts. The OCD began to speak in terms of "experimental" and "shelf" programs which could, if needed, be called upon -- provided there would be enough time. The evolution caused a group of concerned citizens to write President Johnson in 1966 warning that "the current inclination to rely on stepped up preparations when the threat materializes is a dangerous illusion," for "in an accelerating nuclear crisis, it might well be too provocative or too alarming to call for readily available measures to save lives from fallout radiation and other emergency preparations."¹⁴ Nevertheless, these trends would continue.

In a book published in 1968, Stewart Pittman -- after noting the evolution of civil defense policy and the steady diminution of authorizations and funding levels during the Johnson years -- wondered, "have we reverted back to the armband days of civil defense?"¹⁵ The possibility was real. From a requested authorization of \$358 million during Johnson's first year, the request dropped by more than \$280 million to only \$77.3 million in his last year. Of the funds requested, the amounts appropriated by the Congress dropped from \$105.2 million to \$60.5 million. The trends were most unpromising.

Several factors explain this development, but major responsibility must be shared by the Congress and the Executive. It appeared that both President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara supported a viable and active civil defense program in early 1964, but Johnson's failure to give Senator Jackson the needed endorsement of H.R. 8200 and McNamara's cuts of the civil defense budget thereafter suggest the contrary. Exhaustive hearings in the House in 1963 had persuaded that skeptical branch of the Congress that civil defense was viable and needed. Support was given to continuing and concluding a comprehensive nationwide fallout shelter system. Senator Jackson's tabling of H.R. 8200 due to lack of Administration support summarily prevented the passage of this legislation -- the vehicle needed to bring the shelter program to fruition.

Faced with doubts about the viability of the elements in the damage limitation package, as well as the all-consuming nature of the Vietnam War, resource constraints, a Congressional mood of economy, a growing acceptance of the theory of mutual assured destruction, and perhaps weary of providing a sounding board for outspoken peace and religious groups who perceived civil defense as a step toward nuclear war and away from the road to peace, Johnson and McNamara withheld the support that was essential if civil defense were to progress. Sensing this, Congressional support also weakened. Pittman charged that Johnson had been "less than responsible in failing to establish and to maintain a long-term civil defense policy and to provide the necessary Federal leadership to carry it out."¹⁶ As an indication of the strength of Johnson's commitment to civil

defense, one might further note that in Johnson's book, The Vantage Point, published after his departure from office, civil defense was not even mentioned.¹⁷

THE NIXON YEARS

Shortly after assuming the Presidency, Richard Nixon ordered a study of the Nation's civil defense shelter system "to see what we can do there to minimize American casualties" should deterrence fail.¹⁸ A further indication of Presidential interest in civil defense during Nixon's first year in Office came in late October when he signed Executive Order 11490. This included a specific provision encouraging all Federal agencies engaged in building construction to plan, design, and construct such buildings to protect the public against the hazards of nuclear war. In cases where Federal financial assistance was provided for construction, the responsible agencies were encouraged "to use standards for planning design and construction which will maximize protection for the public."¹⁹ According to the OCD Annual Report of 1970, this Executive Order represented a "significant step forward" for the OCD, for this was the first time that Federal agencies engaged in building construction had been requested (though not ordered) to encourage the incorporation of shelter in grant and loan projects involving Federal financial assistance.

Despite these (and other) indications of a renewal of interest in civil defense during the first year of the Nixon Administration, Secretary of Defense Laird, in his written statement before the House Armed Services Committee in February of 1970, indicated that "no major changes are proposed in the Civil Defense Program."²⁰ The ostensible reason for this was that the civil defense program was still the subject of a review by the Office of Emergency Preparedness -- a study that had been ongoing for nearly an entire year. A few weeks later, the new OCD Director (John E. Davis, ex-Governor of North Dakota) appeared before Congress and presented an appropriation request for \$73.8 million -- the lowest civil defense request ever submitted to Congress.

