

**PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE**

Report No.: AB4241

Project Name	Emergency Bridge Reconstruction and Vulnerability Reduction Project
Region	LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Sector	General transportation sector (50%); Flood protection (30%); Central government administration (20%)
Project ID	P114292
Borrower(s)	MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE
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Implementing Agency	
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Environment Category	<input type="checkbox"/> A <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> FI <input type="checkbox"/> TBD (to be determined)
Date PID Prepared	October 17, 2008
Date of Appraisal Authorization	
Date of Board Approval	November 18, 2008

Country and Sector Background

1. Haiti is the poorest country of the Northern hemisphere. Over the past decades, the country has demonstrated a very high vulnerability to a significant number of political, economic and social crisis, as well as to numerous natural disasters and external shocks. Over the past twelve months onle, Haiti experienced in October 2007 a major tropical storm (Noel) that caused flash floods and mudslides in the Western part of the country resulting in 66 deaths and 14,776 families losing their homes. Then in March 2008, rising world prices for food and oil have caused great hardship in the country, and triggered violent protests in early April,

which led the Senate to vote Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis out of office on April 12. Finally after a period of political instability during which the country did not have a confirmed Government, a new government took office just as the second of four major storms and hurricanes (Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike - FGHI) hit Haiti over a three-week period. The resulting damages caused in particular a complete collapse of the transport system, as well as major crop destructions.

2. If the situation is not quickly improved, this last series of natural disasters may evolve into a new period of civil unrest and political instability that could jeopardize the relative progress observed since the political, social and economic crisis of 2004: Democratic government was restored through presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006. Security has improved, as a 9,000-strong United Nations peacekeeping force supports the national police. Major programs of rebuilding and reform have been launched, backed by more than \$2 billion of international assistance. The economy has stabilized and growth resumed, reaching 3.2 percent for FY07. However, these positive results are fragile and Haiti's future is directly linked to the capacity of the country to reduce its vulnerability to external shocks, mitigate adverse impacts and protect its democratic institutions.
3. In this context, the FGHI storms represent a particularly difficult challenge for the Haitian authorities. According to Government and OCHA figures, as of October 4th, 793 people have been killed and 301 injured. An estimated 11,000 houses have been destroyed and 35,000 damaged. Taking into account pre-disaster baseline data, contingency planning, and the impact of Hurricane Jeanne in 2004, an estimated 850,000 to 1 million people were affected throughout the country by the combined impact of the storms. This number may well rise as access improve in the coming days and weeks. According to the Government, 151,000 people are currently displaced, out of which 111,000 people are staying in temporary shelters throughout the country. A preliminary post disaster needs assessment (PDNA), financed by the World Bank hosted Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery estimates that the total effects of FGHI is \$897 million, which represents 14.6% of Haiti's GDP. In terms of economic impact, FGHI is the largest disaster in recent history.
4. Damages to the transport sector have been particularly severe, causing several Haitian regions to be completely isolated and the economy to be almost paralyzed. The Artibonite region is in a catastrophic situation with major flooding in Gonaives and access from the North and the South made complicated by the collapse of three key bridges (Montrouis, Ennery and Mirebalais). Other smaller bridges and road sections have been either destroyed or damaged. Many weakened bridges are expected to collapse by the next rainy season and represent significant threat to the population. Several on-going road works whose drainage system had not yet been completed were also affected. A preliminary assessment was performed by a World Bank mission, comprised of civil engineers seconded by the region of Guadeloupe. The mission identified damages on priority bridges and roads for a total amount of US\$37.7 million. This list was complemented by the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication (MTPTC) to include other second-priority damages for a total amount of US\$90 million.

5. The proposed project in the amount of US\$20 million through an IDA grant is in response to the GoH's official request for financial support in the aftermath of FGHI, which caused significant loss of life and damage throughout the country.

Objectives

6. The project's development objective is to i) restore access on selected critical points of the Haitian transport system, and ii) support vulnerability reduction by strengthening the Haitian National Disaster Risk Management System.
7. In addition to the emergency reconstruction of selected infrastructure, the proposed program is expected to contribute to vulnerability reduction. In particular, the proposed project will pilot integrated approaches to try reducing the impact of future adverse natural events by developing improved technical standards for bridges, promoting the preventive maintenance of infrastructure and building basic institutional capacity to handle future disasters.
8. It is important to note that the proposed operation will not have the capacity to address all shortfalls in the transport sector in Haiti, nor in the Haitian disaster management system. Instead, the proposed operation aims at demonstrating good practices and proposes a basic framework that could be expanded using other resources. A large proportion of project resources will be dedicated to physical emergency and reconstruction works, as identified by post-disaster assessments. However, significant institutional support was also included in order to build capacity for the effective and efficient execution of these works.

