

Session No. 31

Course Title: Social Dimensions of Disaster, 2nd edition

Session 31: Disaster Planning Myths

1 hr.

Objectives:

- 31.1 Describe the paper plan myth
- 31.2 Explain the command and control myth
- 31.3 Discuss five criticisms of the bureaucratic norm model
- 31.4 Describe the problem solving model of disaster planning
- 31.5 Identify the components of a community disaster plan
- 31.6 Describe the steps in the development of a community disaster plan
- 31.7 Apply planning principles to a case example.

Scope:

In this session students are introduced to selected disaster planning myths, alternative models of the disaster planning process, key criticisms of the bureaucratic norm model, components of a community disaster plan and steps in the development of such plans.

Readings:

Student Reading:

Neal, David M. and Brenda D. Phillips. 1995. "Effective Emergency Management: Reconsidering the Bureaucratic Approach." *Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies and Management* 19:327-337.

Professor Readings:

Mullen, Jim. 2003. "Lessons Learned From the Seattle TOPOFF Exercise." *IAEM Bulletin* 20 (No. 7):1, 10.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1996. *Guide For All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2002. *Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Background References:

Schneider, Sandra K. 1992. "Government Response to Disasters: The Conflict Between Bureaucratic Procedures and Emergent Norms." *Public Administration Review* 52:135-145.

Dynes, Russell R. 1994. "Community Emergency Planning: False Assumptions and Inappropriate Analogies." *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 12:141-158.

Auf der Heide, Erik. 1989. *Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination*. St. Louis, Missouri: C.V. Mosby Company (Chapter 3 entitled "The 'Paper' Plan Syndrome", pp. 3-48).

Daines, Guy E. 1991. "Planning, Training, and Exercising." Pp. 161-200 in *Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government*, edited by Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J. Hoetmer. Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association.

General Requirements:

Use Overheads (31-1 through 31-12 appended).

Use Student Handout (31-1 appended).

See individual requirements for each objective.

Objective 31.1 Describe the paper plan myth.

Requirements:

Use Overhead 31-1.

Remarks:

I. Introduction.

- A. **Ask students:** “You have read a lot about the processes and approaches to community disaster planning. One of the myths about such activities commonly is called “the paper plan myth.” Recall our discussion earlier in the course where we analyzed numerous myths about disaster behavior, e.g., panic and looting. So let’s start by going back for a few minutes. What do we mean by the concept of myth?” (**Answer:** myths are beliefs or stories about creatures, ancient times, or events that **are not** based on scientific research or findings).
- B. **Ask students:** “OK. With that clarified, what do you believe might define or illustrate the “paper plan myth”?”
- C. **Record** student examples on the chalkboard.
- II. The paper plan myth.
- A. **Explain:** too many organizational leaders have **assumed incorrectly** that if they had a written disaster plan, it would guide the behavior of their personnel. Too many such plans are produced and just **sit on a shelf** gathering dust. They may have **little bearing** on the behavior of personnel during a disaster response.
- B. **Explain:** Erik Auf der Heide reviewed numerous studies that documented four key aspects of what came to be called the “paper plan myth.”
- C. **Example:** “Disaster planning is an illusion unless it is based on valid assumptions about human behavior, incorporates an interorganizational perspective, is tied to resources, and is known and accepted by the participants.” (Auf der Heide 1989, p. 35).
- D. **Display** Overhead 31-1; “Understanding The ‘Paper Plan Myth’”.
- E. **Review** and illustrate the points listed. For a disaster plan to be effective during a response, it must reflect four principles (adapted from Auf der Heide 1989, pp. 3-48).
1. **Valid assumptions** about human behavior.
 - a. Myth of maladaptive behavior, e.g., panic.
 - b. “Likely” versus “correct” behavior, e.g., activism by victims results in many getting to hospital by unofficial means.
 - c. Victims will not wait at the scene for the triage officer to arrive to tell them the “correct” hospital.

- d. **Example:** Drabek (1968) documented the rapid movement of injured victims from the explosion impact area inside the Indianapolis Coliseum to nearby hospitals. Many arrived in taxi cabs.