In light of the minimum nature of the FY 1971 request, not only was the deterioration of the civil defense program not reversed, it in fact accelerated. In that the Executive and the Congress were approving smaller and smaller amounts for civil defense against nuclear attack, Davis began investigating the prospect of giving the OCD greater responsibility in the peacetime (mostly natural) disaster field. Deciding that there were, indeed, possibilities in the local disaster preparedness area, Davis announced this as "a major shift in emphasis" in his FY 1971 Annual Report.²¹ As Davis elaborated at another point, "the development of local capabilities for effective action in emergencies is essential to civil preparedness, both in peacetime or in the event of attack."²² While this is true, provided that the "development of local capabilities" include those needed in nuclear attack situations (such as large-scale fallout protection), in practice it did not work out satisfactorily during an era of perceived detente. Many local directors became interested only in natural or peacetime preparedness and the OCD became very lax in seeing that Federal monies spent at the local area were, indeed, spent on programs having nuclear attack utility. In essence, national security considerations in civil defense became of secondary importance to local preparedness for peacetime disasters.

In the meantime, the Administration was also marking time on civil defense. After more than a year in the works, the long-awaited study of civil defense by the OEP was completed and forwarded to the National Security Council in June of 1970. Now known as NSSM 57 (for National Security Study Memorandum No. 57), the study would sit for more than two more years before action was taken. Although NSSM 57 remains a classified document, it is no secret that a range of alternative civil defense programs was considered by this study, most of which would have entailed much higher appropriation levels than the Administration had thus far approved. These were not approved. Instead, the NSC directed (NSDM 184) that "there be increased emphasis on dual-use plans, procedures, and preparedness within the limitations of existing authority (and appropriation levels, as it would soon be made clear), including appropriate related improvements in crisis management."²³

The method for implementing NSDM 184 was suggested by another Executive study-paper which was written by the Fitzhugh blue ribbon panel on the defense establishment. Forwarded in early 1971, this report recommended that the OCD be reorganized as a separate agency at the Secretary's level within the Department of Defense. Thus, on May 5, 1972, OCD was officially disestablished and its functions transferred to the newly-created Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA). Although it was stated that "the new agency will provide preparedness assistance planning in all areas of civil defense and natural disasters," there would come to be little doubt that the latter focus was ascendent over the former.²⁴

As sanctioned through NSDM 184, DCPA officially implemented its previous "dual-use" policy. One of the first actions of the new agency was to decide that Federal shelter marking and stocking did not fit into the new dual-use focus. These activities, thus, became "crisis-implemented" programs, i.e., their actual accomplishment would be deferred until periods of increased tension. The Shelter Survey Program -- which had at one time been the very essence of civil defense -- survived, but at a reduced level of importance, with the DCPA advocating the creation of "State Engineer Support Groups" or in-house State organizations to conduct the survey in place of the Federal Engineering Survey support which had been provided since 1962.

Along with these changes, the DCPA noted in its 1972 Annual Report that one of the "major elements of the new program" would be the "development or guidance for local governments, based on risk analysis, to include evacuation planning guidance for high risk areas."²⁵ Having been abandoned a decade earlier, evacuation planning would begin making a comeback under the Nixon Administration. Federal-level "civil defense" officials were quick to point out that they were looking at the evacuation concept "in a quite different context" than had been the case earlier: "Namely, that of a partial dispersal of people from cities during a period of intense international crisis which could well precede a nuclear attack upon the United States."²⁶

It is understandable that the DCPA wanted to divorce itself from the discredited evacuation policy of the early years of atomic-age civil defense. However, evacuation planning conducted under the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations was not entirely tactically oriented. Allowance had been made for the possibility that strategic warning of potential attack would permit evacuation.