Rationale for Bank Involvement

9. The GoH officially requested the World Bank for financial support following the damages caused by FGHI. In response to this appeal the Bank mobilized a team to conduct an assessment of the national transportation system and a team to conduct a comprehensive post-disaster needs assessment under the leadership of the GoH and in conjunction with the European Commission, the United Nations and other technical and financial partners. In response to the government's appeal, and following the assessment of the transportation sector, the World Bank regional management provided US\$ 20 million exceptional IDA in support of the Government's post-FGHI disaster recovery assistance.
10. The FGHI emergency revealed several important shortfalls in Haiti's infrastructure policies and national disaster risk management system. Critical identified issues include: (1) a lack of integrated approach to disaster prevention (including poor urban planning, inefficient water control and strong erosion caused by environmental deterioration); (2) inadequate technical standards for infrastructure construction; (3) lack of infrastructure maintenance; and (4) lack of capacity and institutional arrangements to properly handle crisis management and reconstruction. The current crisis has particularly highlighted the importance of road and bridge maintenance, since properly maintained roads and bridges were less affected.

Description

11. Component 1: Reconstructing selected bridges to restore access (US\$7.2 million): This component will retroactively finance emergency works performed by MTPTC to restore basic access in areas where major bridges have collapsed (sub-component 1.1.). The component will also rebuild two of the four damaged main bridges (Mirebalais and Chalon), help the MTPTC acquire a stock of emergency bridges in preparation for future disasters and provide targeted assistance to bridge reconstruction works financed by other donors (sub-component 1.2.).
12. Component 2: Improving the resilience of transport infrastructure (US\$4.9 million): This component will finance several repair and consolidation works on damaged or weakened bridges and road sections. An indicative list of works has been prepared by the MTPTC, with the assistance of a World Bank mission that visited Haiti immediately after the FGHI storms. This component will also finance community-based routine maintenance activities, building on both the successful experiences piloted by the Road Maintenance Fund and by the Bank-financed Rural Community Driven Development operations in Haiti.
13. Component 3: Improving transport asset management (US\$2.6 million): This component will finance a number of capacity building activities aiming at developing good practices in bridge asset management and at strengthening the institutional capacity of the MTPTC and its regional offices (DDTP).
14. Component 4. Strengthening Haiti’s National Disaster Risk Management System (US\$4.9 million): This component will finance a comprehensive technical assistance package to support the creation of a post-disaster recovery and coordination unit within the MPCE and provide technical assistance to strengthen the vulnerability reduction capacities of the NDRMS per the recommendations of the PDNA (sub-component 4.1 & 4.2). Coordination arrangements will include MTPTC, particularly with regard to the implementation of the proposed project (components 1, 2 and 3), but also other ministries and relevant institutions. This component will also pilot a more integrated approach to disaster prevention through strategic studies to be performed in selected areas particularly vulnerable to natural disasters such as Gonaives or Etang Saumatre-Lac Azuei (sub-component 4.3). This component builds on existing Bank operations in disaster risk management in Haiti, namely the ERDMP, by providing a more systematic approach to disaster risk mitigation, recovery and reconstruction at the national coordination level and within specific key ministries.

15. Financing

	(\$m.)
Source:	
BORROWER/RECIPIENT	0
IDA Grant	20
Total	20

Implementation

16. The proposed project will be implemented by two existing Project Implementation Units (PIU) with a proven track record in managing Bank-financed operations:

17. The Unité Centrale d'Exécution (UCE) will implement Components 1, 2 and 3. The UCE is part of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (MTPTC). The UCE is currently implementing most of the externally-financed investments in transport in Haiti, with resources from the IaDB, Canada (CIDA), France (AFD) and the World Bank (Transport and Territorial Development Project). While the UCE has been very successful in assuming the fiduciary responsibility associated with these operations, it has so far demonstrated a limited capacity in handling technically complex interventions and in implementing activities under a tight schedule. However, the UCE remains the best available alternative to manage transport investments within MTPTC. In order to ensure the sound and swift implementation of the proposed emergency program, the UCE will be reinforced with the creation of a emergency unit (*cellule d'urgence*), staffed with a full time procurement specialist, a contract management specialist, an accountant and an international consultant specialized in bridges. This unit, to be established in the next 2 months following the FGHI events, is expected to have sufficient capacity to immediately jump start the emergency program. The international consultant will also train professional staff of the UCE in handling technically complex bridge repair and reconstruction operations. In addition, a provision has been set up to hire international experts (eg. geotechnical specialist or erosion management expert) on short-term assignments, as specific technical needs may arise.
18. The Bureau de Monétisation Unité de Coordination de Projet (BM-UCP) will implement Component 4. The *Bureau de Monétisation* is part of the Ministry of Finance and is one of the Government's principle donor project management institutions. The BM-UCP currently implements on behalf of the government the World Bank financed Community Driven Rural Development Project, the Community Driven Urban Development Project as well as select components of the Emergency Recovery and Disaster Risk Management Project and the Transport and Territorial Development Project. The BM-UCP has a full compliment of technical and fiduciary staff and has been very successful in the managing the implementation responsibilities associated with these operations. An additional consultant will be hired to facilitate coordination with the UCE.

Sustainability

19. The project's closing date is December 31, 2012. Although the project is being processed as an emergency operation, a four year execution period is proposed to allow for additional time to consolidate the sustainability of technical assistance program.

Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector

20. The proposed project design takes into account lessons learned from previous operations in Haiti and from Bankwide experience with emergency response operations. Those include in particular:
21. Simplified objectives and scope limited to 1 or 2 sectors: While needs are enormous in many other sectors than just transport, complex multi-sector operations are difficult to implement in a low capacity environment such as Haiti, particularly under emergency procedures. The proposed project focuses instead on two single issues: (1) bridge reconstruction and maintenance works and (2) a strategic institutional support program to strengthen the

NDRMS and support the preparation, implementation and monitoring of a comprehensive post-disaster recovery and reconstruction program.

22. Use of reinforced existing implementing agencies: building new institutional capacity in Haiti requires delays that are not compatible with the implementation of an emergency operation. The project could have been implemented using alternative arrangements (eg. management contract with international NGOs or consulting firms). However, this would have weakened the project's longer-term objective of building capacity within Haitian government institutions to manage and prevent future disasters. The project implementing agencies that have been selected have a proven track record in implementing multilaterally-financed activities. However, acknowledging the limited experience of UCE in managing emergency activities, specific support (international consultants) will be granted to build such capacity.
23. Strong technical assistance package to build capacity: despite recent progress, Haiti's governmental institutions still have a very limited capacity. The FGHI emergencies also highlighted strong limitations in the NDRMS. The proposed project includes a comprehensive technical assistance package to address these weaknesses.
24. Maintenance is essential to protect existing infrastructure: There is a large international evidence that maintenance remains the most cost effective investment in the transport sector. In Haiti, the experience of Noel and FGHI have shown that well-maintained infrastructure resist better to hydro meteorological events.
25. Technical alternatives for bridges with proven track record in similar environments: Extreme climatic environment such as Haiti requires adequate technical solutions, particularly for highly-exposed infrastructure such as bridges. Project design includes the recommendations from experienced international emergency bridge specialists who visited Haiti on September 22-26, under a financing agreement with the EU.

Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)

26. This project was classified under Environmental Category B, in which a complete environmental study is not necessary. The risks of triggering negative environmental and social impacts locally are minimal. However, in the context of component 1 and specific sub-projects of component 2, such as the rehabilitation of bridges, the construction of scuppers, of retaining walls, or the rehabilitation of drainage systems. Such specific activities might engender negative impacts.
27. Among the 10 existing safeguard policies, 5 have been triggered to ensure the adoption of measures to adhere to these policies. These are OP/BP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment, OP/BP 4.09 on Pest Management, OP/BP 4.36 on Forests, OPN 11.03 on Cultural Property and OP/BP 4.12 on Resettlement.
28. In response to the three first policies, an Environmental and Social Management Framework was drafted and the fourth policy led to the adoption of a Resettlement Management Framework.

Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project	Yes	No
<u>Environmental Assessment</u> (OP/BP 4.01)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Pest Management (OP 4.09)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Forests (OP/BP 4.36)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7.60)*	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7.50)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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* *By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the disputed areas*