2. **Interorganizational perspective.**

- a. **Remind** students of material reviewed previously, i.e., Sessions No. 20 (“Organizational Responses to Disaster”) and 21 (“Emergent Multiorganizational Networks”).
- b. The actual disaster response system in any community is an **emergent multiorganizational** network (EMON).
- c. All disaster planning **must be** interorganizational in focus.

3. **Adequate resources.**

- a. Without appropriate resources, the best ideas can not be implemented.
- b. **Resources include:** personnel, time, equipment, office space, supplies, etc.
- c. **Agency legitimacy** must be earned; this is a highly important resource for any emergency management agency.
- d. **Structural location** or nesting of the emergency management office varies among communities.
 - 1) Strong case can be made for an independent office whose director reports directly to the county manager or chair of the county commissioners.
 - 2) Many emergency management agencies, especially in larger jurisdictions, are nested within law enforcement, fire, or public works departments.
 - 3) Best location, other than independent agency, is the one that will produce the greatest amount of resources, **including legitimacy**, for disaster preparedness activities.

4. **Participant acceptance.**

- a. Users of plan must have **knowledge** of it.

- b. Training programs, including **multiagency exercises**, can increase user knowledge.
- c. Planning must be viewed as a **continuing process**.
- d. Planning does **not end** with the production of a written document.
- e. Plans **developed by users** have been documented as being more effective and useful in guiding disaster responses than those produced through other methods.

Supplemental Considerations:

The **key message** of this section is to enhance student understanding of the “paper plan myth.” This appears to be a simple task at first. Students must be aided in their understanding of why this **myth is a barrier** in many communities. Once a paper plan is produced, some assume, **incorrectly**, the job is done. Nothing could be further from the truth. A **second message** is the concept of **agency legitimacy**. Too many emergency management agencies and personnel are viewed as “**a joke**” by officials in some emergency service organizations. **Competence, trust, mutual respect**, etc., are all marks of **legitimacy**. Each must be **earned** and **maintained**.

Objective 31.2 Explain the command and control myth.

Requirements:

Use Overhead 31-2.

Start this section with student exercise and proceed with specified lecture material.

Remarks:

I. Introduction.

A. **Exercise.**

1. **Remind** students of exercise procedures.
2. **Divide** class into four groups and assign roles.
 - a. Chair.
 - b. Reporter.

c. Timer.

3. **Announce** time limit: 5 minutes.

B. **Display** Overhead 31-2; “Workshop Tasks.”

1. Group 1 – What is the command and control myth?
2. Group 2 – What are five key criticisms of the bureaucratic norm model?
3. Group 3 – What are two case examples that document criticisms of the bureaucratic norm model (4 illustrations)?
4. Group 4 – What are the key ideas that define the Emergent Human Resource Model (EHRM) of disaster planning?

C. **Start** discussion.

D. **Stop** discussion.

E. **Explain** that the report from Groups 2 through 4 will be given later in the session.

II. The command and control myth.

A. Group 1 report: 2 minutes.

B. **Supplement** as necessary with points like these.

1. Dynes (1994) is summarized by Neal and Phillips (1995, pp. 327-328) (assigned student reading).
2. **“The dominate model”** (Dynes 1994) or “Civil Defense Model” (Neal and Phillips 1995) has its roots in military planning and other bureaucratic theories.
3. **Regardless of the name used, these models reflect a “command and control myth”.**
 - a. The myth assumes that local emergency managers will, **like military commanders**, “take control” and issue “commands”.
 - b. Bureaucratic theory has been **applied successfully** to many businesses, e.g., fast food chains.

- c. **Standardized products**, e.g., a Big Mac, are the desired outputs and standardized procedures are enforced to create such.
- d. High levels of certainty and stability allow for the **rapid training** of personnel who are taught highly specific tasks so as to fit into a specified division of labor.
- e. When applied to the **turbulence** of disaster response and the massive participation by the mix of agencies that arrive to assist, the command and control model fails.