Crisis relocation and "crisis implemented" evacuation are one and the same, yet the differences between the two are largely determined by the undefined meaning attributed to "intense international crisis." Some crises are more intense than others. Moreover, it is always possible that a crisis could escalate over a relatively short period of time. Thus, time and the ability of national leaders to predict the likely course of volatile events might not allow for the activation, much less the implementation, of crisis relocation planning. Intriguingly, the transformation of OCD into DCPA -- with the attendant focus on local preparedness and dual-use, crisis implementation, and crisis relocation -- came fast on the heels of the release of a General Accounting Office study of civil defense activities and status that recommended that more attention be paid to improving the fallout shelter system and scarcely mentioned disaster planning or the dual-use policy. After having studied the accomplishments of civil defense over the past 10 years and the nature of nuclear destruction, the report concluded that even though huge increases in nuclear weapon strength and numbers had occurred over the 10-year period, this had not made survival hopeless. Indeed, the report noted that millions of lives which would otherwise be lost could be saved in the face of an all-out nuclear attack.²⁷

The Administration, as we know, did not accept any of the augmented civil defense proposals contained in the GAO report or in NSSM 57, instead deciding to reorganize civil defense and focus on dual-use local preparedness. While several factors account for this decision, most probably the deciding factor involved the SALT I Treaty which was signed by President Nixon in Moscow just 21 days following the OCD/DCPA reorganization. The major accomplishment of this treaty was in limiting ABM deployment in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Several participants in the negotiations that led to the signing of this Treaty have since stated that a major assumption behind the agreement was that both sides were thereby implicitly accepting the doctrine of mutual assured destruction which said, in effect, that each side could absorb a first strike by the other and still have sufficient forces left to visit unacceptable damage upon the other. By agreeing to limit ABM deployment, it was perceived that each side was agreeing that no steps would be taken to interfere with the other side's capability to inflict unacceptable damage after receiving a first strike, for with effective ABM's, the determination of unacceptable damage became a dangerously cloudy issue. In other words, safety lay in vulnerability.

Highly effective civil defense could create the same instability that ABM's created. While "highly effective" levels of civil defense were not being proposed by OCD, even marginally or moderately effective civil defense programs must have seemed incongruous to the Administration in the context of the SALT environment of cooperation and the theory of hostage populations.

After the Presidential decision was made in May of 1972 to formalize the shift in civil defense emphasis to local emergency planning by disestablishing the Office of Civil Defense and transferring its responsibilities to the new Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, very little high level executive interest was evidenced. The new program continued to evolve in the direction of local emergency preparedness, as was made evident in DCPA appropriations requests and by congressional refusal to approve even a very modest shelter incentive subsidy proposal, fearing, perhaps, that this would be but the leading edge of the wedge. Funds flowing into State and local areas (and constituencies) steadily

increased during the Nixon years, while funds for shelter programs decreased. This reorientation of appropriations generally took place within a stabilized total budget level of approximately \$80 million a year throughout the Nixon years. In fact, however, the stabilized level was illusory in that a rising rate of inflation during this period translated into a steady decline of DCPA program scope and capabilities. In terms of non-inflated dollars, the appropriation authorizations of the Nixon Administration were very close to those of the Eisenhower Administration (which were very low, indeed). In view of the fact that the Nixon era civil defense budgets included significantly more funds for natural disaster programs than was the case during the Eisenhower era, it can be argued that civil defense preparedness against nuclear attack reached a very low point during the Nixon years.

To those working in civil defense during the Nixon Administration, it might well have seemed that civil defense had reverted full circle to the days of paper planning and low priority. Civil defense had been relegated by the Congress to a relatively low and unchanging budget level. With this budget level, inflation was eating away program capabilities. The nationwide fallout shelter system begun under Kennedy was deteriorating and the current emphasis on local disaster preparedness was unlikely to lead to a reversal of this trend. The shelter stocking program had ended upon the depletion of all stocks procured in the early 1960's; the shelter survey program was continued, but a substantially reduced level; enhanced warning and communication systems could not be procured for lack of funds; and OCD/DCPA personnel ceilings were reduced year after year. And, finally, the Administration seemed unconcerned and unwilling to attempt to reverse these trends in an atmosphere of SALT and mutual vulnerability.