Supplemental Considerations:

Given the **clarity** and **content** of the assigned student reading (i.e., Neal and Phillips 1995), this section may be very **brief**. The quality of the analysis presented in the **group report** will give the professor a good sense of direction. **Elaboration** may be required to insure that the key message is fully understood. The degree of elaboration **will vary** with student backgrounds and course context.

Objective 31.3 Discuss five criticisms of the bureaucratic norm model.

Requirements:

Use Overheads 31-3 and 31-4.

Remarks:

- I. Introduction.
 - A. Group 2 report: 2 minutes.
 - B. **Explain** that Group 3 report will provide elaboration.
 - C. **Explain** that the term “bureaucratic norm model” was used by Neal and Phillips (1995) to refer to the same planning approach that Dynes (1994) referred to as “the dominate model” and “command and control” model.
- II. Criticisms of the bureaucratic norm model (Dynes 1994).
 - A. **Display** Overhead 31-3; “Criticisms of the Bureaucratic Norm Model.”
 - B. **Illustrate** and **integrate** with group 2 report; **supplement** as required (adapted from Dynes 1994, p. 147).

1. **Excess time creating planning documents**, i.e., derives from an emphasis on specifying authority relationships in great detail.
2. **Plan creators assign themselves authority**, i.e., agency head assumes more authority than others accord them.
3. **Centralized authority**, i.e., agency head assumes that the “best” organizational design reflects a highly centralized authority structure.
4. **Assumptions of chaos**, i.e., contrary to behavioral research findings on disaster myths, over-planning on excessive details is assumed to be a requirement given an incorrect image of public chaos and mass panic.
5. **Emergent behavior as dysfunctional**, i.e., any behavior that is outside of “the plan” is viewed as a problem source.
6. **Specialized organizational structures**, i.e., new disaster response structures are viewed as desired even though other agency personnel may have a familiarity with the elaborate plan that exists only on paper.
7. **Topdown communication**, i.e., it is assumed that only those in charge know what must be done so communication is viewed as coming from the topdown.

C. **Explain:** these criticisms were summarized by Neal and Phillips (1995) who then elaborated on them with specific case examples based on their field work following the Loma Prieta earthquake (1989) and Hurricane Andrew (1992).

III. Case examples.

A. Group 3 report: 2 minutes.

B. **Display** Overhead 31-4; “Case Examples.”

C. **Review** each point, **integrate** with Group 3 report and **supplement** as required (adapted from Neal and Phillips 1995).

1. **Failure to understand emergent norms.**

a. Hurricane Andrew.

b. “In South Dade County, an ‘Unmet Needs Committee’ and Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) emerged to help with having issues. . . . Rather than discourage such emergent activity, the ARC created a liaison position between the community and the ARC.” (p. 330).

2. Failure to understand collective behavior theory.

- a. Hurricane Andrew.
- b. “Hurricane Andrew challenged the traditional means of providing information and reducing conflict, thus leading one FEMA community relations specialist to suggest: ‘Be creative. We will employ all means to ensure the delivery of critical information to those who need it’.” (p. 331).

3. Failure to understand pre-existing structures.

- a. Loma Prieta earthquake.
- b. “One particular emergent group, the Placement Planning Group, included pre-existing organizations and organizations new to the community. Pre-existing relationships proved integral to re-housing the seniors, especially when trying untested options.” (p. 332).

4. Failure to see the inappropriateness of bureaucratic theory.

- a. Loma Prieta earthquake.
- b. “The National Guard erected a fence around one tent city, creating the impression of Central American prisons and death squads to some immigrants. Some victims chose to stay away from the official tent city due to culturally-based misunderstanding. The ARC tried to reduce such cultural problems by hiring a tri-lingual caseworker to work specifically with Latinos.” (p. 332).

5. Failure to use adequate research methods.

- a. “. . . support for the command and control approach relies upon a small number of cases often based on journalist and anecdotal evidence.” (p. 333).
- b. “Command and control approaches tend to ignore or misinterpret a massive existing literature on disaster behavior.” (p. 333).

Supplemental Considerations:

The **key message** of this section is the critique of the bureaucratic norm model, i.e., command and control. Many professors will choose to **expand** this section through the use of additional case examples. Review of Schneider's (1992) analysis could provide **additional illustrations**, if desired. Similarly, a case study of a more **recent disaster** could be incorporated as a class exercise, or an material for an expanded lecture. Depending on the **quality** of the **two group reports**, some professors will choose to keep this section brief while others will see the need for expansion.

Objective 31.4 Describe the problem solving model of disaster planning.

Requirements:

Use Overhead 31-5.

Remarks:

- I. Introduction.
 - A. Group 4 report: 2 minutes.
 - B. **Explain:** in prior publications, Dynes (e.g., 1983) used the term "Emergent Human Resources Model" which also was used by Neal and Phillips (1995). In 1994, however, the term "Problem Solving Model" was used by Dynes.
 - C. **According to Dynes** (1994): the problem solving model was more consistent with empirically documented conclusions regarding human responses to actual disasters that have occurred. "Instead of chaos, the emphasis should be on *continuity*. Instead of command, the emphasis should be on *coordination*. Instead of control, the emphasis within should be on *cooperation*." (p. 150).
- II. The problem solving model.
 - A. **Display** Overhead 31-5; "The Problem Solving Model".
 - B. **Review** each point, **integrate** with Group 4 report, and **supplement** as required (adapted from Dynes 1994, p. 149).
 1. **Limited disorganization.**
 - a. Some degree of confusion does occur, especially initially.
 - b. Image of social chaos is incorrect.
 2. **Coping capacities remain.**

- a. Individuals and social structures remain.
 - b. Disaster presents some new and unexpected problems to solve.
3. **Existing social structure.**
- a. Best to use existing organizational structures and procedures as much as possible.
 - b. Efforts to impose new or artificial structure are neither possible nor effective.
4. **Resources for problem solving.**
- a. Planning efforts should focus on enhancing the capacity of social units to make rational and informed decisions.
 - b. Social units should be viewed as resources for problem solving, not the source of problems.
5. **Decentralized decision making.**
- a. By its very nature, emergency situations are characterized by decentralized decision making.
 - b. Autonomy of decision making should be valued.
6. **Coordination.**
- a. Flexibility and initiative of local units should be encouraged.
 - b. Coordination among such autonomous units becomes the goal of planning, not trying to avoid chaos, by centralization of authority.

Supplemental Considerations:

This section may be very brief if the points on the overhead are reviewed and illustrated. The **key message** is the six assumptions that are reflected in the “**Emergent Human Resources Model**”. These assumptions reflect a generalized approach to disaster planning, a different mind-set that contrasts sharply to a command and control emphasis. Some professors may select a case study to pursue this model in more detail.

Objective 31.5 Identify the components of a community disaster plan.

Requirements:

Remarks:

- I. Introduction.
 - A. **Distribute** Student Handout 31-1; “FEMA Guidance Documents.”
 - B. **Review briefly** the document list.
 - C. Early FEMA Guidance documents (rescinded as of 1996).
 1. *Guide for the Development of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans* (1990) (Civil Preparedness Guide, CPG 1-8).
 2. *Guide for the Review of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans* (1992) (CPG 1-8A).
 3. *Guide for the Development of a State and Local Continuity of Government Capability* (1987) (CPG 1-10).
 - D. **Current FEMA documents.**
 1. *Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning* (1996) (State and Local Guide, SLG 101).
 - a. All-hazard approach is recommended.
 - b. **“The Guide is a ‘toolbox’ of ideas and advice, not a sample EOP.”** p.iii (Bold in original document).
 - c. “The Guide “. . . **establishes no requirements, and its recommendations may be used, adapted, or disregarded.**” p.iii (Bold in original document).
 - d. Through such statements as these, the FEMA **explicitly emphasized** that disaster planning is a **continuous process** that must be **adapted** to the specific planning unit and jurisdiction.
 2. Chapter 6 of SLG 101 is entitled “Hazard-Unique Planning Considerations.”
 - a. Recommendations are made regarding potential hazard-specific appendixes to our overall emergency operations plan, e.g., earthquake, hurricane, etc.