Clearly, there was room for pessimism, but civil defense was far from dead or forgotten. "Since the Nixon Administration, several controversies have again focused attention on the question of civil defense. A large and expensive Soviet-civil defense program has been 'discovered,' Soviet conventional and strategic forces continue to grow, doubts about mutual assured destruction continue to grow, and concerns have again been voiced about the role of civil defense in limited nuclear war."²⁸

THE FORD YEARS

In 1975, during the Ford Administration, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger directed that the DCPA undertake a new program to improve attack preparedness. This was to commence development of crisis relocation (evacuation) plans or CRP's. The Secretary's February 1975 Annual Report stated that the U.S. should have an option for crisis evacuation for two reasons:

- (1) To be able to respond in kind if the Soviet Union attempts to intimidate us in time of crisis by evacuating the population from its cities; and,
- (2) To reduce fatalities if an attack on our cities appears imminent.

The DoD and NSC studies -- the latter involving the CIA and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as well as DoD -- resulted eventually in adoption of Presidential Directive (PD) 41 in September of 1978. Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard chaired the interagency group which developed PD-41. Its key points were that the U.S. civil defense program was an element of the U.S. strategic posture and that it should:

- Enhance deterrence and stability;
- Reduce the possibility of Soviet crisis coercion;
- Enhance the survivability of the American people and its leadership in the event of nuclear war;
- Include planning for population relocation during time of international crisis; and
- Be adaptable to help deal with natural disasters and other peacetime emergencies.

PD-41 did not provide for completion of a specific program by any specified date.

Enhancing deterrence was a significant change from the insurance rationale stated by President Kennedy in 1961. The essence of PD-41 was later enacted into law in 1980 amendments of the Civil Defense Act, adding a new Title V, "Improved Civil Defense Program," resulting from the efforts of Representatives Ike Skelton and Donald Mitchell, in particular.

PD-41 did not, however, result in an immediate increase in civil defense budget requests. While Secretary of Defense Harold Brown reportedly recommended an FY 1980 start on a seven-year enhanced program, the Administration's request was for a sum providing essentially no real growth -- and the FY 1980 appropriation enacted was for an amount which marked an all-time low, in constant dollars.

The Carter Administration, as part of its government reorganization efforts, took steps which resulted in the formation of FEMA in 1979, by consolidating five previous agencies with emergency-related programs and responsibilities. While former DCPA personnel were dispersed in a number of parts of FEMA, the civil defense program continued to be authorized by the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, and the CD budget was reviewed as a subset of the new Agency's budget.

The FY 1981 request marked the first significant increase in many years. The requested increase was not large, however; and it was, therefore, targeted on increasing capabilities in about 60 "counterforce" areas in 36 states -- communities near ICBM complexes, SAC bases, and ballistic missile submarine ports. The counterforce jurisdictions were to be treated as demonstration areas, and were to be provided additional State-level planning effort, warning points, and other assistance.

The CRP effort was undertaken after extensive pilot and developmental work and included several dozen research projects on issues, including movement feasibility (especially in California and the Northeast), food redistribution, medical care, electric power, and many others. It was deployed only after thorough discussion with the President of the State directors' association and about 10 other State Civil Preparedness Directors, who agreed that planning should be commenced. Relocation plans were to be developed by the fully-funded State planners, and this effort was underway in nearly all States by 1976-1977.

In late 1975, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) administered a sharp shock to the CD community at all levels. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had recommended a FY 1977 CD budget of \$124 million (\$203 million in FY 1984 dollars) -- about half again as large as the FY 1976 appropriation -- based on Department of Defense analyses indicating that CD capabilities should be improved. The OMB, however, directed that the program be cut to about half the FY 1976 level, using as its rationale the perception that the program had become too much oriented to peacetime disasters, which were properly a State and local responsibility -- notwithstanding the Presidential directive, then only three years old, that there should be "increased emphasis on dual-use plans, procedures; and preparedness."