- b. Through such appendixes unique and regulatory planning considerations can be considered.
 - c. Seven attachments were included, e.g., Attachment A – Earthquake; Attachment C – Hazardous Materials.
 - d. Attachment G, entitled “Terrorism” was not included except for a listing of the title followed by “to be completed”.
3. Attachment G – Terrorism (to be used as Chapter 6 of SLG 101) was issued in April, 2001.
 4. *Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents: Interim Planning Guide For State and Local Governments.* (Issued July, 2002).
 - a. “The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center in New York and the ensuing anthrax attacks provided an opportunity to gauge the validity of planning assumptions and to gain a perspective on issues and protocols that need to be incorporated into the planning process.” (p. iii).
 - b. “The updated guidance in this document includes insights gained from interviews with responders and emergency managers involved in the response to the September 11 attacks, the anthrax attacks, the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building, and the 1999 shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado.” (p. iii).

E. **Display** Overhead 31-6; “Key Insights.”

B. **Review** Overhead and illustrate as required. These are key insights that recent events indicate to emergency planners (adapted from FEMA 2002, pp. 3-4).

1. **Flexibility**, e.g., “planners must consider the unthinkable as possible – not simply plan for what has happened in the past” (p. 3).
2. **Coordination**, e.g., regional approaches.
3. **Communications**, e.g., interoperability.
4. **Contingencies**, e.g., loss of emergency responders.
5. **Emergency public information and media relations procedures**, e.g., terrorist attacks attract media.

6. **Integration of federal assets into local response**, e.g., protocols for requesting federal assets.

7. **Support services**, e.g., influxes of volunteers.

II. Basic plan content.

A. **Display** Overhead 31-7; “Elements of the Basic Plan.”

B. **Review** each point briefly and illustrate as required (adapted from FEMA 1996, pp. 4-1 through 4-16).

1. **Introductory material.**

a. Promulgation document, e.g., letter from chief executive of jurisdiction indicating plan is in force.

b. Signature page.

c. Dated title page and record of changes.

d. Record of distribution.

e. Table of contents.

2. **Purpose**, i.e., statement of what the plan is meant to do.

3. **Situation and assumptions**, e.g., specification of hazards, populations, etc.

4. **Concept of operations**, i.e., what should happen, when, and at whose direction.

5. **Organization and assignment of responsibilities**, i.e., listing by position and organization of tasks assigned, e.g., CEO sets policy, fire department manages fire department resources and directs fire department operations, etc.

6. **Administration and logistics**, i.e., policies for managing resources, mutual and agreements, etc.

7. **Plan development and maintenance**, i.e., overall approach to planning, testing, reviewing, etc.

8. **Authorities and references**, i.e., relevant laws, statutes, ordinances, etc.

III. Functional annexes.

A. **Display** Overhead 31-8; “Functional Annex Content.”

B. **Review** each point briefly and illustrate as required (adapted from FEMA 1996, pp. 5-1 through 5-H-22).

1. **Direction and control**, i.e., role of EOC vs. on-scene tactical decision making.
2. **Communications**, i.e., methods of communication among EOC, control centers of emergency response organizations, mass care facilities, etc.
3. **Warning**, i.e., notification procedures for key officials and public and devices to be used, e.g., sirens EAS stations, etc.
4. **Emergency public information**, i.e., media relationships, audience analysis, etc.
5. **Evacuation**, i.e., plans, maps, critical facilities, etc.
6. **Mass care**, i.e., registration of potential facilities, e.g., schools, etc.
7. **Health and medical**, i.e., private and public resources, etc.
8. **Resource management**, i.e., personnel and equipment, e.g., pumps, sand bags, etc.

IV. Hazard specific annexes.

A. **Display** Overhead 31-9; “Hazard Specific Annexes.”

B. **Explain**: while all-hazards emergency planning is the desired focus, emphasis, and approach, there are certain unique features of various hazards that define specialized planning considerations.

C. **Key points** for each hazard listed include such matters as:

1. **Nature of the hazard.**
2. **Risk area.**

3. **Unique and regulatory planning considerations.**

D. **Review** each hazard briefly and illustrate as required (adapted from FEMA 1996, pp. 6-1 through 6-H-4 and FEMA 2002).

1. **Earthquake**, e.g., capacity for rapid damage assessments to ascertain scope of damage, casualties, and status of key facilities.
2. **Flooding and dam failure**, e.g., estimating vulnerable zones through use of the National Flood Insurance Program's (NFIP) maps and studies.
3. **Hazardous materials**, e.g., identification and location of fixed storage sites.
4. **Hurricane**, e.g., general response schedule including time phases and sequence of key actions.
5. **Lethal unitary chemical agents and munitions**, e.g., location of Department of Army installations such as Tooele Army Depot, Utah (42.3%) of the total stockpile; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas (12.0%), etc. (p. 6-E-2).
6. **Radiological hazards**, e.g., nuclear power plant location and procedures.
7. **Terrorism**, e.g., weapons of mass destruction, infrastructure attacks, cyber terrorism and rapid response and involvement of state and federal agencies.
8. **Tornado**, e.g., direction and control requirements including search and rescue, access control and re-entry, debris clearance, etc.

E. **Adaptations.**

1. High probability hazards.
2. **Example:** Tampa Bay Region in Florida; emergency managers prepared coordinated hurricane implementation guide; chapters in guide entitled (adapted from Daines 1991, p. 172).
 - a. **Introduction.**
 - b. **Hurricane hazards and vulnerability.**
 - c. **Warning.**

- d. **Issuance of evacuation order** (legal authority and decision making).
- e. **Direction and control.**
- f. **Evacuation** (evacuation of elderly, traffic control, shelter, transportation and critical services).
- g. **Regional coordination** of evacuation activities.

Supplemental Considerations:

The **key messages** of this section are: 1) there are **basic principles** in emergency planning and 2) the content of a community disaster plan is **complex**. Some professors will choose to limit this section to the material on the overheads. Depending on the course **context**, this section could be **expanded** easily so as to increase the time allocation of the entire session, e.g., two to three class sessions. Additionally, the topic of **terrorism** planning could be expanded through review of the FEMA (2002) guide and selection of additional materials and topics.

Objective 31.6 Describe the steps in the development of a community plan.

Requirements:

Use Overhead 31-10.

Remarks:

- I. Basic principles (adapted from FEMA 1996, pp. 2-1 through 2-3).
 - A. **Don't reinvent the wheel.**
 - 1. Use available guidance.
 - 2. Build on existing plans.
 - B. **Don't go it alone.**
 - 1. Use a team approach, e.g., plans developed by those who will implement them have been the most effective.
 - 2. Potential team members, e.g., office of chief executive, emergency response departments, planning agencies, public works, etc.

C. Don't forget the chief executive official.

1. Enlist support.
2. Keep informed.
3. Planning facilitates his or her job.

II. Basic steps.

A. Display Overhead 31-10.

B. Review each point on the overhead and **supplement** as necessary (adapted from FEMA 1996, pp. 2-3 through 2-12).

1. Research (examples).

- a. Laws, plans, mutual aid agreements, guidance, etc.
- b. Hazard/risk analysis.
- c. Resource base.
- d. Special requirements, e.g., non-English speaking populations, critical facilities like nursing homes, animal care facilities and populations.

2. Development (illustrative steps).

- a. Prepare rough draft.
- b. Planning meetings, i.e., agenda, time cycles, individual meetings.
- c. Brief CEO.
- d. Appoint committees, chairs, and meeting dates.
- e. Committee draft documents.
- f. Circulation of draft document.
- g. Implementation strategies.
- h. Formal presentation of plan.

3. **Validation.**

- a. Review by next level of government, e.g., county, if a city.
- b. Review by state emergency management office, FEMA Region, etc.
- c. Test the plan, e.g., exercise.

4. **Maintenance.**

- a. Remedial action process.
- b. Revision process.
- c. **Remember:** “The EOP is a living document” (p. 2-12).