Moreover, Federal assistance in FY 1977 was to be solely for attack preparedness. After negotiations within the Executive Branch, the FY 1977 request was for \$76 million, which would have involved a 12 percent real decrease from the FY 1976 level. However, the Congress appropriated \$87 million. (This congressional increase over the Administration's request was unprecedented.) However, while the final appropriation involved only a six percent real decrease from the previous year, the "attack-only" emphasis persisted in FY 1977. This was a factor in State and local governments' desire for, and efforts to obtain, a consolidated agency, which was effected in 1979 with the formation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The OMB's action, thus, reversed DoD policy on dual-use, which had been that improved capabilities to deal with peacetime disasters were a "secondary but desirable objective" of the civil defense program. The "insurance" rationale for attack preparedness persisted, but it said nothing about the size of the premium to be paid. It was used equally to justify the large Kennedy program of FY 1962 and the much smaller (and declining) requests of the 1970's.

THE CARTER YEARS

Soon after the advent of the Carter Administration, studies of civil defense programs and policies were undertaken, first within DoD and then at the National Security Council level. The House Committee on Armed Services also conducted CD hearings in 1976, for the first time since 1963, which resulted in Representative Donald Mitchell's becoming an advocate of improved civil defense. Actions were taken to provide for annual authorization hearings on civil defense by the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services.

THE REAGAN YEARS

The FY 1982 budget was ready for presentation in early 1981, and was discussed with the Reagan Administration's National Security Council staff. It was decided that the FY 1982 request (providing for slight real growth of about four percent) should go forward, but that a short-term NSC project would be undertaken to develop a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) to set forth Administration policy for civil defense and to serve as the basis for an enhanced program in coming years. In the meantime, Congress should be advised that the new Administration accepted and endorsed PD-41.

The NSC project was commenced in June 1981 and resulted in approval in early 1982 of an NSDD on U.S. Civil Defense. This provided for essentially the same policy objectives as PD-41; namely, to enhance deterrence, reduce the possibility that the U.S. could be coerced in time of crisis, and improve the ability to deal with natural disasters and other large-scale domestic emergencies. However, the NSDD had two significant additions; it provided for:

- Completing the development of plans and deployment of operational systems for population protection by end-FY 1989, thus providing a date certain for completion of a program, a feature which had been lacking in PD-41.
- Completing analyses and preparations to allow a funding decision to be made on programs to protect key industries and to provide blast shelters for key workers of such industries.

While the Administration's FY 1983 program was being developed, the Congress took further action which had the effect of writing into law the "dual-use" of civil defense program funds for peacetime disasters. In December 1981, it enacted further amendments of the Civil Defense Act which changed the definition to include peacetime, as well as attack-caused, disasters. Funds provided under the Act could be used to prepare for peacetime disasters "...to the extent that the use of such funds for such purposes is consistent with, contributes to, and does not detract from attack-related civil defense preparedness." While the practice had been to permit such use -- except during the "attack-only" emphasis of FY 1977 -- the Congress had for the first time explicitly authorized the use of civil defense funds for peacetime-disaster preparations, subject to the conditions written into the 1981 amendment.

The Administration's FY 1983 civil defense request was for \$252 million, presented as the first year of a seven-year enhanced CD program estimated to require expenditure of about \$4.2 billion through FY 1989.

The request elicited strong opposition from some quarters on the grounds that the Administration's CD program was part of a war-fighting strategy, attempting to "make nuclear war plans credible to the Soviets and acceptable to Americans," and was an effort to "make nuclear troops out of the citizenry." These and related assertions amounted in essence to saying that civil defense would be useless and was, in addition, likely to stimulate nuclear war.