Supplemental Considerations:

Some professors may wish to consult Daines 1991, pp. 174-193, to obtain a more **detailed discussion** of the steps in the planning process. Others will keep this section **brief** and focus primarily on the material presented on the overheads. Students could be **reminded** of the upcoming **field trips** to emergency management agencies and be encouraged to **formulate questions** about the disaster planning process, obstacles confronted and possible changes implemented to improve response capacity regarding the terrorist threat.

Objective 31.7 Apply planning principles to a case study.

Requirements:

Use Overheads 31-11 and 31-12.

Remarks:

- I. Case example: TOPOFF 2 Exercise (Mullen 2003).
 - A. The exercise.
 1. **TOPOFF 2** (Top Officials); second major exercise to test capacity to respond to terrorist WMD attack.
 - 2, **Test cities.**

- a. Seattle: detonation of dirty bomb in commercial area near downtown Seattle.
 - b. Chicago: biological attack.
3. **Mullen** (Jim) is the Director of the City of Seattle Division of Emergency Management.

B. The Lessons.

1. **EOCWEB Application.**

- a. System facilitated communication of information, requests for assistance, monitoring of activity, and filing of required reports.
- b. System was still under development, but reviewed favorably.
- c. Exercise success has speeded implementation process.

2. **Video-conferencing system.**

- a. Provided link: Seattle EOC, Washington State Emergency Management Office, joint operations center, regional operations center, U.S. Health and Human Services Operation Center and King County EOC.
- b. Maintained respective chain of command, but facilitated cross-agency communication.

3. **Business Emergency Network (BEN).**

- a. Several business sites served as “hubs” and granted access to city public relations materials.
- b. Each “hub” site released relevant material to e-mail lists.
- c. Questions were relayed back to the hub site where they were filtered and then forwarded to the city for response and/or action.
- d. Improved communications between government and local businesses.

4. **Red alert perceptual gap.**

- a. Homeland security announced during second day of exercise that the county would be shut down for 24-48 hours. Decision made after hypothetical Chicago attack.
- b. “The impact of shutting down much of the nation’s commerce merits further discussion.” (p. 10).
- c. “Enforcement will be unattainable without voluntary compliance.” (p. 10).

5. Other observations.

- a. “Federal agencies need to be more knowledgeable of the laws and capacities of local and state government.” (p. 10).
- b. “Federal agencies need to be cognizant of the impact of their pronouncements on local jurisdictions.” (p. 10).

II. Case example: Hurricane Elena (Daines 1991).

A. The event.

- 1. Hurricane Elena – August, 1985.
- 2. Pinellas County, Florida.
- 3. Guy Daines was the Director of Emergency Management, for the county.
- 4. Largest medical evacuation in U.S. history.

B. Display Overhead 31-12.

C. Planning process (adapted from Daines 1991, pp. 161-166).

- 1. **Initial planning**, e.g., increased number of nursing homes intensified vulnerability.
- 2. **Warning and communication system**, e.g., call-down system to link all 75 nursing homes within the county to the county warning point.
- 3. **Transportation needs**, e.g., recognition that county resources might be needed, new policy established.
- 4. **Transfer agreements**, e.g., co-signing of mutual aid agreements among alternative nursing home sites.

5. **Guidelines**, e.g., state lacked guidelines so county manager developed; subsequently distributed to state and all nursing homes.
6. **Training**, e.g., upper-level nursing home management were trained and assistance provided for disaster plan.

Supplemental Considerations:

The **key message** of this section is to **bridge the gap** between broad principles and topics in disaster planning and actual exercises or responses to events. Some professors may wish to **expand** this section through the use of additional case studies. Some may follow-up on the Daines case study through analysis and lecture based on the **critique** of the **response** to Hurricane Elena (Pinellas County Department of Civil Emergency Services 1986). This would illustrate how a post-event critique led to subsequent planning activities within an emergency management agency. In this way, the **“living document” theme** could be reinforced. Most professors, however, will wish to keep this section **brief** and limit the presentation to the material contained on the overheads.

Course Developer References:

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