Congressional action on the FY 1983 request, despite House Armed Services authorization of the full \$253 million requested, resulted in an appropriation of \$147.8 million. This provided for real growth, after estimated inflation, of about six percent, rather than the 70 percent growth the Administration's request had contemplated.

The Senate Committee on Armed Services authorized only \$144 million. In the House Committee on Appropriations Report it was stated that the program was seriously flawed in that it relied heavily upon crisis relocation. The Report said that while the Committee "continues to believe that an increased civil defense effort is important ... it does not believe that the 'crisis relocation' plan will work."

Based upon its experience with the FY 1983 request, FEMA developed a new approach for FY 1984, the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS). IEMS aims at developing multiple-hazard preparedness, and stresses those preparations common to emergencies across the entire spectrum -- from tornadoes to hazardous materials accidents, hurricanes, nuclear power plant accidents, and nuclear attack. Such functions include warning, communications, direction and control, health and medical, population movement, shelter, and food and water.

IEMS includes a number of substantive changes in CD program elements. For example, the 205 State-level planners supported by full Federal funding are to assist localities in developing multi-hazard evacuation plans -- addressing all hazards likely to affect a given locality which would allow time for people to move to safer areas. The shelter survey is being restructured to identify buildings offering protection against hurricanes and tornadoes, for example, as well as attack effects. The fully-funded Radiological Defense Program is being broadened so that both personnel and instruments will be able to conduct operations to protect local citizens against radiological hazards resulting from nuclear power plant or transportation accidents, as well as fallout from weapon detonations.

FEMA's FY 1984 CD request was for \$253 million, as the first year of a six-year program (since the 1982 NSDD still required program completion by end-FY 1989). The CD items in the FEMA budget reflected the IEMS approach, but other FEMA budget elements did not, although IEMS does integrate all FEMA programs and the attendant changes are being developed for all programs.


The FY 1984 request, however, encountered difficulties similar to those of FY 1983. Notwithstanding the substantive changes in the program under IEMS, the two House subcommittee chairmen said that it was their belief that the IEMS concept which was being introduced in the FY 1984 request involved changes in words and names, but no significant change in substance. Further, the report of House Appropriations said that "... the basic purpose of the funding has not changed ... The committee still believes that an increased civil defense effort is important, but doubted that the 1983 crisis relocation plan would work," and that FEMA's FY 1984 proposal did not indicate that the program had been changed significantly.

The FY 1984 report of Senate Armed Services Committee contained an admonition that funds provided under the Civil Defense Act must not be applied "in a manner that ... may be incompatible with the purpose for which these funds are authorized -- that is, nuclear-attack related civil defense," and the Committee authorized \$161.5 million -- less than the FY 1984 appropriation of \$169.0 million that had already been agreed to by House-Senate conferees, and subsequently enacted. The \$169 million represents about nine percent real growth after estimated inflation.

CONCLUSIONS

The civil defense program has not been seriously addressed or funded in the U.S., with the exception of the Kennedy program of the early 1960's. Figure 1 summarizes the funding history of U.S. civil defense appropriations for the period 1951 through 1982. Figure 2, comparing current capita expenditures for 16 countries, suggests that the U.S. cannot expect to develop significant attack preparedness at anything like current budget levels. Yet, the Congress has refused since the Kennedy years to fund significant increases, even with the IEMS multihazards approach first presented in FY 1984.

What the future may hold is difficult to predict. However, in July 1983, there are indications that the multiple-hazard emergency plans being developed under the integrated emergency management approach are meeting with wide acceptance in the communities where they have been initiated to date. It may be, therefore, that the IEMS multiple-hazard approach will be endorsed by the four Congressional committees principally concerned, if it is well presented.



**Figure 1. History of Civil Defense Appropriations
in Constant FY 1982 Dollars**

Dollars Per Capita (75 cents for the U.S. in FY 1984)




Figure 2. Civil Defense Per Capita Expenditures (Yearly)

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